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Abstract
With the decision in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] in 1992, the courts cemented their 
role in the self-determination strategies of Indigenous peoples in Australia. More 
than merely recognising a form of title to traditional lands, the tenor of the 
judgements in Mabo's case respected Indigenous peoples and offered the protection 
of the common law. However, the expectations of many Indigenous people for 
change have not since been met. This thesis examines the usefulness of the courts 
and the common law in particular for the self-determination claims of Indigenous 
peoples. I examine the theoretical and institutional limitations on the courts that have 
resulted in a doctrinal history which has generally excluded Indigenous peoples. I 
also analyse the potential for the common law to accommodate self-determination 
claims. I argue that the courts require familiar concepts upon which to base their 
decisions. I identify the notion of equality of peoples as a proper foundation for the 
courts to structure the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state. 
Equality of peoples has roots in the fundamental principles of the common law and 
maintains the integrity of Indigenous peoples’ claims.
Sacred areas and places of strong concern to Aboriginal people still exist . . . and 
what we're saying . . .  the Aboriginal peoples . . . White Man will never clearly 
understand what it really means to us. I suppose that he can't because he's a White 
Man. He can only listen . . . Nationalities of people, where culture is concerned 
should never sit in judgement of one another's cultures.
No matter how much laws the White Man makes, no matter how much decisions he 
makes also and sits down and plans and talks about things . . .  he can never shake us 
out of the Land. Because we in the Land, we in the running water, we in the air we 
breathe, we in the day and the night, the wind the rain, in each blade of grass, each 
grain of sand and all that represents the history and the chapters if you like, if you 
want to put in White Man's terms. But that's our way of looking at it and each 
Aboriginal person, be they male or female, are the carriers-on of this book that's put 
together, if you want to put it that way . . .  a natural book, through human feeling, 
through human brains, human knowledge of how we pass through our generations. 
On the other hand the White man has all his records his rules and regulations. But 
ours is a continuation on of Sacredness that is with us all the time, there's mans, 
here's womans, there's a Sacredness . . . areas that are so important to us that if you 
destroy it all you will destroying us as human beings.
Robert Bropho, Nyoongar Elder
http://www.omen.com.au/~onelife/neopag/aborig.htmi
Contents
Introduction 1
The approach of the thesis 2
The scope of the thesis 5
The structure of the thesis 13
1. Indigenous peoples’ claims against the state 16
Social justice and the politics of survival 17
Land, law and sovereignty 21
Recognition of Indigenous sovereignty 24
The struggle for self-determination 28
Conclusion 32
2. Self-determination and sovereignty 34
I. The limiting assumptions of modem political theory 36
Popular sovereignty and the social contract 36
Equality, freedom and the rights o f citizenship 40
Democratic government and institutional uniformity 44
Political theory and colonisation 47
Conclusion 52
II. Self-determination in contemporary international law 54
Self-determination and human rights 5 7
Self-determination and statehood 66
Draft declaration on the rights o f Indigenous peoples 69
Conclusion 77
III. The language of self-determination 78
Conclusion 85
3. The utility of the courts for the assertion of self-determination claims 87
I. The advantages of using the courts: Overview 88
The enforceability o f common law decisions 90
The advantages o f the courts ’processes 95
The courts as part o f a broader strategy 97
II. Political and institutional constraints of the judicial system 101
The separation o f powers 102
The rule o f law and common law rights 106
Parliamentary supremacy or judicial deference? I l l
III. The limits of the courts as a cultural institution 116
Assumptions o f a uniform and universal colonial law 117
The claims o f the Meriam peoples and the Ngarrendjeri people 121
Presenting Indigenous claims in legal language 123
Judging claims through legal reasoning 129
An alternative approach based on equality and respect 134
Conclusion 140
4. The impact of common law doctrines on Indigenous self-determination 144
I. The domestication of the doctrine of discovery 145
The interpretation o f the doctrine o f discovery by colonial courts 147 
Conquest and acts o f state: the United States' approach 150
II. The Australian courts' approach 155
Characterising Australia as a settled colony 156
The development o f the settlement thesis 162
III. Recognition of Indigenous peoples in Australian Law 168
Reclaiming title in Mabo's case 170
The emergence o f 'act o f state' in A ustralian law 175
Conclusion 187
5. Indigenous self-determination and equality peoples 191
I. Familiar concepts injudicial reasoning 193
Revising the content o f law 194
The development o f the common law 196
Familiar foundations for reasoning 208
II. Equality as a fundamental principle of the common law 210
III. The difficulty of arguing sovereignty in the courts 219
IV. The relationship between sovereignty and equality 227
Conclusion 233
Conclusion 236
Bibliography 242
List of cases 276
List of statutes 283
vii
Introduction
The relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Australian legal system reflects 
the violence and oppression of colonisation. Australian courts have failed to secure 
the collective or individual rights of Indigenous peoples. From the time of the 
assertion of sovereignty by the British, the courts refused to recognise the sovereign 
equality of Indigenous peoples or the rights and interests that have survived 
colonisation.
The denial of Indigenous sovereignty has had a profound impact upon Indigenous 
societies. Lois O’Donoghue argued that the long standing absence of recognition of 
Aboriginal law has had ‘a detrimental effect on all facets of Aboriginal community 
development’ and has substantially contributed to many of the social problems faced 
by Indigenous peoples today. 1 The impact of colonisation was to displace the 
authority and law of the Indigenous peoples with a foreign legal system. With its 
alien institutions and culture, the imposed legal system could not appropriately serve 
Indigenous peoples.
This has led some Indigenous peoples to reject the legitimacy of the courts as a 
forum for promoting self-determination. The culture, the institutional structure, and 
the history of responses by the courts appear to be inimical to Indigenous peoples’
1 Lois O’Donoghue, Chair of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, ‘Customary law 
as a vehicle for community empowerment’, Proceedings of the Indigenous Customary Law Forum, 
Parliament House, Canberra, 18 October 1995, p. 58.
2self-determination. The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the courts and 
the common law are nevertheless a useful tool for Indigenous peoples asserting self- 
determination claims in Australia.
The approach of the thesis
My approach to this thesis focuses on the claims that Indigenous peoples make as 
peoples; that is, claims against the state that assert a collective and distinctively 
Indigenous identity. At the outset I point out that claims to even the most 
fundamental individual human rights are often expressed as collective claims. The 
denial of these rights does not occur on an individual basis, but as a denial of human 
rights based on Indigenous identity. I have labelled these types of claims ‘self- 
determination claims’ through which the right to recognition and survival as distinct 
peoples is asserted.
The concept of self-determination has a context in international law where it is 
described as the right of peoples to freely determine their social, cultural, economic 
and political status. However, self-determination claims by Indigenous peoples, by 
virtue of their distinct identity, implicitly assert the true and rightful custody of the 
lands occupied by the colonising state. Both the meaning of self-determination in 
international law and in the Indigenous context import questions of sovereignty and 
can be seen as a challenge to the legitimacy of the state. It is therefore necessary to 
acknowledge the limitations of an approach based in the non-Indigenous legal 
system. The traditions from which I draw, and the institutions I examine, are part of 
the colonising structure itself.
I acknowledge here the added limitations of such a project being undertaken by a 
non-Indigenous person, educated in the non-Indigenous legal traditions. This is a 
question that I, like many non-Indigenous academics and commentators before me, 
have had to consider carefully. An exchange between two extraordinary women -
3Oodgeroo Noonuccal and Judith Wright -  captures the essence of my thoughts. In
part, my reservations are articulated in Judith Wright’s poem Two Dreamtimes,
written for Oodgeroo:
. . . over drinks at night
we can exchange our separate griefs,
but yours and mine are different.
A knife ’s between us. My righteous kin 
still have cruel faces.
Neither you or 1 can win them, 
though we meet in secret kindness.
I am born o f the conquerors, 
you o f the persecuted.
Raped by rum and alien law, 
progress and economics . . .
My shadow sister, I sing to you 
from my place with my righteous kin, 
to where you stand with the Koori dead,
“Trust none -  not even poets. ”. . . 2
The poem is said to have moved Oodgeroo deeply and it was three years before she 
was able to reply:
Sister poet, 1 answer you,
Where you sit with your “civilised ” kin 
Shadow sister, your high ideals 
Compensate me for their sin...
But, my shadow sister, this I know,
Your dreams are my dreams 
Your thoughts are my thoughts 
And our shadow that made us sisters 
That binds us close together,
Together with us 
CRIES...3
Oodgeroo often spoke about the role of non-Indigenous people in public and 
academic debate and in the Indigenous political movement. In 1969, speaking to the 
FCAATSI executive, Oodgeroo argued that:
White “goodwill” is a shaky foundation on which to build . . . Black 
Australians must strengthen themselves into a solid determined fighting 
unit and dictate their own terms for their own advancement. They must
2 Extract from ‘Two Dreamtimes ’ in Kathie Cochrane, Oodgeroo, University of Queensland Press, St 
Lucia, 1994, pp. 207-9.
3 ibid., p. 96, edited version of ‘Sister P oet’, p. 97.
4define what is best for their own advancement and then they can 
determine where white Australians can be of assistance.4
There was another consideration, one that was impressed upon me when I received
my undergraduate degrees. Murdoch University awarded Lois O’Donoghue her first
Honorary Doctorate. In her address, Dr O’Donoghue left us with this plea:
You are privileged by your education. Education in its broadest sense, 
should produce tolerance, fairness, a passion for equality, a hatred of 
injustice, and a willingness to imagine the position of others.
I urge that you participate in the process of reconciliation, and not regard 
it as some distant and abstract exercise.
The future of my people depends upon it. 5
With these considerations in mind, the perspective from which I understand, construe 
and write about Indigenous issues seeks to be respectful of Indigenous visions and 
worldviews.6 Therefore, I have made every effort not to be prescriptive -  not to say 
what or how Indigenous peoples should be arguing.
This approach affects the argument and the focus of this thesis. Therefore, I 
concentrate on the aims and aspirations of Indigenous peoples and examine the 
utility of the law to achieve such goals. I examine what Indigenous peoples can 
expect from the law, both the opportunities for recognition and the obstacles of 
culture, institution and doctrine. I do not suggest that the courts can provide all that 
Indigenous peoples demand. Nor do I suggest that the courts’ historically 
unsympathetic response to Indigenous peoples can be entirely overcome and I 
understand that many Indigenous people might reject the courts as a tool. However,
4 ibid., p. 81. (original emphasis) FCAATSI was the Federal Council for the Advancement of 
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders.
5 Lois O’Donoghue, Speech on the occasion of the award o f Honorary Doctorate, Murdoch 
University, Perth, 19 March 1994, p. 5.
6 Isabelle Gunning called this process ‘world-traveling’, or engaging in a ‘multi-cultural dialogue’. 
Isabelle Gunning, ‘Arrogant perception, world-traveling and multi-cultural feminism: The case of 
female genital surgeries’, Colombia Human Rights Law Review, vol. 23, 1991-2, p. 191. See also 
Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Women’s rights and traditional law: A conflict’, Third World Legal Studies, 
1994-5, p. 15. This is a similar idea to that proposed by James Tully in Strange Multiplicity: 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge University Press, London, 1995. Others suggest 
that this dialogue does not require complete understanding. See, for example, Cass Sunstein, 
Incompletely theorised agreements, paper presented to Social and Political Theory Group, Workshop 
on social theory, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 13 September 
1996. Robert Williams explained this as ‘respecting your brother’s vision’, that is, the principle of 
‘Gus-Wen-Tah’. Robert A. Williams Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The 
Discourses of Conquest, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp. 326-7.
5my argument is that for Indigenous peoples working within the colonising system, 
the courts can be strategically useful.
The scope of the thesis
The relative disadvantage of Indigenous peoples asserting claims against the 
dominant state has led them to utilise myriad different strategies and tools to achieve 
important self-determination goals. A handful of writers have examined how 
Indigenous peoples use the institutions of the state itself through direct participation 
in the political process, controlling or adapting bureaucratic structures and utilising 
the legal system for the recognition of self-determination claims.7 There are those, 
particularly Indigenous writers, of course, that reject engagement with the colonial 
state, some awaiting a full recognition of Indigenous sovereignty, others pursuing 
international recourse. 8 I have a great respect for this refusal to compromise 
Indigenous sovereignty by acknowledging the authority of state institutions. At the 
same time, I place the courts within the broader political context and within a 
broader self-determination strategy that does not envisage the courts as the only 
focus of attention.
The possibility of legislative resolution of Indigenous peoples claims against the 
state is not considered directly in this thesis. As a result, current legislative 
structures for land rights, or the protection of cultural heritage and self-management,
7 In particular, see Guntram Weither, Self-Determination in Western Democracies: Aboriginal 
Politics in a Comparative Perspective, Greenwood, Westport, 1992. See also Noel Pearson, 
‘Aboriginal law and colonial law since Mabo’, in Christine Fletcher (ed.), Aboriginal Self 
Determination in Australia, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 1994, p. 157; and Colin Tatz, 
‘Aborigines and the civil law’, in Peter Hanks and Brian Keon-Cohen (eds), Aborigines and the Law, 
Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1984, pp. 103-36.
8 See, for example, statements by members of the Aboriginal Provisional Government including 
Geoff Clarke, now an ATSIC Commissioner: ‘Statement to the ILO Conference 1988 on behalf o f the 
National Coalition of Aboriginal Organisations o f Australia’, Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 2(34) 
October 1988, p. 13; Michael Mansell, ‘Can White law accommodate Black demands?’, Aboriginal 
Law Bulletin, vol. 1(23), December 1986, p. 10; Michael Mansell, ‘The High Court gives an inch but 
takes another mile: Perspectives on Mabo, The Aboriginal Provisional Government Perspective’, 
Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 2(57), 1992, p. 4; Michael Mansell, ‘Aboriginal sovereignty’, 
Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 2(37), 1989, pp. 4-6; Pura-lia Meenamatta (jim everett) 
Plangermairreener of the Pallawah, Beyond the Colonial Construct, Paper presented to the Aboriginal 
Nations and the Australian Constitution Conference, Canberra, 23-24 May 1997.
6are not addressed nor is the possibility of constitutional change.9 These political 
outcomes require an analysis of the policies and practices of past and present 
governments that is beyond the scope of this thesis. The focus of the thesis remains 
the responsiveness of the courts to Indigenous claims. However, such an analysis 
does entail an examination of the relationship between the courts and the political 
institutions and their engagement with political ideology and philosophy.
The fact that Indigenous peoples continue to pursue claims through the courts in 
Australia is, of itself, a cogent reason for examining the courts’ response to these 
claims. The history of Australia’s disregard for the rights of Indigenous peoples 
provides the most compelling justification for pursuing the role of the courts in this 
history and their capacity and responsibility for rectifying such abuse. To this end, 
attention is paid in this thesis to the role of the courts, through past decisions, in 
supporting the assertions of the state and the denial of Indigenous peoples’ rights. In 
this context I have examined the institutional constraints on the utility of the courts.10 
This aspect of the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the courts in 
Australia has not yet been fully explored.
Commentary and debate on the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the 
legal system in Australia has, since 1992, centred around native title. The 
recognition of common law native title in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2]u was a
9 Calls for constitutional recognition and a renegotiation of Indigenous-settler relations have become 
more prominent as non-Indigenous Australia approaches the Centennial of Federation and 
contemplates the move toward a republican constitutional structure. For example, Frank Brennan 
argued strongly for constitutional resolution of some of the outstanding grievances of Indigenous 
peoples, in particular, for the recognition of Indigenous peoples as the original owners and prior 
sovereigns of these lands and for the constitutional entrenchment of the right against discrimination. 
See, for example, Frank Brennan, Securing a Bountiful Place for Aborigines and Torres Strait 
Islanders in a Modern Free and Tolerant Australia, Constitutional Centenary Foundation (options 
paper), 1994, and Agreeing on a Document: Will the Process of Reconciliation be Advanced by a 
Document or Documents of Reconciliation?, Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Canberra, 1994.
10 Contributions from past and present High Court Justices have been useful in this regard. See John 
Toohey, ‘A government of laws not of men?’, Public Law Review, vol. 4, 1993, pp. 158-74; Michael 
Kirby, ‘In defence of Mabo’, in Murray Goot and Tim Rowse (eds), Make a Better Offer, Pluto, 
Liechhardt, 1994; Sir Gerard Brennan, Justice resides in the courts, paper presented to the 
Symposium of the Australian Judicial Conference, Canberra, November 1996 and ‘Courts, 
democracy and the law’, Australian Law Journal, vol. 65, January 1991, pp. 32-42.; Sir Anthony 
Mason, ‘Future directions in Australian law’, Monash University Law Review, vol. 13, September, 
1987, pp. 149-63, and Defining the framework of government: Judicial deference versus human 
rights and due process, Centre for Public Policy Workshop, University of Melbourne, 7 June 1996.
11 (1992) 175 CLR 1 (also referred to as Mabo ’s case or the Mabo decision).
7significant reassessment of the legal rights of Indigenous peoples in Australia. Prior 
to 1992, there was much less written about the relationship between Indigenous 
peoples and the legal system.12 Even less again concerned rights over traditional 
lands, let alone extending to discussions of self-determination and sovereignty.13
Since the High Courts decision in Mabo’s case, there has been a great deal of 
discussion and consideration of the implications of native title for the political and 
legal status quo.14 The complexity and rapid change in the recognition, development 
and administration of native title lands is the central focus of much legal 
commentary on Indigenous peoples’ rights. Public debate too has placed native title 
at the centre of the relationship between Indigenous peoples and non-lndigenous 
society in Australia.15
Research on native title is, of course, fundamentally important and I have relied on 
many sources from within this debate, including papers by Garth Nettheim, Frank 
Brennan and Henry Reynolds and particularly Aboriginal people such as Noel 
Pearson.16 However, I have also attempted to move beyond native title to look at 
other self-determination goals that have yet to be fully explored in the debate in 
Australia. In this respect I perceive native title as part of a coherent and
12 See, for example, Hanks and Keon-Cohen, op. cit.; Barbara Hocking, International Law and 
Aboriginal Human Rights, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1988; and Garth Nettheim (ed.), Aborigines, 
Human Rights and the Law, ANZ, Sydney, 1974. Note also, the compendium of cases, legislation 
and materials prepared by John McCorquodale, Aborigines and the Law: A Digest, Aboriginal 
Studies Press, Canberra, 1987.
13 Note, however, debate surrounding the Gove land rights case, Milirrpum v Nabalco (1971) 17 FLR 
141, including, for example, John Hookey, ‘The Gove land rights case: A judicial dispensation for the 
taking of Aboriginal lands in Australia?’, Federal Law Review, vol. 5, 1972, p. 85; Barbara Hocking, 
‘Does Aboriginal law now run in Australia?’, Federal Law Review, vol. 10, 1979, p. 161 and Kent 
McNeil, ‘A question of title: Has the common law been misapplied to dispossess Aboriginals?’, 
Monash University Law Review, vol. 16(1), 1990, p. 99. On sovereignty, note John Hookey, 
‘Settlement and Sovereignty’, in Hanks and Keon-Cohen, op. cit., pp. 1-18.
14 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
15 For a review of the public attitude literature, see Margaret Robinson, From land rights to native 
title: Understanding the construction of community knowledge, attitude and opinion, Social and 
Landuse Unit, National Native Title Tribunal, unpublished manuscript, October 1997.
16 For example see Garth Nettheim, ‘. . . As against the whole world’, Australian Law News, July 
1992, pp. 9-14, and ‘Judicial Revolution or Cautious Correction? Mabo v Queensland’, University of 
New South Wales Law Journal, vol. 16(1), 1993, pp. 1-26; Frank Brennan, ‘The implications of the 
Mabo decision’, Reform, No. 65, Autumn, 1993, pp. 11-13; Henry Reynolds, ‘The Mabo judgment in 
light of imperial land policy’, University of New South Wales Law Journal, vol. 16(1), 1993, pp. 27- 
44; and Noel Pearson, ‘Concept of native title at common law’, Proceedings of the Northern and 
Central Land Councils Conference, Land Rights - Past Present and Future, Canberra 16-17 August, 
1996, pp.118-23; ‘A troubling inheritance’, Race and Class, vol. 35(4), 1994, pp. 1-9; and ‘Wik: 
Whither the separation of powers’, Australian, 2 January 1997, p. 11.
8comprehensive concept of self-determination that can be asserted and argued before 
the courts.
Writers in Australia such as Irene Watson, who take a more critical approach to the 
legal system and colonialism, have been pivotal in developing my arguments. 17 
Also, the writings of Michael Dodson, including his reports as Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, have been useful as they place native 
title in the broader context of social justice and self-determination. 18 I have pursued 
this broader approach, particularly in the first chapter, which reflects the way 
Indigenous peoples talk about native title.
As well as relying on Indigenous writers, I have found that North American research 
in this area provides both a useful comparative reflection and also a great deal of 
theory on the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state, and with the 
law in particular. Indigenous writers such as Robert Williams Jr., Menno Boldt and 
J Anthony Long, as well as non-Indigenous commentators such as Patrick Macklem 
and James Tully, have engaged in a debate that focuses much more on Indigenous -  
non-Indigenous relations as relations between sovereigns, or between peoples. 19 
North American jurisprudence too provides interesting contrasts and, because it now 
receives much greater acknowledgment in Australian courts, is considered in
17 See Irene Watson, ‘Nungas in the nineties’, in Greta Bird, Gary Martin and Jennifer Nielsen (eds), 
Majah: Indigenous Peoples and the Law, Federation Press, Sydney, 1996; ‘Has Mabo turned the tide 
for justice’, Social Alternatives, vol. 12(1), 1993, p. 3; and ‘Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways: Survival 
against the colonial state’, Australian Feminist Law Journal, vol. 8, 1997, pp. 39-58.
18 As well as the annual Social Justice Reports and Native Title Reports produced by the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commission, see also Michael Dodson, ‘Towards the 
exercise of Indigenous rights: Policy power and self-determination’, Race and Class, vol. 35(4), 
1994, pp. 65-76.
19 See, for example, Robert Williams, ...Discourses o f Conquest, op. cit.; ‘The algebra of federal 
Indian law: The hard trail of decolonizing and Americanizing the white man’s jurisprudence’, 
Wisconsin Law Review, vol. 1986, pp. 219-99; and ‘Linking arms together: Multicultural 
Constitutionalism in a North American vision of law and peace’, California Law Review, vol. 82, pp. 
981-1049. Two important collections from Indigenous writers in Canada are Menno Boldt and J 
Anthony Long (eds), The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights, University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985, and Leroy Little Bear, Menno Boldt, and J. Anthony Long (eds), 
Pathways to Self Determination: Canadian Indians and the Canadian State, University Toronto 
Press, Toronto, 1984. See also Patrick Macklem, ‘First Nations self-government and the borders of 
the Canadian legal imagination’, McGill Law Journal, vol. 36, 1991, pp. 382-456, and ‘Distributing 
sovereignty: Indian nations and equality of peoples’, Stanford Law Review, vol. 45, 1993, pp. 1311- 
67; Tully, op. cit.; and Peter Russell, Aboriginal Nationalism: Fourth World Decolonization in 
English Settler Countries, Hugo Wolfsohn Memorial Lecture, La Trobe University, Melbourne, 31 
October 1996.
9discussions about current doctrines and the future direction of the common law in 
Australia.20
However, there is a danger in Australia of romanticising the North American 
situation, as has been the tendency in relation to land claims processes in Canada for 
example.21 Indigenous peoples in these countries suffer severe discrimination, 
deprivation of fundamental human rights and the erosion of their lands and way of 
life and are subjected to colonial control in ways similar to the experience of 
Indigenous peoples in Australia. For these reasons I have found that Indigenous 
writers from these jurisdictions provide a more critical assessment of developments 
in comparative jurisdictions.22 Frank Cassidy has warned that:
diversity does not yield easy generalizations and generalization is one of 
the building blocks in any field of study. Nevertheless, diversity and 
respect for diversity are at the core of aboriginal government.23
For this reason I have taken a cautious approach to developments elsewhere and have
found the theory much more useful than the political and legal outcomes. In addition,
I have relied on the experiences of Indigenous peoples in Australia to temper the
influence of North American writers.
With this in mind, what does emerge from the North American literature is the clear 
identification, by all commentators, of the link between land and other social and 
cultural rights. Discussion of these links in Australia has been limited to
20 In the Mabo decision, attention was paid to decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 
particularly to foundation cases such as Johnson v M ’Intosh (1823) 8 Wheat 543 and Canadian cases 
such as Colder v Attorney General of British Columbia [1973] SCR 313; (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145, St 
Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v R (1888) 14 App. Cas. 46; Attorney-General (Quebec) v. 
Attorney-General (Canada) [1921] 1 AC 401; Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development (1979) 107 DLR. (3d) 513; Guerin v R [1984] 2SCR 335; (1984) 13 DLR (4th) 
321. See generally, Richard H. Bartlett, The Mabo decision, with commentary, Butterworths, Sydney, 
1993. See also R. v. Symonds, [1847] NZPCC. 387; In re Southern Rhodesia [1919] AC 21 i ; Amodu 
Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399; Adeyinka Oyekan v. Musendiku Adele [1957] 
1 WLR 876; [1957] 2 All ER 785; and Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara [1975] ICJR 12.
21 Many visitors have expressed concern at the ‘rosy view’ some Australians seem to hold about the 
position o f Indigenous peoples in North America, particularly among non-Indigenous academics. For 
an example of a warning against such preconceptions, see Michelle Ivanitz, ‘The Emperor has no 
clothes: Canadian comprehensive claims and their relevance to Australia, Land, Rights, Laws: Issues 
of Native Title, Regional Agreements Paper No. 4, Native Title Research Unit, Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, October 1997.
22 For example, Williams, op. cit. and Boldt and Long, op. cit.
23 Frank Cassidy, ‘Aboriginal governments in Canada: An emerging field of study’, Canadian 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 23(1), 1990, p. 99.
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marginalised Indigenous voices and a small group of academic commentators.24 
Outside observers have suggested that Australia must prepare for a shift in emphasis 
by Indigenous peoples from land to sovereignty, self-government and jurisdiction.25 
I argue that cases such as Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] 26 have recognised a base 
entitlement which will provide a degree of bargaining power and legitimacy in 
negotiations with the state and a level of respect in relations with the non-Indigenous 
community. In this way, arguments that have supported land rights may not be 
restricted to the sphere of property interests. Therefore, this thesis pursues the 
justification for recognition of rights in Mabo’s case in the context of sovereignty 
and self-government.
Concepts of equality, sovereignty and even self-determination, that are relied upon 
by Indigenous peoples in voicing their claims, are also often used to deny 
recognition.27 For example, the conflation of equality with universality provides a 
central theme for this thesis. Few theorists have examined the construction of these 
concepts in the context of claims for recognition by Indigenous peoples, particularly 
in Australia. James Tully, in the Canadian context, Robert Williams JR, from the 
United States, and to a lesser degree Will Kymlicka, provide a point of departure for 
my own analysis of the constraining assumptions of Western thought.28
24 Irene Watson, op. cit., is notable in this respect. Compare the Canadian Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples and the reconciliation process and native title debate in Australia. See for 
example, James Tully, A fair and honourable relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
peoples: The vision of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, paper presented to the 
Indigenous Rights, Political Theory and Institutions Conference, Humanities Research Centre, ANU, 
Canberra, August 1997.
25 Patrick Macklem, ‘Indigenous peoples and the Canadian Constitution: Lessons for Australia?’ 
Public Law Review, vol. 5(1), 1994, pp. 11-34.
26 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
27 Michael Dodson, ‘Discrimination, special measures and the right to negotiate’, paper presented to 
the Humanities Research Centre/AIATSIS Conference, Is Racism Un-Australian?, Australian 
National University, February 1997. For an analysis of the return to assimilation in the language and 
policy of the Howard Liberal-National Parties government, see Michael Dodson, Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commission, Fourth Report, AGPS, Canberra, 1996. pp. 1-17. 
See generally, Geoffrey Gray and Christine Winter, The Resurgence of Racism: Hanson, Howard and 
the Race Debate, Monash Publications in History, 1997. On the use of language, see Robert Jansen, 
The language of self-determination and sovereignty, unpublished paper, March 1997.
28 See Tully, Strange Multiplicity, op. cit.; Williams, ...Discourse of Conquest, op. cit. and Will 
Kymlicka, Multi-cultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Clarendon, New York, 
1995.
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In international law also, there is a large literature focusing on Indigenous self- 
determination within colonial states. The United Nations Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations has provided a forum for the expression of Indigenous 
peoples’ grievances on the international stage and has allowed Indigenous peoples to 
have unprecedented involvement in the workings of a United Nations body and to 
gain strength in their common experience. Michael Dodson, a regular participant at 
WGIP, observed that ‘[i]t is in our disadvantage and our struggle for the recognition 
of our rights that we are united’ .29
Regular observers such as Russel Barsh, Douglas Sanders and Sarah Pritchard as 
well as Indigenous participants, have provided analyses of the barriers of statehood, 
and the state system, to Indigenous self-determination.30 This thesis seeks to bring 
the analysis of the state in these debates back to the courts to analyse the obstacles 
inherent in non-Indigenous conceptions of state sovereignty. Therefore, while the 
international developments are not dealt with exhaustively here, they are considered 
in the context of the courts’ use of international law and the theories of statehood in 
international law that are an indirect influence on doctrine.
The utility of the courts is often discussed in terms of the cultural barriers to 
participation and recognition in the courts. In order to discuss the issues of culture, I 
have predominantly drawn on literature concerned with Indigenous peoples’ 
engagement with the courts.31 There is a great deal of writing from critical theorists 
examining the exclusive culture of the courts, including a large feminist literature
29 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commission, Fourth Report, op. cit., p. 153.
30 See, for example, Russel Barsh, ‘Indigenous Peoples: An emerging object of international law’, 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 80, 1986, p. 369; Douglas Sanders, The Current Status 
of International Indigenous Issues Affecting the Aboriginal Peoples o f Canada, Report to the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal peoples, October 1993; and Sarah Pritchard, ‘Native Title in an 
international perspective’, in Proceedings of the Sharing Country: Land Rights, Human Rights and 
Reconciliation after Wik Conference, Research Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences, 
University o f Sydney, 28 February 1997. Michael Dodson included regular commentary on 
international issues in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commission Reports. 
See also, the annual publication of the Australian Contributions to the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations, prepared by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission.
31 Such as Nonie Sharp, No Ordinary Judgment, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 1996; Maureen 
Tehan, ‘A Tale o f Two Cultures’, Alternative Law Journal, vol. 21(1), 1996, pp. 10-14; and Archie 
Zariski, ‘The truth in judging - Testimony (fifty bare-arsed highlanders): the dilemmas of inter- 
cultural testimony’, Alternative Law Journal, vol. 21(1), 1996, pp. 24-32.
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and critical race theory.32 However, feminist and critical race theories are primarily 
concerned with discrimination and exclusion and relate to an experience that can 
only encompass part of the experience of Indigenous peoples.33 I have instead 
limited my analysis to a particularly colonial clash. By doing so, I am not suggesting 
that Indigenous peoples are somehow more oppressed, rather I point out that the 
experiences of Indigenous peoples is unique.
The thesis draws on existing literature to piece together an analysis that had not yet 
been undertaken. I have brought together non-Indigenous conceptions of society and 
placed them alongside Indigenous peoples’ aspirations for a new relationship with 
the state. I have focused on the paradox that the courts are a defender of rights and at 
the same time are a legitimating arm of the coloniser. I have also focused on the 
question of how useful the outcomes might be to the aims and aspirations of the 
Indigenous peoples themselves. Therefore, political and legal theory concerned with 
notions of sovereignty and self-determination, when contrasted with Indigenous 
understandings of these concepts, provide a basis from which to analyse the courts’ 
ability to accommodate Indigenous peoples’ demands, and to understand the 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Australian legal system. The 
academic and public debate surrounding the High Court’s decision in Mabo’s case, 
and the decision itself, provide a constant thread in this analysis. The thesis is 
therefore grounded in the current debates on native title yet reaches into new areas of 
concern, focusing more directly on the aspirations of Indigenous peoples for self- 
determination. The thesis takes on the courts as a central tool in Indigenous peoples’ 
self-determination and assesses whether the courts can truly achieve the goals set for 
them.
32 See for example, Mari Matsuda, ‘Voices of America: Accent, anti-discrimination law and a 
jurisprudence for the last reconstruction’, Yale Law Journal, vol. 100, pp. 1329-1407.
33 Compare the approach of Deborah Bird Rose, ‘Land rights and deep colonising: The erasure o f  
women’, Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 3(85), 1996; and ‘Women and land claims’, Land, Rights, 
Laws: Issues in Native Title, Issues Paper no. 6, Native Title Research Unit, AIATSIS, January 1995.
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The structure of the thesis
In addressing the utility of the courts for Indigenous peoples, the thesis begins by 
establishing self-determination as the standard by which the courts should be 
assessed. The first chapter places the notion of self-determination and the assertion 
of sovereignty at the foundation of the claims against the state. This chapter presents 
Indigenous expressions of these claims in order to capture the meaning of self- 
determination claims. From this, self-determination claims can be understood as 
assertions of sovereignty, in the sense that Indigenous peoples demand recognition of 
their way of life, government and law. Indigenous peoples demand respect as equals 
whose authority and autonomy are equally legitimate in the constitution or 
construction of the state. This chapter also examines the link between the different 
sorts of claims made by Indigenous peoples, from social justice to claims for 
resources and lands, to self-government and sovereignty. I argue that all of these 
claims are part of the same process - the process of self-determination. The focus on 
the aspirations and aims of Indigenous peoples necessitates that the utility of the 
courts be examined in light of those aims. Therefore, the first chapter provides the 
context for the thesis and establishes a basis from which the approach of the courts is 
to be assessed.
Chapter two examines the essence of non-Indigenous understandings of self- 
determination and sovereignty through influential political theories of the modern era 
and the assumptions of statehood in the international law of self-determination. The 
chapter highlights the way these theories limit the capacity of non-Indigenous 
peoples, communities and institutions to recognise the legitimacy of Indigenous 
peoples’ claims. This leads to the conclusion that these assumptions are a part of the 
institutional structures of the colonial state. They are part of the non-Indigenous 
ways of thinking about the questions raised by Indigenous peoples’ claims.
Chapter three focuses on the utility of the courts for Indigenous peoples’ self- 
determination strategies in a more concrete sense. The chapter draws on the political
theory discussion to illustrate the cultural as well as institutional constraints on the 
courts, which limit their capacity to accommodate self-determination claims. An 
overview of the strategic advantages and disadvantages of the courts points to two 
issues that require further discussion: first, the limits on enforceability of common 
law recognition of rights and, second, the clash of cultures that occurs when 
Indigenous peoples engage with the legal system.
From the discussion of the courts as an institution, chapter four then examines the 
way in which the courts have responded to Indigenous peoples’ claims through the 
development of common law. The discussion returns to the doctrine of discovery, 
first discussed in chapter two, to explore the way in which it was incorporated into 
common law throughout the British colonies to preclude recognition of Indigenous 
peoples. The approach of Australian courts in the development of the concept of 
‘peaceful settlement’, or terra nullius, is examined in detail. The chapter draws 
together the limitations and inconsistencies in the recognition of Indigenous self- 
determination claims in Mabo ’s case to show the problems of further development of 
even the most recent doctrines.
Finally, chapter five explores an alternative approach to arguing self-determination 
that has the potential to overcome the limitations and inconsistencies in current 
doctrines. The chapter explores the need to provide familiar concepts upon which 
the courts can base their reasoning. This approach, in taking account of the nature of 
judicial reasoning, provides some explanation ot the reticence of the courts to accept 
claims that assert sovereignty. Instead, I argue that equality of peoples provides a 
familiar basis for the courts and an appropriate way of structuring relations between 
Indigenous peoples and the state, yet at the same time maintains the integrity of the 
claims of Indigenous peoples.
In total, the strategic advantages and limitations of using the courts in self- 
determination claims must be considered with two principles in mind. First, the 
courts’ responses to specific claims must be measured against the broader struggle
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by Indigenous peoples for self-determination. Second, the limitations of the courts 
must be placed in the context of the philosophies or world view that inform the 
institutions and the decision-makers. It is only with an understanding of the context 
from which each of the actors come to the courtroom that mutual recognition can 
occur. This thesis will explore the outer limits of this recognition, where mutual 
respect can lead to a greater accommodation of Indigenous peoples’ claims. The first 
step in this examination is to understand the claims that Indigenous peoples make 
against the state and the context in which the courts are considered important.
Chapter 1
Indigenous Peoples’ Claims Against the State
The immediate task in this first chapter is to identify what I mean when I talk about 
Indigenous peoples’ self-determination claims. My understanding of these concepts 
is informed by the statements of Indigenous peoples themselves. Therefore, this 
chapter presents Indigenous voices speaking of their relationship with the colonial 
state. This chapter is not an attempt to define or delimit Indigenous views for, as 
Michael Dodson argued, ‘[o]ur distinct identity has for the last two hundred years
been the subject of non-indigenous attempts to define, characterise and reshape it’.' 
Instead, in this chapter, I have let Indigenous voices speak for themselves.
The importance of listening to Indigenous voices was emphasised by Marcia
Langton in preparing Too Much Sorry Business, the report of the Northern Territory
Aboriginal Issues Unit to the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody
in 1990. In that report, Marcia Langton argued that:
Sovereign and autonomous authority in the midst of interconnectedness 
is the typical feature of the Aboriginal person, especially in the older 
generations who have the experience and knowledge to understand who 
they are . . .
Michael Dodson, Assimilation versus self-determination: No contest, North Australia Research 
Unit, Australian National University, Discussion Paper No. 1/1996, p. 3.
This personal sovereignty is the product of a powerful cultural past, 
remembered in the sacred icons which surround us in the landscape, each 
one belonging to a person or to a family .. .
These are the sovereign voices of people who know who they are and 
what they want for the children and grandchildren.
The demands of Indigenous peoples provide the framework for my argument and 
approach in a number of important respects. The importance of issues such as 
equality, land, law and sovereignty to the relationship between Indigenous peoples 
and the state remain common threads. Also, this chapter illustrates that although 
there is great diversity of views on approaches to, and engagement with, the state, 
there is a core of ideas held in common that defines the relationship between 
Indigenous peoples and the state.
This chapter is divided into sections that group together particular claims against the 
state. Yet, at the same time, there is a continuity between the concepts of justice, 
land, law and sovereignty that makes the segmentation artificial. This tension in 
segmenting Indigenous peoples’ claims will be explored further in relation to the 
treatment of these claims by the courts. For now, these different elements can be 
understood as parts of a continuum of claims that form a distinctive Indigenous 
struggle for self-determination. This struggle begins with the daily lives of 
Indigenous peoples fighting for the survival of their culture and their people.
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Social justice and the politics of survival
Indigenous peoples have survived the process of colonisation despite suppression 
and subjugation by the structures of the state. But this survival has involved a 
struggle. Irene Watson explained the effect of this ‘politics of survival’ on the lives 
of Indigenous peoples:
2
Marcia Langton, Too much sorry business, Report of the Northern Territory Aboriginal Issues Unit, 
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, National Report, vol. 5, Appendix D (I), 
AGPS, Canberra, 1991, p. 292.
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We are watching waves of our people dying. The waves are constant, 
leaving behind a generation of children dispossessed from their natural 
environment and culture. The pre-occupation for many Nungas has 
become survival -  against oppression, depression, and death. The overall 
quality of life has deteriorated due to the pre-occupation with life and 
death issues. The right to life is at stake. That has become the extent of
3our reduction during these past 200 years of colonialism.
The daily experience of colonisation has prioritised the achievement of fundamental
levels of justice and the equal enjoyment of life-sustaining services. The immediacy
of the fight for social justice was explained by Michael Dodson, in the first report of
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner:
Social justice must always be considered from a perspective which is 
grounded in the daily lives of indigenous Australians. Social justice is 
what faces you when you get up in the morning. It is awakening in a 
house with an adequate water supply, cooking facilities and sanitation. It 
is the ability to nourish your children and send them to a school where 
their education not only equips them for employment but reinforces their 
knowledge and appreciation of their cultural inheritance. It is the 
prospect of genuine employment and good health: a life of choices and
4
opportunity, free from discrimination.
However, Dodson warned that this is not merely an issue of disadvantage. In the
context of claims against the state, the ‘facts of injustice’ should not be confused
with the ‘reasons to remedy them’. Instead:
[a] decent standard of health and a life expectancy equivalent to others is 
an entitlement. Social justice is not primarily a matter of relief of 
suffering. It is a matter of the fulfilment of a responsibility.
To draw this distinction is not to deny that the facts themselves speak out 
for a remedy. Nor is it to deny that compassion is a proper response.
But compassion is an insufficient foundation for the delivery of rights.
This statement makes clear that the claims made by Indigenous peoples against the 
state are not claims for special measures or special treatment but are asserted as 
entitlements. Moreover, the rationale for redressing injustice is not merely an issue
Irene Watson, ‘Nungas in the nineties’, in Greta Bird, Gary Martin and Jennifer Nielsen (eds), 
Majah: Indigenous Peoples and the Law, Federation Press, Sydney, 1996, p. 3.
4
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, First Report, AGPS, Canberra, 
1993, p. 10.
ibid., p. 6.
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of citizenship entitlements but ‘should rest on the special identity and entitlements of 
indigenous Australians by virtue of our status as indigenous peoples’ .6
Even claims to fundamental goods such as the delivery of basic services and the
enjoyment of a basic level of quality of life are expressed as collective claims. This
recognition is an integral part of the claims against the state and is central to the
legitimacy of the state itself. Irene Watson put these issues in context:
The recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty should be acknowledged as 
being fundamental to the survival of Indigenous peoples. To ignore and 
deny Aboriginal peoples their laws and culture whilst other nations freely 
practise theirs without fear of recrimination, is to condone racism and the 
continued colonialism of Indigenous peoples. If Indigenous peoples are 
to remain colonised peoples, we will inevitably witness the continued 
decline of the first nation peoples of this country. And finally, a society 
that fails to take action in healing itself of racism will discover that the
passing of Nunga peoples will mark the decline of all humanity.
In similar terms Les Malezer spoke of the relationship between Indigenous peoples 
and the state:
Reconciliation is widely regarded as the opportunity for Aboriginal 
people to obtain and enjoy true equality. But it is more than that. It is 
the opportunity for the nation to heal its deepest wound, to develop its 
own identity, and to correct the most obvious flaw in its constitutional 
makeup.
The non-Aboriginal people of Australia are likely to suffer at the hands 
of the world unless the most fundamental rift in our coexistence as
g
peoples is directly addressed.
The failure of the state to recognise Indigenous peoples and to respect their status as 
such, is seen as a fundamental flaw in the constitution of the Australian state.
The fight to be recognised as distinct peoples is tied to the struggle to be treated 
equally, and with equal respect. The importance of equality to the claims of 
Indigenous peoples cannot simply be understood as demanding to be the same as
ibid., p. 9.
Irene Watson, Nungas in the nineties, op. cit., p. 12. See also Irene Watson, ‘Has Mabo turned the 
tide for justice’, Social Alternatives, vol. 12(1), 1993, p. 10.
8
Les Malezer, on behalf o f the Foundation for Aboriginal and Islander Research Action (FAIRA), 
Speech on the Occasion of the Palm Island Award Wages Win 1997, 5 April 1997, p. 6.
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non-indigenous Australians or as the rights of citizenship within ‘one nation’. 
Pura-lia Meenamatta argued that:
many Australian Indigenous people see white Australia as being 
diametrically different in its spiritual, social, political and sovereign 
ideologies. Therefore, from the crucial question of Australian citizenship 
flow many questions that need attention by Australian Indigenous 
peoples . . .
Failure to address this sensitive question will undoubtedly see 
Aboriginality assimilated into a nationalism that totally rejects the
rightful status Aboriginal nations should be accorded in our own land.
To confuse the concept of equality with sameness is to use equality and freedom
from discrimination as a ‘guise for assimilation’ . 10 Again, the claim for equality
must be understood as a demand to be recognised as peoples. Barry Fewquandie,
giving evidence to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Native Title explained:
If equality is about making me have the same values and the same 
priorities, then I do not want it. I want access and equity. If the end 
result is being exactly like you whitefellas, then I do not want it. I do not 
believe that is what our people want.
We have a separate identity . . . We want to be able to do the right thing.
The right thing is not destroying the land. It is not destroying the culture.
It is not replacing it.
To understand equality as encompassing respect is to understand the importance of 
difference and maintaining a distinct identity. In turn, Oodgeroo explained that 
change should not and cannot be forced upon Indigenous peoples:
We are different hearts and minds 
In a different body. Do not ask of us 
To be deserters, to disown our mother,
To change the unchangeable.
The gum cannot be trained into an oak.
Something is gone, something surrendered, still 
We will go forward and leam.
Not swamped and lost, watered awa^, but keeping
Our own identity, our pride of race.
Pura-lia Meenamatta (jim everett) Plangermairreener of the Pallawah, Beyond the colonial 
construct, paper presented to the Aboriginal Nations and the Australian Constitution Conference, 23- 
24 May 1997, Canberra, pp. 6, 7.
10
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report, Jan-Jun 
1994, AGPS, Canberra, 1995, p. 63.
Barry Fewquandie, evidence to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Native Title, Mount Isa, 
Parliamentary Debates, 4 August 1994, p. 374.
12
Oodgeroo Noonuccal, extract from ‘Assimilation - No!’, in Kathie Cochrane, Oodgeroo, 
University o f Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1994, p. 74.
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Indigenous people understand that demands based in an assertion of separate and 
distinct identity will be perceived as a threat to the unity of the constructed nation. 
The resistance does not even need to be articulated, as Lois O’Donoghue poignantly 
observed:
We succeed largely where we do not threaten, where we can be 
accommodated into the mainstream -  as artists, as sportspeople, as 
bureaucrats. However, we threaten when we set out to succeed on our 
own terms, where the mainstream has to adjust itself to accommodate us,
and our cultural norms.
The demand for social justice is tied to an understanding of equality that seeks not 
only the equal enjoyment of rights but, also, equal respect as peoples. This 
conception of equality underpins collective claims for land, and for the recognition 
of law and sovereignty.
Land, law and sovereignty
Within the core demands that Indigenous peoples make against the state, land has 
generally taken prominence. Demands extend to the recognition of ownership of 
lands currently occupied, as well as the return of lands, compensation and control 
over decisions concerning lands of significance. The centrality of land to Indigenous 
demands is often found to be difficult to communicate to the commodity culture of 
non-Indigenous Australia. Galarrwuy Yunupingu attempted to do so in his ‘Letter 
from Black to White’:
The land is my backbone. I only stand straight, happy, proud and not 
ashamed about my colour because I still have land. The land is my art. I 
can paint, dance, create and sing as my ancestors did before me. . . .  I 
think of land as the history of my nation. It tells of how we came into 
being and what system we must live. My great ancestors who live in the 
times of history, planned everything that we practise now. The law of 
history says that we must not take land, fight over land, steal land, give 
land and so on. My land is mine only because I came in spirit from that 
land, and so did my ancestors of the same land . . . My land is my
foundation.
Lois O'Donoghue, Speech on the Occasion of the Award of Honorary Doctorate from Murdoch 
University, Perth, 19 March 1994, p. 4.
14
Galarrwuy Yunupingu, ‘Letter from Black to White’, Land Rights News, December 1976, p. 9.
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For many Indigenous people land claims are not an issue of asking for something
new, or even asking for something back. It is a demand for recognition of what has
always been. Oodgeroo recounted a story that reiterates this sentiment:
This is my land: I have always said that, even as a child. The white 
people used to say to dad: ‘That girl walks this land as though she thinks 
it’s hers’. Dad wouldn’t say anything. He’d just walk home and tell me,
‘Mrs So-and-so said you walk this land as though you think it’s yours’.
‘It is mine, isn’t it?’ I would say. And he’d say: ‘Yes, girl. Don’t ever
forget it. ’ 15
Recognition of Indigenous peoples’ claims within the colonial legal system must 
also be understood from the perspective of Indigenous peoples and their law. While 
the colonial legal system has come to recognise Indigenous law with respect to land, 
there is a concurrent justification for the acknowledgment of Indigenous law more 
generally. For Indigenous peoples, their law remains an integral part of their life 
experience, though its reality, let alone validity, is largely denied by the state. Lois 
O’Donoghue identified the importance of acknowledging law, for the survival of 
Indigenous peoples:
I believe that the long standing absence of meaningful official 
recognition of Aboriginal customary law has had a detrimental effect on 
all facets of Aboriginal community development and that it has 
substantially contributed to many of the social problems and varying 
degrees of lawlessness present today .. .
Not only is the recognition of Aboriginal Customary law an issue of 
pride, heritage and custom. It can also be, to some communities, an issue
of survival.
The refusal of the Australian state to recognise these claims has not resulted in the 
diminution of the importance of land and law in the lives of Indigenous peoples. 
Michael Dodson observed the commitment of Indigenous people to maintain their 
law:
If the existence of the laws of Indigenous Australians depended on active 
government recognition, they would not exist. We have kept our laws 
and cultures. Given the almost total vacuum of government initiative . . .
Kath Walker (Oodgeroo), in Terry Lane (ed.), As the Twig is Bent: Childhood Recollections of 
Sixteen Prominent Australians, Dove, Melbourne, 1979, p. 33.
16
Lois O'Donoghue, ‘Customary law as a vehicle for community empowerment’, Proceedings of the 
Indigenous Customary Law Forum, Canberra, 18 October 1995, AGPS, Canberra, 1996, p. 58.
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[T]he maintenance of our laws and cultures is likely to remain a matter 
purely for us.
Nungat Mumunbullawilak, in welcoming a conference group to his traditional lands,
took the opportunity to impress upon his audience the significance of land issues for
the Nyoongar peoples in their approach to the non-indigenous people:
My Nyoongar name is Mumunbullawilak . . . [T]his land is the land
Derbal Yerigan, which is the Swan River area . . . We, as a people, own
all the Swan River area, all the banks along the Swan River itself.
Today, we all live miles away from it because we have been pushed
away. We do not own one building on the Swan River or a bit of land
. . . Nyoongar people, as a group, cannot say or even think about
reconciliation until such time as the State Government and the Federal
18
Government are prepared to listen to the Nyoongar people.
Matilda House, Chair of the Ngunnawal Local Aboriginal Land Council, who speaks 
for lands including the area now housing the Commonwealth Parliament, expressed a 
similar perspective:
The honour of Australia lies not only in negotiating a treaty with the 
indigenous people of the nation but also in recognising the civil, political 
and human rights of a people whose physical possession and sovereign 
rights over their country were violated. Until this occurs there will be no 
contemporary justice for indigenous Australians and there will be no 
reconciliation without justice . . . How can we as nations of peoples 
reconcile ourselves, our sovereign position, to a relationship with the 
Australian Government who are cheats, thieves and liars? Are we to 
reconcile to the detriment of our own culture and sovereignty? . . . How 
can we the Ngunnawal people be compensated for the loss of our nation 
when the Federal government itself is physically situated on it . . . Due 
to dispossession alienation and cultural deprivation I am unable to 
comment on customary law other than acknowledging that native title to
the Australian Capital Territory is Ngunnawal country, my country.
The assertion of custodianship or traditional ownership of lands that have been 
usurped by the non-indigenous society remain as important as claims to occupied 
lands.
Michael Dodson, ‘Customary law and human rights’, Proceedings of the Indigenous Customary 
Law Forum, ibid., p. 52.
18
Nungat Mumunbullawilak (Richard Wilkes), Welcome by Nyoongar Elder, WA Aboriginal Native 
Title Working Group, Annual Conference, Perth, 20-21 June 1996, pp. 3-4.
19
Matilda House, Chair, Ngunnawal Local Aboriginal Land Council, Welcome and Introduction to 
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation and Constitutional Centenary Foundation Conference on the 
Position o f Indigenous Peoples in National Constitutions, Canberra, 4-5 June 1993, pp. 3-4.
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The basis for questioning the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
people on the issue of land can be stated simply. Michael Dodson said that, in
responding to opposition to Indigenous claims:
we must continually return to an immovable conviction that our human 
rights to our lands cannot be compromised. The non-Indigenous 
community must come to accept this . . . [T]he well being of a 
community cannot depend on the dispossession and denial of the human 
rights of a minority.
Claims for land are not distinguished from the law and social structures that tie the 
people to the country. The recognition of rights to land is also the test of the 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the colonial society.
Recognition o f Indigenous sovereignty
Many Indigenous people have argued that any relationship with the state will depend
on the state’s recognition of Indigenous peoples as first owners and first sovereigns
of the lands. However, this is not necessarily presented as an ultimatum. Charles
Perkins, speaking about Mabo ’s case and the rejection of terra nullius argued that:
The Mabo judgement should be seen as [a building block]. By doing 
away with the bizarre concept that this continent had no owners prior to 
settlement by Europeans, Mabo established a fundamental truth, and 
establishes the basis for justice . . . the basis of a new relationship 
between indigenous and non-Aboriginal Australians. The message 
should be that there is nothing to fear or to lose in the recognition of 
historical truth, of the extension of social justice, or the deepening of
Australian social democracy to include indigenous Australians.
Others have taken a stronger line in questioning the basis of Australian sovereignty. 
However, positions such as that of the Aboriginal Provisional Government should 
not be dismissed. To radicalise the APG and its members overstates the difference in 
approach. The challenge is to the state’s claims of legitimacy in excluding 
Indigenous sovereignty. Yalarutja explained that:
20
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report, op. cit., p.
6.
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Charles Perkins, ‘Self-determination and managing the future’, in Christine Fletcher (ed.), 
Aboriginal Self Determination in Australia, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 1994, p. 39.
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In 1990 I was asked by some elders to be the president of an Aboriginal 
Government to create a real inspiration and a real self-determination 
agency of our own. I am not really a witness to things like the 
constitutions and legislation; I am a victim of i t . . .
There is an assumption by the colonial invaders that this was their land 
. . . They know it is not their land. Thieves do not have rights equal to
the owner of property . . .  It is a problem because they have not been
22
prepared to pay their way - to pay the rent to be here.
These questions are at the heart of even the most ‘moderate’ statements of 
Indigenous peoples’ claims.
Noel Pearson, who is not generally considered a radical Aboriginal voice,
commented on the nature of the self-determination struggle in terms that may be
alarming to people in the non-Indigenous community:
We are in political guerilla war, in a colonial circumstance which is 
powerful and against which we infrequently prevail. People in situations
like ours must make do with the tools which are on hand.
At the same time, these tools must be understood for what they can and cannot
provide. Pearson cautioned against using these tools blindly:
In devising these [political] strategies we need to be realistic about the 
following: first about the content and nature of the tools which are 
available to us; second about what these tools can positively achieve.
They are limited tools and to optimise results we must use them wisely 
and skillfully. Third we have to confront the motivation of those people 
who we think might listen to us and recognise the circumstances in 
which they may be prepared to respond to our cause. Fourth we need to 
be realistic about achieving the full effect of our strategies and about 
maximising the prospects for reaching the most desirable outcomes for
us.
Pearson suggested that both radical and moderate strategies must be implemented to
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secure results. Indigenous peoples use all the tools available without necessarily 
accepting the legitimacy or authority of the various institutions, but understanding 
their limitations and advantages.
Yalarutja (Clarrie Isaacs), Provisional Government of Australia, Evidence given to the Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliamentary Debates [Proof Copy], 3 
December 1993, pp. 462, 463.
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A fundamental rethinking of the legitimacy of the state is required in order to
understand the claims of Indigenous peoples. Irene Watson explained the conflict:
In general, Nunga rights from a Nunga perspective differ from the 
Anglo-Australian view of what Nunga rights should or should not be, 
and are as different from the view of the rights of Anglo-Australians 
from an Indigenous perspective. The use of Anglo-Australian law to 
decide what are the rights of Indigenous people is the same as using 
Aboriginal law to decide what are the rights of non-indigenous 
Australians. From both camps there is denial of the other’s sovereignty 
. . . Justice and equality of rights will not flourish in this situation. The 
right to be indigenous and the right to be non-indigenous are competing 
rights with conflicting interests. The resolution of conflict should be one 
of peaceful co-existence, replacing the processes of domination, 
subjugation and genocide; this will only be achieved through mutual
respect for each other’s right to self-determination.
The refusal of the state to recognise the traditional owners of lands is a denial of 
Indigenous peoples’ claims to status as first peoples. Therefore, this distinction 
between Indigenous identity as recognised or constructed by the state and the reality 
for Indigenous peoples is inextricably linked to assertions of sovereignty. Les 
Malezer asserted the continuity of this ancient sovereignty in contrast to the 
assertions of the state:
This centenary [of the first Queensland ‘Protection’ Act] brings many 
thoughts to mind, b u t. . . the most important message is the actual short 
period of time which has elapsed since the Queensland government 
dispossessed our people, removed them from their traditional lands and 
adopted forced settlement administration upon us to ‘assimilate’ us.
This short period of time is insufficient to deny our tradition rights, our 
common law rights. It is not an adequate period to say that our 
associations with our land and with our laws has been completely 
severed. It is not sufficient time for a Federal Government or the 
Queensland Government to claim that the present generation does not 
bear the guilt of the past or have a responsibility to restitution. The 
injustice of the past 100 years has to be addressed. There can be no way
forward for the Australian nation without such redress.
However, as time passes and the effects of assimilation continue to have an impact 
on Indigenous society, Pura-lia Meenamatta argued that Aboriginal traditions of 
knowledge and social structure should inform the way claims are asserted:
Irene Watson, Nungas in the nineties, op. cit., p. 2. 
Les Malezer, op. cit., p. 5.
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We, the Aboriginal people of Australia, must explore our sovereignty to 
define nation and state so as to achieve indigenous definitions that
eminate from traditional indigenous societal structures.
From an Indigenous context, the demands made against the state are expressed in 
terms of sovereignty, and made as peoples with all that implies. For Michael 
Dodson:
our distinct and collective identity makes our classification as peoples 
inescapable. Accordingly, we are entitled to fully exercise our right to
self-determination in the same manner as all peoples.
This claim is made not only in the domestic sphere but also, increasingly, in
international fora. Asserting these claims in the presence of the international
community can invigorate Indigenous peoples in their struggle, particularly as they
share their experience with other peoples engaged in similar struggle. Flowever,
Indigenous peoples have also found the process frustrating at times, often
withdrawing from discussions with the states. In 1988, Geoff Clarke, on behalf of
the National Coalition of Aboriginal Organisations of Australia reminded the
International Labour Organisation that:
we are peoples and demand to be treated as such. We are not asking for 
that status, we have already have it. It is what we are in fact, and no 
twist of language can deprive us of our identity . . .  we define our rights 
in terms of self-determination . . .  it is our birthright. We are ancient 
people and we remind you that it was you who came to us. You came to 
take and you are still taking, although we are not asking for this right 
which we already possess as peoples, we insist that our relationship with
you be based on the recognition of respect for that right.
On this analysis self-determination forms the basis from which claims can be
asserted and constructed. Michael Dodson explained the nature of self-determination
as the process underlying Indigenous claims:
Correctly understood, every issue concerning the historical and present 
status, entitlements, treatment and aspirations of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples is implicated in the concept of self determination.
The reason for this lies on the fact that self determination is a process.
Pura-lia Meenamatta, op. cit., p. 5.
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The right of self determination is the right to make decisions. These 
decisions affect the enjoyment and exercise of the full range of
fundamental freedoms and human rights of indigenous peoples.
From land, health and community issues to self-government and sovereignty, the 
demand is for greater autonomy in relations with the Australian state and more 
control over the factors that are central to their identity as Indigenous peoples.
The struggle for self-determination
Small gains in the process of self-determination can have both substantive and 
symbolic importance. Charles Perkins noted that successes in the courts, for 
example in achieving recognition over land, are, ‘also about self-determination -  
giving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples the space and resources to enjoy
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our culture, to work out our own solutions and control our own lives’.
Similarly, Les Malezer, speaking of the Palm Island Award wages success,
expressed the importance of these achievements to the self-determination movement:
These people and their struggle for justice have struck a blow against the 
historical oppression of Aboriginal and Islander people in this State, a 
blow that could and should give hope and encouragement to all the 
thousands of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in Queensland 
desperately waiting for, and deserving of, overdue restitution and
compensation.
In this address, Malezer specifically acknowledged the personal sacrifice of 
individuals such as John Koowarta, Eddie Koiki Mabo, and the ‘magnificent five’ of 
the Palm Island claim, particularly those who never saw justice in their individual 
cases. However, these remain small victories in a struggle for much greater 
recognition. For Olga Havnen, from the National Indigenous Working Group on 
Native Title:
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, First Report, op. cit., p. 41. 
Charles Perkins, op. cit., p. 41.
Les Malezer, op. cit., p. 1.
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Resistance to colonialism and the nation state by Indigenous people is as 
old as the historical process itself and, in Australia, the strength of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander societies today is a tribute to over
200 years of struggle against the dominant society.
From the perspective of groups such as the Aboriginal Provisional Government, 
Pura-lia Meenamatta has maintained, ‘[w]hether Aboriginal people choose to join in 
with white Australia or seek Aboriginal nationalism and sovereignty, a hard road 
into the future is assured’;35
Unless Indigenous communities are able to take the time and space to 
discuss the principles of Aboriginality, informed by Aboriginal 
knowledge and thinking, then Aboriginality too will become another
colonial construct.
From a different perspective, Michael Dodson also highlighted the importance of 
Indigenous people being given the time and the opportunity, not only to reaffirm 
their identity, but also to determine their relationship with the Australian state and 
community.37
The claims of Indigenous peoples against the state have been set out in detail at 
various times, exploring Indigenous peoples’ relationship with the state. Gallarwuy 
Yunupingu told the story of the Bark Petition sent by the Yolngu people to the 
Commonwealth Parliament demanding that their land rights be respected. These 
rights were not respected, and the Yirrkala lands were taken for a bauxite mine. 
Galarrwuy reminded us that ‘ [t]he bark petition is still sitting in the new Parliament 
House, a proud but sad symbol of my peoples’ fight for their land’.
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Another important example is The Barunga Statement, presented to the Hawke 
Labor government nearly a decade ago. The Barunga Statement contained the 
following demands:
We the indigenous owners and occupiers of Australia call on the 
Australian Government and people to recognise our rights:
- to self-determination and self-management including the freedom to 
pursue our own economic, social, religious and cultural development;
- to permanent control and enjoyment of our ancestral lands;
- to compensation for the loss of use of lands, there having been no 
extinction of original title;
- to the protection and control of access to our sacred sites, sacred 
objects, artifacts, designs, knowledge and works of art;
- to the return of the remains of our ancestors for burial in accordance 
with our traditions;
- to respect for and promotion of our Aboriginal identity, including the 
cultural linguistic, religious and historical aspects, including the right to 
be educated in our own languages, and in our own culture and history;
- in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial 
Discrimination, including rights to life, liberty, security of person, food 
clothing, housing, medical care, education and employment 
opportunities, necessary social services and other basic human rights.
We call on the Commonwealth Parliament to pass laws providing:
- a national elected Aboriginal and Islander organisation to oversee 
Aboriginal and Islander Affairs;
- a national system of land rights;
-a police and justice system which recognises our customary laws and 
frees us from discrimination and any activity which may threaten our 
identity or security, interfere with our freedom of expression or 
association, or otherwise prevent our full enjoyment and exercise of 
universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We call on the Australian Government to support Aborigines in the 
development of an International Declaration of Principles for Indigenous 
Rights, leading to an International Covenant.
And we call on the Commonwealth Parliament to negotiate with us a 
Treaty or Compact recognising our prior ownership, continued 
occupation and sovereignty and affirming our human rights and
freedoms.
While the Barunga Statement, with the original Bark Petition, hang in Parliament 
House in Canberra, few of these claims, even those concerning fundamental issues 
such as non-discrimination before the legal system, have been realised.
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For Indigenous peoples, this failure is a hurtful reminder of their relationship with 
the state, which remains a relationship of subjection and oppression, reinforcing the 
relations of power. Marcia Langton identified the effect of this refusal on 
Indigenous peoples:
Aboriginal people want a demonstration of acknowledgment and 
commitment from Australia. The level of disappointment and cynicism 
in the Aboriginal community is high and further discouragement 
amongst Aboriginal leaders and workers, mostly the result of this 
constant disappointment in government inaction on known problems 
with known solutions, leads more and more to their inability and 
unwillingness to continue in the thankless task of rectifying the many
serious problems that were not of their making.
This disappointment has never resulted in Indigenous peoples backing away from 
their struggle. In 1993, in the context of the drafting of the Native Title Act, a 
national meeting of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples was held at Eva 
Valley in the Northern Territory to again present their demands to the Australian 
Parliament:
We Demand that:
. . .  the Commonwealth agrees to a negotiating process to achieve a 
lasting settlement with and for the benefit of all Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples. Since time immemorial we have owned, 
occupied, used and enjoyed this continent and its islands in accordance 
with our Laws and Customs to the exclusion of the whole world. Since 
the arrival of non-indigenous people our political and territorial integrity 
has been violated and that violation continues. This settlement process 
must recognise and address these historical truths. It must also address 
the impact of our dispossession, marginalisation, destabilisation and
disadvantage including financial and material recompense.
Perhaps the Working Party for Aboriginal Self-Government meeting in Waramungu 
lands expressed Indigenous peoples claims in their simplest form: ‘Wake Up,
42
Australia -  Aboriginal Self Government Always Was and Always Will Be!’
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Tracker Tilmouth warned:
We will not sit silently while our rights are being so single mindedly 
attacked. We will fight to achieve justice, to rectify wrongs . . .  we will 
continue the struggle until justice prevails and we are treated with
equality and dignity.
Tracker cited Long Pwerle, chair of the Central Land Council in 1991:
Every fight we take up and every success that we win has come to us 
through years of struggle, and those years add up to the lives of 
Aboriginal people who are fighting to protect their land and their 
culture.
Indigenous peoples continue to seek to come to terms with the dominant society, 
seeking reconciliation and inclusion as well as recognition and autonomy. Successes 
such as the Gurindji walk off for equal pay and the recognition of common law 
native title in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] remain symbolic victories. To this Peter 
Yu argued:
Recognition of our native title rights offers government the opportunity 
to overcome its disgraceful and undignified behaviour towards 
Aboriginal people. We all now have the opportunity to forge a new
45
relationship, based on respect and mutual accommodation.
Conclusion
This chapter has identified a number of themes that inform the discussions and 
arguments presented in the thesis. In particular, I rely on the conceptions of self- 
determination and the interconnected claims that Indigenous peoples make as 
peoples. These claims are not based exclusively upon current disadvantage, although 
that remains a source of legitimate continuing grievance. Nor can Indigenous claims 
be explained simply by reference to the historical aspect of the claims, for example 
to the return of traditional lands. Indigenous claims must be understood from their
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source, as claims made by peoples who continue to be subject to oppression from a 
colonial state. Indigenous peoples claim greater autonomy in determining their own 
futures and the opportunity to negotiate their relationship with the state and the non- 
Indigenous society. Importantly, Indigenous peoples demand equal respect as 
peoples.
The claims vary from non-discrimination, to land, as well as recognition of 
sovereignty and self-government. In the European language of politics and 
international law, these claims translate as self-determination, a recognised right of 
all peoples. Indigenous peoples have embraced this terminology as well as other 
concepts from European political theory such as sovereignty and self-government as 
the best way to express their demands in the language of their oppressors. Despite 
their power, these claims continue to be opposed not merely by might but also by 
theory. In the next chapter, I examine the politics of self-determination to indicate 
some of the obstacles that have prevented recognition of the claims of Indigenous 
peoples in the political theory, international law and the discourse of rights.
Chapter 2
Self-determination and Sovereignty
There is continued resistance to the self-determination claims of Indigenous peoples. 
The conventions of modem political theory and international legal discourse 
contribute to this.1 Both have developed in a way that asserts the primacy of 
statehood and has excluded the collective claims of Indigenous peoples. The 
previous chapter examined how Indigenous peoples have used the concept of a right 
to self-determination to express various claims against the state in Australia. In this 
chapter, I explore the tension between the claims of Indigenous peoples to self- 
determination and the sovereignty of the colonising state. The political theory from 
which the concept of self-determination emerged will be discussed, with specific 
reference to notions of sovereignty and governance that underpin debates in the legal 
sphere. Also, this chapter analyses the status of self-determination in rights 
discourse and in international legal doctrine.
1 In using the term ‘modem theory’, I have grouped together theorists from the broad liberal 
democratic traditions that underpin the modem state. It also reflects a time period that is considered 
the modem period and includes theorists from the sixteenth century on to contemporary theorists. 
Modem theory in this sense does not include critical theory from Marx to post-modem literature 
although I acknowledge that those schools also share many traditions of thought with the modern 
theories. See Barry Hindess, Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault, Blackwell, Oxford, 
1996, p. 13. See also, F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, Watts, London, 1966.
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The chapter focuses on the impact and the usefulness of the political theory and 
international law for the purposes of Indigenous peoples. Understanding the 
theoretical debates is important because the way Indigenous peoples present their 
claims may be affected by the language they adopt. For example, Indigenous 
peoples have taken up the language of ‘inherent rights’, in particular, the inherent 
right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination under international law. Such an 
approach is understandable given the power of rights discourse in both the domestic 
and international sphere. The difficulty, however, is in the invocation of political 
ideologies and theories of governance that are assumed to be universal. I argue that 
the underlying assumptions of all these conceptions of sovereignty have posed 
obstacles to the full recognition of Indigenous claims.
Part I examines the assumptions and ideology that shape non-Indigenous perceptions 
of Indigenous claims. In particular, social contract theories and theories of 
individual rights are examined because these are often considered to be the most 
influential philosophies in the Western world.2 Part II examines the place of 
Indigenous peoples in the international human rights regime. A discussion of 
international law is important for this thesis because Indigenous peoples have 
increasingly sought satisfaction of their claims in international fora. At the same 
time, international law, and human rights debates in particular, have an influence in 
domestic law and policy. An examination of the utility of international rights 
discourse also helps to explain the limits of the language adopted by Indigenous 
peoples. While there is a disjunction between international law theory and political 
theory, many of the unquestioned assumptions re-emerge to be addressed in the 
context of the state system. Part III returns to the language that Indigenous peoples 
use to voice their claims, particularly the concepts of self-determination and 
sovereignty. This discussion highlights the attraction of concepts such as self- 
determination and sovereignty but raises some of the concerns over the use of
2 See for example Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long, ‘Tribal traditions and European-Western 
political ideologies: The dilemma of Canada’s Native Indians’, in Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long 
(eds), The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights, University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto, 1985, p. 342. See also Hindess, op. cit., p. 14.
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language which, at its roots, has been used to exclude Indigenous peoples from 
recognition.
I. The limiting assumptions of modern political theory
A discussion of political theory in the context of the relationship between Indigenous 
peoples and the courts is important in two respects. First, when Indigenous peoples 
voice their claims in the language of self-determination and sovereignty, there are a 
number of assumptions within those terms that are not necessarily shared between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. Second, those same assumptions, while 
rarely examined, inform the institutions within which Indigenous peoples make their 
claims. Therefore, they form the context within which those claims will be 
understood by decision-makers. In this part, I identify the core assumptions in the 
theories of sovereignty that limit the ways in which rccw-Iridigenous people 
understand the language of self-determination.
Popular sovereignty and the social contract
The concept of sovereignty incorporates theories of internal authority as well as 
external relations. The location of power and authority in a society and the 
legitimacy of its exercise are central to understanding conceptions of sovereignty.3 
The theory of sovereignty is not a purely philosophical creation but a creature of the 
political context in which it was first developed. The story of sovereignty in modem 
political theory places authority with the people, in name at least, providing 
legitimacy to the democratic state.
3 See Boldt and Long, op. cit., p. 335 and Hindess, op. cit., pp. 9-11.
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In the sixteenth century Jean Bodin argued, in support of the French monarchy, that 
there must be some supreme and absolute authority which is itself not subject to the 
laws, but is maker and master of them.4 The emerging theories of ‘popular 
sovereignty’ and ‘representative government’ eventually replaced the absolutist 
view.5 Theorists such as John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau located the 
legitimacy and scope of authority in the purpose for which individuals come together 
to form a society and the fiction of a social contract emerged.6 Authority, it was 
argued, derived from agreement among the people and vested in, or was delegated to, 
a representative government. In a sense, however, these theories have yet to be 
‘unmonarched’, in that conceptions of a unitary, hierarchical and supreme authority 
persist.7 Unable to disengage with the old idea of a supreme authority, the 
revolutionary, rhetorical quality of popular sovereignty was coupled with companion 
theories of governance that legitimised the exercise of sovereign power by 
governments.
The theories of sovereignty construct a consenting polity from an elaborate 
mythology. Social contract theories are premised on the notion that individuals 
freely enter into civil society through a compact to better protect their natural
4 Jean Bodin, The Six Books o f the Commonwealth, [1576] translated by M. J. Tooley, Blackwell, 
Oxford, [n. d.], p. 28. For discussion, see also pp. 25-36, 40-9 [Bk I Ch. 8 s.10]. Bodin argued that 
the very concept of political order requires a sovereign authority which is absolute and indivisible. 
See generally, Julian H. Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Rise o f Absolutist Theory, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1973, p. 23. Compare Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, [1668] edited by 
Edwin Curley, Hackett, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 110-18 [Ch. XVIII], who thought that although 
sovereignty was originally derived from the people, once attributed (whether to an individual or 
legislature) it was absolute and permanent. See generally, Johannes Mattem, Concepts o f State, 
Sovereignty and International Law with Special Reference to the Juristic Conception o f the State, 
Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1928, pp. 2-3. These conceptions of absolute sovereignty persisted in the 
law in the concept of a ‘legal sovereign’, a single locus of supreme authority, and in the notion of 
‘parliamentary supremacy’ discussed below.
5 The durability of absolute sovereignty and the Divine Right of Kings were undermined by the 
emergence of a strong House of Commons in Britain. See Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: 
The Rise o f Popular Sovereignty in England and America, W. W. Norton, New York, 1988, pp. 17- 
37. See also Mattem, op. cit., pp. 5-6. On the Papacy’s preference for ideas of popular sovereignty, 
see Mattem pp. 22-3.
6 See John Locke, The Second Treatise on Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original 
Extent and End o f Civil Government, [1690] Blackwell, Oxford, 1956, pp. 29, 51 and Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, The Social Contract, [1762] translated by M. Cranston, Penguin, London, 1968, for 
example, p. 69. See generally, C. B., Macpherson, The Political Theory o f Possessive Individualism: 
Hobbes to Locke, Clarendon, Oxford, 1962.
1 Boldt and Long, op. cit., p. 335. James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age o f 
Diversity, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1995, p. 52, used the phrase ‘unmonarched’ to 
describe the inherent male, European, imperial bias of constitutional theory. Compare the thoughts of 
Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings [1977], Harvester, New 
York, c. 1980, p. 121, ‘we need to cut off the Kings head: in political theory that has still to be done’.
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freedom.8 The constitution of a society is seen as a deliberate self-determining act. 
The ‘people’ are seen as emerging from a theoretical state of nature, who choose 
self-rule and deliberate on a new constitution or who come together to articulate their 
conception of the common good.9 Social contract theories also created the fiction of 
the ‘founding moment’, that reinforced the idea of consent. 10 Through this mythical 
agreement between the people, the authority of government is a delegation of powers 
for the limited purpose of securing the freedom of the individual. * 11 Sovereignty 
remained with the people.
The idea that the right to govern rests on consent has influenced many styles of 
political theory. 12 As a result, theories of modem democratic statehood share a 
number of assumptions; namely, that the state is constituted by an homogenous, 
sovereign people who agree to be governed by uniform legal and political 
institutions. 13 Moreover, this is assumed to be a universal theory of society. These 
are the key features of sovereignty and statehood that form what James Tully called 
‘the empire of uniformity’ . 14 Little attention was paid to the conception of ‘the
8 Locke, op. cit., p. 49 and Rousseau, op. cit., p. 60. For discussion, see Macpherson, op. cit., p. 247. 
Kant, op. cit, p. 161 [ss.43, 44], explained this as the need to regulate mutual influence when people 
come into reciprocal contact. On the more ancient origins of the notion of the compact, see Mattem, 
op. cit., pp. 22-3.
9 For Locke, op. cit., pp. 50-1, there was a presumption that individuals have the capacity to govern 
themselves and therefore give up only so much of their freedom as is necessary for their better 
protection in society. This presumption relies on a view of the pre-civic state of nature as one of 
natural equality and freedom. Compare Hobbes, op. cit., p. 76, whose argument for strong 
government assumed a state of nature in which life was ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’. See 
also, Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince [1640], Scolar, Yorkshire, 1969. Other theorists saw the 
purpose of government to provide for a common conception of Right or a common will, for example, 
Kant, op. cit., p. 163, [s.44]. For G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, [1821], Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1967, e.g. p. 155, the state is committed to the promotion of higher ideals, in direct 
contrast to the minimalist view of the state adopted by liberal thinkers.
10 Tully, op. cit., p. 69, pointed to the imposition of a constitution on current generations with the 
idea that any ‘rational’ person would agree today, reflecting Locke’s own conception of the modem 
constitution as the pinnacle of human progress. It appears that despite disagreeing with Hobbes’ view 
of irrevocable accession to a ruler, Locke’s theory too has a sense of permanence.
11 Locke, op. cit., p. 122, thought this power could be revoked if misused. Locke’s theory of the 
social contract, op. cit., pp. 107-22, especially p. 112, reflected disdain for arbitrary and unrestrained 
power, and sought to refute the absolutist views expressed by Hobbes. Contrast Hobbes who retained 
elements of absolutism, prioritising the need for order over liberty. Thomas Hobbes, De Cive: The 
English Version, annotated by Howard Warrender, Clarendon, Oxford, 1983, pp. 88-93, 97, 102-5; 
and Leviathan, op. cit., pp. 110-15, concerning the ‘Rights of Soveraignes by Institution’. See 
generally, Umozurike O. Umozurike, Self Determination in International Law, Archon and Shoe 
String, Hamden, 1972, pp. 9-10.
12 See Hindess, op. cit., pp. 13, 22, for further discussion of this point.
13 For Tully’s account of the modem constitution, see op. cit., pp. 41, 59. Compare Hindess, op. cit., 
pp. 13, 22. See also, Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law [1887], Augustus M. Kelly, New 
Jersey, 1974, p. 161 [s.43].
14 Tully, op. cit., p. 58. See also p. 62.
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people’ in the sense of how they are to be defined, or how they should define 
themselves. These theories obscure diversity by construing the ‘people’ as 
homogenous. Tully explained that:
The first way the empire of uniformity is established in theory is the 
premise that the sovereign people who establish the constitution are 
already culturally indifferent members of one society who aim to set up a 
regular constitutional association with a single locus of sovereignty. 15
More specifically, culture is perceived as either ‘irrelevant, transcended or
uniform’ . 16
The ideal of the nation-state as uniform and homogenous has never reflected the 
interactions, interrelations and constitutional arrangements existing amongst 
peoples. 17 Federation, confederation and various forms of association have been 
much more the norm throughout the history of societies. Yet, the assumption of 
uniformity became so predominant, based on these early theorists, that basic 
concepts such as ‘the people’ and ‘popular sovereignty’ have been defined in 
agreement with it. 18 The theories of Hobbes, Locke and other modem theorists have 
become weapons of resistance to Indigenous peoples’ claims because they expressed 
ideas that continue to inform contemporary debates about political power and 
government’ . 19 The application of these theories to multi-nation states, or states 
constituted by different peoples, has in the past resulted in the blanket denial of 
Indigenous claims to self-determination and sovereignty. This denial has occurred 
on two fronts, both in the way rights are construed and in the way the legitimacy of 
government is determined.
15 ibid., p. 83.
16 ibid., p. 63.
17 On the number of states compared to the number of nations, see Henry Reynolds, Aboriginal 
Sovereignty: Three Nations, One Australia?, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996, pp. 174-86, especially p. 
174. See also, Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-determination: The Accommodation 
of Conflicting Rights, University of Pennsylvania Press, Pennsylvania, 1990, p. 26.
18 Tully, op. cit., p. 9.
19 Hindess, op. cit., p. 14. On the influence of social contract theory on other political theory, see pp. 
13,22.
40
Equality, freedom and the rights of citizenship
The theories of social contract draw heavily upon the idea that there are natural rights 
that each individual is capable of bringing to society, and therefore capable of 
surrendering to government. For Locke, the rights to life, liberty and estates, which 
together are their property, could guarantee human freedom.20 The social contract 
was entered into for the better protection and preservation of these inherent rights, 
thus defining the minimal role of government.21
Locke’s approach forms the basis of much modem state practice and international 
law. For example, Thomas Jefferson was influenced by Locke’s view of the nature 
of the individual and the nature of civil society.22 These views were expressly 
incorporated into the American Declaration of Independence:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights; 
that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that to 
secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any 
form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of 
the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, 
laying its foundations on such principles, and organizing its powers in 
such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and 
happiness.23
The ideology that propelled the revolutions of France and America evolved around 
the assumption of uniform, or homogenous, states where a common notion of the 
public good existed.24 Minority interests, it was thought, could be secured by the 
protection of individual rights.25 More specific rights that are enumerated in law and
20 Locke, op. cit., p. 63.
21 It is not, Kant assured, that the individual has sacrificed a part of their freedom. Rather, each gives 
up their personal freedom ‘in order to receive it immediately again as Members of a Commonwealth’, 
in the form of a regulated order or Civil State regulated by laws o f Right. Kant, op. cit., pp. 169-70 
[s.47]. See also Locke, op. cit., p. 64.
22 Umozurike, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
23 Thomas Jefferson, The Declaration of Independence, 4 July 1776, in Thomas Jefferson, The 
Portable Thomas Jefferson, edited by Merril Petersen, Viking, New York, p. 235. The Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and Citizen and the new Constitutions o f France had a similar effect. For 
discussion, see Umozurike, op. cit., p. 10 and Mattem, op. cit., p. 30.
24 For a discussion of the vulnerability of Republican sentiment, based on the fiction o f homogeneity, 
to different views of the public good, see Jane Smith, ‘Republicanism, imperialism and sovereignty: 
A history of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty’, Buffalo Law Review, vol. 37, 1988/9, pp. 531-5.
25 Jefferson’s inaugural address as President, which articulated ‘the creed of our political faith’, 
exemplified this concern: ‘Though the will o f the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be
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theory are often traced to the idea of individual freedom. For example, Kymlicka 
argued that even the recognition of Indigenous self-determination claims, including 
self-government and jurisdiction, can be justified to promote the freedom of the 
individual.26
Despite the focus on the individual, Indigenous peoples and many jurists have 
utilised the idea of ‘inherent rights’. Specifically, they argue that self-determination 
is an inherent right of peoples which derives from the right to govern themselves.27 
The idea of inherent rights is attractive because it suggests that the right exists 
outside any state structure and does not depend on recognition by the state. 
However, the traditional body of inherent rights theory may also pose obstacles to 
Indigenous peoples’ claims. The individualist nature of the dominant rights regime 
and contract theory does not adequately accommodate claims for groups rights.28
The source of rights, and who defines them, is an important consideration in 
determining the nature of the rights, and hence, whether Indigenous claims are 
recognised in them. Criticisms of ‘inherent rights’ theory emerged very early, from 
within liberalism itself. For example, utilitarian theorists, such as James Mill and 
Jeremy Bentham disputed not only the notion of the inherent rights of individuals but 
also the legitimacy of the legal system imposing a system of rights.29 A utilitarian 
would suggest that no paternal body could best determine the ‘right’ choices for any
right must be reasonable; that the minority possesses their equal rights, which equal law must 
protect.’ See Thomas Jefferson, Inaugural Address as President, Washington DC, 4 March 1801, in 
The Portable Thomas Jefferson, op. cit., p. 291. For praise of the emerging American system of 
government, see Alexis DeToqueville, Democracy in America, [1835] translated by Henry Reeve, 
Knopf, New York, 1945.
26 Kymlicka, op. cit., pp. 69, 107.
27 For example, see ATSIC, Australian Contributions to the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations, annually. Contrast Boldt and Long, op. cit., p. 337.
28 Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-determination, Yale University Press, London, 
1978, pp. 47-51.
29 ‘natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, -  
nonsense upon stilts . . .  So much for terrorist language.’ Jeremy Bentham, ‘Anarchical fallacies; 
being an examination of the Declaration o f Rights issued during the French revolution’, in Bikhu 
Parekh (ed.), Bentham ’s Political Thought, Groom Helm, London, p. 269. The utilitarian argument 
emerges from Hobbes’ Leviathan and the view of individuals as calculating, self-motivating beings 
who choose a course of action based on the relative pleasure over pain. Thus the pursuit o f happiness 
and self-interest -  utility maximisation- determines human choices. Morality then, is the choice 
which tends to promote happiness.
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individual.30 Other theorists rejected the assumption of self-interest, arguing instead 
that natural law and the pursuit of what is right regulate the choices of individuals.31 
From different perspectives, these theorists placed the individual in a social context. 
In short, there is conflict in political theory about the source and content of rights and 
indeed about human nature itself.
The utilitarian view has some similarities to arguments from jurists who view a legal 
right as meaningless without first assuming the existence of a legal system within 
which a doctrine of rights can operate,32 For example, Brian Slattery argued that an 
individualist approach, whether viewing the individual as essential community- 
minded or essentially self-interested, fails to give sufficient regard to the historical 
development of rights doctrines. While vested in individuals, inherent rights stem 
from membership in socially defined groups.33 Slattery argued further that moral 
reasoning can both draw upon tradition and practices particular to certain societies 
and strive for universality to have persuasive force for the inhabitants of other moral 
traditions.34 There are, of course, contrasting views. For example, MacIntyre 
recognised that rights reflect communal practices and traditions that are not 
universal.35
Both MacIntyre and Slattery agreed that rights depend not so much on a legal system 
but on a sense of community. That is, rights do not precede community, as in the 
traditional view of inherent individual rights, but emerge from it. Only from a sense 
of community do feelings of obligation arise which, in the presence of a system of
30 The rules of society should therefore be those that offer ‘the greatest happiness o f the greatest 
number’. Bentham, ibid., p. 309.
31 Kant, op. cit., p. 164 and Hegel op. cit., p. 86.
32 See, for example, James L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law 
of Peace, 5th edn, Clarendon, Oxford, 1955, p. 51. See also Mattem, op. cit., p. 56.
33 Brian Slattery, ‘Rights, communities and tradition’, University o f Toronto Law Journal, vol. 41, 
1991, p. 452. Slattery, p. 460, suggested that universal human rights have developed from a sense of 
global community.
34 Slattery, op. cit., p. 463. This ‘evangelical’ style is similar to that of Kymlicka, op. cit., pp. 152- 
72, who, in seeking to accommodate Indigenous peoples demands, still assumed the universal value 
of liberalism in a way that is reminiscent of Kant’s language of moral progress. In particular note the 
discussion o f ‘illiberal minorities’ and the use of persuasion to encourage the use of liberal 
democratic institutions if self-government is to be ‘tolerated’.
35 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Whose Rationality?, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre 
Dame, c. 1988 and MacIntyre, After Virtue, Duckworth, London, 1981, pp. 65-8.
43
enforcement, can translate into the language of rights. This conception of rights does 
not necessitate a universality of content. Rights that differ from one community to 
another are not invalidated nor limited by a dominant conception of the inherent 
rights properly attributable to an individual under liberal theory.
This view holds some attraction in the struggle by Indigenous peoples for 
recognition of their communities within the rights discourse. The key for 
appropriating rights discourse to claims for community rights is to reject the claims 
of universality in the doctrine as currently construed. Instead, where rights are 
understood to take their form from the community, then it makes sense that rights 
can be communal, and can be exercised in relations between communities. This 
reassessment is imperative because unless the doctrine is modified to include the 
rights of distinct communities that associate with one another, it may continue to 
legitimise oppression.
Where the state consists of distinct peoples an homogenous view of the nation state 
creates the imperative of assimilation. Duncan Ivison suggested that self- 
determination claims based on distinct, collective rights pose a profound challenge to 
liberal theories of justice, because they appear to fragment the foundation of 
common citizenship.36 However, the exclusion of Indigenous peoples from the 
construction of that common identity and the constant economic and political 
pressure to assimilate are resisted by Indigenous peoples because the notion of 
‘common citizenship’ fails to recognise and accommodate Indigenous identity. It is 
therefore arguable that this concept seeks to construct a sense of national identity and 
unity through exclusion and coercive universalism.37 The idea of equal treatment,
36 Duncan Ivison, ‘Aboriginal rights and political theory’, Research School of Social Sciences Annual 
Report, Australian National University, 1994, p. 25. For an example of this argument, see Nathan 
Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination and Public Policy, Basic Books, New York, 1975, pp. 197-8, 200, 
who argued that special treatment of one group will cause instability because others will also demand 
special rights. Kymlicka, op. cit., pp. 66-9, argued that such an approach is concerned more with 
instability than with justice.
37 ibid., pp. 64, 73. Kymlicka, p. 74, expressed concern over the ethnocentric assumptions, over­
generalisations and the ‘conflating of contingent political strategy with enduring moral principle’ that 
these approaches epitomise.
44
when linked to individual rights thus becomes a source of oppression rather than 
freedom.38
Democratic government and institutional uniformity
The concept of popular sovereignty has been described as little more than a ‘fiction’ 
used to justify the government of the many by the few.39 While modem theory no 
longer asserts that authority is absolute, hierarchy remains an inextricable part of it. 
Boldt and Long noted that modern theorists assume that the sovereignty of the 
people cannot be wielded by the people themselves.40 Contrary to the ideal of 
popular sovereignty, the fiction is overwhelmed by the institutional nature of 
sovereignty that assumes the value of uniformity, through uniform institutions, 
hierarchical government (or supreme authority) and an homogenous polity.
The rationale for vesting sovereign authority in a representative government in social 
contract theory is to temper individual self-interest in relations between people.41 
This provides legitimacy for the powers exercised by government and provides a 
basis for defining the limits of that power.42 Therefore, even where the powers of 
government are not set down in an actual contract or constitution, the extent to which 
government legitimately impinges on individual freedom has theoretical limits.
38 For a critique of objections to Indigenous claims that assert equality as their foundation, see 
Jeremy Webber, ‘Individuality, equality and difference: Justifications for a parallel system of justice’, 
in Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Aboriginal Peoples and the Criminal Justice System: 
Report o f the National Round Table on Aboriginal Justice Issues, 1993, pp. 149-50. See also Michael 
Dodson, ‘Assimilation versus self-determination: no contest’, North Australia Research Unit, 
Australian National University, Discussion Paper No. 1/1996, p. 7.
39 Morgan, op. cit., pp. 13-15.
40 Boldt and Long, op. cit., pp. 335-6, pointed to common language such as ‘political leaders’, 
‘decision-makers’, and ‘governments’ that are all influenced by notions of hierarchical authority.
41 This view of human nature was not necessarily shared by all theorists at the time. Rousseau, op. 
cit., p. 72, for example, viewed the collective as capable of acting outside the interests of the 
individual, for the benefit of the whole, including minority interests. Later theorists tended to 
distance themselves from the idea of a common will, emphasising the dangers of unrestrained 
democracy, or the ‘tyranny of the majority’. See for example, Tocqueville, op. cit., p. 258.
42 Rousseau, ibid., p. 139, agreed that the powers of government were a mere delegation, while 
taking a more extreme view of the power of the general assembly.
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Contemporary understandings of sovereignty, beginning with Locke and Rousseau, 
have generally focused on democratic government as the basis for internal self- 
determination. Therefore, the enjoyment of political participation determines 
whether self-determination is being effectively exercised. Umozurike summarised 
this view:
A people within a metropolitan territory who enjoy these rights 
cannot make a case that they are denied the right of self- 
determination even though there may be political agitation for a 
particular status, such as independence. The situation will be 
different if they are denied human rights and are not free to 
participate in government.43
However, it is inaccurate to suggest that where the members of a state are able to 
participate in the democratic system of government, with majority rule and minority 
protection, all citizens, regardless of their membership of a distinct people within the 
state borders, are exercising internal self-determination. As Michael Dodson 
observed, ‘[i]t is a fallacy all too evident to indigenous peoples that belonging to a 
democratic state guarantees to all peoples an equal voice and fair representation in 
government’ .44 In the case of Indigenous peoples, this undifferentiated notion of 
citizenship has been shown to be either inadequate or ineffective to protect even their 
most fundamental rights as citizens.
For many, group representation is seen as a model for achieving self-determination 
in states that do not share a sense of nationhood.45 It is thought that this kind of 
representation could afford the pluralism required to provide an equitable 
relationship between distinct groups.46 Michael Asch argued that group 
representation overcomes ‘the crisis of community’ that occurs when a minority is
43 Umozurike, op. cit., p. 58.
44 Michael Dodson, ‘Towards the exercise of Indigenous rights: Policy, power and self- 
determination’, Race and Class, vol. 25(4), 1994, p. 72.
45 See, for example, Alexis Heraclides, The Self Determination of Minorities in International Politics, 
Frank Cass, London, 1991, p. 11 and Michael Asch, ‘Aboriginal self-government and the 
construction o f Canadian constitutional identity’, Alberta Law Review, vol. 130(2), 1992, pp. 466-9. 
See also Jose Martinez Cobo (Special Rapportuer), Study of the Problem o f Discrimination against 
Indigenous Populations, U.N. Sub-commission of Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of  
Minorities (UN Doc. E/CN 4/Sub.2/1986/7 and Add. 1-3).
46 See, for example, Iris Marion Young, ‘Polity and group difference: A critique of the ideal o f 
universal citizenship’, Ethics, vol. 99, January 1989, p. 250 and, generally, Justice and the Politics 
and Difference, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990.
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subject to the rule of the majority but provides an alternative between the status quo 
and separation.47 However, in most instances, and certainly in Australia, this idea is 
rejected, because it offends the all-pervasive norm of uniformity.
In contrast, federalism, or the association of self-governing territories, which exists 
in Australia, Canada and the United States, for example, provides for mutual 
recognition and power sharing.48 The characteristics of sovereignty are more 
complex in a federal system, where sovereignty is shared between distinct 
communities. An understanding of the workings of power in a federal system of 
shared sovereignty can provide a theoretical and practical basis for a more pluralist 
approach, which recognises the sovereignty of Indigenous peoples.49 The notions of 
meaningful participation and self-rule must be assessed outside the theoretical 
limitations imposed by the liberal democratic norm. Peter Russell argued that:
Aboriginal societies like all enduring human societies are fundamentally 
political in nature -  political that is in the Aristotelian sense. They are 
communities in which the distinctive social genius is expressed in the 
way they render justice to one another and order their internal affairs. To 
deny a people the opportunity to make laws for the internal ordering of 
their own society is to deny them to exist as enduring political societies.
Such a denial is the very essence of Imperialism.50
Demands for self-government, self-determination and equal respect as peoples
underscore Indigenous peoples’ claims. Therefore, the idea of sovereignty and of
inherent rights remains attractive if they are imbued with equal respect for
Indigenous peoples. However, at the same time as democratic states were being
established from the colonial territories of the British Empire these new ‘nations’
47 Asch, op. cit., p. 466, noted however that in the context o f the Canadian constitutional structure, 
‘we have not accepted the principles of direct consociation on an intellectual level and have not found 
the will or the way to resolve the matter of Aboriginal self-government through principles o f indirect 
consociation’. See also p. 469.
48 For example, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (Imp) brought together the 
colonies into a mutually agreed federation. Section 51 reserves certain powers for the 
Commonwealth and the states to share, the plenary remains for the states. The Canadian Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the Royal Commission, [6 vols], Ottawa, 1996, 
recognised the ways in which federation can accommodate the same power sharing and mutual 
recognition o f Indigenous peoples. In particular, see vol. 1, pp. 677-91, which outlines ‘the four 
principles of a renewed relationship’: mutual recognition, mutual respect, sharing, and mutual 
responsibility.
49 For a territorial approach to self-determination, see for example, Lea Brilmeyer, ‘Secession and 
self-determination: A territorial interpretation’, Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 15-16, 1990- 
91, pp. 177-202.
50 Russell, op. cit., p. 17.
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were imposing their own empire over Indigenous peoples. While Indigenous 
peoples’ claims may reflect the same principles of consent and self-rule, they 
challenge the legitimacy of that nation building.51 This historical aspect of the 
relationship has a profound impact on the non-Indigenous reactions to self- 
determination claims.
Political theory and colonisation
The assumptions of modem political theory lie at the base of the relationship 
between Indigenous peoples and the colonial state. That relationship is also affected 
by the translation of theory into practice. These two things combined in the denial of 
respect for Indigenous peoples as equal sovereigns in the process of colonisation. 
Non-Indigenous people have sought moral and theoretical justification for the 
violence of colonisation from the outset. It is this moral aspect, of being first 
peoples, that Irene Watson suggested ‘pinches at the balls of the colonising state’ . 52
The notion of the equality of nations was an important element of the theories of 
sovereignty. This external aspect of sovereignty implied that every polity should be 
seen as equal, enjoying unlimited and exclusive sovereignty over their territory.53 At 
the time, it was thought by the likes of Hobbes, Locke and Pufendorf that uniform, 
unitary legal and political structure was the solution to political instability in
51 Peter Russell, Aboriginal Nationalism: Fourth world decolonisation in English settler societies, 
Hugo Wolfsohn Memorial Lecture, La Trobe University, Melbourne, 31 October 1996, p. 3.
52 Irene Watson, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways: Survival against the colonial state’, Australian 
Feminist Law Journal, vol. 8, 1997, p. 56.
53 For example, Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo [1688], translated by C. 
H. and W. A. Oldfather, Oceania, New York, 1964, vol. II, p. 367, argued that the equality o f all 
peoples meant that peoples were entitled to prevent the thrusting of foreigners into their territories. 
The theories of social contract had an influence on the international law theorists o f the time, for 
example, see Pufendorf, pp. 330, 364-70, 381. See also, Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo 
Scientifica Pertractatum [1764], translated by Joseph H. Drake, Oceania, New York, 1964, vol. II, 
pp. 15-16. For Emmerich Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the 
Conduct o f the Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns [1758], translated by Charles G. Fenwick, Oceania, 
New York, 1964, vol. Ill, pp. 3, 5-6, 113, the state possesses the same rights as man. From equality 
of man Vattel deduced the equality of states. In the same way, states have duties to each other to 
promote society. These ideas persist in contemporary international law as the principles o f respect for 
the equality of states, territorial integrity and exclusive jurisdiction.
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Europe.54 The respect for equality was not extended to Indigenous peoples either in 
theory or in practice. 53 It is important to note that these theories were not ignorant of 
Indigenous peoples. Rather, they were often construed to deliberately exclude 
Indigenous peoples from the community of nations and justify colonial practice.56
Legal scholars have begun to re-examine the writings of theorists such as Locke, 
Emmerich de Vattel and Fransiscus de Vitoria.57 For Vitoria, the Indians of the 
Americas ‘undoubtedly possessed true dominium, both in public and private 
affairs’ . 58 Many commentators have focussed on this aspect of Vitoria’s writings to 
illustrate a position in the earliest international law that respects the equality of 
Indigenous peoples. 59 While the ideas of equality and respect among nations formed 
the basis of modem international law, the most influential principles that were to 
carry through to the political theories and practices of colonialism were those that 
served to justify the process. 60
Vitoria was writing at a time when European involvement in the Americas was 
predominantly for trade, before the onset of more invasive colonisation. However, 
Vitoria was not necessarily the humanist or egalitarian that many commentators have 
suggested. While Vitoria argued that the Indigenous peoples were to be respected in
54 James Youngblood Hendersen, ‘The doctrine of Aboriginal rights in Western legal tradition’, in 
Boldt and Long, op. cit., p. 189, argued that theorists such as Pufendorf, Grotius and Gentilis and the 
concept of natural law were essential in this process.
55 Werther, op. cit., p. 39. However, as Slattery, op. cit., p. 37, pointed out, the law of nations was 
not certain because the powerful states did not have a settled practice consistent with it. See also 
Brian Slattery, ‘Aboriginal sovereignty and Imperial claims’, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, vol. 29, 
1991, p. 685 and, generally, Boldt and Long, op. cit.
56 For example, see James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 1993, pp. 137-78.
57 See, for example, Reynolds, op. cit., p. 43, Werther, op. cit., pp. 36-7, Asch and Macklem op. cit., 
p. 510, Garth Nettheim, ‘Sovereign desires’, Australian Left Review, No. 126, March 1991, pp. 33-4. 
Contrast Brian Slattery, Ancestral lands..., op. cit., p. 26. Thomas Flanagan, ‘From Indian title to 
Aboriginal rights’, in Louis Knafla (ed.), Law and Justice in a New Land: Essays in Western 
Canadian Legal History, 1986, p. 85, noted that modem self-determination claims are often 
formulated not as claims for rights but claims for recognition as sovereign and the rights that are 
possessed by all nations at international law.
58 Fransisco de Vitoria, ‘Des Indis’ [1539], in Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (eds), Fransico 
de Vitoria: Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1991, p. 251.
59 See, for example, Nettheim, op. cit., pp. 33-4 and Youngblood Hendersen, op. cit., p. 188.
60 See Robert A. Williams Jr, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of 
Conquest, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 13, 92-3, 96-107. Williams, p. 98, argued that 
one of Vitoria’s primary motivations in the lectures ‘on the Indians Lately Discovered’, in 1532, was 
to find a justification for the Spanish aggression against the South American peoples that was not 
wholly based on ecclesiastical assertions of jurisdiction.
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their possession, they were obliged to comply with the duties set forth in the natural 
law of nations.61 The effect was to judge relations with Indigenous peoples, and in 
particular their response to encroachments from European powers, against an 
unknown alien standard. Moreover, any transgression of the ‘universal’ norms of the 
Law of Nations would justify conquest and colonisation.62 Williams described 
Vitoria’s legacy for Indigenous peoples in less positive terms than many 
commentators, describing the Law of Nations as ‘an instrument of empire’.63
To this end, M.F. Lindley, in 1928, concluded that on the issue of Indigenous 
peoples’ sovereignty, the preponderance of writing supported the view that 
‘backward races’ possess ‘a title to the sovereignty over the territory they inhabit 
which is good against more highly civilised peoples’.64 However, the assumptions 
implicit here were more explicitly stated in terms of political institutions to hold that 
‘lands in the possession of any backward peoples who are politically organised 
ought not to be regarded as belonging to no one’.65 Assumptions of superiority and 
hierarchy had placed peoples on a developmental timeline.66 The ‘scientific’ 
development view of human history in which the cultures of the world could be 
ranked according to their progressive stage of socio-economic development was 
devastating for Indigenous peoples. Modem constitutions had been developed in 
contrast to ‘ancient’ constitutions based on ad hoc government by custom.67 
‘Modern’ European cultures were thought to be the highest and most developed in 
the hierarchy. On this view, lower or backward cultures would benefit and improve 
from the implantation of European institutions.
61 Vitoria, op. cit., pp. 278-84. For a discussion, see Williams, op. cit., p. 97.
62 Vitoria, op. cit., pp. 282-91. For discussion, see Williams, op. cit., pp. 104-5. Williams, p. 105, 
argued that the erasure of cultures and beliefs was the ‘unseen by-product of a discourse o f conquest 
enforcing a vision of the world focused on one right way of life for all mankind.’
63 Williams, ibid., p. 108.
64 M. F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law: 
Being a treatise on the law and practice relating to colonial expansion [1920], Longman, London, 
1928, p. 11.
65 ibid., p. 20 (emphasis added).
66 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, op. cit., pp. 64-5.
67 ‘Modem’ societies in constituting the state were seen to go through a process of critical reflection 
on their customs to create a uniform system of institutions with a central locus of sovereignty, ibid., 
p. 59.
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International law theories affecting Indigenous peoples were greatly influenced by 
John Locke, who directly addressed the assertion that Indigenous peoples were 
already constituted, self-determining and sovereign peoples deserving of respect.68 
The political and economic systems by which Indigenous peoples lived were equated 
with the ancient inferior constitutions of the social contract theory.69
With increased trading activity and competition among European powers for 
territory, ideas of private property were of great influence, particularly in legal 
doctrines. Locke believed that people had no property except in their bodies, and as 
a consequence, in land in which they had mixed their labour, in particular through 
agriculture.70 The introduction of private property and the market economy were a 
central justification, as much as an impetus for colonisation. All systems of 
government came to be measured in commodity terms - the exploitation of resources, 
cultivation of soil and use of markets. It was argued that the Indigenous peoples had 
‘no reason to complain’ when Europeans encroached on their lands, so long as there 
was enough remaining in common for them.71 The corollary, of course, was that no 
person, or people were entitled to more land than they required for sustenance under 
agriculture.72
Echoing the ideas expressed by Locke, Vattel justified colonialism on familiar bases:
Every nation is . . . bound by the law of nature to cultivate that land 
which has fallen to its share. There are others who, in order to avoid 
labour, seek to live upon their flocks and the fruits of the chase. Now 
that the human race has multiplied so greatly, it could not subsist if every 
people wished to live after that fashion. Those who still pursue this idle 
mode of life occupy more land than they would have need of under a 
system of honest labour, and they may not complain if other, more 
industrious nations, too confined at home, should come and occupy parts 
of their lands.73
68 ibid., p. 79.
69 Locke, op. cit., p. 9.
70 ibid., pp. 15-17,22.
71 ibid., pp. 15, 18-24. See Vattel, op. cit., p. 37: ‘The cultivation of the soil . . .  is an obligation 
imposed on man by nature’. See also Tully, Strange Multiplicity, op. cit., pp. 71-2, 78.
72 For an extensive analysis o f Locke’s conception of property and the obligations and conditions on 
ownership, see James Tully, ‘Rediscovering America: the two treatises and aboriginal rights’, chapter 
5 in Tully, ...Locke in Contexts, op. cit., pp. 137-76.
73 Vattel, op. cit., pp. 34-5. pp. xii, xiii, [Bk. 1. Ch. 8 s.81] opposed the attack of American nations 
and argued that savages may not be civilised against their will, as a matter of law. Yet, Vattel, like
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The impression was of the benevolent and benign inevitability of colonisation and, 
moreover, an obligation on Indigenous peoples to graciously accept it.
Even though the nation was perceived as the natural political unit, modem theorists 
approved of expansion and the assimilation of ‘backward peoples’, supported by the 
progressive view of human history.74 Edward Said noted the importance of this view 
to the legitimacy of colonisation because it provided a justification apart from a 
purely profit motivation:
a commitment that allowed decent men and women to accept the notion 
that distant territories and their natives should be subjugated . . .  [and] the 
almost metaphysical obligation to rule subordinate, inferior, or less 
advanced peoples.75
Plurality and diversity are more difficult to conceive if the progressive development 
view of societies is taken for granted. This view of history and culture also 
underscored the assumed universality of modem theory. The influence of the 
economic argument in justifying colonisation and coercive assimilation cannot be 
overestimated.76 Indigenous peoples were thought to be better off for the arrival of 
Europeans and the imposition of a commercial system. It was thought that as 
societies developed and converged, modem constitutions would establish uniform 
legal and political institutions, based on liberal democracy and the market 
economy.77
Locke, argued that the Earth belonged to all in common and as such, no one could ‘take to themselves 
more land than they have need or can inhabit and cultivate’. See Vattel, op. cit., p. 85.
74 John Stuart Mill, Three Essays, Oxford University Press, London, 1975, pp. 382, 384. Mill, p. 
385, argued that ‘... it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another: and when it 
was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race, the absorption is greatly to 
its advantage’. For a comment on Mill, see Patrick Thomberry, ‘Self-determination, minorities, 
human rights: A review of international instruments’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
vol. 38, October 1989, p. 869.
75 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, Knopf, New York, 1993, p. 10 (original emphasis). See 
also Russell, op. cit., p. 5, in agreement.
76 Said, op. cit., p. 75. For Kant, this would go so far as a duty to spread commerce and republican 
constitutions. Kant’s position is discussed in Tully, Strange Multiplicity, pp. 67, 80-1.
77 Tully, ibid., p. 67. The debate then centred around whose model was the most superior. For 
example, Kant’s ‘republican constitution’ was put forward as the method of achieving moral 
progress.
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Conclusion
The social contract theories embody two important elements that influence 
contemporary understandings of the state and sovereignty. First, political authority 
is vested in government by agreement between the people. Second, the state exists 
by and for the freedom of the people. These have become the sources, and the 
measures, of legitimate political power. Thus performance of the obligation to 
protect the accepted inherent rights of individual citizens has become the sole 
measure of legitimate government.
Assertions or assumptions about the universality of existing institutions, whether 
because they are assumed to be superior or to somehow transcend culture, make 
challenge difficult and obfuscate the imperial culture embedded in them. It is not 
simply that these theories were written by European male elites, but that they were 
written specifically to exclude Indigenous peoples. 78 Unless these hidden 
assumptions are acknowledged and open to question then Indigenous peoples face an 
impossible situation. Indigenous peoples are forced to present their claims in the 
institutions and in the language of the coloniser. Here, Tully noted, ‘the injustice of 
cultural imperialism occurs at the beginning, in the authoritative language used to 
discuss the claims in question’ .79 Indigenous peoples’ claims may be difficult to 
express in these alien terms, or they may be distorted by the limits of language they 
are forced to use.80
Edward Said has warned that modern theorists should be approached with ‘an acute 
embarrassed awareness of the all pervasive, unavoidable imperial setting’ .81 The 
crisis of legitimacy for modem theories in this respect cannot be resolved simply by 
amending the theory to include Indigenous peoples. These theorists share certain
78 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, op. cit., pp. 41, 58. See also p. 7.
79 Tully, ibid., pp. 34 and 39, argued that to respond justly to the claims o f Indigenous peoples 
requires the questioning of often unexamined conventions, ‘inherited from the imperial age’. See also 
pp. 47-8, 53.
80 Boldt and Long, op. cit., p. 343.
81 Said, op. cit., p. 66.
53
conventions of thought so that a narrow range of familiar uses of terms has come to 
be accepted as the authoritative traditions of interpretation.82 These concerns are 
imperative given the adoption by Indigenous peoples of so many terms from modem 
theory.
Indigenous peoples often do not speak from a ‘conventional’ theoretical perspective. 
They have borrowed from the liberal tradition in the use of rights discourse, from 
post-modem conceptions of difference, from nationalist ideas of culture and 
nationhood, as well as Marxist understandings of oppression. The unique experience 
of Indigenous peoples in the history of the world gives rise to a distinctive, critical 
Indigenous politics. Together with critical race theory and critical feminist theory, 
this alternative perspective shares a fundamental criticism of contemporary modem 
theorists, in the essential European, masculine, imperial origins and biases of the 
modern theoretical framework.83
The remainder of the chapter more closely examines the accepted regime of rights 
under international law to which Indigenous peoples have appealed, in particular the 
emerging right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination. From the discussion so 
far there are a number of issues that carry through to the discussion of international 
law. The idea of a universal truth, the value attached to uniform institutions and the 
assumption of supreme unitary' sovereignty have all had an impact on the nature and 
content of international law.
82 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, op. cit., p. 36.
8i ibid., pp. 47-8. Tully, p. 53, grouped Indigenous peoples with other groups demanding cultural 
recognition, calling this broader collection ‘interculturalists’: including ‘Aboriginal peoples, members 
of suppressed and divided nationalities, linguistic and visible minorities and citizens who seek 
Constitutional recognition of international cultural relations among peoples’. While I understand that 
minorities share many grievances with Indigenous peoples, I continue to draw a distinction between 
the unique experience of oppression suffered by Indigenous peoples and their distinct claims to 
traditional custodianship, ownership and sovereignty in their lands.
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II. Self-determination in contemporary international law
In the last decade, with some access to the United Nations mechanisms, Indigenous 
peoples have turned to international law and human rights to assert their claims to 
self-determination. 84 Collective rights have gained recognition in the international 
arena to a large extent by the efforts of non-state actors, including Indigenous 
peoples, to alter the traditional state-based order.85 Continued dissatisfaction with 
progress domestically and the promise of developments in the international arena 
have bolstered support for a global resolution to the problems faced by Indigenous 
peoples around the world.
Since the Law of Nations of Vitoria and Vattel, international law has been concerned 
predominantly with the external sovereignty, independence, and relations between 
states. The Charter o f the United Nations, too, provides that states have an 
obligation to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other 
states.86 In addition, the United Nations is excluded, under the Charter, from 
interfering in the domestic jurisdiction of the state. 87 The ideas of sovereign equality 
and sovereign independence have taken on an exclusively statist character. 88
However, the international community is increasingly concerned with the internal 
aspects of self-determination. That is, to ensure that ‘the people’ freely determine 
their political structures and are therefore truly represented at the state and,
84 For a personal account of the genesis of this interest, see Helen Corbett, ‘International efforts’, in 
Voices from the Land, ABC Books, 1993, pp. 76-88. Even prior to the formation of the United 
Nations, North American Indigenous peoples sought inclusion in the community o f nations. See, for 
example, the Iroquois petition reproduced in the judgement of Logan v Styres (1959) 20 DLR (2d) 
416, at pp. 422-4. See Douglas Sanders, ‘Aboriginal rights: The search for recognition in 
international law’, in Boldt and Long, op. cit., pp. 192-203.
85 Many commentators have argued that ‘transovereign’ or ‘transnational’ groups are increasing in 
international importance. See Timothy Terrel and Bernard McNamee, ‘Transovereignty: Separating 
human rights from traditional sovereignty and the implications for the ethics of international law and 
practice’, Fordham Law Journal, vol. 17(3), 1994, pp. 460-1. See also Williams, Encounters..., op. 
cit., p. 662. See also Sarah Pritchard, ‘The significance of international law’, in Sarah Pritchard (ed.), 
Indigenous Peoples, The United Nations and Human Rights, Zed Books and Federation Press, 
Leichhardt, 1988, pp. 2-3.
86 Article 2(4).
87 Article 2(7).
88 See Hannum, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
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concomitantly, at the international level. While self-determination has always been 
considered central to international law, many issues previously regarded to be within 
the domestic jurisdiction of a state have come to be considered issues of international 
concern.89 Peter Russell suggested that at the core of this change is the wavering of 
support for the ‘conviction of inherent superiority’ that served to justify 
colonisation.90 The ideological commitment to non-discrimination among peoples 
brings the hope of a more positive response to the claims of Indigenous peoples.
It would be significant for Indigenous peoples to have an internationally recognised 
right to self-determination, and all that may entail, in the face of competing claims 
from states to their territory and their resources.91 The implication of formulating 
self-determination claims in the language of rights is primarily its assertion of 
entitlement. The involvement of Indigenous peoples in international fora has 
focused on broadening this authoritative influence in an appeal to an inherent right of 
Indigenous peoples to consensual government.
In the end, however, the United Nations is constituted by states, although many of 
them are themselves decolonised nations.92 Irene Watson expressed scepticism of 
the international system constituted in such a way:
We face a state that shares a membership at the United Nations with 
others who likewise have created their identities upon the spoils of 
colonialism. And they act together as though their act of togetherness 
somehow legitimises the conspiracy and reluctance to end colonialism 
and genocide.93
Collective rights embodied in a claim to self-determination are seen as a threat to the 
sovereignty of the dominant state. This tension between Indigenous self- 
determination and the state’s assertion of sovereignty is a recurrent theme throughout
89 Pritchard, The significance of international law, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
90 Russell, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
91 Williams, Encounters ..., op. cit., pp. 668-9.
92 Russell, op. cit., p. 5
93 Watson, Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways, op. cit., p. 45. The control that states have over the debate 
in international fora means that the debate reflects a statist bias. Michael Dodson, Assimilation 
versus Self-determination, op. cit., p. 2, noted that it is the white way to control the agenda and 
debate, to determine the who and what of self-determination.
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this discussion as it is the basis of arguments against the recognition of a right of 
Indigenous peoples to self-determination.
The barriers to abandoning the colonial relationship between Indigenous peoples and 
the states, have moved from overt racism, to rest on a conception of the supremacy 
of the state. Russell described this as the ‘sovereign idea of sovereignty’, that is, a 
notion of absolute and incontrovertible power.94 However, Barry Hindess argued 
that in early theories of sovereignty, the fact of power was intimately tied to the 
conception of power as a function of consent. Hindess suggested that although this 
understanding of power has fallen out of fashion since the Second World War, 
modem conceptions of statehood and sovereignty remain rooted in these same 
values.95
International law debates, then, reflect two conceptions of power. One, the statist 
view, concerned with the fact of power and the preservation of existing states’ 
territory; the other, concerned with the legitimacy of government, according to 
liberal democratic standards. This distinction is central to the claims of Indigenous 
peoples in the international sphere. Paul Coe argued that ‘while one group has 
dominant power and the means to implement it, that does not necessarily give that 
group the right to sovereignty and the exercise of power’ .96 Michael Dodson also 
criticised international law for giving greatest weight to the ‘power to have power’ .97 
Dodson suggested that Indigenous peoples seek a recognised ‘right’ to have power, 
with support at a ‘moral, legal and political level’ .98 Power construed in this way is a 
question of legitimacy.99
94 Russell, op. cit., p. 17. Watson, op. cit., p. 54, argued that ‘we have devolved from racism, to a fear 
of states dis-integrating and collapsing. As though the basis upon which colonial states exist is an 
honourable and justifiable one that should be preserved’.
95 See Hindess, op. cit., p 12. These two ideas o f power and legitimacy of government are the central 
themes of Hindess’ book.
96 Paul Coe, ‘Laws of the Black People - 1985: Sovereignty’, in Barbara Hocking (ed.), International 
Law and Aboriginal Human Rights, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1988, p. 141.
97 Dodson, Towards the exercise of Indigenous rights, op. cit., p. 70.
98 ibid., p. 71.
99 ibid., p. 73.
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The international human rights regime consists of rights and freedoms directed to 
ensuring that governments are representative of the ‘whole people belonging to the 
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour. ’ 100 International instruments 
relating to non-discrimination and political participation are central to the concern 
for legitimate government, as well as recognition of a scheme of individual rights. 
The rights of minorities and religious rights have also received recognition. 
However, Indigenous peoples’ claims have not been accommodated by the existing 
regime. The assumptions of an homogenous people and uniform institutions of 
government have excluded their claims. Nowhere has this exclusion been better 
illustrated than in the treatment of Indigenous peoples’ assertion of the right of self- 
determination.
Self-determination and human rights
United States President Woodrow Wilson first raised the notion of self-determination 
as a principle of international relations. 101 Until then, self-determination had been 
confined to the context of sovereignty and self-rule in political theory. Wilson 
popularised the term ‘self-determination’ as descriptive of the right of peoples to 
have the government of their choice, free from external domination. 102 This was
100 The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co­
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Resolution 2625 
(XXV) of 24 October 1970 GA Res. 2625 UNGAOR 25th Sess. Supp No. 28, p. 121 (1971) para.l 
(The Declaration on Friendly Relations).
101 President Wilson’s enthusiasm for a general and broadly applicable principle received criticism, 
most notably from his own Secretary of State, Robert Lansing who referred to self-determination as:
one o f those declarations of principle which sounds true, and in the abstract may be 
true, and which appeals strongly to man’s innate sense of moral right and to his 
conception of natural justice, but which, when an attempt is made to apply it in every 
case, becomes a source of political instability and domestic disorder and not 
infrequently a cause of rebellion.
Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative, Mifflin, Boston, 1921, p. 101.
102 Trotsky also professed the principle of self-determination of peoples, though the philosophical 
basis for this was in direct contrast to Wilson’s liberalism. The platform of the Petrograd socialists 
argued that: ‘Peace without annexations and indemnities on the basis o f self-determination o f peoples 
is the formula adopted without mental reservations by the proletarian mind and heart’. Proclamation 
of 15 May 1917, quoted in Umozurike, op. cit., pp. 14, 15.
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firmly based in the notion of popular sovereignty.103 ‘The people’, not states, were 
central to this idea.
Examining the emergence of the ‘right’ of self-determination, Pomerance went so far 
as to say that self-determination:
has not only been transformed from a political or moral principle to a 
full legal ‘right’; it has become the pre-emptory norm of international 
law, capable of overriding all other possible peremptory norms and 
even such others as the prohibition of the threat or use of force in 
international relations.104
The right of all peoples to self-determination was included at Article 1 of the United 
Nations Charter, among the purposes of the Charter, and Article 55 in which the 
United Nations pledged to promote important political and social goals:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being 
which are necessary for the peaceful and friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples.
Self-determination and human rights were seen as part of the same norm and as the 
basis for friendly relations and international peace.105 Human rights instruments, 
while the emphasis remained on the rights of individuals, included the right of 
peoples to self-determination.106 Self-determination has been recognised in a number
103 President Wilson, in a message to the Provisional government of Russia, 22 May 1917, stated that 
‘We are fighting for the liberty, the self-government, and the undictated development of all peoples’. 
See The Papers o f Woodrow Wilson, vol. 42 (1917), edited by Arthur Link, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, pp. 366-7.
104 Michla Pomerance, Self-determination in Law and Practice: The new doctrine in the United 
Nations, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982, p. 1. It is generally agreed that there is a right of self 
determination in positive international law in some form. See generally, Thomberry, op. cit. 
Contrast Buchheit, op. cit., p. 81, who noted the argument presented to the Human Rights Committee 
through the late 1950s, that self-determination is a political principle and not a legal right, thus should 
not be included in a legally binding document. Ingrid Detter De Lupis, International Law and the 
Independent State, 2nd edn, Gower, Hants, 1987, p. 14, noted, in particular, the right to self- 
government, which reflects an internal expression of self-determination, as an emerging new rule of 
international law.
105 In Article 56, members of the United Nations pledge to support the purposes set out in Article 55. 
Ostensibly the purpose of including such a provision was to facilitate the national independence of 
colonial and mandated territories, with chapters XI and XII on non-self-governing territories. On the 
binding nature of the Charter, De Lupis, ibid., pp. 13-14, argued that while in some cases the 
resolutions of the General Assembly are more important than ‘the loose provisions of the United 
Nations Charter’, the Charter, as a treaty, is ‘endowed with binding force’. See also Umozurike, op. 
cit., p. 52, and Pomerance op. cit., p. 9. Also H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, 
Stevens, London, 1950, p. 148. Contrast Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, Stevens, London, 
1950, p. 29.
106 The Human Rights Covenants: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (GAR 
2200 A(XXI) 16 December 1966) (ICCPR) and The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (GAR 2200 A (XXI) 16 December 1966) (ICESCR), begin with the right of all 
peoples to self-determination, at Article 1.
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of important international instruments and has been exercised in a number of 
instances to free ‘peoples under alien domination’ . 107 Yet it remains the most 
controversial right used to determine the legitimacy of the government of a state.
Formulation of the principle of self-determination into the language of rights has led 
to the pressure for precise definition and delineation of the nature, scope and content 
of the right. Defining the right of self-determination in international law has been 
characterised by attempts to deny the existence or application of the right in 
circumstances that threaten existing states. 108
President Wilson’s understanding of self-determination incorporated two aspects. 
The first aspect identified the people as the ultimate authority within a state (internal 
self-determination) and the second, of great importance in the ensuing international 
order, was the casting off of alien rule in respect for the autonomy of sovereign 
peoples (external self-determination) . 109 However, it was intended that the principle 
only be applied to the national minorities of the vanquished powers, and was not to 
be used to inquire into ancient wrongs. 110
The most notable exclusion in the decolonisation process was the ‘salt water thesis’ 
of The General Assembly Declaration on the Granting o f Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, which restricted the obligation to facilitate self-determination 
to geographically separate territories, that were distinct, ethnically or culturally, from 
the administrating country. * 111 Irene Watson referred to the mythology of ‘post-
107 Hector Gros Espiell (Special Rapporteur), The Right to Self-determination: Implementation of 
United Nations Resolutions, study commissioned by the United Nations Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.l, 1980.
108 Thus, implementation has been limited to the decolonisation context and has not been readily 
accepted by states to extend any further. Thomberry, op. cit., p. 874.
109 It has been suggested that the external perspective reflects the status in relations with other 
internationally recognised sovereign powers and is distinguished from the internal perspective, or the 
nature and forms of governance, adopted by the people. More broadly, however, external self- 
determination can be defined as the act by which a people determine their future international status 
and liberate themselves from alien rule. Pomerance, op. cit., p. 37.
110 Wilson was influenced by the views of John Stuart Mill who agreed with the assimilation of 
Indigenous cultures. See note 74 above.
111 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Resolution 
1514 (XV) o f 1960 GAOR 15th Session, Supp. 16, p. 66, paras 6-7, together with General Assembly 
Resolution 1541 (XV), GAOR 15th Session, Supp. 16, Principle IV, p. 29. See also Pomerance, op. 
cit., p. 12.
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colonialism’ that ‘spread throughout the states’ academic institutions’ with the 
passing of these declarations. The assertion that colonialism ended with the passing 
of this resolution, ignores the ‘300 million Indigenous Peoples [who] still live a 
colonised existence’.112 The exclusion of Indigenous peoples from this process of 
decolonisation is not premised on a discernible difference between the peoples 
themselves (for example on a scientific development view) but is affected by 
determination of states to protect their territorial integrity. Watson and Dodson both 
spoke of the ‘cost’ involved in the recognition of Indigenous self-determination as a 
primary reason for their exclusion from international legal rights.113
While later UN resolutions do not carry the same emphasis on colonialism, they have 
become more focussed on democratic government and the enjoyment of individual 
human rights as the measures of legitimate government.114 The Declaration on 
Friendly Relations recognised the right of peoples to self-determination as the basis 
for friendly relations but qualifies this in terms that reflect the fiction that the state 
represents a single homogenous people. For the assessment of a valid exercise of 
internal self-determination, liberal democracy has emerged as a norm of international 
law. It implies that self-determination is satisfied where a ‘legitimate’ representative 
government is in place.115 Various commentators have noted the emphasis on liberal
112 Watson, Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways, op. cit., p. 56.
113 ibid., p, 46, 55, and Dodson, Towards the exercise of Indigenous rights, op. cit., p. 69-70.
114 Thomberry, op. cit., p. 875.
115 The Declaration on Friendly Relations, op. cit., at para. 1, asserts that:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity 
or political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and 
thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the 
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
Heraclides, op. cit., p. 30, argued that the current regime for allowing self-determination favours the 
incumbent authority regardless of the nature of that authority. Significantly, the United States 
proposal originally contained a reference to representation of ‘all distinct peoples’ as opposed to ‘the 
whole people’ which was included in the final draft. The Declaration on Friendly Relations 
establishes a set of guidelines for the exercise of self-determination to ensure that the outcome is truly 
the wish of the people. Indeed the guidelines belie a suspicion of any outcome short of complete 
independence. Although this provides some safeguards, it is a reflection of the United Nations pre­
disposition to see secession as the inevitable result of recognising a right to self-determination. 
Pomerance, op. cit., p. 25, noted that while independence is not an imperative or even necessary 
option, anything short should be open to subsequent review.
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majoritarianism. 116 This universal understanding of freedom focussing on 
participation has proved a difficult obstacle for Indigenous peoples. 117
Self-determination means more than merely political rights of participation. Michael 
Dodson argued that self-determination is to peoples what freedom is to individuals, 
that self-determination:
[is] the most fundamental of our rights as peoples; the pillar on which all 
other rights rest; a right of such a profound nature that the integrity of all 
other rights depends on its observance. 118
On this view, self-determination of peoples comes before individual rights and is in 
itself essential for individual freedom. 119
In contrast, states argue that self-determination is an instrumental right the purpose 
of which is to facilitate the enjoyment of individual human rights. 120 As an 
instrumental right, the function of self-determination would be to ensure that a 
people enjoy the human rights recognised by international law. 121 By implication, 
where such rights are enjoyed, in a representative system of government, self- 
determination is being exercised. Similarly, where such rights are being denied, the 
content of self-determination would be that which is required to ensure the protection 
of human rights.
In the first instance, criticism can be leveled against this approach for requiring a 
measurable degree of suffering under human rights abuses before a right of self-
116 Thomberry, op. cit., p. 876; Pomerance, op. cit., p. 39 and Antonio Cassese, ‘The Helsinki 
Declaration and self-determination, in Thomas Buergenthal (ed.), Human Rights, International Law 
and the Helsinki Accord, Universe Books, New York, 1977, p. 90.
117 On the idea o f the universal vision o f truth, see generally Williams, ...Discourses o f Conquest, op. 
cit.
118 Dodson, Towards the exercise o f Indigenous rights, op. cit., p. 68, referred to Nasser Addine 
Ghazali, ‘Opposition to violations o f human rights’, in UNESCO, Violations of Human Rights, Paris, 
1984: ‘Self-determination is to peoples what freedom is to Individuals . . .  the very basis o f their 
existence’. See also Antonio Cassese, ‘The self-determination of peoples’, in Louis Henkin (ed.), The 
International Bill o f Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Colombia Press, New York, 
1981,p. 101.
115 Richard Falk, ‘The rights o f peoples (in particular Indigenous peoples), in Lelio Basso (ed.), 
Theory and Practice of Liberation at the End of the XXth Century, International Foundation for the 
Right and Liberation o f all Peoples, Bruylant, Brussels, 1988, p. 604 .
120 Crawford, op. cit., p. 14.
121 See, for example, James Anaya, ‘The capacity of international law to advance ethnic or nationality 
rights claims’, Symposium: 1990 Moscow Academic Conference, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 13, 
1991, p. 403.
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determination is recognised. However, on a more fundamental level, this approach 
suggests that had United Nations efforts to protect individual human rights been 
more successful, there would be no demand for an exercisable right to self- 
determination by Indigenous peoples.
The protection afforded to Indigenous peoples under the individual rights regime can 
be summarised briefly. The United Nations Charter established non-discrimination 
in the enjoyment of human rights, among the central tenets of the United Nations. 
Therefore one of the principal purposes of the United Nations is in ‘promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion’ . 122 The ideal of non-discrimination 
in the enjoyment of human rights was reiterated, and elaborated, in later human 
rights instruments including The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights m The human rights covenants, 
to which Australia is a party, impose obligations on states to ensure the human rights 
contained in them, ‘without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status’ . 124 The International Convention on the Elimination o f all Forms o f 
Discrimination (CERD) also signed by Australia, reinforces the prohibition on 
discrimination and the obligation on states to eliminate racial discrimination. 125 A 
recent recommendation has reaffirmed the application of the provisions of the 
Convention to Indigenous peoples and calls upon states to include reference to them 
in their periodic reports. 126
122 United Nations Charter Article 1(3), see also Article 55.
123 Specifically, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948) (Art. 2, 7), The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 2.2, 26), and The International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 2.2).
124 ibid.
125 Preambular para.l, Art. 2 and expanded at Art. 5. See generally, Sarah Pritchard, ‘Native title in 
an international perspective’, in Sharing Country: Land Rights, Human Rights and Reconciliation 
after Wik, Proceedings of a Public Forum Held at University of Sydney, February 28, 1997, Research 
Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Sydney, 1997, pp. 35-6.
126 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XXIII (51) 
concerning Indigenous Peoples, adopted at the Committee’s 1235th meeting, 18 August 1997 (UNDoc 
CERD/C/51/Misc.l3/Rev.4), paras 1-2, 6.
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Further, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognises, in 
Article 27, the rights of minorities to enjoy their own culture, religion and language. 
It has been argued that Article 27 could protect issues of cultural importance such as 
the relationship of Indigenous peoples to their lands.127 Moreover, the Human Rights 
Committee of the United Nations stated that protection of minority rights may 
require ‘positive measures’ and acknowledged the importance of culture, including 
land use.128 Article 27 has been used to confirm special rights of Indigenous people, 
in order to protect activities central to cultural survival.129 However, the Committee 
specifically identified these rights as a manifestation of individual rights.130 
Therefore, rights which appear to be collective rights, such as the right to the 
exercise of religion or to be educated in one’s own language, are primarily concerned 
with successful integration and the freedom of the individual, rather than with the 
survival of peoples.131
The comparison between the ‘instrumental right’ position of states and arguments 
put forward by some commentators who, while supportive of Indigenous peoples’ 
claims, adopted a human rights approach to self-determination are worthy of note. It 
has been suggested that minority claims to autonomy and recognition encompass the 
more specific grievances of Indigenous peoples.132 For example, James Anaya 
advocated a ‘human rights approach to autonomy claims’ which focused on the 
imperative of ‘cultural survival and nourishment’, drawing on the fundamental 
values of freedom, equality and peace.133 Anaya avoided the historical basis for
127 Pritchard, Native title in international perspective, op. cit., p. 45. See also Michael Dodson, 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report Jun 1994-Jul 
1995, AGPS, Canberra, 1995, p. 13.
128 General Comment 23 (1994) paras 6.2, 7 UN Doc HR1/GEN/1/Revl(1994), p. 40.
129 Kitok v Sweden UNDoc CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (1988); Ominayak v Canada UNDoc A/45/40 
(1990) vol. 2 at 1; Lansmann v Finland UNDoc CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994); and Lovelace v 
Canada UNDoc CCPR/C/OP/1 (1988). See Pritchard, Native title in international perspective, op. 
cit., pp. 45-7 and Douglas Sanders, ‘Collective rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 13, 1991, pp. 
379-80.
130 General Comment, op. cit., para. 6.2. Compare CERD, General Recommendation, op. cit., para.4.
131 For an exposition of this polyethnic or multicultural liberalism, see, generally, Kymlicka, op. cit.
132 Thomberry op. cit., pp. 867-8, and Anaya, op. cit., pp. 408-9.
133 Anaya, ibid., p. 408. Compare Robert McCorquodale ‘Self-determination: A human rights 
approach’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 43, October 1994, p. 857, whose 
‘human rights approach’ refers to the standards for assessing self-determination claims rather than the 
way claims are framed as in Anaya’s analysis. In contrast, Lea Brilmeyer, op. cit., argued that
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claims of Indigenous peoples in an effort to circumvent the prejudices of the states 
against any challenge to their recognised sovereign powers or territory. In this way, 
Anaya suggested, self-determination is freed from the spectre of destablisation and is 
therefore capable of embracing the continuum of outcomes short of secession that are 
often overlooked in international debate. 134
This approach would place reliance on the recognised rights of minorities in existing 
human rights instruments as the test of whether self-determination is being exercised. 
While it is important to de-emphasise secession as a threat, Indigenous peoples’ 
historical claims encompass much more than cultural integrity. In a similar way to 
the arguments of the states, these theories would require abuse of power, that is, a 
level of oppression, before a legitimate claim to alternative sovereignty would be 
entertained. 135 Understandably, some Indigenous people have rejected this view 
because it fails to acknowledge important aspects of the experience of oppression 
and colonisation. 136 Allotting a merely instrumental role to self-determination denies 
that even where individual rights are now protected Indigenous peoples may still 
suffer disadvantage stemming from alien domination. As a collective expression of 
political will, self-determination is both a means to an end, that is the enjoyment of 
human rights, and an end in itself. 137
The restrictive approach of remedial self-determination can be distinguished from 
the more liberal approach, which Buchheit termed the ‘parochialist model’ . 138 Rather 
than requiring a measure of suffering before a claim of self-determination can
secession claims should not be assessed as claims of distinct peoples but as competing claims to 
territory.
134 Anaya, op. cit., p. 409.
135 Buchheit, op. cit., pp. 53-5.
136 For example, Watson, Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways, op. cit., p. 56, described Anaya’s argument 
as: ‘a complete sellout from an Indigenous perspective’. On the importance of the historical and 
moral claim, see Weither, op. cit., pp. 34-6 and Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit.
137 Special Rapporteur Jose R. Martinez Cobo, op. cit., p. 20, concluded that self-government is an 
inherent part of the cultural and legal tradition of Indigenous peoples and, in its many forms, is a 
basic precondition to the enjoyment of other rights. See also Dodson, Towards the exercise of 
Indigenous rights, op. cit., p. 68; and Catherine Ioms, ‘Indigenous peoples and self determination: 
Challenging state sovereignty’, Case Western Reserve Journal o f International Law, vol. 24(2) 1992, 
pp. 209-10.
138 Buchheit, op. cit., p. 223. Compare Umozurike, op. cit., p. 58.
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succeed, the parochialist model merely requires a genuine ‘self wanting to control 
its own political destiny, driven by the urge to be governed by those like them. 139 
This approach is rooted in the philosophical commitment to self-rule. For advocates 
of this approach, there is no need to assess the merit of the ‘alien rule’, for the mere 
fact of alien rule is the basis of the claim. 140 Instead, there is an emphasis on the 
historic, cultural, religious and/or ethnic distinctiveness of the people and the 
genuine desire for autonomy. To this end, Espiell argued that alien subjugation is 
‘any domination which the people freely determine as such . . . whatever legal 
formula may be used in an attempt to conceal it’ . 141 Rather than focussing on a 
severe deprivation of human rights or on the disruption of international order, the 
inquiry is focussed on the rights of the group as a people.
For these reasons, it has been argued that there is a general imperative to address 
Indigenous peoples’ grievances apart from all other injustices, with regard to their 
unique histories. 142 Falk distinguished Indigenous peoples through their deprivation 
of sovereign rights and a lack of participation or representation in prevailing political 
arrangements. 143 Michael Dodson expressed a similar view:
Because the non-indigenous state was founded on the basis of non­
recognition of pre-existing indigenous rights and laws, indigenous 
peoples and the non-indigenous state lack an agreement about the basic 
principles of nationhood, the structure of government, the source of law, 
and the shaping and sharing of power, wealth and national resources. 144
139 Buchheit, op. cit. Pomerance, op. cit., p. 73, advocated this as a democratic approach which is 
justified because the concept o f self-determination is, itself, based on the notion of consent o f the 
governed.
140 Buchheit, ibid., p. 223-4.
141 Espiell, op. cit., p. 6, and Pomerance, ibid., p. 15.
142 Weither, op. cit., pp. 34-6, argued that this historical and moral claim has been the source o f their 
unique advances in the direction of self-determination thus far. See also Crawford, op. cit., p. 14. 
Also, Elizabeth Pearce, ‘Self-determination for Native Americans: Land rights and utility o f domestic 
and international law’, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, vol. 22, 1991, p. 377, drew a distinction 
between minorities and peoples:
Minorities are groups with distinct cultures, languages or religions that are legally 
and politically integrated into larger nations . . . ‘Peoples’ by contrast, generally 
have a history of autonomy, self-government and nationhood; their claim to self- 
determination rests on their historically separate political and legal existence.
While a minority may also constitute a people, to equate the two without distinction may deny 
Indigenous peoples a right to self-determination.
143 Falk, op. cit., p. 591.
144 Dodson, Towards the exercise o f Indigenous rights, op. cit., p. 73.
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These fundamental grievances result in a variety of encroachments, deficient social 
services, and constant pressure on lands and resources. Therefore, Indigenous 
peoples’ claims are centred on their collective identity based upon inherent sovereign 
rights to government by consent and a history of denial by internal domination. To 
this end, self-determination has been described as a collective right that attaches to a 
group whose goals ‘transcend the ending of discrimination’ . 145 On this view, 
members of the group are not joined simply by external discrimination but by 
internal cohesiveness. More than equal participation, Indigenous peoples seek 
distinct group survival and the freedom to determine their relationship with other 
groups, nations and states. 146 The claims of Indigenous peoples cannot be adequately 
incorporated within the individual human rights or civil rights discourse (though they 
may appeal to those forums). Rather, they include unique rights as peoples, and, in 
particular, as first peoples whose sovereignty predates that of the state.
Self-determination and statehood
The concern over a competing sovereignty lies at the base of arguments against the 
right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination. Part of the difficulty for the 
claims of Indigenous peoples is that the incorporation of self-determination into 
international relations, through the process of nation building, assumed a connection 
between self-determination and statehood, even assuming it to be synonymous with 
the expression of statehood. This early conception of self-determination was 
described as ‘an imprecise amalgam of ideas about self-government and
145 Sanders, Collective rights, op. cit., pp. 368-9, provided an analysis o f individual, group and 
collective rights in this way. Individual rights, for example the right not to be discriminated against, 
are, in effect, the right not to be recognised by reference to a group. Group rights are the sum o f the 
individual rights o f its members. Collective rights do not end with the end of discrimination and 
characteristically relate to the assertion of identity. In contrast, international instruments clearly refer 
to the rights o f minorities to preserve their culture and language, and practice their religion as the 
rights of individuals to the same, to be exercised in community with others. See also Falk, op. cit., 
pp. 585-6.
146 De Lupis, op. cit., p. 15, argued that there is juridical support for this interpretation o f self- 
determination in the International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for 
States o f the Continued Presence o f South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 ICJReports 16 at para. 56. De Lupis noted the Court’s
67
democracy’ . 147 The focus on territory and the threat of secession limits possibilities 
for the exercise of the right in the circumstances of Indigenous peoples. 148
The core concepts of self-determination apply to all independent states, in their right 
‘freely to choose and develop [their] political, social, economic and cultural 
systems’, just as these elements should be enjoyed by all peoples in their pursuit of 
self-determination. Thus it was suggested that self-determination is a claim against 
the self-determination of another, not against anti-self-determination or non-self­
determination. 149 The principle that Indigenous peoples rely upon to support their 
claims to autonomy and independence is one of the central tenets underlying state 
sovereignty. As a result, the demands of Indigenous peoples are confronted with the 
ideas of territorial integrity and autonomy that dominate the international, statist 
sphere.
It is important to recognise that Indigenous peoples often operate outside the statist 
conceptions of international law. The desire for control over decision making in 
Indigenous communities does not necessarily lead to a desire for independent 
statehood. Therefore, arguments against secession do not preclude the recognition of 
the right of self-determination. Rather, they merely highlight the difficulties with 
radical change in current state structures and the need to address more creative 
solutions to resolve conflict. 150
use of the term ‘peoples’, referring to the people of the territory as a ‘jural’ and injured ‘entity’, who 
have a right under international law to progress toward independence.
147 Pomerance, op. cit., p. 1.
148 Falk, op. cit., pp. 585-6, argued that the growth of international human rights standards is a 
challenge to governmental supremacy. Yet the states define the nature and content of rights and limit 
international recourse. The developments in state practice have shown that in certain circumstances, 
and from time to time, the right of peoples to self-determination will take precedence over other 
norms of territorial integrity and exclusive jurisdiction. For example, in the context of the colonial 
subjugation model, self-determination was considered to have precedence over norms of territorial 
integrity, non-interference and non-violence. From this, Pomerance, op. cit., p. 1, concluded that 
self-determination has become ‘the pre-emptory norm of international law’ (original emphasis).
149 Thomberry, op. cit., p. 375, construed the right of peoples entitled to self-determination as the 
right to independent statehood itself, to which all the principles of territorial integrity and non­
interference apply equally. For this reason, Pomerance op. cit., p. 73, stated that the determination of 
‘which self is entitled to determine what, when and how, remains the central question’.
150 Buchheit, op. cit., pp. 21-31, provided a comprehensive list of the arguments against secession, 
and some of the contradictory principles that refute or at least balance the argument. However, ‘The 
Spectre of Secession’ which Buchheit argued underpin the fears of states should be identified as 
merely practical arguments against injudicious secession. Falk, op. cit., pp. 603-4, suggested that 
what is required is a formal expression of the urgency and seriousness of the claims and the grossness 
of the abuse of human rights, and a qualitative extension of human rights and self-determination.
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At the same time, the failure to recognise the right of Indigenous peoples to self- 
determination cannot be justified merely by the threat to the territorial integrity of 
the state. Territorial integrity cannot simply be equated with stability and self- 
determination with disruptive change. As Irene Watson argued, for Indigenous 
peoples peace is not a known or lived reality. 151 Indeed it could be argued that 
recognition of the right to complete self-rule may provide a sense of security, by 
creating a more equal relationship, and thus provide the foundations for a negotiated 
state structure.
The question of who is to be recognised as the ‘self entitled to self-determination 
continues to be a source of contention. Attempts to limit the applicability of the 
recognised right of peoples to self-determination have led the states to simply assert 
that Indigenous peoples are not peoples and therefore unable to claim self- 
determination. 155 Thus, a convenient conclusion has been reached first and a 
definition has been constructed around it, to exclude those for whom it may connote 
a right of secession. 154
Generalised theories of sovereignty have confused debate over the status of multi­
nation states, and particularly Indigenous peoples. While the states continue to argue 
that it is the population of a state as a whole which is to be considered a people for 
the purposes of self-determination, peoples within current state boundaries argue for 
their separate recognition. International law has been framed upon the assumption
151 Watson, Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways, op. cit., p. 55.
152 For example, The Declaration on Friendly Relations, op. cit., general part, para 3, recognised self 
determination as the basis of friendly relations.
153 For example, see debates in the International Labour Organisation, revising the Convention 
Concerning the Protections and Integration of Tribal and Semi-tribal Populations in Independent 
Countries, 1957 (Convention 107) where the states were against the use of the term ‘peoples’ and 
preferred to refer to ‘populations’. In the revised Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries 1989 (Convention 169), Article 1 para 3, while recognising 
Indigenous ‘peoples’ qualified the term to exclude any meaning in international law. See Geoff 
Clarke, ‘ILO Convention 107: Revision or reversion’, Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 2(40), 1989, p. 4. 
For a more comprehensive discussion of the revision process see Lisa Strelein, ‘The price of 
compromise: Should Australia ratify ILO Convention 169’, in Greta Bird, Jennifer Nielsen and Gary 
Martin (eds), Majah: Indigenous People and the Law, Federation Press, Sydney, 1996, particularly 
pp. 77-9. See also Russel Barsh, ‘An advocates guide to the Convention on Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples’, Oklahoma City Law Review, vol. 15, 1990, p. 209.
154 This was epitomised in the ‘salt water thesis’ in Resolution 1541, discussed above. A similar 
criticism of International law formulation was expressed by Dodson, Towards the exercise of 
Indigenous rights, op. cit., p. 70.
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that the state is an indivisible people while considering Indigenous peoples as merely 
minority populations.155 Moreover, it assumed that states acting in the international 
arena express the legitimate authority of the people that they represent.156
Yet, the international community has begun to recognise the distinction between 
states and the ‘peoples’ who are entitled to exercise self-determination. The 
Declaration on Friendly Relations reflects a strengthening of the principle among 
the fundamental tenets of international law.157 A pivotal change in the approach in 
this declaration was to address the implementation provisions to ‘peoples’ rather 
than to ‘states’. The change in emphasis is important for the emergence of an 
effective right of self-determination.
Draft Declaration on the Rights o f Indigenous Peoples
The continuing international attention on the treatment of Indigenous peoples by 
states has led to a reconsideration of the status of Indigenous peoples in matters of 
international concern. In 1971 Jose Martinez Cobo was appointed special rapporteur 
to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities to conduct a study of the specific problem of discrimination against 
Indigenous peoples.158 The fact of the study being undertaken gave a level of
155 Crawford, op. cit., p. 14.
156 Falk , op. cit., pp. 595-6.
157 The International Commission of Jurists’ Report, The Events in East Pakistan, 1971: A Legal 
Study, Geneva, 1972, p. 67, observed that The Declaration on Friendly Relations was ‘the most 
authoritative statement of the principles of international law relevant to the questions of self- 
determination and territorial integrity’. In its three preambular paragraphs, the Declaration affirms 
the principle of self-determination. In contrast to earlier formulations of the main principles of 
international law, this document gives some guidance as to how they stand in relation to one another. 
The Resolution states, in general part para 2, that:
In their interpretation and application the above principles are interrelated and each 
principle should be construed in the context of the other principles . . . Nothing in this 
Declaration shall be construed as prejudicing in any manner the provisions of the 
Charter or the rights and duties of the Member States under the Charter or the rights of 
peoples under the Charter taking into account the elaboration of these rights in this 
Declaration.
While not making self-determination necessarily peremptory, this provision clearly disposes of 
notions of supremacy of particular principles over others.
158 Sub-Commission Resolution 8 (XXIV), 18 August 1971. The Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities is a sub-commission of the Commission on Human 
Rights, a functional Commission of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
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legitimacy to the claims of Indigenous peoples and placed these issues on the agenda 
of a number of countries, non-governmental organisations and international 
bodies.159 Even before the completion of the report, with support from Norway and 
the Netherlands in particular, the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
established the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) 
as a pre-sessional working group of the Sub-Commission.160 The Working Group 
was established for the dual purposes of providing a forum to review the experiences 
of Indigenous peoples and to draft standards for the treatment of Indigenous peoples 
by member states.161
The establishment of the Working Group was a significant act of recognition of the 
struggle of Indigenous peoples and the need for an international response to their 
claims. The Working Group is structured as a body of ‘experts’ who hear 
submissions from states, non-governmental organisations and from Indigenous 
peoples themselves.162 The Working Group has met annually since 1982 and at each 
session the ‘review of developments’ has allowed Indigenous peoples to come
159 See Douglas Sanders, ‘The Re-emergence of Indigenous Questions in International Law’, 
Canadian Human Rights Yearbook, 1983, pp. 3-30; Russel Barsh, ‘Indigenous Peoples: An emerging 
object of international law’, American Journal o f International Law, vol. 80, 1986, p. 369; and Barsh, 
‘Indigenous North America and Contemporary International Law’, Oregon Law Review, vol. 62, 
1993, pp. 99-100.
160 Sub-Commission Resolution 2 (XXXIV), 8 September 1981, endorsed by the Commission on 
Human Rights Resolution 1982/19, 10 March 1982, and authorised by ECOSOC Resolution 1982/34, 
7 May 1982. The Cobo Report, op. cit., was completed in 1983. The use o f ‘populations’ in the title 
of the Working Group was quickly recognised as a denigrative term that denied Indigenous peoples 
rights as peoples under international law. The Working Group is often referred to as the Working 
Group on Indigenous Peoples as a sign of respect and recognition. The title of the document 
emerging from the Working Group (The Draft Declaration on the Rights o f Indigenous Peoples) and 
the terms of the declaration refer to peoples and proposals have been suggested for changing the 
name of the Working Group in any restructuring of its role.
161 The two tasks were identified in the 1982 Resolution of the ECOSOC, op. cit.
(i) to review developments pertaining to the promotion and protection of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous populations; and
(ii) give special attention to the evolution of standards concerning the rights of such populations.
162 There are five members of the Working Group (representing the five regions recognised by the 
UN) which are drawn from the Sub-Commission. As experts they act in their individual capacity and 
do not represent the governments of their states. The number of Indigenous NGO’s with consultative 
status is limited (approximately twelve, predominantly North American, but including NAILSS and 
ATSIC from Australia). From the outset it was determined that any Indigenous person or 
representative could address the Working Group. To facilitate this involvement the United Nations 
Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations was established to fund a number of Indigenous people to 
attend Working Group Sessions.
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together from all over the world to share their stories and challenge the governments 
of the states in which they find themselves.163
The value of this forum for Indigenous peoples to find support in their common 
experience should not be underestimated. Michael Dodson, in the Fourth Report of 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, stated that:
The United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations is a 
forum where Indigenous peoples from around the world come together.
It provides a structure for the articulation of our rights. It gives us the 
shared power of common positions. I have described the Working Group 
as a ‘small revolution’, a revolution which has seen the Earth’s 300 
million Indigenous people stand, not in isolation against often hostile 
Nation States, but together in dialogue with governments, many of which 
had their genesis in colonial power. 64
Integral to the success of Working Group for Indigenous Populations was its process
and operation. Marcia Langton highlighted the significance of being treated equally
in the Working Group, with equal status in many respects, equal speaking rights and 
equal treatment of reports, and recognition of the right of any Indigenous person to 
speak.165
From 1985 the Working Group has concentrated on drafting standards for the 
promotion and protection of the rights of Indigenous peoples. A Draft Declaration 
o f the Rights o f Indigenous Peoples was developed based on the rights of minorities 
under current human rights instruments and the rights of peoples as they are 
currently understood. The Working Group recognised that in order to adequately 
address the concerns of Indigenous peoples, the declaration must protect Indigenous 
peoples’ individual rights, distinct collective identity, education, economic and social
163 In 1986, the meeting o f the Working Group, along with the Sub-Commission and its other 
subsidiaries, were cancelled for financial reasons. Each year the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission publishes the Australian Contribution to the Working Group. These collections provide 
an interesting contrast by bringing together the statements from the Australian government, ATSIC 
and Indigenous community organisations including legal rights groups, education groups, Land 
Councils, among many others.
164 Michael Dodson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Fourth 
Report, AGPS, Canberra, 1996, p. 153 (parentheses omitted). See also Erica Irene Daes, in the 
Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Tenth Session, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33, at paragraph 25.
165 Marcia Langton, The United Nations and Indigenous Minorities: A Report on the United Nations 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, in Hocking, op. cit., p. 83.
72
rights, land rights, self-government rights and self-determination rights.166 An 
intersessional working group of the Commission on Human Rights is now 
considering the draft declaration.167
The Indigenous participants at the WGIP, while generally supporting the Draft 
Declaration, had expressed some reservations about the level of compromise 
throughout the Working Group’s history right up until the final text was agreed 
upon.168 During the eleven years of the Working Group states’ representatives 
argued strongly against the inclusion of ‘peoples’ rights’, namely the right o f self- 
determination. For example in 1983, Australia’s representative, while supporting the 
concept of self-management, sought to ‘avoid any suggestion that separate 
development or secession is at issue’.169 Eventually, through many years of dialogue, 
the importance of the right was recognised by all the participants and the final draft 
included, at Article 3, that:
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.170
Many Indigenous people argued that without this recognition the Draft Declaration
would not have reflected the aspirations of Indigenous peoples.171
At the same time, some Indigenous people expressed disappointment at the inclusion 
of Article 31, which purports to elucidate the meaning of self-determination for
166 See Erica Irene Daes, Address to Conference on the Position of Indigenous Peoples in National 
Constitutions, Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation and Constitutional Centenary Foundation, 
Canberra, 4-5 June 1993, pp. 52-9. For broad grouping of these rights see ATSIC, The United 
Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Analysis (prepared by Sarah 
Pritchard), June 1996. See also Falk, op. cit., pp. 607-8 and the final text of the Draft Declaration on 
the Rights Of Indigenous Peoples, from the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add. 1.
167 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1995/32, 3 March 1995, resolved ‘to establish an 
open-ended inter-sessional working group . . .  with the sole purpose of elaborating a draft declaration, 
considering the draft . . . "United Nations declaration of the rights of indigenous peoples" for 
consideration and adoption by the General Assembly within the International Decade of the World’s 
Indigenous People’.
168 See for example, Watson, Indigenous Peoples law-ways, op. cit., p. 24.
169 Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations at its second session, Review of 
Developments UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1983 2/Add.2 (2 August 1983), pp. 2-3.
170 Article 3 is supported by preambular para. 14, that acknowledges the right of self-determination in 
the United Nations Charter and the human rights covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR) thus providing the 
link between Indigenous peoples and ‘all peoples’ as understood in those instruments.
171 Watson, Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways, op. cit., p. 56. See also Sharon Venne, op. cit.
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Indigenous peoples but implicitly excludes recognition of a right of secession.172 
Article 31 states:
Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self- 
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters 
relating to their internal and local affairs, including culture, religion, 
education, information, media, health, housing, employment, social 
welfare, economic activities, land and resource management, 
environment and entry by non-members, as well as ways and means for 
financing these autonomous functions
While the inclusion of this provision may ensure the passage of the draft through the 
levels of the United Nations and relieve some of the states’ paranoia over the threat 
of secession, it is arguable that any limitation of the concept of self-determination 
may fundamentally undermine it.
As a result of these reservations, Indigenous participants at the first session of the 
working group of the Commission on Human Rights were insistent that the 
declaration be accepted for consideration in its entirety.173 The representative of the 
Grand Council of Crees stated:
The Draft Declaration is perhaps the most representative document that 
the United Nations has ever produced, representative in the sense that its 
normative statements reflect in a more than token way, the experience, 
perspectives, and contributions of indigenous peoples. In a word, it is a 
document of equal dialogue and mutual recognition . . . [therefore] the 
Working Group should approach the Draft Declaration before it on the 
basis of a high presumption of validity of its provisions.174
172 Watson, ibid., p. 57, with others, referred to this provision as ‘the shopping list’.
173 A statement adopted by consensus from the Indigenous organisations attending the preparatory 
meeting called for the adoption of the draft declaration by the sub-commission as it ‘reflected 
minimum standards for the survival of Indigenous peoples’ (Report of the Working Group 
established in accordance with the Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 
1995, at its first session, UN Doc E/CN.4/1996/84, para 25). This sentiment was reiterated at the 
Second Session (Report of the Working Group established in accordance with the Commission on 
Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995, at its second session, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1996/WG.15/CRP.7, para 7). At the first meeting in November/December 1995, it was 
agreed that: ‘In general, both Governments and Indigenous organizations agree that the draft . . .  as 
adopted by the Sub-Commission constituted a sound basis for discussions to come’. See Report of 
the first session, paragraph 21. However, a draft agenda for the second session again caused concern 
with the Indigenous caucus calling for the immediate adoption of the declaration ‘without change, 
amendment or deletion’. The proposal was disregarded and the Indigenous people withdrew from the 
meeting restating concerns over the level of involvement of Indigenous peoples in the process stating 
that ‘this blatant disregard [was] a serious violation of the agreed process of the principle of full 
participation and the general goodwill and spirit of co-operation’. Statement of the Indigenous 
peoples caucus to the Chairman of the Intersessional open ended working group established to 
elaborate a draft declaration on the rights of Indigenous peoples, 21 October 1996. For a full report, 
see Sarah Pritchard, ‘The United Nations and the making of a declaration on Indigenous rights’, 
Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 3(89), 1997, p. 6. The Indigenous delegation returned to the plenary on 
25 October.
174 Report of the First session, op. cit.
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For the same reasons, and to protect the integrity of the Draft Declaration, concern 
has been raised over the level of involvement of Indigenous peoples under the more 
restrictive rules of the Commission’s working group. Involvement and meaningful 
participation of Indigenous peoples was so important to the drafting process. The 
struggle to re-establish such a level of engagement has resulted in some frustration 
for Indigenous participants in this new forum, resulting in a withdrawal from the 
1996 meeting.175
Despite the uncertainties and concerns for the Draft Declaration, Michael Dodson 
commented on the value that Indigenous peoples continue to place in the process:
We have not yet lost faith in the capacity of the Working Group, in time, 
to arrive at an understanding of the aspirations and entitlements of 
Indigenous nations and peoples.176
Standards that emerge from the Draft Declaration, largely reflecting Indigenous 
aspirations, will have significant import. They will give recognition to the claims of 
Indigenous peoples as legitimate claims against the states. The moral persuasiveness 
of the WGIP has already been evident, as has the impact of ‘intercultural dialogue’ 
on the state actors. In the midst of the tension at the 1996 meeting of the working 
group of the Commission on Human Rights, the Canadian government, previously 
opposed to Article 3 and the use of the term ‘peoples’, stated that:
the government of Canada accepts a right of self-determination for 
Indigenous peoples which respects the political, constitutional and 
territorial integrity of democratic states.177
This turn around highlighted the impact of sustained dialogue and openness on the 
part of states can achieve.
175 Indigenous participants walked out in protest with only the Australian delegation remaining. For 
comment, see Watson, Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways, op. cit., p. 58, note 35. See also, Pritchard, 
...the making of a declaration, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
176 Michael Dodson, Statement on behalf of the Central Land Council, Indigenous Woman 
Aboriginal Corporation, NAILSS and the NSW Aboriginal Land Council, reported in Pritchard, ...the 
making of a declaration, op. cit., p. 8.
177 Report o f the second meeting, op. cit., para. 309. Note comments by Michael Dodson, Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, also on behalf o f ATSIC and NAILSS, 
Reported in Pritchard, ...the making of a declaration, op. cit., that the Canadian statement ‘is 
testimony to what is possible in building understanding and respect for these concepts [and] confirms 
our faith in the value and importance of this process’. See also the Report o f the Second meeting, 
para. 319. A similar transformation could be observed in the Australian government representatives 
at the WGIP, although the impact o f the change in government has yet to be assessed.
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Proposals for strengthening and renewing the role of the WGIP appear to have the 
support of governments. 178 However, the Working Group would have no role in 
hearing complaints by Indigenous peoples against states for abuse of human rights 
and no mechanisms to investigate claims or question governments. In proposing a 
renewed structure for the Working Group, members have suggested that other 
‘competent’ bodies within the United Nations system would be better to undertake 
complaints. 179 However, other bodies within the United Nations have been 
inaccessible for Indigenous peoples’ self-determination claims. 180
The Human Rights Committee, established under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, established under the Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f 
Discrimination, and the Committee Against Torture, established under the 
Convention Against Torture all have individual complaints procedures against states 
that have signed the relevant instruments and agreed to the procedures. 181 Attempts 
by Indigenous peoples to access these procedures have been relatively unsuccessful. 
While upholding individual rights against discrimination, in the Lovelace and Kitok 
cases, claims by Indigenous peoples under the right of self-determination would not 
be entertained. 182 In Ominayak v Canada the Human Rights Committee determined 
that the ‘individual’ complaints procedure under the Optional Protocol could not
178 Prior to the change in government this certainly included Australia. See statements by Damir 
Ivkovic, on behalf of the Australian (Keating-Labor Party) government, in ATSIC, UN Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations, 13th Session, The Australian Contribution, 1995. On the future 
role of the Working Group, Agenda item 8, p. 107, ‘Australia sees the Working Group as having a 
continuing and important role. The WGIP performs a valuable function as the only forum in which 
indigenous peoples can freely raise their concerns’. Also, p. 113, on the consideration o f a permanent 
forum (Agenda item 9), ‘Australia strongly supports the establishment of a permanent forum for 
Indigenous peoples within the United Nations system’.
179 Erica Irene Daes, in United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Report o f the 
Tenth Session, ECN.4/Sub.2/1992/33 para 25. See also Professor Miguel Alfonso Martinez, in the 
Report of the Eleventh Session, op. cit., para 189.
180 See generally, Mary Ellen Turpel, ‘Indigenous peoples rights of political participation and self- 
determination: Recent international legal developments and the continuing struggle for recognition’, 
Cornell University Law Journal, vol. 25, 1992, p. 589. Compare Sarah Pritchard, ‘The importance of 
international law’, op. cit., on the use of international law generally.
181 See Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Individual complaints: an overview and admissibility requirements’, in 
Sarah Pritchard, Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights, op. cit., p. 74. Also, 
note the International Labour Office enforcement/monitoring procedures under Convention 169 or 
107 and the ECOSOC Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or Resolution 1503 
confidential procedures.
182 Lovelace v Canada UNDoc CCPR/C/OP/l(1988); and Kitok v Sweden UNDoc 
CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985( 1988).
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accommodate communications concerning the collective right of self-
determination. 183 This direction was confirmed in the Mikmaq case where the 
Committee rejected arguments based on self-determination as beyond the 
competence of the Committee. 184 In the absence of effective complaint procedures, 
the forum provided by the review of developments at the WGIP is valued by 
Indigenous peoples, as evidenced by the high levels of participation.
The limitation of the international system remains the preference for maintaining the 
status quo of state sovereignty. Reflecting on the difficulties of states’ resistance, 
Michael Dodson argued that:
When we become disheartened by the apparent monopoly which states 
have on power, it is crucial that we remember that, despite their claims to 
the contrary, states are not sovereign. Peoples are sovereign. States do 
not have rights. Peoples have rights.
And when people are not free they will fight for that freedom. And they 
will continue to fight for that freedom until it is theirs. 185
The principles of non-intervention and territorial integrity, traditionally the
cornerstones of states’ expression of self-determination, should not be presumed to
take precedence over other norms of international law, in particular the right of
peoples to self-determination.
The preponderance of academic opinion agrees that Indigenous peoples’ right to self- 
determination, including the right to independent statehood, could be recognised 
within the framework of current international law. 186 Taken together, the 
international instruments show a systematic affirmation of the right of all peoples to 
self-determination and, as Michael Dodson has observed, ‘[t]he fact that we are
183 Ominayak v Canada, 26 March 1990, UNDoc CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (1990) (The Lubicon Lake 
Case).
184 Mikmaq Tribal Society v Canada, 3 December 1991, UNDoc CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986 (1991). 
Instead, the committee attempted to fit the claims within an individual right to participate in 
government.
185 Dodson, Towards the exercise o f Indigenous rights, op. cit., p. 75.
186 For an assessment of the approaches see, for example, loms, op. cit.
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colonised within geographical borders of existing states has in no way attenuated the 
impact of colonisation, which for us has been equally heinous’ . 187
Recognition of Indigenous peoples as colonised peoples will require a fundamental 
shift in thinking and in the assumptions upon which previous approaches have been 
based. This would appear to be a difficult task when, as we have seen, the exclusion 
of Indigenous peoples from recognition has its roots in the earliest principles of 
international law. If Tully is correct, then the change that is required can only come 
from dialogue, where equality and respect are truly practised and Indigenous voices 
heard. For many Indigenous peoples the Working Group has provided this 
opportunity.
Conclusion
Examining the international response to the claims of Indigenous peoples reveals the 
realities of power in the international sphere and also the limits of its founding 
theories. The jealously guarded authority and territory of existing states is supported 
by the international system. However, Indigenous peoples’ claims do not, of 
necessity, demand concessions in this statist sphere. The conflation of sovereignty 
and statehood in international law feeds the resistance to Indigenous peoples’ claims, 
as a threat to the ideal of an homogenous state. International law reinforces the ideal 
of uniform institutions and universal participation as the measures of legitimate 
sovereignty. Also, the primacy of individual rights discredits the collective claims of 
Indigenous peoples whose unique status has not been recognised.
Many Indigenous people have embraced the move toward rights discourse. Indeed 
Robert Williams Jr. described its adoption as ‘an act of self defence’ because, ‘rights
187 Dodson, Towards the exercise of Indigenous rights, op. cit., p. 69.
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discourse enables indigenous peoples to understand and express their oppression in 
terms that are meaningful to them and to their oppressors’ . 188
Further, Williams argued that rights discourse can be liberating for Indigenous 
peoples ‘if applied and systematised correctly’, that is, to include collective rights. 189 
Indeed, in relation to the assertion of self-determination, Michael Dodson argued 
that, ‘[t]he level of fervour with which we assert the right is a reflection of its 
profound and pervasive violation’ . 190
This discussion illustrates that supreme sovereignty and the individual as sole 
possessor of rights are part of legal and political language. All of these emerge from 
a particular tradition of thought that has become universally accepted and permeates 
the institutions and doctrines to which Indigenous peoples appeal. The final point to 
highlight is that the international law does not necessarily hold the answer for 
Indigenous peoples’ struggle for self-determination. Like the other tools available, 
international law remains a part of a comprehensive strategy, in which use is also 
made of the domestic courts.
III. The language of self-determination
The assertion of identity, autonomy and authority and the demand for recognition 
and respect have led Indigenous peoples to embrace the language of self- 
determination. The attraction of this language is in the force of its imagery, in its
188 Robert A. Williams Jr, ‘Encounters on the frontiers of international human rights law: Redefining 
the terms of Indigenous peoples’ survival in the world’, Duke Law Journal, 1990, p. 662. In contrast, 
Flanagan, op. cit., p. 84, argued that although Aboriginal people are ‘taking the opportunity to restate 
their ancient view o f themselves’, the influence o f legal tradition upon their vocabulary produces 
anomalies. In particular, self-determination claims are asserted through doctrines originally founded 
in hierarchical relationship of dependence.
189 Williams, ibid., p. 662, argued that this would require that rights regimes include collective rights 
and secondly to appreciates the value of Indigenous peoples’ story-telling.
!9° Dodson, Towards the exercise o f Indigenous rights, op. cit., p. 68.
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meaning, and also in the application of the concept in international law and politics.
I use the term ‘self-determination claims’ throughout the thesis to describe the broad 
array of claims made by Indigenous peoples against the state as peoples. Therefore, 
claims that assert oppression, such as claims to equality and non-discrimination, 
claims to equal protection of the laws, as well as assertions of collective identity, 
through self-government, land titles and the recognition of Indigenous laws and 
institutions come under the broad penumbra of self-determination claims. These are 
not claims for special rights or privileges. Rather, they are claims for recognition of 
the prior and continuing authority of Indigenous peoples, respect for their autonomy 
and their status as the first peoples of the land. This issue of respect is fundamental 
to Indigenous peoples’ claims against the state.
Self-determination has been expressed as the freedom of a people to determine their 
own political status, and the freedom to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 191 In this sense, self-determination is not, in itself, secession or self- 
government or the right to vote. Rather, it is seen as a statement of principle, that 
whatever the nature of the institutions of government, they be chosen by the freely 
expressed will of the people. 192
It has been suggested that self-determination is ‘merely a statement of a problem and 
not a solution for it’ . 193 But self-determination is better understood as a statement of 
the appropriate way to respond to the aspirations of Indigenous peoples. 
Alternatively, it could be said to be a description of the nature of the process for 
attaining outcomes. Irene Watson explained that:
Self-determination is a term adopted by Indigenous Peoples to express to 
the world who we are. And by what path or process we should proceed
191 This is the language used in international instruments discussed above. More specifically, 
Umozurike, op. cit., p. 192, has characterised self-determination as including: 1) government 
according to the will o f the people; 2) absence of internal or external domination; 3) the free pursuit 
of economic social and cultural development; 4) enjoyment of fundamental human rights and equal 
treatment; and 5) the absence of discrimination on grounds o f race, colour, class, caste creed or 
political conviction. Compare Buchheit, op. cit., p. 14, who defined external self-determination as the 
expression, by a group of people, o f their right to pursue their political, social, cultural and economic 
wishes without the interference or coercion of outside states.
192 Pomerance, op. cit., pp. 26-34. See also Thornberry, op. cit., pp. 868-9.
193 Arnold J. Toynbee, ‘Self determination’, The Quarterly Review (London), No. 484, 1925, p. 319.
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in gaining respect and recognition as Peoples and custodians of the earth 
our mother. 194
The attraction is in the emphasis on process as the essence of self-determination. In 
this context, self-determination respects a people’s autonomy and authority in 
decision-making.
With this understanding of process, it has been argued that self-determination should 
be viewed as a continuum of outcomes up to and including secession. 195 The 
possibility of territorial and non-territorial autonomy remains central to the self- 
determination process. 196 Yet the ultimate mode of self-determination that emerges 
in the circumstances of a particular case must meet the demands of the Indigenous 
people concerned. The idea of ‘self and identity, and the power to ‘determine’ 
seems to provide recognition of the many aspirations implicit in Indigenous peoples’ 
claims. It is the characteristic of self-rule that underscores the claims of Indigenous 
peoples.
In non-Indigenous legal and political theory self-determination has been associated 
with statehood and the conventions of modem theories of sovereignty. The impact 
of this association is imperative not least because states, governments and many 
theorists use the rhetoric of sovereignty to preclude recognition of Indigenous 
peoples’ claims. Examining the reactions to self-determination claims in an 
international context, Hurst Hannum noted that:
Sovereignty is the cornerstone of international rhetoric about state 
independence and freedom of action, and the most common response to 
initiatives which seek to limit a state’s action in any way is that such 
initiatives constitute an impermissible limitation on that state’s 
sovereignty. 197
194 Watson, Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways, op. cit., p. 55.
195 Pomerance, op. cit., p. 75.
196 Heraclides, op. cit., p. 11. Similarly, James Anaya, op. cit., p. 409, argued that the self- 
determination principle is capable of embracing ‘more nuanced interpretations and applications, 
particularly in an increasingly interdependent world in which the formal attributes of statehood mean 
less and less’. As a result, self-determination should be seen as ‘a right of cultural groupings to the 
political institutions necessary to allow them to exist and develop according to their distinctive 
characteristics’.
197 Hannum, op. cit., p. 14. Although I take issue with Hannum’s suggestion early in his book, at p. 
15, that ‘sovereignty is an attribute of statehood and only states can be sovereign’, this does set up the 
difficulty for Indigenous peoples asserting self-determination in the face o f states’ assertions of sole 
sovereignty.
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Yet, many Indigenous peoples also voice their claims in the language of sovereignty, 
although their understanding of sovereignty may be different to that put forward by 
the state. Boldt and Long argued that the appeal of sovereignty, similar to that of 
self-determination, is in its vagueness, allowing people to ‘project onto it a promise 
of most of their political, socio-cultural, and economic aspirations’ . 198
Commentators have described the claims of Indigenous peoples as a third movement 
of decolonisation or anti-imperialism, by those who were excluded and suppressed 
by the previous waves of decolonisation and state building. 199 The analogy with 
earlier struggles for independence and freedom from colonial domination further 
elucidates the attraction of the language of self-determination and sovereignty.200 
However, the first movements of anti-imperialism and decolonisation sought 
independence and self-government within an accepted framework of nation-state 
building, with its presumptions of uniformity and legitimacy. The difficulty for 
Indigenous peoples is that their claims often question the dominant framework. 
Irene Watson suggested that:
Indigenous peoples question not only by what right the colonial power 
has come to exist but also to what extent colonial rules and regulations 
become incorporated into indigenous legal systems . . . The question 
remains to be answered, how far is the state prepared to go, in peeling 
away the layers of the imposed legal system? Are they prepared to 
undress themselves, and in their alien nakedness surrender to the law of 
the land? 201
While Indigenous peoples do not necessarily seek secession or independent
statehood, their claims challenge the legitimacy of their oppressor’s authority and
198 Boldt and Long, op. cit., p. 334. See also Hannum, op. cit., p. 14, ‘the content of the term . . .  is at 
least murky, whatever its emotional appeal’. Peter Russell, op. cit., p. 17, suggested that Indigenous 
peoples assert sovereignty specifically because non-indigenous peoples deny that they have it.
199 See, for example, Tully, Strange Multiplicity, op. cit., p. 16, drew the analogy with earlier 
struggles against imperial systems, initially against the papacy and Holy Roman Empire and the 
absolutist regimes in societies within Europe and then the continuing progression of former colonies 
freeing themselves from European imperialism. On these movements, see generally, Mattem, op. cit. 
Compare Peter Russell, op. cit., p. 4, who saw the first wave of decolonisation in the emergence of 
independent states such as the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia from colonial rule 
and the second in the process o f nation building throughout Europe, Africa and Asia, after World War 
II.
200 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, op. cit., p. 16.
201 Watson, Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways, op. cit., p. 58.
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most importantly they question the universality of the framework against which their 
claims are judged.202
The legitimacy of claims, in the first instance, is tested by the structures and 
language of alien institutions. But even where these claims are acknowledged, they 
are then assessed according to the same conventional criteria designed to exclude 
them. Demands for recognition of sovereignty, nationhood, or self-determination are 
all assessed in terms that presume the very universals under challenge, including the 
uniform state with its centralised, hierarchical systems of legal and political 
institutions.203
Concern must also be raised over the impact of the process on the claimants 
themselves. It is difficult to imagine that these alien concepts can be relied upon 
without some of their substance being imported into Indigenous ways. Peter Russell 
identified the irony in Indigenous peoples’ success in the courts and international 
forums:
The use of these terms reflects more than simply a change in the use of 
symbols. It reflects a significant degree of societal assimilation. Fourth 
world peoples like third world peoples will find themselves becoming 
less distinct from the dominant society as they adopt that society’s 
techniques to resist its domination.204
The influence of European, patriarchal, hierarchical, ideas and institutions is a subtle 
aspect of assimilation.205 In response, Indigenous peoples continue to assert the 
value of their own ways, which survive in the face of centuries of attempts at 
coercive assimilation.
202 Peter Russell, op. cit., p. 2, argued that the challenge in this third movement of decolonisation is 
that ‘it must make it possible for the decolonized and the former colonizers not only to share the same 
territory but to share membership in a common [multi-national] political community’.
203 Boldt and Long, op. cit., pp. 335-7 and Tully, Strange Multiplicity, op. cit., pp. 9, 36.
204 Russell, op. cit., pp. 6-7, also noted this process in the decolonisation process in Africa. The term 
‘Fourth world’ peoples has been used to refer to Indigenous peoples who often live in ‘third world’ 
conditions in first world, wealthy countries.
205 Boldt and Long, op. cit., pp. 335-7. This problem has been of particular concern to Indigenous 
women. See for example, in the case of land claims hearings, Deborah Bird Rose, ‘Land rights and 
deep colonising: The erasure of women’, Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 3(85), 1996, p. 9. See also 
Annie Keely, ‘Women and land: The problems Aboriginal women face in providing gender restricted 
evidence’, Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 3(87), 1996, p. 4-5 and Deborah Bird Rose, ‘Women and 
land claims’, Land, Rights, Laws: Issues o f Native Title, Issues Paper No. 6, Native Title Research 
Unit, A1ATSIS, January 1995, p. 4.
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As a result, however, Indigenous peoples currently face an ‘impasse’. Either they 
seek recognition, not on their terms but on the terms of ‘the master’ or they can 
refuse to engage in the process and resort to resistance.206 The fact that these 
continue to be the only options available merely underscores the continuing process 
of colonialism. However, an alternative exists. Irene Watson argued that movement 
away from colonialism can only occur where the state is prepared to question its own 
institutions and ways of thinking in order to listen to Indigenous peoples claims.207 
On the few occasions where such a willingness has been demonstrated, Indigenous 
peoples have shown their readiness to engage in a dialogue. The discussion in this 
chapter has shown that many Indigenous peoples are enthusiastic about international 
law and international forums where there is an encouragement for participants to 
listen to the voices of others and not to speak for others, and reciprocally, of not 
being compelled to speak in the dominant language and traditions of discourse.208
Noel Pearson recognised the significance of the High Court’s recognition of 
customary land titles in a similar vein:
For a long time, the only political currency which Aboriginal people 
could use was their refusal to be involved. Now that the non-Aboriginal 
legal system has offered something in the way of rights, however narrow, 
to refuse to engage in the game and to fail to appreciate the rules and its 
limitations -  even if our purpose is to disrupt the game -  no longer seems 
smart.209
Pearson explained that Indigenous peoples may be willing to negotiate with the state, 
where the state shows a willingness to listen to the claims that Indigenous peoples 
make. Pearson also acknowledged, however, that any negotiation requires an 
understanding of the limitations of the process.210
206 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, op. cit., p. 56.
207 See Watson, Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways, op. cit., p. 58.
208 This observation has been made by others. See, for example, Tully, Strange Multiplicity, op. cit., 
p. 34. Of course, the international arena has not been entirely receptive to Indigenous peoples claims 
and the willingness of states to listen to their voices has not always been forthcoming or 
wholehearted.
209 Noel Pearson, ‘Mabo: Towards respecting equality and difference’, Voices from the Land: 1993 
Boyer Lectures, ABC Books, Sydney, 1994, p. 101.
210 Noel Pearson, ‘Aboriginal law and colonial law since Mabo’ in Christine Fletcher (ed.), 
Aboriginal Self-determination in Australia, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 1994, pp. 157-8.
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One of the primary problems, as Jeremy Webber suggested, remains the limitations 
of the language of the non-Indigenous participants in this debate:
the words we use to describe our world are always inadequate and 
provisional. They are in large measure artefacts , made in another time 
for another purpose . . . [A]fter all, here as elsewhere, the cross-cultural 
debate occurs predominantly through the use of non-Aboriginal concepts, 
in part because they are the only concepts non-Aboriginals know. These 
forms of expression need refinement and reconception as our situation 
changes, as we come to accept the value of other cultures, and as our 
understanding grows.211
From this acknowledgement, Tully argued that non-Indigenous people are capable of 
freeing themselves from ‘deeply ingrained, imperious habits of thought and 
behaviour’ through ‘dialogue’, rather than the imperial monologue of conventional 
modern theory.212
Recognising and respecting participants comes through allowing them to speak in 
their own language and ways. Tully explained that this ability to see and understand 
‘aspectively’ is an inter-cultural dialogue already familiar to Indigenous peoples but 
one that our own culture has yet to embrace. 213 Respecting Indigenous peoples in 
their own terms must overcome the powerful norm of uniformity in conventional 
theory that permeates the ways of thinking in European-derived cultures.
211 Webber, op. cit., p. 136 (Parentheses omitted). Here Webber echoes the thoughts o f the 
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein whose own struggles, particularly with his class, led him to theorise 
on the link between culture and language. In its simplest form, Wittgenstein’s argument was that ‘the 
limits of my language are the limits of my world’. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Auscombe, 3rd edn, Blackwell, Oxford, 1974. For an 
explanation o f Wittgenstein on culture and constitutionalism, see Tully, Strange Multiplicity, op. cit., 
pp. 103-13.
212 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, op. cit., p. 19. See also, Said, op. cit., for example p. 4, referred to 
those habits o f thought as ‘structures of attitude and reference’. See also Paul Patton, ‘Mabo, 
freedom and the politics o f difference’, Australian Journal o f Political Science, vol. 30, 1995, p. 108.
213 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, op. cit., pp. 24-5, 26, 58.
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Conclusion
The political theory of sovereignty provides two useful clues to the modem 
conception of self-determination. First, it clearly delineates the nature of internal 
sovereignty as the source of authority within a community. Second, self- 
determination, as it is currently understood as a right of ‘peoples’, is a reflection of 
the notions of popular sovereignty, which posits the ultimate authority of 
government in the people. Sovereignty also has an external aspect, which respects 
the autonomy of other sovereign peoples. The view of sovereignty that emerged 
from modern theory, however, is based on a fiction of homogeneity that cannot be 
sustained in the context of multi-nation societies. The norms of liberal democracy 
and individual rights also create an ideological barrier to recognition of Indigenous 
peoples through assumptions of universality. The impact of these assumptions on 
Indigenous peoples is the lived experiences of coercion, assimilation and genocide.
On a more fundamental level, however, the idea that ‘the people’ are sovereign and 
entitled to self-rule accommodates Indigenous peoples’ assertions of authority and 
autonomy. Freedom from internal domination in the enjoyment of self- 
determination is an important measure of the legitimacy of the exercise of power 
within a state. An absence of domination demands a recognition of the interests of 
Indigenous peoples. Internally, the ability of a people to determine the political and 
other structures that will facilitate distinct survival is the measure of self- 
determination.
At the international level too, the ideal of consent is defined in deference to the 
conception of the nation-state. In defining the content and scope of international law 
states have attempted to limit international recourse for Indigenous peoples through 
deliberate exclusion. The ‘selves’ entitled to self-determination under international 
law were arbitrarily distinguished from Indigenous peoples. The fundamental 
political good of self-rule and the international norm of equality of respect for
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peoples, could have extended to Indigenous peoples as a natural connection to other 
colonised peoples. However, the statist theory has defined the limits of self- 
determination, based on current state attitudes toward the inviolability of their own 
sovereignty. The stumbling block continues to be the unquestioning adherence to 
the assumption of homogeneity.214
While the use of the term ‘peoples’ has created confusion, the principle of self- 
determination has been entrenched in international law and paved the way for 
evolution and development. The Draft Declaration on the Rights o f Indigenous 
Peoples, prepared by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations provides an 
opportunity for an international response to the disadvantage faced by Indigenous 
peoples. The Draft Declaration, and the mechanisms of involvement that have 
emerged around it, heralds a change in attitude at the international level. The 
perspective brought by Indigenous presence in the international arena, allows claims 
to be assessed on the basis of world order logic that is mindful of the statist claims 
but also receptive to societal claims of a non-statist character, including those of 
‘captive nations’ .215
When Indigenous peoples bring these same claims into the domestic sphere the 
assumptions persist. The assumption of a supreme sovereign and the assumption 
that the individual is the sole possessor of rights are the foundation of Australian 
legal and political institutions. The discussion in this chapter therefore provides a 
background to the approach of the courts toward self-determination claims.
214 Buchheit, op. cit., p. 17 lamented:
One searches in vain, however, for any principled justification of why . . .  a 
manifestly distinguishable minority which happens to find itself, pursuant to a 
paragraph in some medieval territorial settlement or through a fiat o f the 
cartographers, annexed to an independent state must forever remain without the scope 
of the principle o f self-determination.
See also Pearce, op. cit., pp. 377-8, who noted that the International Court o f Justice definition clearly 
encompasses Indigenous peoples of the Americas, in contrast to other international documents. See 
also Pomerance, op. cit., pp. 16-17, 41-2.
215 Falk, op. cit., p. 593.
Chapter 3
The utility of the Courts for the Assertion of 
Indigenous Self-determination Claims
The Australian courts, like their counterparts throughout the common law world, 
have resisted claims that question the central ideas of sole sovereignty and individual 
rights underpinning the liberal state. In response to the High Court’s attempt to
recognise Indigenous systems of land titles in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2]' Michael 
Mansell commented that:
The court did not overturn anything of substance, but merely propounded 
white domination and superiority over Aborigines by recognising such a 
meagre Aboriginal form of rights over land . . .  If Mabo represents the 
best that the legal system has to offer, then Aborigines will be put off by 
the effort and costs involved in litigating for such a puny reward. Mabo
offers something for those who are grateful for small blessings, but
2
nothing in the way of justice.
Despite this type of criticism, Indigenous peoples continue to assert self- 
determination claims through the courts. Indigenous peoples using the courts need
‘ (1992) 175 CLR 1.
2
Michael Mansell, ‘The High Court gives an inch but takes another mile: Perspectives on Mabo, the 
Aboriginal Provisional Government Perspective’, Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 2(57), August 1992, 
p. 6. See also, Michael Mansell, ‘Can White law accommodate Black demands?’, Aboriginal Law 
Bulletin, vol. 1(23), December 1986, p. 10.
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to consider the structural and cultural barriers to develop a strategy for maximising 
the utility of the common law. At the same time they must avoid legitimising the 
role the courts have played in the history of Indigenous peoples relations with the 
Australian state.
This chapter examines the difficulties of asserting cultural claims in an alien forum. 
Part one provides an overview of the strategic advantages and limitations of asserting 
Indigenous peoples’ self-determination claims through the courts, first as a forum for 
advancing claims against the state, and second for achieving substantive outcomes. 
Two central issues emerge that require further examination. Part two considers the 
relationship between the courts and other institutions of the state, and the impact of 
institutional limitations on the courts’ capacity to achieve social change. Part three 
examines the specific discourse and culture of the courts and the impact these 
characteristics have on the substantive results of court cases.
I. Advantages and limitations of using the courts: Overview
Cultural and institutional limitations have an impact not only upon the utility of the 
courts, but upon their legitimacy as decision-makers with respect to Indigenous self- 
determination. It is not merely a concern that the courts may fail to fully appreciate 
an alternative cultural perspective. Self-determination claims bear upon the 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous society. Demands for 
respect for Indigenous belief systems, acceptance of responsibility for past wrongs 
and, above all, justice for Indigenous peoples in the present, are the cornerstones of 
self-determination claims.
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It is arguable that Indigenous peoples continue to come before the courts more out of 
necessity than from any acceptance of the legitimacy of the institution. The 
necessity arises from the process of colonisation itself that has led to the domination 
of one society and its laws over another. As a result of the power relations with the 
colonising state, Indigenous peoples cannot invoke their own law in negotiating for
self-determination. Indigenous laws and institutions, while they persist, are not 
recognised by the dominant legal system as a site for determining these issues. 
Therefore, if Indigenous peoples are to assert legal rights against the state they have 
little choice but to engage with the legal structures of the state.
Through Indigenous peoples’ continuing struggles against colonialism direct 
concessions from the state are observable. While the gains have been moderate, it 
could be suggested that any recognition is significant given the fundamental 
challenge the claims of Indigenous peoples pose to the state. Understandably, 
however, the role of the courts in gaining recognition of Indigenous peoples’ claims 
is subject to considerable debate. Some have suggested that the courts are a useful
4
indicator of trends and patterns in Indigenous - non-Indigenous political relations. 
Some acknowledge the strategic advantages of the courts as a forum, and some see a 
potential role for the courts in substantially shaping relations between Indigenous
and non-Indigenous people.* 5 In contrast, others question the ability of courts to 
effect social change at all, and criticise the expenditure of resources for litigation.6
There are a number of key issues that are contested in this debate, over and above the 
consideration of the outcomes of particular cases. The ability of courts to implement 
their decisions has come under particular criticism, while the nature of the forum and
Guntram Werther, Self Determination in Western Democracies: Aboriginal politics in comparative 
perspective, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1992, p. 42.
ibid., p. 66.
Compare Noel Pearson, ‘Mabo: Toward respecting equality and difference’, in Voices From the
Land: 1993 Boyer Lectures, ABC Books, Sydney, 1994, pp. 89-101, with Brian Keon-Cohen and
Bradford Morse, ‘Indigenous land rights in Australia and Canada’, in Peter Hanks and Brian Keon- 
Cohen (eds), Aborigines and the Law, Allen & Unwin, 1984, p. 75. See also Werther, op. cit., p. 66.
6
Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991.
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the strategic utility of the courts are considered their greatest advantage. The relative 
powerlessness of Indigenous peoples, in political terms, centres the debate on the 
need to use the tools that are available. The question is at what cost.
The enforceability o f  common law decisions
The value of the courts in Indigenous peoples’ strategies must be assessed in the 
context of the structural relationship between institutions of the state. The 
enforceability of court decisions depends, to a large degree, on other arms of 
government for their implementation. For this reason, some have suggested that the 
courts cannot protect the rights of minorities or achieve social change and that 
political alternatives should be the focus of social movements. The difficulty of 
implementing a particular decision can be contrasted with the value of the 
recognition of rights and the development of beneficial doctrines over time.
When Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court held that state 
government laws could not interfere with the sovereign-to-sovereign relationship 
between the Cherokee Nation and the Federal government, United States President, 
Andrew Jackson, is reputed to have remarked, ‘John Marshall has made his decision,
7
now let him enforce it’. The decision in Worcester v Georgia was not implemented
g
and the Cherokee were forcibly removed from their lands. A. V. Dicey, the 
influential English constitutional lawyer, used the example of the Cherokee Nation 
case to illustrate the weakness of the courts when they are in conflict with the
7
Quoted in Donald B. Cole, The Presidency of Andrew Jackson, University Press o f Kansas, 
Lawrence, 1993, p. 114, in reference to Worcester v Georgia 31 US (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
8
The trek of the Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek, Chicksaw and Seminole Indians from their ancestral 
lands in Georgia to reservations eight hundred miles west (between 1831 and 1842) was characterised 
by acts of genocide including poisoning and violence. The most devastating march o f the Cherokee, 
in 1838-9, became known as the ‘trail o f tears’ and only one quarter of the Cherokee population 
survived the exodus. See briefly, Carl Waldman and Molly Braun, Atlas o f the North American 
Indian, Facts on File, New York, 1985, pp. 183-5. For more discussion see Anthony Wallace, The 
Long Bitter Trail: Andrew Jackson and the Indians, Hill & Wang, New York, 1993.
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9
interests of the state and without the support of the executive. Marshall CJ himself 
commented on the limits of the ‘Courts of the conqueror’ to question the exercise of 
brute force underpinning the claims to sovereignty, jurisdiction and title to lands by 
the colonising state. ' 0
It has been argued that the courts’ inability to implement decisions is the critical
factor in their failure as tools for social reform." This is a serious criticism of the 
utility of the courts for Indigenous peoples asserting self-determination claims. This 
criticism centres not only on the limits of the courts’ willingness to challenge the 
legitimacy of acts of state but also on their capacity to effect a change in the relations 
of power within the state.
However, these criticisms often fail to pay sufficient regard to the long term
development of the law from a particular decision. For example, Worcester v
Georgia came to form the basis of the ‘domestic dependent nation’ doctrine that
recognised a limited form of sovereignty inherent in Indian nations. Repeatedly,
Indian nations have returned to the United States Supreme Court to enforce the
decision in particular instances. The result of this evolution is a legal doctrine that
limits the exercise of power by governments through recognition of a sovereign
12
sphere of autonomy in the Indian nations. In this respect the doctrine could be
A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th edn, McMillan, London, 
1920, p. 173. Reported differently in Dicey, p. 173: ‘John Marshall has delivered his judgement; let 
him now enforce it, if he can’.
10
Johnson v M ’Intosh 21 US (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), p. 588: ‘Conquest gives a title which the Courts 
of the conqueror cannot deny’. See also p. 572-3. In Worcester v Georgia (1832), see pp. 542-3. 
More generally, Philip Frickey, ‘Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and 
Interpretation in Federal Indian law’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 107(2), December 1993, pp. 389, 
suggested that in Johnson, Marshall CJ established ‘a rigid dichotomy between power and law’.
Making this argument, Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 21, relied on cases such as the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954), in which the Supreme 
Court held that the segregation of schools on the basis of race was unconstitutional. Rosenberg, pp. 
42-72, argued that due to insufficient popular support for the decision, the lower courts failed to 
implement the decision and there was no political will to enforce de-segregation. It was more than 
ten years before any significant change in segregated schooling occurred. Rosenberg suggested that 
the decision may have even heightened opposition to the civil rights movement.
12
See also Cherokee Nation v Georgia 31 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831). The Cherokee nation cases form the 
basis of the judicial recognition and therefore legislative recognition of the sovereignty (though 
limited domestically) of Indian nations, their jurisdiction over territory and their exclusive 
relationship with the federal government to the exclusion of the States. See generally Frickey, op. cit. 
For a view of the development of the law in the United States, based on these early decisions see, for 
example, United States v Santa Fe Pacific Rail Co. 314 US 339, at p. 345 (1941); Tee-Hit-Ton v
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described as quasi-constitutional, although its genesis is from within the common 
law.
An example of the limits of the courts' implementation powers was seen in Australia 
with the claim by John Koowarta, and the Winychanam group of Aurukun, against 
the Queensland government. John Koowarta was denied the right to purchase the 
Archer River Holding pastoral lease in Queensland, through the Aboriginal Land 
Fund Commission. This denial was solely on the basis of Aboriginality. In the High 
Court, counsel for Mr Koowarta argued that such a decision was inconsistent with 
the Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act 1975. The High Court agreed that the 
Queensland government had discriminated against Mr Koowarta in not allowing the
purchase of the lease.13 Instead of Mr Koowarta getting his land, the Queensland 
government blocked the purchase by creating a national park over the lease
14
property. To this end, Frank Brennan argued that acting for groups whose rights 
are highly politicised would continue to require a balancing of the prospect of 
success in litigation against the risk of legislative or executive derogation from the 
claims. After all, the defendant is the State ‘whose representatives have no 
compunction in pillorying the courts and moving the goal posts so that the interests
of the majority remain secure’.
In contrast, during the Mabo litigation the Queensland government sought to 
circumvent proceedings by passing the Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act 
1985 which deemed complete beneficial ownership of all of Queensland to be in the
Crown regardless of whether native title now or had ever existed.16 This time, the 
courts were able to protect the interests of the claimants. The High Court declared
United States 248 US 272, at p. 280 (1955); United States v Shoshone 304 US 111 (1968); and 
Oneida Indian Nation v County of Oneida 414 US 661, at pp. 667-9 (1974).
Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen; Queensland v Commonwealth (1982) 39 ALR 417.
See John von Stunner, ‘The Fighting Wik’, Cape York Unity News, No. 5, Mar/Apr 1997, p. 29.
Frank Brennan, ‘Revolution by lawful means: Litigating the rights of the marginalised -  a 
revolution in the rights o f asylum seekers and Indigenous peoples, Proceedings of the New Zealand 
Law Conference, Wellington, 2-5 March, 1993, Volume 1, p. 45.
16
Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act 1985 (Qld), Section 3.
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that the legislation violated the Racial Discrimination Act, relying on the precedent
of Koowarta ’s case. A majority of four judges determined that the Queensland Act
denied the Meriam people rights in their lands while other Australians were
unaffected by the legislation. Therefore the legislation was contrary to the principle
18
of equality before the law enshrined in section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act. 
The primary difference in the reasoning of the majority and the minority was not 
whether the courts could strike down discriminatory legislation, or whether this 
legislation was indeed discriminatory, but whether the claim could be entertained
19
prior to a determination of rights to land being made.
After ten years of litigation the High Court recognised Indigenous peoples’ laws and
rights over lands. The Meriam peoples were declared to hold title to their lands ‘as
20
against the whole world’. Although very little land has been transferred to
21
Indigenous peoples since the Mabo decision, the decision fundamentally changed 
the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Australian state and society.
However, the delay and expense in achieving reform through such a process appears 
to support arguments that courts are not structured for social reform. Rosenberg 
stated that:
In general . . . not only does litigation steer activists to an institution 
that is constrained from helping them, but it siphons off crucial
resources and talent and runs the risk of weakening political efforts.
Mabo v Queensland [No. 1] (1988) 166 CLR 186.
18
(1988) 166 CLR 196, per Brennan, Toohey, Gaudron JJ, at p. 218.
19
ibid., at p. 196, per Mason CJ, and at p. 243, per Dawson J; but contrast Wilson J at p. 206.
20
Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 217, per Order of the Court.
Apart from the original High Court declaration over the Murray Islands, there have been only two 
determinations of native title under the processes set up by the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). The first 
was a determination that the Dunghutti people were native title holders of land at Crescent Head in 
New South Wales, and that compensation should be paid for extinguishment by compulsory 
acquisition. (NNTT ref # NC94/5). The second was a determination of native title over Aboriginal 
reserve land belonging to the Warra peoples of the Hope Vale community of Cape York (NNTT ref # 
QC96/15).
22
Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 339.
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Arguing that the courts cannot be removed from the political system in which they 
operate, Rosenberg concluded that to expect change through the courts is a romantic
23but unrealistic vision of rights winning over politics.
Indigenous peoples may question whether an alternative approach that concentrated 
efforts on direct political action would have significant effect in relation to 
Indigenous self-determination. The limits of the political, social and economic 
power of Indigenous peoples in relation to the state constrain their ability to disrupt 
the political centre. Thus, to a large degree, Indigenous self-determination depends 
upon the will of the state to permit it, regardless of the theoretical, legal or moral
24authority of the claim. Instead, it has been argued that the greatest self- 
determination gains have been achieved through Indigenous peoples appropriating
the state bureaucracies and using the legal processes to their own advantage. 25
It is in this context that Weither argued the incremental nature of self-determination 
gains has been the essence of their success.26 For Weither, this reflects the ability of
. . 27indigenous peoples to ‘work quietly’ within existing state systems and structures.
If an incremental approach is appropriate, then the courts may be better suited to the
The basis of this criticism is that the courts’ ability to effect change has been overstated by social 
reformers who have ‘reified and removed the courts from the political and economic system in which 
they operate’. Rosenberg, ibid., p. 343, did not turn his mind to the specific circumstance of 
Indigenous self-determination claims, concentrating on the Black American civil rights movement, 
women’s pro-choice movement and less substantially on the environmental movement. Indeed Cass 
Sunstein suggested that Rosenberg’s own conditions for successfully using the courts may well have 
been met in the case of Indigenous peoples in Australia. Sunstein, Personal Communication, 13 
September 1996.
24
Werther, op. cit., pp. 59-61, 82, 98 argued that Indigenous peoples are unable to have significant 
influence over non-Indigenous parties due to their small, dispersed population and their economic and 
social marginalisation.
25
ibid., p. 60. See also Colin Tatz, ‘Aborigines and the civil law’, in Hanks and Keon-Cohen, op. 
cit., pp. 111-13. It appears from the evidence examined by Werther, pp. 58-62, that this is in fact the 
approach taken by Indigenous self-determination movements. Contrast Norway and Denmark, 
discussed at pp. 58-62. The notable exception in this analysis is Aotearoa/New Zealand in which 
Maori political parties and Maori Members of Parliament operate. See Augi Fleris, ‘From social 
control toward political self-determination?: Maori seats and the politics of separate Maori 
representation in New Zealand’, Canadian Journal o f Political Science, vol. 18(3), September 1985, 
pp. 551-76.
26
Werther, op. cit., p. 98.
27
ibid. However, Werther, p. 59, acknowledged that, ‘[fjor aboriginal people there may be instances 
when the symbolic and mobilisation benefits of having their own national political party outweigh the 
costs, but this must be decided with a firm understanding that effecting change directly through the 
electoral mechanism is almost impossible’. See also Peter Leslie, ‘The role of political parties in
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claims of Indigenous peoples than is suggested by Rosenberg’s analysis. The 
development of doctrines over time, characteristic of the common law, fits within 
this incremental strategy. The implementation of specific decisions is therefore 
better understood as part of a broader, longer-term view of what is required to 
achieve social and political change from within the structures of the colonial state.
The advantages o f  the courts' processes
Apart from the development of common law doctrine, the characteristics of the court 
as a forum arguably hold particular advantages for Indigenous peoples’ self- 
determination claims. The freedom of the courts from the vagaries of political and 
electoral pressures enables them to determine issues outside the public debate or 
popular opinion. This independence is imperative for the assertion of self- 
determination claims that may threaten the privileges of the majority. Claims for the 
protection and promotion of the rights of minorities are bound to be politically 
unpopular. Therefore, courts are able to act where other arms of the state are unable 
or unwilling.
The courts are also thought to provide equal access and influence in that the
adversarial process allows Indigenous claimants to meet the state on a more equal
28
footing, at least in terms of the presentation of argument. It is argued that the legal 
processes provide greater assurance that all interested parties will be heard and that
29
all relevant information will be brought to bear. The rigorous assessment of the 
information ensures that the actions and views of the state are questioned outside the 
bureaucracy that supports them.
promoting the interests o f ethnic minorities’, Canadian Journal o f Political Science, vol. 2(4), 
December 1969, pp. 419-33.
28
See Ralph Cavanagh and Austin Sarat, ‘Thinking about the courts: Toward and beyond a 
jurisprudence o f judicial competence’, Law and Society Review, vol. 1, 1980, p. 378.
29
Cavanagh and Sarat, ibid., pp. 381-2, argued that ‘it is difficult to see how any other institutional 
actor [than a judge] is better equipped to become informed of the ramifications of comparable 
decisions’. In addition, and in contrast to legislative and executive processes, claimants can gain 
access to information held by the state through the process of ‘discovery’, the sharing of relevant 
information between the parties prior to the trial.
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Importantly, the arguments before a court can be based on principle, enabling self- 
determination claims to be asserted without compromise. The determinations of the 
courts, in turn, reflect the nature of the arguments. Thus, the courts are able to make
aspirant and principled statements/ 0 Abram Chayes argued that:
the ability of a judicial pronouncement to sustain itself. . . and the power 
of judicial action to generate assent over the long haul become the
ultimate touchstones of legitimacy.
Chayes went further to suggest that ‘judicial action only achieves such legitimacy by
32responding to and indeed stirring the deep and durable demands for a just society’.
The principle advantage of the courts is the requirement to be objective. Also, 
impartiality requires more than the absence of actual bias but respect for due process, 
that is, ‘treating equally all those who seek its remedies or against whom its remedies
are sought’ .33 While acknowledging criticisms that dispute that there is such a thing 
as judicial objectivity, an issue I will consider below, those coming before the courts 
can demand impartiality and challenge the legitimacy of a court that is not seen to be 
objective. Political or personal preferences are expected to be excluded from the 
determination of the court and, through written reasons, determinations are often 
more transparent than political decisions.
The method of assessing information in the courts is, however, a double-edged 
sword and has marked implications for Indigenous peoples’ self-determination 
claims. Concern has been raised that the consideration of what is relevant to the
30 .
Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2 
edn, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1986, p. 26, argued that courts have the capacity to ‘appeal 
to [our] better natures, to call forth [our] aspirations, which may have been forgotten in a moments 
hue and cry’. See also, Mason, Defining the framework of government: Judicial deference versus 
human rights and due process, paper presented to the Centre for Public Policy, Workshop on the 
Changing Role of the Judiciary, University of Melbourne, 7 June 1996, p. 25, and Sir Gerard 
Brennan, Justice resides in the courts, Opening Address to the Symposium o f the Australian Judicial 
Conference, Canberra, November 2, 1996, reproduced in edited form in the Australian, 8 November 
1996, p. 15.
Abram Chayes, ‘The role of the judge in public law litigation’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 89(7), 
1976, p. 1316.
Brennan, Justice resides, op. cit., p. 15.
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claims, as well as the methods of assessing claims, is biased in favour of information
34and evidence from within a particular sphere of thought. This ‘badness of fit’ 
between the claims being made and the courts’ treatment of them will be discussed 
in detail in part three of this chapter.
The courts as part of a broader strategy
Where Indigenous peoples ground their claims in their sovereignty as peoples, it has 
been suggested that they challenge the state’s need for formal legitimacy as a Taw
abiding polity’ .35 That is, self-determination claims highlight the contradictions in 
the treatment of Indigenous peoples under the law. To this end, there may be a 
strategic advantage gained by structuring the debate around the concept of 
Indigenous status. Claiming Indigenous status provides a legal and moral basis for 
achieving self-determination which courts find as difficult to ignore as it is to 
reconcile with the existing law. Specific doctrinal arguments are often 
overshadowed by the challenge that claims of Indigenous status pose to the core of 
state claims to exclusive sovereignty and the primacy of individual rights. To the 
extent that the courts recognise self-determination claims, they are giving reality to 
Indigenous peoples’ sovereignty and existence of collective rights. As a corollary, 
the assertion of Indigenous self-determination claims in the courts challenge state 
assumptions regarding the applicability of individual or group rights within the
liberal state.36
Arguing self-determination claims through the courts may heighten the power of 
claims that can be suppressed or disregarded in the political sphere. While 
opponents may argue that framing questions for the courts strips the claims of
See for example, Archie Zariski, ‘The truth in judging - Testimony (fifty bare arsed highlanders): 
The dilemmas of inter-cultural testimony’, Alternative Law Journal, vol. 21(1), 1996, p. 24. These 
issues will be further explored in part three below.
Weither, op. cit., p. 33.
ibid., pp. xi, xvi-xvii, 4, 14, 36, 87-90.
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popular appeal, there remain significant indirect benefits in terms of political
. . .  37leverage and ‘pricking powerful consciences’. Success, or indeed failure, in the 
courts can be seen as a tool to agitate for policy and legislative change. Patrick 
Macklem observed that even small victories in the legal sphere can be quickly
38
translated into political power. Macklem argued that Indigenous peoples have
made far more gains in the legal sphere that in the political sphere because legal
39
decisions often act as the impetus for political change.
Where Indigenous peoples lack the key resources that can be translated into political 
influence, the courts are useful not only for direct outcomes but also to strengthen the 
voice of the claimants within the other branches. Judicial delineation of rights, 
however limited, can be used as bargaining power in negotiations over specific 
policy outcomes. For example, in 1971 Justice Blackburn of the Supreme Court of
40
the Northern Territory refused to recognise Aboriginal title to lands. The decision 
prompted the Whitlam Labor government to initiate discussion on national land 
rights. As a result land rights legislation was introduced in the Northern Territory
41
and later in almost all other states. Weither observed that ‘the political effect of 
this decision was to energise a national debate over aboriginal rights and eventually 
lead to major concessions by the state’.42
Rosenberg also argued that the educative role of judicial decisions and their ability to mobilise 
public support for a cause are vastly overstated, pp. 25-26, 28-30. Compare Rosenberg, pp. 12-13, 
with Harvard Law Review, Note, vol. 91, 1977, p. 428 at p. 463. See Aiyeh Neier, Only Judgement: 
The Limits o f Litigation in Social Change Legislation, Wesleyan University Press, Connecticut, 1982,
p. 12.
38
Patrick Macklem, ‘Indigenous peoples and the Canadian constitution: Lessons for Australia?’, 
Public Law Review, No. 5, 1994, p. 33. See also Duncan Ivison, Decolonising the rule o f law: 
Mabo’s case and postcolonial constitutionalism, Draft manuscript, 1995.
39
Patrick Macklem, ‘First Nations Self-government and the Borders o f the Canadian Legal 
Imagination’, McGill Law Journal, vol. 36, 1991, p. 393, using the example of Guerin v R (1984) 13 
DLR (4th) 321, argued that the recognition of the fiduciary duty of Canada toward Indigenous peoples 
had an immediate impact on the accountability of Parliament for political actions concerning 
Indigenous peoples.
40
Milirrpum v Nabalco (1971) 17 FLR 141. For further discussion of the decision, see pp. 165-7 
below.
41
Western Australia is the notable exception. See Parliament of the Commonwealth, Aboriginal 
Land Rights Commission, Second (Final) Report, April 1974 (Woodward Commissioner) AGPS, 
Canberra, 1975 and the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth).
42
Werther, op. cit., p. 74, was able to point to similar dynamics in the wake o f failed land cases in 
Canada and Norway.
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Success in the courts can also provide Indigenous peoples with tools that can be 
wielded in negotiations with the government for even greater measures of self- 
determination. In some instances, the threat or spectre of litigation can provide the 
necessary political pressure to facilitate negotiations. This process could be
43
observed in Australia in the wake of Mabo v Queensland [No. 2]. The recognition 
of rights to traditional lands under the common law led to the introduction of the 
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) confirming the title in Australian law. The High Court 
decision also gave Indigenous peoples greater power in negotiating the final form of
44
the legislation than had been the case with previous land rights legislation. 
Similarly, the inadequacy of the native title recognised in Mabo was highlighted and 
as a result the government made an undertaking to introduce social justice measures
45
and a land fund to make restitution for the dispossession.
Irrespective of the strategic advantages of claims being asserted in the courts, in 
weighing the advantages against the disadvantages Rosenberg, for example, placed 
great importance upon the question of resources, suggesting that:
strategic choices have costs, and a strategy that produces little or no 
change drains resources that could be more effectively employed in 
other strategies.
In total, Rosenberg’s analysis suggested that in order for change to come through the 
courts, popular or political support for the changes must already exist. Moreover,
47
there must be external avenues for the implementation of the changes. In the result, 
court decisions would be neither sufficient nor necessary. They are not sufficient 
because they require support from other agencies for successful implementation of
43 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
44
Pearson, Towards respecting equality, op. cit., p. 101.
45
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, First Report 1993, AGPS, 
Canberra, 1993, pp. 34-7. While the social justice package has not been rejected, it has not been 
acted upon.
46
Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 339, concluded that ‘not only does litigation steer activists to an institution 
that is constrained from helping them but it also siphons off crucial resources and talent and runs the 
risk o f weakening political efforts’.
47
ibid., pp. 32-6.
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change and they are not necessary because if all these conditions existed, change 
would occur outside the courts. On this view, courts can only assist a reform
movement by removing lingering obstacles, and providing a ‘mopping-up’ role.48
However, it is arguable that the courts could manipulate these conditions to force a 
reluctant government to act, in particular, by binding the government to the decision 
through the threat of compensatory relief. Also, rights recognised by the courts can 
be exercised, returning to the courts for protection when those rights are threatened. 
The spectre of compensating Indigenous peoples for each encroachment on common 
law titles forced the state’s compliance. For Indigenous peoples’ self-determination 
claims the issues are of such magnitude that the threat of compensation is a 
significant incentive for government action.
While the extent to which the courts’ can act independently has been questioned, 
they do provide a public platform within the state structures from which Indigenous 
peoples can present their demands to the state. The courts can be a forum for the 
amplification of the voice of the oppressed. In addition, court action publicises and 
politicises the claims against the state, bringing the issues into public debate. All of 
these characteristics of the courts respond to the marginalised position of Indigenous 
peoples in colonial states.
This view directly contrasts with the criticisms of the courts’ implementation power 
and presents the courts as a public, and therefore political, forum from which to 
agitate for reform. While it may be true that in most respects the courts are an 
imperfect, or conservative, measure of ‘true relations’ between Indigenous people 
and the state, they may also impel changes in ‘direction, trend and pattern’ of those
49
relations.
There is a need, however, to further examine the two most significant difficulties
ibid., p. 342.
Weither, op. cit., p. 64.49
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encountered in bringing claims to the courts. First, because of the absence of 
constitutional recognition of Indigenous peoples in Australia, the common law is the 
source of rights claimed against the state. Therefore the claims that the courts are 
vulnerable to the legislature must be considered in detail. It is necessary to consider 
whether this has an impact on the courts’ capacity to recognise self-determination 
claims. Second, the courts must be acknowledged as a cultural institution. As such, 
there are obstacles of understanding; in translating and presenting claims and in the 
courts’ ability to accommodate claims from an alternative worldview.
II. Political and institutional constraints of the judicial system
There has been debate about the legitimacy of Australian courts’ initiation of legal 
reform. Many have accused the High Court of Australia of ‘judicial activism’ in the
sense that it has usurped the role of Parliament as lawmaker.50 The recognition of 
Indigenous land titles under the common law in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] has
been a focus of the debate.5' This section concentrates on a somewhat different, 
though often entwined, discussion that centres on the courts’ capacity to achieve any
See for example, P. H. Lane, ‘The changing role o f the High Court’, Australian Law Journal, vol. 
70, March 1996, pp. 246-51; S. E. K. Hulme, ‘Aspects of the High Courts’ handling of Mabo’, 
Victorian Bar News, No. 87, 1993; and P. Connolly, ‘Should the courts determine social policy’, The 
High Court of Australia in Mabo, Association of Mining and Exploration Companies Inc, 1993, p. 5. 
Contrast Hal Wooten, ‘Mabo -  Issues and challenges’, Judicial Review, vol. 1, 1994, p. 303; and 
Noel Pearson, ‘Wik: Whither the separation of powers’, Australian, 2 January 1997, p. 11. Self- 
determination claims, o f their nature, are more than likely to make their way to the High Court of 
Australia. Also, it is the High Court that determines the common law of Australia, within which 
Indigenous peoples’ rights are likely to be recognised (see Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 
CLR 1, per Brennan J at p. 29). Therefore, references to the courts and the judiciary in this section 
refer to the High Court in particular.
(1992) 175 CLR 1. Controversy has not centred around that decision exclusively. See also 
Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wells (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 
104: Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292: Leeth v The Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455: 
and Minister for Immigration v Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 128 ALR 353. See generally, Lane, op. cit.
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substantive reform. This question is of great importance to Indigenous peoples 
assessing the utility of courts for asserting self-determination claims. In this sense, 
discussion does not revolve solely around the courts’ willingness to entertain self-
determination claims. * 5 Rather, critics suggest that courts are constrained by their 
own structure and their relations with other institutions of the state and warn of the
54
dangers in overstating the role of the courts in achieving social reform. The 
structural independence of the courts can be examined through key doctrines of the 
separation of powers and the rule of law.
The separation of powers
Australia bases its political structure on a separation of powers between the three
arms of government -  the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. 55 The system 
is directed to providing checks and balances against the exercise of arbitrary power. 
Yet, there is some debate over the role of the judiciary within a democratic 
government. Some suggest that the courts are undemocratic and unrepresentative
and should be merely interpreters of law.56 Others argue that the courts’ role is 
sometimes to make representative democracy more representative.57
Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist Papers, stated that:
Cavanagh and Sarat, op. cit., p. 373, clearly identified the need to separate ‘considerations of  
legitimacy o f courts from those of competence or capacity’.
However, the judiciary’s own perception of its role is of central importance and will be dealt with 
in the context of this discussion.
54
Rosenberg, in a seminar to the ANU Law Faculty, 17 May 1996, challenged what was described as 
an emerging view that not only are courts able to effect social change but are uniquely suited to the 
task. To this end, Rosenberg, Hollow Hope, op. cit., pp. 15, 21, identified constraints on the capacity 
o f the courts to achieve substantive reform, creating a dependence on the other arms o f government.
5 The independence of judiciary and the separation of powers was affirmed in R v Kirby: Ex parte 
Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 and Attorney-General for the Commonwealth 
v The Queen (1957) 95 CLR 529. See generally Sir Anthony Mason, A new perspective on the 
separation o f powers, Paper delivered to the Reshaping Australian Institutions ANU Public Lecture 
Series, No. 1,25 July 1996.
56
See for example Lane, op. cit.
57
See Aryeh Neier, op. cit., p. 23, also pp. 13-14. Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Future directions in 
Australian law’, Monash University Law Review, vol. 13, September 1987, p. 163, argued that the
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[the judiciary] has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no 
direction of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no 
active resolution whatever. It may be truly said to have neither FORCE 
nor WILL but merely judgement; and must ultimately depend upon the
aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgements.
These comments are often invoked to support criticism of the utility of the courts in 
the promotion of a reform agenda, emphasising the lack of budgetary or coercive
59
power to enforce decisions. For, if it is true that the courts depend upon the 
executive for the efficacy of their decisions then Indigenous peoples must seriously 
question whether courts can be sufficiently independent to entertain a challenge to 
the state or a claim against state interests. Here, we return to the first limitation 
identified in the overview in part one. The extent to which courts are able to operate 
independently of the other arms of state affects their capacity to promote significant 
reform.
Hamilton, himself, was championing the cause of the separation of powers and of the 
pivotal role of the judiciary in preserving the freedom of the individual against the 
power of the parliament. When Hamilton described the judiciary as the ‘least 
dangerous’ arm of the state it was not a reference to its status as a threat, or
courts play a representation reinforcing role. See also John Williams, ‘The court of many colours’, 
Australian, 4 March 1997, p. 13.
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Alexander Hamilton, ‘A view of the constitution of the judicial department in relation to the tenure 
of good behaviour’, No. LXXVIII, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The 
Federalist Papers [1787-88], edited by Isaac Kramnick, Penguin, Middlesex, 1987, p. 437, stated 
that of the three arms of government the judiciary is the weakest. Hamilton had, in turn, referred to 
the ‘celebrated Montesquieu’, The Spirit of Laws, Legal Classics Library, New York, 1984, vol. 1, p. 
190, who stated that of all the three powers the judiciary is ‘next to nothing’. See generally, John 
Williams, The protection of rights under the Australian Constitution: A republican analysis, PhD 
Thesis, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1997, p. 39. Alexander 
Hamilton and James Madison organised the Constitutional Congress in Philadelphia from which the 
United States Federal Constitution emerged. The Federalist Papers appeared as a series in New York 
newspapers over a ten month period to persuade voters to ratify the Constitution. The comments are 
relevant to Australia’s state structure which is also a federal system incorporating the separation of 
powers doctrine. In R v Kirby: Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, it 
was noted that ‘probably the most striking achievement of the framers of the Australian instrument of 
government was the successful combination of the British system of parliamentary government . . . 
with American Federalism.’ See Mason, A new perspective, op. cit., pp. 10-11. Moreover, The 
Federalist Papers and the United States Constitution influenced the drafting of the Australian 
Constitution. See Williams, The protection of rights, op. cit., pp. 137-44.
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See for example, Rosenberg, Hollow Hope, op. cit., pp. 2-3. See also, Alexander Bickel’s chapter 
title ‘neither force nor will’ in a book called ‘The Least Dangerous Branch’, also a reference to 
Hamilton, or Aryeh Neier’s book title, ‘Only Judgement’.
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otherwise, to the political centre, but to the constitutional rights of the people.60 
Hamilton concluded that the general liberty of the people can never be under threat
from the judiciary, as long as it remains independent.6'
Therefore, rather than implying a hierarchy within the structures of the state, the
independence of the judiciary depends upon it being equal in relations with the
legislature and executive. Hamilton argued that:
it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only that the 
independence of judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects 
of occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no 
farther than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of
citizens, by unjust and partial laws.
Admittedly, the role, and more importantly, the power, of the court to control the 
actions of the legislature are less clear in the absence of a comprehensive 
constitution. However, the role of the judiciary in protecting citizens against the 
excesses of the representative body is not limited to those jurisdictions in which
rights are enumerated in a limited constitution.63
The simultaneous adoption of the Westminster system of responsible government 
has meant the incomplete separation of the executive and legislative arms of
64
government. The responsibility implied by the greater independence of the
60
Hamilton, op. cit., p. 437, argued that ‘the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always 
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be the least in a 
capacity to annoy or injure them’. This is directly contrasted to the coercive power of the executive 
and the budgetary power of the legislature: ‘the sword and the purse’. See also Sir Gerard Brennan, 
‘Courts, democracy and the law’, Australian Law Journal, vol. 65, January 1991, p. 33.
61
Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 437-8. The complete independence of the courts was seen as ‘peculiarly 
essential’. The comments were made in the context of an argument for tenure of good behaviour for 
the judiciary being entrenched in the United States Constitution, to reinforce the independence of the 
judicial arm. Hamilton, op. cit., p. 440, saw the courts as the ‘bulwarks of limited constitution against 
legislative encroachments’. See also p. 437; Madison, Federalist Papers, op. cit., No. XLVII, p. 303; 
and M. J. C Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation o f Powers, Clarendon, Oxford, 1967, p. 13.
Hamilton, op. cit., p. 441. Hamilton, p. 439, argued that this conclusion does not ‘suppose a 
superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is 
superior to both.’ Compare Dicey, op. cit., pp. 170-1, in his critique of the written Constitution, as 
interpreters and enforcers of the Constitution, ‘the Bench of judges is not only guardian but also at a 
given moment the master of the Constitution’.
ibid., p. 437. The rule of law and the separation of powers has a place in both liberal and 
republican tradition at once a design for protection against the despotism of the Crown and in the 
latter case against the ‘tyranny of the majority’.
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For discussion, see for example, Brennan, Courts, democracy and the law, op. cit., p. 35. See also 
Mason, Defining the framework, op. cit., p. 7. Recognised by the High Court in Brown v West (1990)
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judiciary led Sir Gerard Brennan, currently Chief Justice of the High Court, to reflect 
that:
As the wind of political expediency now chills Parliament’s willingness 
to impose checks on the Executive and the Executive now has a large 
measure of control over legislation, the courts alone retain their original
function of standing between government and the governed.
The courts allow those excluded from the political process not only to give voice to
their interests but also to be heard.66 Sir Gerard Brennan argued that control over 
Parliament by the Executive has exposed the interests of minorities and individuals
67
to risk. Moreover, only when these marginalised groups are included in some way 
can the state claim legitimacy. To this end, Neier argued that the courts play a
critical role in making pluralist democracies actually work.68
The notion of the courts as protector of rights and of marginalised groups exists in 
Australian society despite the absence of a constitutional Bill of Rights. Sir Gerard 
Brennan commented that, as a society, ‘[w]e are the inheritors of a Constitution 
(partly written) which we accept, without too much reflection, as appropriate to
69
secure and preserve our freedom’. This ‘faith’ is an inheritance from British
70
ancestry. While the separation of powers and the notion of representative 
government were entrenched in the Constitution,7' the protection of rights was left to
169 CLR 195 at p. 201. Mason, A new perspective, op. cit., p. 10, noted that the independence o f the 
judiciary is therefore the strongest element of the separation of powers structure.
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Brennan, Courts, democracy and the law, op. cit. See also Mason, Defining the framework, op. cit.
66
Neier, op. cit., p. 14.
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Brennan, Justice resides, op. cit., p. 15.
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Neier, op. cit., p. 14.
69
Brennan, Courts, democracy and the law, op. cit., p. 32.
Alexis de Toqueville, ‘Social control: Individualism, alienation and deviance’, in On Democracy, 
Revolution and Society, edited by John Stone and Stephen Mermell, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1980, p. 282, observed o f English constitutionalism, ‘The love o f justice, the peaceful and 
legal introduction of the judge into the domain of politics, are perhaps the most standing 
characteristics o f a free people.’
The separation of powers is explicit in the construction of the Constitution (Chapters I, II and III 
refer to the Parliament, the Executive government and the Judicature respectively) and, particularly 
the independence of the judiciary through security of tenure and guaranteed remuneration (s72), and 
the constitutional protection o f Chapter III Courts. The High Court has determined that 
representative government is implied by sections 7 and 24, referring to election ‘directly by the 
people’. See Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wells (1992) 177 CLR 1; and Australian Capital Television 
Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106.
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the ‘rule of law’. Where individual and minority rights are not guaranteed by a 
supreme law in the form of a constitution, the function of the courts to stand between 
the government and the governed becomes more important.
The rule of law and common law rights
The notion of the rule of law encapsulates the idea that there are fundamental
73
principles that are ‘superior, and possibly anterior, to positive law’. The rule of law 
is a constitutional principle, guiding both the exercise of power by the state and the 
bounds of positive law. Geoffrey Walker described the rule of law as ‘a philosophy 
of judicial restraint and fairness in the use of government power’, thus reconciling
74
the two antagonistic forces of law and power. In this way, the rule of law reflects a 
conception of the separation of powers between judiciary and legislature, defining 
their respective spheres of operation.
While the rule of law can be explained as an institutional doctrine, it is generally 
accepted that it also carries certain values of the common law and is intrinsically 
linked to understandings of rights and freedoms. For example, the International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) was established in 1955 to promote the rule of law 
throughout the world. In its first declaration, The Act of Athens, the ICJ spoke of 
‘the Rule of Law which springs from the rights of the individual developed through
Dicey, op. cit., p. 179, traced the rule of law as an institution since the Norman Conquest. 
Interestingly, the need for a Bill o f Rights in the American Constitution was at first rejected at the 
Philadelphia Convention, on the understanding that they would be sufficiently protected by the 
separation of powers in the Constitution, the Bill, o f rights was seen as a natural outgrowth o f the 
protections afforded by the separation of powers. See Mason, A new perspective, op. cit., p. 9.
Geoffrey Walker, The Rule o f law: Foundation of Constitutional Democracy, Melbourne 
University Press, Melbourne, 1988, p. 3.
74
ibid., pp. 1-3, 42.
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history’. Therefore, the role of the courts in the protection of rights is central to the 
rule of law tradition.76
There has been criticism that such an approach ties the rule of law to a liberal-free
77
market-democratic model. However, the ICJ asserted a continuing and more
inclusive relevance of the rule of law:
the Rule of Law is a dynamic concept. . . which should be employed not 
only to safeguard and advance the civil and political rights of the 
individual in a free society, but also to establish social, economic, 
educational and cultural conditions under which legitimate aspirations
and dignity may be realized.
The difficulty in defining the rule of law, and its association with a limited set of 
individual freedoms, has seen it invoked less often in legal commentary and case 
law. It has been argued that the temporary disfavour of the rule of law was in large 
degree due to the focus upon Dicey’s formulation of the principle, and criticisms of
79
it. The implication of this emphasis has been a failure to explicate and develop the
doctrine of the rule of law. Allen has suggested that this, in turn, has led to serious
imbalance between the powers of Parliament and other institutions of the
80
Constitution.
International Commission of Jurists, The Rule of Law in a Free Society, Report of the International 
Congress of Jurists, New Delhi, India, Geneva, 1959, p. 2. Compare Walker, op. cit., who argued the 
rule of law should focus on ‘freedoms from rather than freedoms to.' (original emphasis)
76
Justice John Toohey, ‘A Government of laws, and not of men?’, Public Law Review, vol. 4, 1993, 
footnote 10, p. 160, admitted that the common law has not necessarily consistently protected the 
interests of minorities, but suggested that perhaps insufficient use was made of the common law prior 
to the introduction of discrimination legislation. See also Tatz, op. cit., pp. 103-36.
See Walker, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
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ICJ, op. cit., p. 3. See generally, Toohey, op. cit., p. 159. Contrast Joseph Raz, ‘The rule of law 
and its virtue’, Law Quarterly Review, vol. 93, 1977, pp. 195-6, who described the statement by the 
ICJ as a ‘perversion’ of the rule of law.
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Walker, op. cit., p. 8, 128. Dicey, op. cit., pp. 198-9, characterised the rule of law as having three 
aspects. First, the rule of law provides a restraint on arbitrary power; second, the rule of law also 
means equality before the law, which Dicey equated with the universal application of the ‘ordinary 
laws of the land’; and finally, the rule of law sees the fundamental rights of the citizens depending not 
upon the special guarantee of a written document, but instead arising from the ordinary law.
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T. R. S. Allen, ‘Legislative supremacy and the rule of law: Democracy and constitutionalism’, 
Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 44, 1985, p. 114, commented that the failure of the courts to develop a 
clear and coherent doctrine of the rule of law can be traced to Dicey’s failure to present his 
formulation ‘in clear juristic terms’.
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Early reference can be found to the powers vested in the courts in upholding the rule
of law. The authority of the courts to reject an Act of Parliament was affirmed in Dr
Bonham ’s case, in 1610 where Sir Edward Coke pronounced:
it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will . . . 
controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly 
void; for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, 
or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will 
controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.
It appeared for a time that the notion had little application, particularly during a
period in which a principle of parliamentary sovereignty was recognised by the High
_  82
Court.
Despite this, many commentators have identified the rule of law as a constitutional
83
principle or convention upon which our written Constitution was premised. Recent 
members of the High Court have criticised the approach of the Court in earlier times 
for ignoring the separation of powers and the rule of law for the protection of rights
84
and judicial independence. However, it has been suggested that the rule of law has 
taken on a renewed importance in the context of a re-emergence of natural law
85
tradition and the recognition of fundamental rights. Sir Gerard Brennan argued that 
the judiciary:
[as] the least dangerous branch of government, has public confidence as 
its necessary but sufficient power base. It has not got, nor does it need, 
the power of the purse or the power of sword to make the rule of law
81
Dr Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co. Rep 113b, 118a; 77 ER 638, at p. 652, per Coke LJ, with 
Warburton and Daniel JJ. This was not an isolated case however, see Walker, ibid., pp. 118, 154. 
With respect to the power to void an act of the executive, see Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co Rep 
63; 77 ER 1342. On Sir Edward Coke and the development of the rule of law doctrine, see Walker, 
pp. 104-19.
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This was during the time o f Chief Justice Dixon who reputedly had a ‘low opinion’ o f the 
separation of powers doctrine. Mason, A new perspective, op. cit., p. 13. See generally, Sir Owen 
Dixon, ‘The law and the constitution’, Law Quarterly Review, vol. 51, 1935, p. 590, especially p. 
606. Walker, ibid., pp. 118-19, suggested that the doctrine merely fell into disuse and as such has 
never been strictly overturned. See for example, Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co 
Pty Ltd and Meakes v Dignan (1931)46 CLR 101, at pp. 117-18 per Evatt J.
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See for example, Walker, ibid., pp. 1, 3, and Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions, 
Clarendon, Oxford, 1984, p. 9.
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See generally, Mason, Defining the framework, op. cit.; Mason, A new perspective, op. cit.; 
Toohey, op. cit.; and Brennan, Courts, democracy and the law, op. cit.
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See Mason, Defining the framework, ibid., p. 1; Mason, Future directions, op. cit., p. 162; and 
Toohey ibid., p. 167.
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effective, provided the people whom we serve have confidence in the 
exercise of the power of judgement.
Brennan argued that the community looks to the courts for the protection of 
minorities and individuals against any overreaching of their legal interests by the 
legislative or executive arms of government
In New Zealand, where there is no written constitution, the resurgence of a notion of
87
the rule of law has been stronger than elsewhere. Sir Robin Cooke helped to re­
establish the power of the judiciary in a series of cases. In New Zealand Drivers 
Association v New Zealand Road Carriers, Cooke P with McMullin, and Ongley JJ 
questioned:
the extent to which in New Zealand even an Act of Parliament can take
away the rights of citizens to resort to the ordinary Courts of law for the
88
determination of their rights.
Similarly, in Fraser v State Services Commission, Cooke P felt that ‘some common 
law rights may go so deep that even parliament cannot be accepted by the Courts to
have destroyed them’ .89
While these decisions, and the principle that they support, have been acknowledged
90
in Australian cases, they have not been affirmed. The power of the courts to restrict
Brennan, Justice resides, op. cit., p. 15, using the words of Hamilton, op. cit., p. 437.
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See generally, Jane Kelsey, Rolling Back the State: privatisation o f power in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1993, pp. 191-211. Mason, Defining the framework, 
op. cit., p. 29, described the Australian jurisdiction as ‘more conservative’ in this respect than other 
jurisdictions, most notably New Zealand.
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[1982] 1 NZLR374, at p. 390.
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[1984] 1 NZLR 116, at p. 121. That view was confirmed in Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board 
[1984] 1 NZLR 294, at p. 398.
90
See Employees and Builders Labourers Federation of NSW (BLF) v Minister for Industrial 
Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372 per Kirby P, pp. 403-4 and Street CJ, pp. 386-7. See also Greiner v 
Independent Commission against Corruption (1992) 28 NSWLR 125 per Mahoney JA, p. 152. 
Compare House of Lords decisions concerning Nazi war crimes where legislation constituted ‘so 
grave an infringement of human rights that the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as 
law at all’: Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] AC 249, p. 278. See also John M. Kelly, A Short 
History o f Western Legal Theory, Clarendon, Oxford, 1992, pp. 418-9. See also the House of Lords 
decision in R v Home Secretary; Ex Parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696, where Lord Bridge of Harwich, p. 
748, did not deny the power of the courts to prevent the exercise of power by the executive, granted 
by parliament, where it would infringe fundamental human rights.
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the Parliament has generally been limited to the interpretation of statutes. The 
courts will presume an intention on the part of Parliament not to infringe upon the 
rights of citizens, so that ‘where two alternative constructions of legislation are open,
92
that which is consonant with the common law is to be preferred’. The text of a 
statute is interpreted, as far as possible, with respect for the values of the common 
law ‘so that they do not trench upon interests by which the common law set great
93
store. The limits to this protection are to force the legislature to be explicit if it
94
intends to abrogate rights. Therefore, where Parliament enacts legislation that is 
harmful to human rights, the courts are ‘helpless to remedy injustice in the face of
95
unjust legislation, enacted within power’.
The theory of the rule of law asserts that there are fundamental principles and rights 
against which the laws of the land can be judged, particularly as they relate to the 
exercise of power by the Parliament against the vulnerable. The extent to which the 
courts can restrain Parliament is as much a matter of judicial doctrine as political 
philosophy, and precedent exists for a strengthening of the power of the judiciary in
96
this regard. Moreover, the interpretation or understanding of those fundamental 
principles, can, and has, developed as the legal system seeks to be more inclusive.
91
However, note the recent decision in Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth (unreported decision of the 
High Court o f Australia, A29/1997, 1 April 1998; [1998] HCA 22), in which legislation allowing the 
building of the Hindmarsh Island bridge was found to be a valid exercise of Commonwealth 
legislative power. Two of the six justices, Gaudron J, at paras 44-5 and Kirby J, paras 152 ff., found 
that the Commonwealth’s power to make laws with respect to Aboriginal people was limited to 
beneficial laws, while two other judges, Gummow and Hayne JJ, at para. 82, found that the 
constitutional power was limited by the power of the courts to overturn legislation that showed a 
‘manifest abuse’. See also Gaudron J, paras 36-42 and Kirby J, para 117, point 3, and paras 159 ff. 
The remaining two judges, Brennan CJ and McHugh J, found it unnecessary to decide.
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96
‘After all’, Sir Gerard Brennan, ibid., p. 38, observed, ‘the doctrine o f the sovereignty of 
Parliament must itself be found in the common law which first distributed among the three branches 
o f government their respective functions.’
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However, Dicey’s observations on the United Kingdom Constitution remain 
pertinent to Australia in relation to common law rights, when it is admitted that, 
‘[o]ur constitution, in short, is a judge made constitution, and it bears on its face all
97
the features, good and bad, of judge made law’. Therefore, the strength of the rule 
of law as a constitutional doctrine is largely to be determined by the courts 
themselves in determining the balance of power between the judicial and legislative 
arms of the state. Unless the courts assert their power to protect rights, Parliament 
can prove its ‘sovereign power’ by interfering with those rights. In turn, the strength 
of the rule of law determines the security of common law rights including the 
common law recognition of the rights of Indigenous peoples. It is clear that the rule 
of law and the idea of fundamental, inalienable rights are accepted by the courts. 
However, the balance that is drawn by the courts, between fundamental rights and 
the intentions of parliament, requires further examination in the following section.
Parliamentary supremacy or judicial deference?
For Dicey, there was no ‘balancing’ between common law rights and the intentions 
of parliament. On the contrary, Dicey’s treatise on the Law o f the Constitution 
juxtaposes the rule of law against the supremacy of Parliament. Dicey argued that 
Parliament:
[has] the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that 
no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right
to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.
This position seems contrary to the notion of constitutionalism and to the rule of law 
itself. In the context of a republican critique of Dicey’s position, John Williams
97
Dicey, op. cit., p. 192.
98
ibid., p. 38.
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pointed out that ‘this perspective places one group (in this case the parliament) above
99
the law, the very thing that the rule of law was meant to prevent’.
Moreover, the notion of constitutionalism asserts that government should be limited 
according to clearly articulated principles, whether written or unwritten. In answer 
to this Dicey suggests the limitations imposed by the conventions of English 
constitutionalism are illusory:
No one of the limitations alleged to be imposed by law on the absolute
authority of Parliament has any real existence, or receives any
countenance, either from the statute-book or from the practice of the 
100Courts.
The clear role for the judiciary and the strong separation of judicial power that flows
from Australia’s written constitution, in turn, reinforces the rule of law.10' Dicey
acknowledged that the separation of powers and also the distribution of powers in a
102
federal scheme are antithetical to parliamentary sovereignty. ‘When we bear that 
in mind,’ Sir Anthony Mason observed, ‘it is surprising that Dicey’s theory of
103
parliamentary sovereignty took such a strong hold in Australia’. The High Court 
has distanced itself from Dicey’s theory of parliamentary sovereignty but, as Sir
Anthony noted, ‘not entirely so’ . 104
John Williams, The protection of rights, op. cit., p. 35 (original emphasis). Sir Gerard Brennan, 
Justice resides, op. cit., p. 15, argued that ‘a free society only exists so long as it is governed by the 
rule of law -  the rule which binds the governors and the governed’.
100
Dicey, op. cit., p. 68. The limitations referred to include judicial legislation (common law); 
natural law or international law; Crown prerogative and preceding legislation and parliaments. See 
pp. 58-68. Instead Dicey, pp. 68-82, relied on civil disobedience and electoral repercussions to 
constrain parliament.
101
Dicey, ibid., p. 133, admitted that the separation of powers that ‘makes the judges the guardians of 
the constitution provides the only adequate safeguard which has hitherto been invented against 
unconstitutional legislation’. Arguably the reservation of Judicial Independence in Chapter III of the 
Constitution protects the rights of individuals in the judicial process. See for example Dietrich v The 
Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, per Brennan J.
102
In relation to federalism, see Dicey, ibid., p. 135, where an entire chapter (III) (especially pp. 153- 
9) is devoted to federalism while little attention is given to the separation of powers doctrine. See 
also Mason, Defining the framework, op. cit., p. 10, and Mason, A new perspective, op. cit., p. 12.
Mason, Defining the framework, op. cit., p.10.
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ibid., p. 5. See also, p. 22. Some renowned constitutional commentators still affirm the doctrine, 
see for example Lane, op. cit., p. 250. Perhaps the clearest rejection of parliamentary sovereignty can 
be found in Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106.
113
Parliamentary supremacy has been rejected as a constituting principle of institutional 
relations in Australia. Yet, a residual adherence to the influence of Dicey emerges 
from the English common law tradition that has formed part of Australian law. This 
remains a concern for the protection of rights in Australian law. The interpretation 
of the separation of powers doctrine has deferred to the ‘supremacy’ of parliament in 
the absence of constitutional limitations.
The ‘balance’, as Mason has described it, suggests that while the courts will give 
greater weight to rights than would the political process, they will adhere to the
power of parliament to abrogate those rights through unambiguous legislation. 105 For 
example, the power of parliaments, both state and Commonwealth, to abrogate the 
rights of Indigenous people to their lands was included in the native title doctrine
established in the Mabo case. 106 The common law protection of Indigenous rights 
fell short of protection against the parliament as sovereign. Arguably, this does not 
accord with tenets of the separation of powers or the rule of law, placing the 
Parliament in a position of supremacy above the law. This hierarchy leaves the 
judiciary vulnerable to the interests of the legislature or executive, creating the type
of alliance between the anus of government originally feared by Hamilton. 107
The detachment of the courts from the state undermines the balance in the separation
of powers. At the same time, however, the High Court has acknowledged its role in
recognising and protecting fundamental rights and freedoms through the common
law. This approach has been described as a ‘deference to legislative judgement’
108
rather than a ‘concession to Parliamentary supremacy’. To this end, Sir Anthony 
Mason has argued that:
Judicial deference to legislative judgement -  the refusal of the High 
Court to substitute its opinion for that of parliament on the question
Mason, Future directions, op. cit., p. 163, and Mason, Defining the framework, op. cit., pp. 24-5. 
Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at pp. 33-6, per Brennan J.
Hamilton, op. cit., p. 437. See also Weither, op. cit., p. 36.
Mason, Defining the framework, op. cit., p. 23.
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whether a law will achieve the legitimate end in view, ultimately rests on 
the separation of powers rather than on parliamentary supremacy.
Moreover, in determining the extent of the powers of the judiciary to circumscribe
legislation that impinges on rights, Mason suggested:
Such a judgement calls for an evaluation of the community consensus or 
underlying philosophy as to the proper balance between the legislature 
and the judiciary as lawmakers.
The significance of the distinction between deference and supremacy is that while 
the courts respect the role of the legislature, pursuant to the Constitution, legislation
must be reasonable and appropriate to the end in question. 111 There has been a
renewed willingness on the part of the High Court to check the exercise of political
power on this basis. This has been illustrated most particularly in the freedom of
112
political communication cases. The High Court’s preference for tracing protection 
to a textual basis within the Constitution goes some way to explain the Court’s 
willingness to venture out in these decisions. For example, in the emergence of the 
‘democratic principles’ argument to sustain judicial intervention, the textual
113foundation within the Constitution, in this case, is representative government.
Mason identified this as a ‘purposive trend injudicial reasoning’ that showed:
a willingness to identify an object or purpose from the provision of the 
Constitution, and develop by way of implication a principle or rule of
law which will give effect to that object or purpose.
On this basis, the Court, in cases such as ACTV and Langer, found itself able to 
invalidate legislation which was not appropriate and adapted to the end in
A ‘legitimate end’ being the legitimate exercise of a constitutional head of power. See Mason, A 
new perspective, op. cit., p. 33.
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Mason, Future Directions, op. cit., p. 160, citing in support Geelong Harbour Trust 
Commissioner’s v Gibbs Bright and Co. (1974) 129 CLR 576, at pp. 584-5. See also, Brennan, 
Courts, democracy and the law, op. cit., p. 38.
Mason, Defining the framework, op. cit., p. 23. The test originally adopted in reference to the 
external affairs power has been applied more generally. See Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106. Compare Langer v Commonwealth (1996) 134 ALR 400 at p. 
413.
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Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wells (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television v 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; and Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 
CLR 104.
See Mason, Defining the framework, op. cit., p. 8. 
ibid., p. 21.
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question. " 5 While the principle identified in these cases was founded on 
representative government, the power of the Court to invalidate the legislation was
founded on the separation of powers. " 6
The willingness of the High Court to restrain the Commonwealth from interfering 
with rights is important. It illustrates a strengthening of the presumption that without 
unequivocal expression of intent, no statute will be read as authorising an abrogation 
or curtailment of a common law right. Moreover, it has extended that presumption
to the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. " 7 Sir Gerard Brennan 
concluded that:
If we again ask the question “are the courts fitted to provide an effective 
check against any oppressive exercise of power by the other branches of 
government?” the answer is not an unqualified yes or no . . . The 
Judicial Branch of government is still the least dangerous branch to the 
political rights of the community and the most constant protector of those 
rights, but its strengthening is critical to the democratic freedom of which 
we boast and to the peace, order and good government that are the
birthright of future generations.
In sum, the notion that the courts are the ‘least dangerous’ branch of government 
may explain Indigenous peoples’ willingness to utilise the courts. Mason has 
suggested that judges tend to give more weight to ‘rights’, and to respect for human
119
dignity than politicians or administrators. And they do have the power to
120
recognise rights that were not previously acknowledged. Further, the Parliament is 
reluctant to override a determination of the High Court because the courts have
Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 and Langer v 
Commonwealth (1996) 134 ALR 400 at p. 413. In this context, the Court found that provisions o f the 
proposed law so far intruded into the freedom of expression as not to reasonably and appropriately be 
adapted to the ends that lay within the limits of power.
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legitimacy and moral authority in the community that governments are reticent to 
challenge.'2'
Together, these observations suggest that self-determination claims may not only be 
successful in the courts but may have continuing recognition through the legislature 
and executive. While the courts have recognised particular rights of Indigenous 
peoples and given them the protection of the common law, as with Indigenous land 
titles, the power of parliaments to abrogate these rights limits that recognition. 
Without constitutional protection, those rights remain vulnerable. However, there is 
scope for the courts to adopt an approach that embraces the principle of judicial 
independence. The strengthening of the presumptive rule of interpretation to protect 
rights from the arbitrary exercise of power offers a greater security to recognised 
rights. The courts continually look to a principled decision rather than an expedient 
or popular solution. Therefore, the importance of their role in legitimating 
democratic government underscores an approach that puts greater store on the 
recognition and protection of rights.
III. The limits of the courts as a cultural institution
Indigenous self-determination claims are an assertion of a persisting sovereignty and 
the survival of Indigenous identity. When these claims are asserted in Australian 
courts, they are subjected to a different culture that struggles to comprehend an 
alternative worldview. This raises the concern whether Indigenous peoples can truly 
obtain any measure of recognition from the dominant and alien legal system. This
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part examines some of the difficulties that arise from the clash of cultures that occurs 
when Indigenous peoples claim rights through the courts. A consideration of some 
impressions of Indigenous peoples engaging with an alien institution leads to an 
analysis of particular issues arising from the way in which courts understand self- 
determination claims. These issues include the fragmentation of claims, the 
exclusive process of legal reasoning and the restricted acceptance of evidence. The 
proceedings in the Queensland Supreme Court of the Meriam peoples land claim 
over the Murray Islands, and the Kumarangk/Hindmarsh Island heritage protection 
claim by the Ngarrindjeri people help to illustrate the difficulties facing Indigenous 
peoples.
Assumptions o f  a uniform and universal colonial law
In the wake of the High Court decision in the Wik peoples’ case, Galarrwuy
Yunupingu made an observation about the ‘ownership’ of the law and the courts that,
while obvious to Indigenous peoples in Australia, those who constitute the
Australian legal system find difficult to comprehend. Galarrwuy commented that:
You have a legal and court system which is your High Court -  this is 
your system -  you have this system and you say to us: we must obey that
system. We must fit into that system. We must become part of that
122
system because we’re all Australians.
The demand for Indigenous peoples to conform to the non-Indigenous legal 
structures implies the supremacy and universality of non-Indigenous law. It is also 
assimilationist in that it suppresses the expression of Indigenous Taw-ways’. Irene 
Watson argued that Indigenous law-ways have survived, although they remain
123
subverted by the Australian state. Watson explained the importance of Indigenous 
law:
Galarrwuy Yunupingu quoted by David Byrne, Sharing Country: Land Rights, Human Rights and 
Reconciliation after Wik, Proceedings of a Public Forum at University of Sydney, 28 February 1997, 
Research Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Sydney, 1997, p. 84.
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Our voices were once heard in light of the law. The law transcends all 
things, guiding us in the tradition of living a good life, that is, a life that 
is sustainable and one which enables our grandchildren yet to be bom to 
also experience a good life on earth. The law is who we are, we are also 
the law. We carry it in our lives. The law is everywhere, we breathe it, 
we eat it, we sing it, we live it. And it is, as explained by George 
Tinamin: Ngangatja apu wiya, ngayuka tjamu. This is not a rock, it is 
my grandfather. This is a place where the dreaming comes up, right from
inside the ground.
Marcia Langton, similarly, described Indigenous law as a holistic expression of 
Indigenous identity and society:
What our people mean when they talk about their Law, is a cosmology, a 
worldview which is a religious, philosophic, poetic and normative 
explanation of how the natural, human and supernatural domains work. 
Aboriginal Law ties each individual to kin and to ‘country’ -  particular 
estates of land -  and to Dreamings. One is born with the responsibilities 
and obligations which these inheritances carry. There are many onerous 
duties, and they are not considered to be optional . . .  As many of our
people observe, Aboriginal Law is hard work.
In this way, Indigenous peoples are perhaps more explicit about the connection 
between law and culture in a society.
Indigenous peoples argue that there are different law-ways operating in Australia, 
and that they are alienated from the laws and institutions of the state that do not 
recognise the reality of pluralism and Indigenous Law in particular. The greatest 
obstacle to courts recognising the limitations posed by this alienation are that legal 
institutions and legal reasoning are not generally viewed as culturally relative. The 
myth of universality that permeates modem political theory is as pervasive in 
discussing the Australian legal system as it was for earlier discussions of 
sovereignty. For Indigenous peoples, utilising the courts requires engagement with a 
foreign institution. The courts’ procedures and structure reflect the European culture 
from which they were derived. The discourse too is culturally driven, requiring 
Indigenous peoples to translate their claims for self-determination, which are 
essentially cultural claims, into alien forms.
ibid., p. 39.
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Notwithstanding the fundamental importance of Indigenous peoples’ claims to 
country, or other cultural, social and political claims, Robert Williams Jr. argued 
that:
[Indigenous peoples] have been judged and their legal rights and status 
have been determined in European legal thought and discourse by alien 
and alienating norms derived from the European’s experience of the
world. ' 26
The hidden norms of the Australian and other European-derived legal system have 
been theorised by many traditions of critical scholarship. Mari Matsuda summarised 
the broad ‘critical perspective’ of the law, in the context of relations of power in 
society:
As feminist theorists have pointed out, everyone has a gender, but the 
hidden norm in law is male. As critical race theorists have pointed out, 
everyone has a race, but the hidden norm in law is white . . . When 
parties are in a relationship of domination and subordination we tend to 
say the dominant is normal and the subordinate is different from
normal.
There are a number of implications of this hidden culture of the legal system. Where
the cultural bias of the system is not acknowledged, those who participate in the
system act on a number of assumptions that perpetuate the habits of thought, making
128
it difficult to challenge the prevailing relations of power and recognition.
It was argued in the previous chapter that the language of modern political theory is 
inextricably tied up with the institutions of the modem, liberal-democratic state. 
Moreover, the cultural and temporal influences on those theories are equally part of 
the make-up of those institutions, including the courts. The previous chapter also
Robert Williams Jr, ‘Learning not to live with Eurocentric myopia: A reply to Professor 
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concluded that modem theories, and the institutions; that emerged from it, were 
designed to eliminate or suppress cultural diversity and justify uniformity.
The legal system operates on the assertion that it is objective and neutral, that it 
encapsulates universal values. Moreover, there is an assumption that institutional 
uniformity and the type of political and legal monism upon which the legal system is
129
based, reflects a superior ‘constitution’ of society. This preference for legal and 
political monism in the institutional structures of the state emerges from the theories 
of sovereignty that identified a single supreme authority as the locus of sovereignty. 
The idea that this is somehow a superior structure for society is also a reflection of 
the progressive view of human history, that is, as societies developed they would 
converge on a uniform set of legal and political institutions. The dominant, 
Eurocentric worldview ensured that this model would reflect the dominant European 
model. These models of hierarchy persisted in legal doctrines such as parliamentary 
sovereignty.
The assertion of a universal, neutral and supreme legal system is a device of 
colonisation. The assumptions upon which the courts assess Indigenous claims does 
violence to Indigenous peoples when it excludes them, suppresses their law and 
forces assimilation to the dominant law-way. The implications of such a bias for the 
utility of the courts in the assertion of self-determination claims are important. The 
difficulties of presenting claims to an alien forum, and translating ideas into an alien 
language, to be judged according to alien norms, impose substantial barriers for 
Indigenous claimants.
Tully, ibid., p. 66. For example, Matsuda, op. cit., p. 1395, argued that it is a typical justification 
to assert that uniformity is both efficient and unifying.
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The claims o f  the Meriam peoples and Ngarrindjeri people
Two examples illustrate the cultural difficulties that Australian courts pose for the 
assertion of self-determination claims. First, the Meriam peoples’ claim over the 
Murray Islands culminated in the most significant recognition of Indigenous self- 
determination claims by a court in Australia. The case spanned ten years from the 
time of application; through attempts by the Queensland government to pre-empt the
130
case; and the findings of fact by Justice Moynihan of the Queensland Supreme
Court;'31 until the final determination of the High Court of Australia.'32 Edward 
Koiki Mabo, the principal plaintiff, died less that six months before the High Court
handed down its decision.'33 In June 1992 the High Court recognised the prior and 
continuing system of land titles in the Murray Islands in Mabo v Queensland [No.
134
2]. However, the passage of the claim was difficult for the plaintiffs and the 
Meriam people as a whole, many of whom gave evidence. The determination of 
issues of fact before Justice Moynihan of the Supreme Court of Queensland 
highlighted some of the difficulties of institutional structure and understanding that 
arise in the assertion of self-determination claims through the courts.
Nonie Sharp, who spent a great deal of time with the Meriam people during and after 
the trial, summed up the experience:
[the] long hearing of Meriam claims to traditional title to certain lands, 
reefs and sea areas and the existence of a system of Meriam land law was 
beset by distortion and trivialisation. The overall effect of this was often 
to diminish Meriam meanings and certain matters of profound meaning
to the Meriam were bypassed.
130 Mabo v Queensland [No. 1] (1988) 166 CLR 186.
Mabo v Queensland (Determination of issues of fact, Supreme Court o f Queensland, Moynihan J, 
16 November 1990).
Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1.
For the story of Eddie Koiki Mabo, and the genesis of Mabo’s case see MABO: Life o f an Island 
Man, (motion picture) Film Australia, 1997.
134 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
Nonie Sharp, No Ordinary Judgement: Mabo, the Murray Islanders’ Land Case, Aboriginal 
Studies Press, Canberra, 1996, p. xix.
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Sharp concluded that the ‘oral tradition and the absence of corporate political 
authority’ in Meriam culture tested the capacity of the courts: ‘the former tested the 
boundaries of the court’s rules of evidence; the latter stretched the court’s 
comprehension to its limits.136
The Kumarangk/Hindmarsh Island dispute highlighted the continuing problem of 
legitimacy of the Australian legal system for Indigenous peoples seeking protection
137
of cultural interests. The dispute involved a struggle over Aboriginal heritage 
protection for the island known as Hindmarsh, or Kumarangk, in South Australia and 
a bid to halt development of a bridge to the mainland. The Ngarrindjeri people 
argued that the island and the surrounding waters were of special significance 
because of their importance to the spiritual and cultural beliefs of the Ngarrindjeri, 
including particular secret-sacred beliefs exclusive to Ngarrindjeri women. The 
integrity of the women claiming sacred knowledge and significance was directly 
challenged and a South Australian government Royal Commission determined that 
the sacred knowledge was a fabrication. The Commissioner, Justice Iris Stevens 
concluded that, ‘the beliefs said to constitute the “women’s business” . . .  are not 
supported by any form of logic, or by what was already known of Ngarrindjeri
138
culture’. The issue is by ‘whose knowledge, and whose logic’ were these claims
ibid., p. 166.
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assessed?
Maureen Tehan has argued that two divergent and irreconcilable worldviews were 
operating in the Kumarangk dispute, and her comments are applicable more 
generally. The interaction of the state and the Indigenous people revealed a story of
140
'dominance and colonisation’. The Indigenous people claimed protection under 
the dominant system, seeking to translate their system of beliefs into a form that 
would be heard and understood within that system. The dominant system sought to 
define Indigenous cultural heritage in familiar terms, to be tested against established 
rules to test the ‘truth’ of the claim, and ultimately to discredit and reject the claims.
The Kumarangk dispute is an important illustration of the limitations of the courts. 
Maureen Tehan argued that:
Both politically and legally, the Hindmarsh Island Bridge case stands as 
an example of the inability of the Anglo-Australian system to 
comprehend Aboriginal cultural interests. It also provides clear evidence 
that the dominant political and legal system has yet to find a language 
and means of according any significant recognition to Indigenous 
systems of law, regulation and belief which does not operate to
. . 141appropriate those systems . . .
The following sections expand on the Meriam and Ngarrindjeri peoples’ experience 
of the legal system to illustrate the difficulties that must be overcome if Indigenous 
peoples are to pursue claims through the courts.
Presenting Indigenous claims in legal language
The language of Indigenous people, demanding respect for their distinct identity and 
sovereignty, stands in stark contrast to the language of the law which has forced 
these broad claims to be fragmented into discrete units. While hopeful that the Mabo 
decision heralds a changing approach to self-determination claims, Dodson observed
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what appears to be, ‘an addiction in the Australian legal system of isolating 
components of Aboriginal law in order to place them into the artificial compartments
142which western legal systems are familiar with’.
Demands for self-determination are dissected into separate piecemeal claims for 
traditional rights to land, sacred sites, hunting and fishing; claims for jurisdiction and
143
the recognition of customary laws; and claims to inherent sovereignty. Of course, 
claims to land are intimately tied to and in fact are a part of a broader Aboriginal 
law. It is difficult to make an artificial distinction between land and claims for
144
recognition of law and jurisdiction. It was argued in chapter one that the self- 
determination claims that Indigenous peoples make against the state have an 
expression of sovereignty at their core. The interrelationship between claims to land, 
jurisdiction and sovereignty underscores the difficulty for Indigenous peoples of 
separating and fragmenting claims. The difficulty was highlighted by Rhonda 
Agius, a Ngarrindjeri woman, who commented that ‘Western Society has a way of
145
putting things in little boxes. You don’t see things holistically as we do’.
In contrast, the courts seem to approach each of these categories differently. While 
claims to land have been accepted, claims to criminal jurisdiction have been
146
explicitly rejected. It could be argued that the distinction appears to depend upon 
the extent to which the claim is perceived as a threat to the state as the sole source of 
sovereignty. However, such a distinction is arbitrary because, as we have seen, self- 
determination claims at whatever level of abstraction are based on a claim to a
Michael Dodson, ‘From Lore to Law: Indigenous rights and Australian legal systems’, Alternative 
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persisting sovereignty, and therefore implicitly challenge the state as sole
147
sovereign.
Commenting on the distinction drawn by the courts, Michael Dodson explained that:
[the] process of artificially selecting what is legitimate provides 
compromised justice for Indigenous people . . . The Australian legal 
system must take the further step of accepting that native title is
inseparable from the culture that gives it meaning.
The barrier to this change is not primarily one of content but understanding. For 
courts to recognise the integrative and holistic nature of Indigenous cultural claims, 
they must first understand how their own culture impinges upon their ability to 
accommodate self-determination claims.
In reference to the process of determining the issues of fact in the Meriam peoples’ 
claim, Sharp argued that the legal process had not provided a ‘suitable medium
149
through which to express Meriam people’s relationships to land’. Moreover, that 
at the heart of this ‘badness of fit’ was the gulf between Meriam interrelationship
with land and sea and the European idea of land as an economic commodity. 150 For 
Justice Moynihan, the Meriam relationship with the land was characterised as purely
economic. 151 In contrast Justice Blackburn, twenty years earlier, had found the
152
Yolgnu relationship with the land was purely spiritual. Neither is entirely correct
Weither, op. cit., p. xvii, argued that challenging the sovereignty of the state is inherent in self- 
determination claims. Therefore, Weither criticised legal analysis that focuses on defining self- 
determination based on western legal experience, which cannot even explain the scope of self- 
determination claims.
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because the relationship is being judged according to European measures, where
153these two elements of life are distinct.
The recognition of native title to land in Mabo has been described as insufficient, or 
inadequate. Others go further to suggest that the recognition is misconstrued and
154
inappropriate. In the First Report of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Social Justice Commissioner, Michael Dodson argued that the treatment of 
Indigenous interests in land under native title fails to take into account the spiritual 
and cultural dimensions of the relationship. Instead the courts have focused on 
economic elements of land use with little understanding of the additional roles 
played by activities such as hunting, fishing and gathering in the maintenance of
Indigenous cultural life. 55
Dodson was critical of the courts’ unwillingness to recognise other rights and 
derivations from a full acceptance of Indigenous society as a source of law. ' 56 This
would include much broader jurisdiction and self-government claims. ' 57 In the 
presentation of claims Indigenous peoples must, instead, confront the essentially 
Western cultural practice of fragmenting claims, which in Indigenous culture and 
law-ways may be interrelated. Moreover, even when claims are reduced to land 
claims for example, expressing Indigenous understandings of land and translating 
those ideas for the courts is difficult because the holistic understandings Indigenous 
peoples are not accommodated.
At the heart of the difficulty of translating Indigenous claims for the courts is the 
fundamentally different understanding of what is relevant to the claim. The 
translation of claims is more clearly explained by a discussion of the issue of
Sharp, ibid.
154
Paul Patton, ‘Mabo, freedom and the politics of difference’, Australian Journal o f Political 
Science, vol. 30, 1995, p. 111.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, First Report 1993, Canberra, 
AGPS, 1993, p. 29.
156
Dodson, From Lore to Law, op. cit., p. 2.
157
Matsuda, op. cit., p. 1401.
127
testimony and examining how oral traditions are received within the procedures of 
the courts for the reception of evidence. The hearing of testimonial evidence forms
158
the foundation of decision-making in Australian courts. The issue of evidence is 
therefore a central consideration in contrasting the claims by Indigenous peoples and 
the courts’ accommodation of those claims.
The Meriam people viewed the court case as an opportunity to explain their law, and
159
‘to make things fair and square’. They had an expectation that they would be 
given the opportunity to recall the facts of their land tenure and how they came to 
know these laws, that they would be judged fairly, and ‘that the truth of their
ownership would then become evident to the judge’ . ' 60 This view of the courts as an 
opportunity to ‘explain’ is a common expression that helps to explain the attraction 
to the courts for Indigenous peoples. In this way the evidence given by the Meriam
witnesses was directed toward gaining the courts’ understanding of their law.'6' 
Indeed, one of the primary reasons for remittance to the Queensland Supreme Court
had been to allow the Meriam people to have ‘the right to give evidence’ . ' 62 Despite 
this enthusiasm it became apparent very early that the hearing might not allow the 
Meriam people the opportunity they had sought.
There was an understandable expectation that testimony, as a form of evidence, 
would be capable of embracing the oral traditions of Indigenous peoples. However, 
as Archie Zariski pointed out, it constitutes ‘a trap’ for those concerned with cultural
Although documentary evidence has grown and physical evidence continues to play a minor role, 
the general rule is that a witness can only give evidence of facts that have been perceived with one of 
their five senses. The statement is accepted as prima facie evidence o f the possession o f such 
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Butterworths, Sydney, 1991, p. 46.
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claims. Precisely because the courts are cultural institutions, their reasoning
reflects the culture from which they were derived. Therefore, Zariski argued:
If testimony is ultimately justified by virtue of necessary contribution to 
the coherence and cohesiveness of a Western World view then the giving
of testimony will be perilous for those who do not share such a world.
Nonie Sharp suggested that counsel for the Meriam people feared that the witnesses
were being subjected to behaviour that they may have construed as ridicule. ' 6 Greg 
McIntyre, the Meriam5s counsel, recalled that Justice Moynihan had struggled to
understand or respect the evidence given. ' 66 Sharp argued that these were not 
primarily problems of language but of understanding in a more complex sense, 
where the use of ‘mythical-religious idiom’, of metaphor and analogy, were 
apparently not readily accessible to the literal mind. ' 67
The emphasis placed upon testimonial evidence has been identified with a reliance 
on familiar ways of knowing, with parallels to methods of inductive logic and 
notions of objectivity in Western science: ' 68
It is the familiar face of the ‘common(sense) man’ of the law who both 
gives and receives testimony. But it is the face of the same not of the 
other, the outsider, or the alien. This testimony comes not from them but 
from us. It is a narrative from within a culture trying to look beyond its 
familiar stories.
It is arguable that Western legal ways of assessing truth are unable to do justice to 
the testimony of those who do not share the same traditions of thought.
Irene Watson described this as a problem of distance:
non-Indigenous peoples are much further removed from the knowledge 
and philosophy of their own Indigenous identities and relationships to 
the land than what Indigenous peoples are. It is a two thousand year
Zariski, op. cit., p. 24.
164 ibid.
165
Sharp, op. cit., p. 42. Still, the witnesses showed few signs of frustration. See for example, the 
evidence o f Gobedar Noah, TQ 2159, in Sharp, p. 72.
166
Greg McIntyre, Interview, Perth, 3 December 1996.
167
Sharp, op. cit., p. 74, also pp. 96, 142.
168
Asch and Bell, op. cit., p. 505.
Zariski, op. cit., pp. 24-5.
169
129
track back for many non-Indigenous peoples to the source of their own 
indignity. 170
Looking back at non-Indigenous relationships with the land we are faced with a very 
different understanding to that asserted by Indigenous peoples. But these 
relationships must be understood as emerging from the culture of the European 
society rather than as a universal measure of all societies. This same understanding 
must extend not only to the way in which claims are received, but how they are 
judged.
Judging claims through legal reasoning
There are characteristics of legal reasoning that make it difficult for Indigenous 
cultural claims to be successfully argued. Unfortunately, there are a number of 
aspects of legal decision-making that assume the universality of the Australian legal 
system, including the concept of law itself.
In the Meriam peoples’ claim, Greg McIntyre attributed much of Justice Moynihan’s 
difficulty to his narrow conception of law and his attraction to a notion of the ‘noble
171
savage’. Moynihan J concluded that the Meriam people were ruled more by
172
custom or ‘good manners’ than by law. Dismissing the evidence of several Meriam 
witnesses as to the existence and exercise of Malo’s law, Moynihan J suggested that 
‘it does not become a rule of law just because any number of witnesses call it a rule
173
of law’. Elsewhere Moynihan J remarked T would say it sounds more like a
Watson, Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways, op. cit., p. 54.
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Greg McIntyre, Interview, Perth, 3 December 1996.
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See discussion of Justice Moynihan’s judgement in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 
1, at p. 18, per Brennan J.
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TQ 1811, in Sharp, p. 94. On this question of proving authenticity, see Jeremy Beckett, ‘The 
Murray Islands land case and the problem of cultural continuity’, in Will Sanders (ed.), Mabo and 
Native Title: Origins and institutional implications, CAEPR Research Monograph No.7, Australian 
National University, 1994, pp. 21-2.
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system of anarchy than a system of law that disputes are resolved by having a brawl 
or avoiding a brawl’.174
In a similar vein to McIntyre, Sharp suggested that Justice Moynihan’s rejection of 
Male’s law as merely a story was based on an understanding of law as the ‘command 
of the sovereign’. As well there was a perception of a progressive view of human 
history, in which Indigenous peoples occupy some sort of Hobbesian state of
175
nature. To this end, Moynihan J remarked:
I suppose in those general senses any group of human beings -  perhaps 
animals . . . has a series of precepts which have to be abided [by in order
to] live together as a group.
Justice Moynihan reflected views expressed in many decisions regarding Indigenous 
systems of law throughout the common law world. One notable comparison is the 
decision of Justice McEachem of the Supreme Court of British Colombia in
177
Delgamuukw v The Queen (1991). In relation to the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en
peoples’ claim for the recognition of self-government and other rights, Chief Justice
McEachem of the Supreme Court of British Colombia remarked:
I have heard much at this trial about beliefs, feelings and justice. I must 
again say, as I endeavoured to say during the trial, that courts of law are 
frequently unable to respond to these subjective considerations.
It is understandable that the capacity of courts throughout the western world to 
comprehend self-determination claims is compromised if belief, feelings and even
179
justice have no place in the determination of fact in the courts.
TQ 1807, in Sharp, op. cit., p. 94.
ibid., p. 144. For a discussion of Hobbes and the pre-civic state of nature as well as the influence 
o f the progressive view of human history, see pp. 37-8 above.
TQ 2235, in Sharp, ibid., pp. 141-2.
(1991) 79 DLR (4th) 185 (BCSC). For an interesting perspective on the trial, see Don Monet and 
Skanu’u (Ardythe Wilson), Colonialism on Trial: Indigenous Land Rights and the Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en Sovereignty Case, New Society, Philadelphia, 1992.
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Delgamuukw v. British Colombia (1991) 79 DLR (4th) 185 (BCSC), at p. 201, per McEachem CJ.
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McEachem CJ drew a distinction between the ‘subjective considerations’ of beliefs feelings and 
justice, and admissible evidence - ‘the facts which permit the application o f legal principle’. 
Delgamuukw v British Colombia (1991) 79 DLR (4th) 185 (BCSC) at p. 201.
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Similarly, throughout the Kumarangk dispute the beliefs of the Ngarrindjeri women
were viewed with suspicion. As a result, the Ngarrindjeri women refused to
180recognise the authority of the Royal Commission and did not give evidence. For 
those who did give evidence, it was an experience of frustration, again illustrating 
the difficulty of translating the claims and making them understood. The following 
exchange between George Trevorrow, questioned by the Counsel assisting the 
Commission, David Smith, is illuminating:
Q. How did you know that by connecting the island to the mainland by a 
bridge . . . was somehow offensive to its significance as a place of 
women’s business.
A. I think it is just common sense.
Q. But you didn’t know anything about the content of the women’s 
business.
A. No I still don’t know any of the content.
Q. It may be that a bridge from the island to the mainland would have no 
affect on -
A. It is still going through our waters . . .
Q. The importance of the waters is something to do with women’s 
business is it.
A. It very well could be, but it is important to the Ngarrindjeri culture 
because of the meeting of the waters. I didn’t want to say this, but the 
place of the waters relates to what we call -  the Ngarrindjeri people call 
Ngaitji, which is each clan group’s symbolic totem so to speak. Those 
places like that is where these things bread, where they live, where they 
feed, all those things. To upset the totem area you are upsetting 
everybody. But I don’t expect you to understand that, the Ngarrindjeri 
Ngaitji.
Q. Let me put a suggestion to you: what you are talking about is a 
disturbance to the environment. Is that right.
A. No, more than that. To what those Ngaitji are to the people. They are 
not just animals and fish and snakes and things to us. They are real. 
They are more like people. Spiritual. . .
Q. I want to put a label on it so that we can understand it. Is it the case 
that what you are talking about -  that is. that a bridge cannot go to the 
island -  is to do with some other spirituality of the island not women’s 
business.
Repeated attempts were made to challenge the Royal Commission, see ALRM v Stevens [No. 1] 
(1994) 63 SASR 551; ALRM v Stevens [No. 2] (1994) 63 SASR 558; and ALRM v Stevens [No. 3] 
(1994) 63 SASR 566.
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A. Fm talking about my business
Q. Can you tell us as much as you can about that.
A. I said it just now. N-G-A-I-T-J-I
Q. Which is what you are talking about, is a question of protecting the 
island from a lot of people coming to the island and ruining it. That’s 
what it is isn’t it.
A. You interpret it as environment, I don’t. We have a different 
interpretation it seems. We cannot as Aboriginal people, separate 
environment and culture. They go hand in hand.
Q. The Ngaitjis, that is the bird symbols and totems for the clans and 
people, are in fact the wildlife, aren’t they.
A. As you view them yes.
Q. Why are they different from-
A. Because -  no, I can’t talk to you about that. It is plain to see you 
would never understand about that anyway.
Q. I am suggesting that your objections to the bridge, in the end, boils 
down to really protecting the island from too many people coming onto it 
and degradation that would lead to in terms of wildlife, plants and that 
sort of thing. That’s what it is about, isn’t it.
A. Well, that’s what you are calling it.
Q. You say it is more than that do you.
Irene Watson pointed to the disrespect and ignorance of Indigenous peoples law and
182
culture illustrated by this exchange. However, it is also illustrative of the difficulty 
of translating holistic conceptions of land and culture of Indigenous Law within the 
traditions of the colonial legal system.
The Commonwealth Hindmarsh Island Report, prepared by Justice Jane Mathews, 
was highly critical of the findings of the Royal Commission but there too, Justice 
Mathews found it difficult ‘fitting Aboriginal beliefs about land into the language of
183
the Heritage Protection Act’. These comments hark back to observations by Nonie
reproduced in Watson, Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways, op. cit., pp. 51-3.
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ibid., p. 51.
183
Mathews, op. cit., p. 191. Although eventually tabled in Parliament, the Mathews report has no 
legal effect due to a successful challenge against Justice Mathews as Reporter under the separation of  
powers doctrine: Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (unreported
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Sharp of the ‘badness of fit’ between Indigenous and non-Indigenous conceptions in
184
the Meriam Islands land claim.
In greater detail, Justice Mathews went on to observe that:
the law requires that those who oppose a declaration [under the Act] 
must be given an opportunity to respond to the “case” against them. And 
if that case depends upon “embargoes” or “rules” which are associated 
with a particular tradition, then the law says that the opponents of a 
declaration must be told of the details of that tradition. This no doubt 
places a heavy burden on applicants, particularly those who are relying
on confidential traditions.
Hilary Charlesworth noted that Justice Mathews’ comments here highlight the ‘irony 
of the inability of legislation designed to protect Aboriginal heritage to understand
that heritage in its own context’ . ' 86 Instead, Indigenous peoples are forced to 
reformulate their claims into legal language. Some may question whether such a 
process can be successful if the legal system requires that Indigenous peoples also 
express their claims according to an alien way of understanding.
The unacknowledged biases of legal procedures and reasoning, and of legal 
practitioners, has a propensity to put Indigenous culture on trial in self-determination 
claims. The pervasive view of a universal law and legal institutions has so deeply 
affected the habits of thought of the non-Indigenous society that it has become 
difficult to conceive an alternative source of law within the borders of the Australian 
state and even more difficult to comprehend Indigenous peoples’ claims in their own 
terms. But there are signs that leaps of thought are beginning to occur in the legal 
sphere.
decision, High Court of Australia, Full Court, 6 September 1996). The Mathew’s report was not the 
first report to the Minister on this matter. Professor Cheryl Saunders reported to the Minister in 1995. 
But both the Report and the Minister’s order for protection were overturned by the Federal Court: 
Norvill and Milera v Chapman and Ors, Tickner v Chapman and Ors (1995) 133 ALR 226. As a 
result however, the original application under the Act still stood. The validity of legislation 
introduced to frustrate the claim was affirmed in Kartinyeri v The Commonwealth (unreported 
decision o f the High Court of Australia, A29/1997, 1 April 1998; [1998] HCA 22). See Frank 
Brennan, ‘Building a bridge on a Constitutional sea change’, Indigenous Law Bulletin, vol. 4(3), June 
1997, p. 6, and Jennifer Clarke, ‘Should parliament enact the Hindmarsh Island Bill’, Aboriginal Law 
Bulletin, vol. 3(88) February 1997, pp. 15-18.
Sharp, op. cit., p. xix.
185 Mathews, op. cit., p. 205.
Charlesworth, op. cit., p. 21.
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An alternative approach based on equality and respect
Commenting on the missed meanings and misunderstandings of the Meriam peoples’ 
testimony, Nonie Sharp stated that for the Meriam people ‘[s]ome matters were so
187
deeply cultural that they were not open to question’. This is true of both sides of 
this encounter. The cultural engagement that occurs when self-determination claims 
are argued in the court requires each side to expose the fabric of their way of life to 
understand the similarities and differences with the other.
Michael Asch and Catherine Bell argued that the greatest difficulty facing self-
determination claims is the reluctance of judges to view the evidence from a
188
perspective outside their own. In the Meriam land claim, Justice Moynihan failed 
to appreciate his own perceptual biases and as a result, the ‘simplicity of his 
assumption coloured the summaries and interpretations he interpolated in the course
189
of the hearings; they almost certainly coloured his evaluation of Meriam culture’.
The failure to acknowledge the cultural bias of legal processes and reliance upon the 
myth of an objective, neutral, universal law is coupled with a conscious or 
unconscious stereotyping of Indigenous society as primitive. Asch and Bell 
observed that:
The unfamiliar is characterised as subjective cultural belief rather than as 
factual and objective, leaving Aboriginal assertions of truth to be seen as
untrustworthy and beyond proper consideration in a court of law.
Specific instances of this continued discrimination, and its prevalence in the content 
of law, are evident in both of the examples used in the discussion so far.
As we have seen, the colonial law provides the terms in which claims must be stated. 
Therefore, Indigenous peoples are forced to translate their worldview into legal 
language to make the courts understand their values and their culture. Moreover,
187 Sharp, op. cit., p. 74.
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Asch and Bell, op. cit., p. 505.
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Sharp, op. cit., p. 167.
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Indigenous peoples must also frame what are essentially historical, moral challenges 
to the legitimacy of assertions by the state in terms that will be accepted by an arm of 
the state. However, Sharp observed signs of ‘an awakening sensibility’ within the 
legal system, partly in response to the High Court’s Mabo decision, at the heart of 
which is an evolving understanding and respect for Indigenous peoples. Sharp 
argued that:
[there is] a break in ‘the natural inheritance’ of those born of the 
conquerors [and] an acceptance of the integrity of cultural difference and 
with it the tenet that the peoples who were dispossessed ‘are their moral
equals’ . 191
Sir Gerard Brennan ties this sensibility to the rule of law, by suggesting that:
[p]erhaps the independence that is most difficult for judges to achieve is 
independence from those influences which unconsciously affect our 
attitude to particular classes of people. Attitudes based on race, religion, 
ideology, gender or lifestyle that are irrelevant to the case in hand may 
unconsciously influence a judge who does not consciously address the 
possibility of prejudice and extirpate the gremlins of impermissible
discrimination.
The danger is that judicial independence of this kind depends ultimately on the
193
‘calibre and character of the judges themselves’. There are, however, elements of 
judicial reasoning that do allow the courts to successfully engage with Indigenous 
peoples’ law-ways.
As a first step, acknowledging that the law is cultural institution would substantially 
alter the approach taken to the proof of claims. Asch and Bell called for an ‘new 
legal epistemology’, a ‘new jurisprudence’ that is premised upon the equality of
194peoples. Moreover, an approach based on equality of peoples would accommodate 
alternative worldviews rather than requiring the remoulding, or worse the rejection, 
of claims based on cultural assumptions. The result would be that the courts would 
no longer interpret historical fact in a way that gives primacy to the perceptions of
Sharp, op. cit., p. 16.
Brennan, Justice resides, op. cit., p. 15. 
ibid.
Asch and Bell, op. cit., p. 549.
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one people over another. Such a reconstruction would require not only an 
acknowledgement of cultural bias, but also recognition of the need to admit new 
forms of evidence. This would include recognition of, for example, story-telling of 
dreaming tracks, of responsibility for land and culture, of ways of governing and of 
laws and relationships, as well as the history of dispossession and genocide which 
has affected every facet of Indigenous society. All of these issues would be received
195as evidence rather than be denigrated as subjective belief and hurt feelings.
In this manner, it is arguable that testimony can be conceived and received within a 
cultural context allowing Indigenous peoples to present their claims in their own 
way. A more accommodating approach stems from respect for the equality of 
Indigenous peoples and for their right to assert their claims against the state. Such an 
approach would require true communication, through an exchange of meaning and 
insight that cannot be achieved through interrogation and suspicion. Archie Zariski 
argued that in the process of gaining knowledge, the courts ‘ought to consider letting 
others speak more for themselves. In principle, we must be prepared to listen more
196
and ask less’. If the coloniser’s law is to be accommodating of the claims of 
Indigenous peoples, it must be able to hear their voice and listen to the story they 
want to tell.
The acceptance of Indigenous evidence would face the greatest difficulty if, as in the 
case of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en, they were trying to explain their system of 
laws and government, in a cultural context. However, the recent decision of the full 
court of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Delgamuukw case reaffirmed the
This was also identified as a significant difficulty in Monet’s account of the Gitksan and 
W efsuw efen trial before Chief Justice McEachem. Monet, op. cit., passim, related parts of 
testimony given by Gitksan chiefs and the interjections of the court which continually questioned the 
evidentiary value of what the witnesses wanted the court to hear. See for example, pp. 28-9, 38, 42 
among others. Compare similar stories about the reception of evidence of titles to land in the Mabo 
proceedings in Sharp, op. cit., passim. Although, in the Mabo case, the bulk o f evidence was left 
unchallenged by Moynihan J who was in the unusual position of determining facts for another court. 
Therefore, Moynihan J was not able to exclude evidence because issues such as whether the Meriam 
law was law, and therefore allowable or hearsay, was a matter for the High Court.
196
Zariski, op. cit., p. 27, put forward a specific proposal for reconstructing the trial process to 
achieve this shared vision, in which special juries for cultural claims, made up of members o f the 
culture from which the issues arise, acted as ‘part jurors, part witnesses and in part as experts’ and 
who are respected as equals.
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importance of adapting common law rules of evidence to accommodate the claims of
197
Indigenous peoples. Chief Justice Lamer held that ‘aboriginal rights are truly sui 
generis, and demand a unique approach to the treatment of evidence which accords
198
due weight to the perspective of aboriginal peoples’. Specifically, Lamer CJ stated 
that this would require the courts to ‘come to terms with oral histories’ recognising
199
that for many Indigenous peoples oral histories are the only record.
Lamer CJ expressed concern that although admitting the oral history evidence, the 
trial judge had not given any independent weight to them, assumedly because they 
did not accurately convey historical truth as a court would normally understand it. 
Chief Justice Lamer suggested that McEachem CJ expected too much of the oral 
histories and placed an impossible burden on the claimants given the evidence that
was available to them.200 Moreover, Lamer CJ was fearful ‘that if this reasoning
were followed, the oral histories of aboriginal people would be consistently and
201
systematically undervalued by the Canadian legal system’.
In the Mabo decision, the High Court of Australia expressed concern that the
difficulty of proving Indigenous peoples’ claims should not preclude their
202
recognition. While the statements are not as strong as in the Canadian context, 
there is a continuing movement toward respecting and giving due weight to the 
Indigenous perspective of what is appropriate and cogent evidence.
The need to overcome an implicit assumption of universality is not exclusively a 
problem of the courts. Assumptions of superiority and an evangelical imposition of
Delgamuukw v British Columbia (unreported decision, Supreme Court of Canada, No. 23799, 11 
December 1997, Lamer CJ, La Forest, L’Heureux-Dube, Cory, McLachlin and Major JJ). See also R 
v Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507.
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cit., paras 49-50, 68.
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202
138
. * 203
one vision of the truth is a feature of European colonial cultures. Moreover, it is 
arguable that the courts may be the best place for bridging inter-cultural dialogue. 
Although Indigenous peoples have always resisted colonisation, only recently has 
recognition begun to come from the non-Indigenous state, through acknowledgement 
of claims in the courts, as well as recognition in international law. James Tully 
argued that this is a revival of the Aboriginal and common law system that has been
204
‘hidden beneath the empire of modern constitutionalism’.
Tully identified an ‘Aboriginal and common law system’ of inter-cultural dialogue 
already in existence, in which three principles, of mutual recognition, continuity and 
consent, constitute a system that is familiar to both Indigenous Law and common law
205
systems. The principles of mutual recognition and consent equate with the ideas 
of equality and respect already highlighted, whereas the principle of continuity 
embodies the idea of a dialogue, recognising that relationships between equals must 
be continually renegotiated.
In contrast, Nonie Sharp argued that the use of metaphor and analogy by the Meriam 
peoples was not readily accessible to the literal mind and therefore limited the ability
of the court to understand and respect the claims being made. 206 Also, the exchange 
between George Trevorrow and Counsel assisting the South Australian Royal 
Commission illustrate that legal practitioners in the court are often unable to 
comprehend the evidence given. These examples show that comprehension is as
207
much a function of attitude as of familiarity. But where does this leave Indigenous
peoples before the courts?
See generally, Robert Williams Jr, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The 
Discourses o f Conquest, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990.
204
Tully, op. cit., p. 136.
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For example, Mari Matsuda, op. cit., pp. 1362, 1397, has observed that the prejudices people 
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culture of domination.
139
As Tully argued, the common law method should be more accessible for this type of 
reasoning, because:
[in law] understanding a general concept consists in being able to give 
reasons why it should or should not be used in any particular case by 
describing examples with similar or related aspects, drawing analogies or 
disanalogies of various kinds, finding precedents and drawing attention 
to intermediate cases so that one can pass easily from familiar cases to
the unfamiliar and see the relation between them.
The value of analogical reasoning was also argued by Cass Sunstein who suggested 
that the use of analogy allows for ‘incompletely theorised agreements’, in which 
there is no need to agree on universal principles but to recognise differences and
209
similarities in order to reach a resolution. Tully pointed to the claimants in the 
Delgamuukw case, arguing that Indigenous peoples are adept at explaining concepts
of Indigenous culture and Law, contrasting these with European understandings and
210
finding intermediate examples to help the court understand.
I have argued earlier that the incremental approach of the courts, and the common
law method are viewed as one of the advantages of the courts and, indeed, one of the
reasons for the self-determination gains that have been made in the courts. Similarly,
Tully’s principle of continuity sees each agreement as ‘one link in an endless chain’,
the link is open to review and to re-negotiation, if the agreement is not as appropriate
211
as it might have appeared. There is a possibility that the development of doctrine 
will reflect a developing understanding of Indigenous law-ways so that they may be 
more successfully accommodated by the courts of the state.
Tully, op. cit., p. 108.
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Conclusion
Given the limitations of the courts in their cultural context and the institutional or
structural constraints on them, Rosenberg concluded his analysis of the courts urging 
that they be rejected as a vehicle of social change:
To ask [courts] to produce significant social reform is to forget their 
history' and ignore their constraints. It is to cloud our vision with naive 
and romantic belief in the triumph of rights over politics. And while 
romance and even naivete have their charms, they are not best exhibited 
in courtrooms.
Asking the courts to recognise and support self-determination claims by Indigenous 
peoples is fraught with dilemmas. Such claims require reliance on an institution 
which is in part responsible for legitimising centuries of dispossession and denial of 
Indigenous self-determination. The state maintains relative power and often, as
213Nettheim noted, law ‘simply follows and legitimates power.’ In both form and
214content, there is a pervasive legal bias in favour of the oppressor. The courts are 
resistant to challenges to the legitimacy of the state. The common law is not wholly 
accommodating of the claims themselves and has deferred to the sovereign to which 
it owes its authority. Nor are the courts accommodating of alternative worldviews, 
forms of expression and unfamiliar conceptions of order and authority. Moreover, 
the institutions of the common law require Indigenous peoples to formulate their 
demands in a culturally specific discourse that does not adequately accommodate an 
Indigenous perspective.
Critics have argued that the result is an abdication of judicial responsibility for the
215
actions of the state. For example, Chief Justice Marshall of the United States
Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 343.
213
Garth Nettheim, ‘International legal notes: Seminar on the rights of Indigenous peoples under law 
and practice, Canberra, Australia, May 1-2 1986’, Australian Law Journal, vol. 60, July 1986, p. 418.
Weither, op. cit., p. xviii.
2,5 Rosenberg, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
141
Supreme Court coined the phrase ‘courts of the conqueror’, arguing that the courts 
were powerless to interfere in the subjugation of Indian nations to the United States. 
But the courts are not subjects of the state, rather they are an arm of the state; they 
are not the courts of the conqueror, they are the conqueror. They have used their 
authority to affect the rights of Indigenous peoples and, in particular the relations 
between Indigenous peoples and the state. Yet, the courts perceive themselves in a 
hierarchy in which they assert that they are unable to entertain a challenge to state 
sovereignty.
However, there are strategic advantages as well as direct benefits in using the courts. 
As an institution and an arm of government, the judiciary provides an important 
public forum for the assertion of self-determination claims. The size of the 
Indigenous population and the relative power of the state make it necessary for 
Indigenous people to locate the forum where their voice will be best and most widely 
heard. The courts provide an opportunity to assert rights, challenge the state, 
publicise claims and educate the community.
Self-determination movements often work within the state structures and clearly 
recognise the political and, indeed, cultural, nature of the courts. Still, the strategic 
advantages of the courts make them one of the more useful tools in maintaining 
momentum toward self-determination. Weither referred to this strategic use of the 
courts as the ‘weapons of the weak’, because they are ‘available for conversion and 
provide a useful political link to the “centre”, which represents a strategic choice 
made because of its utility’.216
Noel Pearson, former Chair of the Cape York Land Council, has commented on 
devising strategies, that:
[Indigenous peoples] need to be realistic about the following: first, about 
the content and the nature of the tools which are available to us; second,
Werther, op. cit., pp. 50-51. From James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of 
Peasant Resistance, Yale University Press, Connecticut, 1985. This is not a true reflection of Scott’s 
use o f the term. Scott was concerned with uprisings of a more revolutionary nature, which did not 
necessarily operate through existing state structures.
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about what these tools can positively achieve. They are limited tools and 
to optimise results we must use them wisely and skilfully.
While accepting that the courts are not the answer to every claim of rights and 
having regard to their limitations, the advantages for Indigenous peoples in accessing 
a central arm of government and public forum are important.
The non-constitutional character of the rights being asserted places the claims of
Indigenous peoples within the common law. Despite the difficulty in presenting
Indigenous peoples’ claims to the court other commentators have maintained the
usefulness of the courts and the common law. Colin Tatz went so far as to say that:
the Australian political system has nothing to offer Aborigines but that 
they may win legally what they cannot win politically; that the law and 
legal process are perhaps more effective means of asserting rights than
conventional politics.
In this alternative argument the strategic advantages of the court as a forum are 
recognised but so too are the real advantages of attaining specific self-determination 
goals and the development of long term self-determination strategies through the 
flexibility of the common law.
Observations made here suggest an opportunity to utilise the courts for self- 
determination claims that rejects past perceptions and, instead, appeals to the courts’ 
independence as well as their responsibility for law making in Australia, appealing to 
the responsibility of the courts and their legitimacy as protectors of the rights of 
citizens especially classes of citizens. Indigenous peoples in Australia and elsewhere 
have found the courts, and the common law in particular, a useful instrument to 
achieve public recognition of their claims and political leverage in negotiations with 
the state. The common law can also provide the direct benefits of litigation through
Noel Pearson, ‘Aboriginal law and colonial law since Mabo’, in Christine Fletcher (ed.), 
Aboriginal Self-determination in Australia, Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 1994, p. 158.
Tatz, op. cit., p. 104.
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acknowledgement of the rights claimed. The extent to which the common law can 
be utilised to recognise self-determination claims will be explored in the following 
chapters where the flexibility suggested here will be tested.
Chapter 4
The Impact of Common Law Doctrines on Indigenous
Self-determination
The role of Australian courts in accommodating the claims of Indigenous peoples 
will depend, largely, on the receptiveness of the common law. The potential for 
recognition of rights within the common law attracts Indigenous peoples to the 
courts despite the institutional and cultural limitations. However the common law 
has not generally embraced these claims and the utility of the courts must be 
assessed in light of their approach to self-determination claims. The vision of a 
universal law with its attendant mythology of the superiority of the European legal 
and political institutions has been central to the courts’ relationship with Indigenous 
peoples in the past. These assumptions continue to influence current decisions and 
doctrines.
This chapter examines the doctrines that concern Indigenous self-determination and 
the more recent attempts to accommodate some recognition of Indigenous peoples 
within the common law of Australia. A comparison between the unique 
development of the doctrines concerning Indigenous peoples’ land, law and
145
sovereignty in Australia helps to explain the context of more recent developments in 
the Australian common law. The reclaiming of rights to lands and territories in 
recent court action is then considered. The overthrow of the myth of terra nullius is 
contrasted with the reinforcement of the act of state doctrine to illustrate the 
continuing tensions in the recognition achieved within the common law. Recent 
decisions are used to examine how these tensions are currently being played out.
The approach taken in this chapter is not intended to be wholly negative or critical. 
Rather, the discussion of the limitations of existing doctrines provides a foundation 
for determining the ways in which the common law might facilitate the realisation of 
self-determination in the future. This latter question forms the point of departure for 
the following chapter. The common law recognition of rights is central the strategic 
usefulness of the courts as a tool for asserting self-determination.
I. The domestication of the doctrine of discovery
Self-determination claims question the assertion of sovereignty, jurisdiction and title 
by the British Crown over the territories that became known as Australia. These 
assertions were legitimated first by political theory and then by natural law theory 
and international law and finally by the courts. The accepted justification for the 
acquisition of sovereignty was the superiority of the colonisers over the inhabitants 
particularly in relation to political organisation, but also with respect to religion, land 
use, social institutions and skin colour. 1 As we have seen, the law of nations, while 
positing equality of nations as a central tenet, was also formulated to justify
1 Michael Asch and Patrick Macklem, ‘Aboriginal rights and Canadian sovereignty: An essay on R v 
Sparrow Alberta Law Review, vol. 29(2), 1991, p. 511.
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colonisation and limit recognition of Indigenous peoples.2 Vitoria acknowledged 
that the Indigenous peoples of the new world should be allowed to govern 
themselves ‘in both public and private matters’ .3 However, recognition was 
dependent upon a Eurocentric evaluation of the social and political development of 
Indigenous peoples and was dismissive of the governmental structures that were in 
place.4 5
Similarly, the justification for the taking of lands from the Indigenous people was the 
assumption of superiority in land use and the ‘right’ of civilised peoples to cultivate 
the land.3 Vitoria and Vattel propounded this view from the sixteenth century as an 
attempt to reconcile the natural law rights of peoples with the colonisation of the 
Americas. The motivation of European powers in securing trading partners and 
allies was superseded by a new more intrusive agenda. The primary focus of 
colonial expansion had turned to the control of lands and resources.6 The 
‘discovering’ states laid claim to all the lands of the discovered territory as sole 
sovereign.
2 See, for example, Samuel von Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo [1688], translated 
by C. H. Oldfather, Oceania, New York, 1964, vol. II; Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo 
Scientifica Pertractatum, [1764], translated by J. H. Drake, Oceania, New York, 1964, vol. II, pp. 
xxxii, xxxix; and Emmerich Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to 
the Conduct of the Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns [1758], translated by C. H. Fenwick, Oceania, 
New York, 1964, vol. Ill, pp. xii, xiii. See generally, James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity  ^ Cambridge University Press, New York, 1995, pp. 70-82. 
Contrast, for example, Asch and Macklem, op. cit., p. 510, who pointed to the notion of equality in 
the law of nations and therefore argued that colonisation was a breach of international law as it was 
understood at the time. See also Thomas Flanagan, ‘From Indian title to Aboriginal rights’, in Louis 
Knafla (ed.), Law and Justice in a New Land: Essays in Western Canadian Legal History, Carswell, 
Toronto, 1986, p. 85. This contrast is illustrative of Slattery’s argument that the law of nations is 
unreliable as a basis for claims because it was not settled and was determined largely by, or in the 
interests of, the powers of the time. See Brian Slattery, Ancestral lands, alien laws: Judicial 
perspectives on Aboriginal title, University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, Studies on 
Aboriginal Rights, No. 2, 1983, p. 26.
3 Fransiscus de Vitoria, ‘Des Indes [1539]’, in Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (eds), 
Fransisco de Vitoria: Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1991, p. 251.
4 See, for example, M. F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in 
International Law, Longman, London, 1928, p. 11.
5 It was asserted that the superiority of European land use justified the taking of uncultivated lands, 
leaving sufficient lands for the Indigenous people to survive. See John Locke, The Second Treatise of 
Government, ss. 31-8. Contrast Wolff, op. cit. This imposition of the West’s vision of the ‘truth’ on 
the non-Westem world is the basis of Robert Williams critique of the law as supporter of these 
assumptions. See Robert A. Williams Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The 
Discourses of Conquest, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990. More generally, see James 
Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, Clarendon, New York, 1979, pp. 176-81.
6 Jane Smith, ‘Republicanism, imperialism and sovereignty: A history of the doctrine of tribal 
sovereignty’, Buffalo Law Review, vol. 37, 1988/9, p. 535.
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The interpretation of the doctrine of discovery by colonial courts
On the earliest understandings of the international law of nations ‘discovery5 carried 
with it rights as against other European nations in relation to trade. 7 The rights 
flowing from discovery expanded with the changing interests in new territories, to 
include exclusive rights to purchase lands and the right of conquest. 8 It could be 
argued, then, that the rights of colonised peoples have always been an issue of 
international law. However, British courts domesticated the rules of international 
relations and the acquisition of territory into the common law from the earliest times.
British courts had always purported to recognise the rights of inhabitants of newly 
‘acquired5 territories where their traditions and values were similar to those of the 
British. 9 However, the legitimacy of the Crown's assertion of sovereignty was 
justified if the territories could be characterised as a political and legal vacuum. The 
reasoning of the courts led to the development of a ‘test5 of civilisation that would 
determine the rights of peoples. Therefore, the laws applicable to conquered nations 
were firmly established in the antiquity of the common law, the ancient roman ius 
gentium and the universal law of nations. 10
Conquest was one of three methods of acquiring land under British common law and
7 Phillip Frickey, ‘Marshalling past and present: Colonialism, constitutionalism and interpretation in 
federal Indian law’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 107(2), 1993, p. 397. The basis of discovery was not 
to control Indians and Indian lands but the right to trade and purchase lands and protection from other 
European powers.
8 To this end, Slattery, Ancestral Laws..., op. cit., p.37, argued that the doctrine of discovery was not 
as certain as some have suggested because the powerful states did not have a settled practice. See 
also Brian Slattery, ‘Aboriginal sovereignty and imperial claims’, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, vol. 
29, 1991, p. 685.
9 See for example Calvin’s case [1608] 7 Co Rep la; 77 ER 377 at p. 398. In Calvin’s case in 1608 
the test had distinctly religious aspect:
for if a King come to a Christian kingdom by conquest, seeing that he hath vitoe et nicis 
potestatem, he may at his pleasure alter and change the laws of the kingdom: but until 
he doth make alteration of those laws the ancient laws of that kingdom remain. But if a 
Christian King should conquer a kingdom of an infidel and bring them under his 
subjection, there ipso facto the laws of the infidels are abrogated, for that they be not 
only against Christianity, but against the law of God and of nature.
See generally Michael Asch, Home and Native Land: Aboriginal rights and the Canadian 
Constitution, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1993, p. 42. See also, Williams, op. 
cit., pp. 199-200.
10 See Campbell v Hall 1 Cowp. 204 (1774) per Lord Mansfield, pp. 209-11. See also Williams, op. 
cit., p. 301.
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each of the methods had different implications. The classic pronouncement of the 
methods of acquisition is found in Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws o f 
England:
Plantations, or colonies in distant countries, are either such where the 
lands are claimed by right of occupancy only, by finding them desart and 
uncultivated, and peopling them from the mother country; or where, 
when already cultivated they have been either gained by conquest, or 
ceded to us by treaties. And both these rights are founded upon the law 
of nature, or at least upon that of nations. 11
Where a colony was established by force, in a territory whose inhabitants had a legal
and political system in place, the local law continued unless contrary to British
concepts of morality and justice or until altered by the Crown. 12 This was
distinguished from the rules for settlement, as stated by Blackstone:
For it is held, that if an uninhabited country be discovered and planted by 
English subjects, all of the English laws are immediately there in force 
. . . But in conquered or ceded countries, that have already laws of their 
own, the king may indeed alter and change those laws; but, till he does 
actually change them, the ancient laws of the country remain. . , 13
Where lands were already inhabited, the doctrine of discovery did not envisage 
immediate acquisition of sovereignty unless ceded or conquered. However, a fourth 
method of acquisition of territories emerged in British colonial practice which turned 
on the idea of cultivation in Blackstone’s Commentaries and harks back to a 
distinction drawn in Calvin’s cases, between Christians and infidels. 14 This latter 
category of acquisition by ‘settlement’ saw occupation of territory by the original 
inhabitants simply not recognised. 15
The particular interpretation of what constituted ‘desert and uncultivated’ did not 
necessarily coincide with Blackstone’s own conception of the justification for
11 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England [1823], Legal Classics Library, New 
York, 1983, Book 1, p. 105.
12 The basis o f the conquest rule can be traced to the decision in Cambell v Hall (1774) Lofft 655, at 
pp. 741; 98 ER 848, at p. 895-6. See also Blankard v Galdy (1693) Holt KB 341; 90 ER 1089, and 
Calvin’s case [1608] 7 Co Rep la; 77 ER 377.
13 Blackstone, Commentaries, op. cit., Book 1, pp. 104-5. Blackstone, p. 105, went on to characterise 
the American plantations as within the latter class, having been obtained by conquest, by driving out 
the Indigenous inhabitants, or by treaty. As such ‘the common law of England has no allowance or 
authority there; they being no part of the mother country, but distinct (though dependent) dominions’.
14 Asch, op. cit., p. 424.
15 See generally Brian Slattery, The land rights of Indigenous Canadian peoples as affected by the 
Crown’s acquisition of their territory, PhD Thesis, Oxford University, 1979.
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acquiring title to lands. 16 Indeed, Blackstone went so far as to question the role of 
the law in legitimising the acts of state that wrested sovereignty and title from the 
Indigenous peoples:
Pleased as we are with possession, we seem afraid to look back to the 
means by which it was acquired, as if fearful of some defect in our title; 
or at least we rest satisfied with the decision of the laws in our favour. 17
Michael Asch argued that had the test of occupancy been truly objective and non- 
discriminatory, the division between conquest and settlement may have been highly 
rational. 18 Instead, the definition was based on ethnocentric biases so that 
unoccupied land, on the legal view, was not determined by the presence or absence 
of people but on whether the people met the test of civilisation. 19
The importance of this doctrine to the laws of the colonial states was highlighted by 
Robert Williams Jr. who argued that:
For the native peoples of the United States, Latin America, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand . . .  the end of the history of their 
colonisation begins by denying the legitimacy of and respect for the rule 
of law maintained by the racist discourse of conquest of the Doctrine of 
Discovery.20
The common law approach to conquest and settlement relied on assumptions of 
superiority, whether religious or political, that characterised the political and natural 
law theories. The courts incorporated these justifications in their ‘reasoning’ to 
reassert a test of civilisation by which the superiority of the British could be used to 
justify the denial of the rights and interests of the Indigenous peoples as well as their 
sovereignty and independence.21
16 Blackstone, Commentaries, op. cit., Book 2, p. 2. Blackstone’s distinctions were primarily 
concerned with the implications for the introduction of the law of England to new territories, rather 
than with the recognition of rights of the Indigenous inhabitants. Blackstone’s concern for the 
treatment of Indigenous peoples is reflected in the following passage, at Book 2, p. 7:
17
18 
19
But how far the seising on countries already peopled, and driving out or massacring the 
innocent and defenceless natives, merely because they differed from their invaders in 
language, in religion, in customs, in government, or in colour; how far such a conduct 
was consonant to nature, to reason, or to Christianity, deserved well to be considered by 
those, who have rendered their names immortal by thus civilizing mankind.
ibid., p. 2.
Asch, op. cit., p. 44. 
ibid.
20 Williams, op. cit., p. 325.
21 Robert Williams Jr., ‘Learning not to live with Eurocentric myopia: A reply to Professor
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Conquest and acts of state: the United States’ approach
Between 1823 and 1832 the United States Supreme Court, under Chief Justice 
Marshall, handed down a series of decisions which form the basis for the recognition 
of Aboriginal rights in the United States, Canada and, more recently, Australia.22 In 
Johnson v M ’Intosh the Court had its first opportunity to face squarely the issue of 
rights over Indian lands.23 Confronted with a dispute between colonists over deeds, 
Chief Justice Marshall treated the loss of independence and control over lands as a 
fait accompli.
While conceding that the ‘pretension of converting discovery of inhabited country’ 
into a form of title was an ‘extravagant’ one, Marshall CJ abdicated judicial 
responsibility for the rights of peoples against the exercise of power by the state.24 In 
this way, Phillip Frickey argued that ‘colonial pretensions’ were privileged to the 
exclusion of all other considerations.25
The doctrine of discovery was adopted into the domestic law of the United States but 
formulated on the narrowest construction, giving the discovering nation the
Laurence’s learning to live with the plenary powers of congress over Indian Nations’, Arizona Law 
Review, vol. 30, 1988, p. 439 (restating an argument from Williams, ‘The algebra of federal Indian 
law: The hard trail of decolonizing and Americanizing the White man’s jurisprudence’, Wisconsin 
Law Review, 1986), argued that:
American Indian nations have been judged and their legal rights and status determined 
in European legal thought and discourse by alien and alienating norms derived from the 
European’s experience of the world, the central texts of contemporary Federal Indian 
law, beginning with its grounding legal text, the Doctrine of Discovery, deny respect to 
American tribal peoples’ fundamental human rights of autonomy and self 
determination.
22 In the United States, see Williams v Lee 358 US 217 (1958); in Canada, R v Sioui (1990) 70 DLR 
(4th) 427 at p. 449 (SCC); and in Australia, see Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 
60, per Brennan J.
23 21 US (Wheat.) 543 (1823). One significant earlier case in which Marshall CJ commented on the 
status of the lands past the Western frontier, refering to Indian lands as ‘the vacant lands within the 
United States’: Fletcher v Peck 10 US (6 Cranch) 87 at p. 142 (1810). Williams, ... Discourses of 
Conquest, op. cit., p. 309, described this case as the ‘preliminary ceremonies in the legal internment 
of the doctrine that American Indians possessed natural rights to the lands they had occupied since 
time immemorial’.
24 Johnson v M ’Intosh 21 US (Wheat.) 543 (1823) at p. 591.
25 Frickey, op. cit., p. 385. Many commentators have criticised Marshall CJ for the ‘anti-intellectual’ 
approach taken in Johnson v M’Intosh. See for example, Werther, op. cit., p. 38, and Frickey, op. 
cit., pp. 386-7.
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exclusive right to extinguish Indigenous peoples right of occupancy, and recognising 
no natural law based rights to sovereignty in the Indigenous peoples:26
the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely 
disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired . . . 
[T]heir rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were 
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their 
own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original 
fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who 
made it.27
What began as a law regulating trade as between European powers became a doctrine 
of dependence, subjecting the Indigenous peoples to the authority of the state, 
cementing the vulnerability of Indigenous land and other rights in law. In Johnson v 
M ’Intosh Marshall CJ both recognised European arrogance and reinforced it, relying 
on a perception of the courts’ institutional impotence.28
Frickey argued that in embracing colonialism Marshall CJ relied on two ‘starkly 
colonial visions’ of cultural superiority and judicial inferiority.29 For example, 
Marshall CJ stated that:
Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, 
whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals maybe, 
respecting the original justice of the claim which has been successfully 
asserted.36
26 Johnson v M ’Intosh 21 US (Wheat.) 543 (1823), at pp. 573-4. See also Williams,... Discourses of 
Conquest, op. cit., p. 313.
27 Johnson v M ’Intosh 21 US (Wheat.) 543 (1823) at pp. 547, 573-4.
28 Chief Justice Marshall stressed the need to accept ‘the actual state of things’, and engaged in a 
process of rationalising in law, the acts of the state. Williams,... Discourses o f Conquest, op. cit., p. 
308, argued that in Johnson v M ’Intosh Marshall CJ merely legitimated the outcome of United States 
military campaigns and commercial agreements and ‘silently ignored’ the rights of the Indigenous 
peoples. For example, see Marshall CJ at pp. 572-3. This sentiment was reiterated at p. 589: ‘some 
excuse if not justification in the character and habits of the people whose rights had been wrested 
from them’. See also Werther, op. cit., p. 39, and Macklem, ...Borders of the Canadian legal 
imagination, op. cit., pp. 400-1. However, Marshall CJ displayed his own prejudices and falsities in 
comments such as the following, from Johnson, p. 590:
the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was 
war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in 
possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a 
distinct people was impossible, because they were as brave and as high spirited as they 
were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence.
29 Frickey, op. cit., p. 388. Both of these assumptions have been discussed extensively throughout 
chapters two and three leading up to this discussion.
30 Johnson v M ’Intosh 21 US (Wheat.) 543 (1823), p. 588. This idea was reinforced throughout the 
judgement at pp. 572, 589, 591-2. The term ‘courts of the conquerors’ was used by Chief Justice 
Marshall in Johnson v M ’Intosh 21 US (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), p. 588. On this, see Foster, op. cit., 
pp. 355-6; Frickey, op. cit., pp. 394-5; Slattery, ...Imperial claims, op. cit., p. 685; and Gary Meyers, 
‘Different sides of the same coin: A comparative view of the Indian hunting and fishing rights in the 
United States and Canada’, UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, vol. 10(1), 1991, p. 75.
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While Marshall CJ expressly avoided judgements about the justness of colonisation 
or even of assertions of superiority, 31 the decision ‘immunised’ those questions from 
judicial review.32 For Williams, ‘[t]he dominant themes of Marshall’s denial of 
Indian natural-law rights in Johnson are clearly established in those early evasions of 
judicial accountability’ .33 Therefore, Johnson v M ’Intosh established the dichotomy 
between power and law that was to form the foundation of the judicial inaction that 
has become known as the ‘act of state’ doctrine.34
During the period in which Marshall CJ was developing the discovery doctrine as 
domestic law, there was some dissent among his peers who saw the Indian nations as 
foreign and independent and, although they may have entered into a protection 
arrangement with the more powerful State, considered this a frequent occurrence 
among independent nations.35 However the argument was defeated and the principle 
of equal sovereignty was replaced by one of ‘relative sovereignty’ which established 
the hierarchy between Indigenous peoples and the colonising state in the common 
law, under the ‘dependent nation’ idea. 36
Later cases involving the Cherokee Nation elaborated on the ‘diminished’ 
sovereignty alluded to in Johnson v M ’Intosh.31 Unlike Johnson, the Cherokee cases 
involved a claim by Indigenous people in which sovereignty was a central issue. 
While dismissing the claim on a technical, jurisdictional question, Chief Justice 
Marshall constructed a model of Indian status that posited the Indigenous peoples not 
as foreign states but certainly as sovereign entities within the Constitution of the 
United States. 38 Remarkably, Marshall CJ accepted the arguments and underlying
31 Johnson v M ’Intosh 21 US (Wheat.) 543 (1823), at pp. 588, 589.
32 Frickey, op. cit., pp. 388-9.
33 Williams,... Discourses o f Conquest, op. cit., p. 312.
34 This dichotomy was identified by Frickey, op. cit., p. 389.
35 Fletcher v Peck 10 US (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), p. 146 per Johnson J, dissenting; Cherokee Nation v 
Georgia 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831), p. 59, per Thompson J, dissenting. On this, see Macklem, op. cit., 
p. 398, and Flanagan, op. cit., p. 87.
36 Meyers, op. cit., pp. 89-90, noted that the Marshall doctrine enshrines a tension between 
nationhood and dependence in the maintenance of a ‘measured separatism’.
37 Johnson v M ’Intosh (1823) 21 US 260, at p. 574.
38 Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), at p. 18.
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assumptions of the Cherokee, accepting their status as ‘nation’ as well as the 
integrity of their relationship with the United States under treaty.39 Marshall CJ 
stated that the Cherokee, with other Indian nations were ‘a distinct political 
society’.40
This construction of Indian status was confirmed in Worcester v Georgia in 1832.4'
Marshall CJ concluded that Indian nations were:
distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within 
which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands 
within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed 
by the United States.42
Worcester v Georgia confirmed an exclusive sovereign to sovereign relationship 
between Indian nations and the federal government that would be upheld by the 
courts. This however, was no protection against the federal government itself.43
Marshall CJ appeared more willing to criticise the origins of the titles asserted by the
state and now legitimated by the law:
It is difficult to comprehend . . . that discovery . . . should give the 
discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the pre­
existing rights of its ancient possessors.44
While less strident in its commitment to judicial impotence, Worcester v Georgia 
reaffirmed the act of state doctrine:
power, war, conquest, give rights, which after possession, are conceded 
by the world; and which can never be controverted by those on whom 
they descend. We proceed, then, to the actual state of things, having 
glanced at their origin; because holding it in our recollection might shed 
some light on existing pretensions.45
Despite accepting that the doctrine of discovery and conquest was difficult to defend 
on the grounds of justice or natural law, Marshall CJ kept the Court shrouded in a
39 ibid., p. 15.
40 ibid., p. 16.
41 31 US (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
42 ibid., p. 557.
43 See Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), at p. 18; Worcester v Georgia 31 US (6 
Pet.) 515 (1832), at pp. 557-62. Confirmed in US v Sandoval 231 US 28 (1913), at pp. 46-7.
44 Worcester v Georgia 31 US (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), p. 542.
45 ibid., p. 543.
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veil of judicial incompetence. Aggression against Indian peoples was now subject to
judicial scrutiny under the domestic dependent nation doctrine, but colonisation itself
and historical acts of aggression by the state were seen as merely part of the fabric of
legal history.46 Williams concluded that:
White society’s exercise of power over Indian tribes received the 
sanction of the Rule of Law in Johnson v McIntosh . . . [and] while the 
tasks of conquest and colonization had not been fully actualized on the 
entire American continent, the originary rules and principles of federal 
Indian law set down by Marshall in Johnson v McIntosh and its discourse 
of conquest ensured that future acts of genocide would proceed on a 
rationalized basis.47
Assuming the supremacy of the federal government legitimised the exercise of
power to extinguish the rights of Indigenous peoples without consent and
unrestricted by any natural or common law rights. Chief Justice Marshall’s rejection
of the natural law literature and embrace of the power of the state were explicit. For
example, in Worcester v Georgia, Marshall CJ stated that ‘natural law and abstract
principles of justice must take a back seat to power and accomplished fact’ .48
Guntram Weither has highlighted the implications of such assumptions of
superiority, and the role of the law in supporting them:
The tactic of denying legal recognition of international law status of 
aboriginal nations has been an important political function of legal 
fictions in aboriginal law throughout history . . .  In the world of practical 
politics, this question comes down to one of relative power.49
In short, respect for the equality of peoples was disregarded in the face of absolute 
power. While Indigenous peoples continued to exercise sovereignty over their 
remaining lands and peoples the law no longer recognised their independence. The 
creation of a hierarchy of sovereignty subordinated Indian nations and left 
Indigenous peoples without recourse against the exercise of power by the state to 
dispossess them of their lands.
46 Frickey, op. cit., p. 395. See also Williams, ...Discourses of Conquest, op. cit., p. 317.
47 ibid.
48 Worcester v Georgia 31 US (Pet.) 515 (1832), at p. 543.
49 Weither, op. cit., p. 40.
155
II. The Australian courts’ approach
The assertion of sovereignty by the British Crown over the lands and peoples of
Australia was unilateral, without the knowledge or consent of the peoples of the
continent. The actions of the Crown in relation to Australia were, arguably, against
the European, international and domestic law and in contrast to European practice of
the time. In fact, the Admiralty’s instructions to Lieutenant James Cook in 1768
reflected the more accepted approach:
You are likewise to observe the genius, temper, disposition and number 
of the natives if there be any, and endeavour by all proper means to 
cultivate a friendship and alliance with them, making them presents of 
such trifles as they may value, inviting them to traffick, and shewing 
them every kind of civility and regard; taking care however not to suffer 
yourself to be surprised by them, but to be always on your guard against 
any accident.
You are also with consent of the natives to take possession of convenient 
situations in the country in the name of the King of Great Britain, or, if 
you find the country uninhabited take possession for his majesty by 
setting up proper marks and inscriptions as first discoverers.30
Nettheim commented that Cook may have found the east coast of Australia, but he 
did not discover it.51 The land was already occupied by peoples organised into 
cohesive societies with their own laws and beliefs.5" Many commentators have gone 
so far as to conclude that no assertion of sovereignty can be legitimate if made by 
brute force without the consent of the Indigenous peoples.53 Cook did not seek and 
certainly did not receive the consent of the people when sovereignty was declared.
50 Reproduced in Garth Nettheim, “ The consent of the natives’: Mabo and Indigenous political 
rights’, Sydney Law Review, vol. 15(2), 1993, p. 223. See also Garth Nettheim, ‘Mabo and 
Aboriginal political rights: The potential for inherent rights and Aboriginal self-government’, in Will 
Sanders (ed.), Mabo and Native Title: Origins and Institutional Implications, Centre for Aboriginal 
Economic Policy Research, Monograph 7, 1994 , p. 46.
51 Nettheim, Consent of the natives, op. cit.
52 For a comprehensive historical survey of Aboriginal political society, see Henry Reynolds, 
Aboriginal Sovereignty: Three Nations, One Australia? Reflections on Race, State and Nation, Allen 
& Unwin, Sydney, 1996, pp. 16-38.
53 See for example, Nettheim, Consent of the natives, op. cit., and Michael Asch and Catherine Bell, 
‘Definition and interpretation of fact in Canadian Aboriginal title litigation: An analysis o f  
Delgamuukw’, Queens Law Journal, vol. 19(2), 1994, p. 527. See also Asch and Macklem, op. cit., 
p. 513, and Hamar Foster, ‘Forgotten arguments: Aboriginal title and sovereignty in Canada 
Jurisdiction Act cases’, Manitoba Law Journal, vol. 21, 1992, p. 346.
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Characterising Australia as a settled colony
Colonisation proceeded on the false assumption that the continent was sparsely 
populated. It appears that this may have been in part due to information provided by 
Joseph Banks that the environment was too hostile to sustain substantial 
populations.54 However, with the arrival of the First Fleet, information to the 
contrary quickly came to light.53 Yet, as Reynolds observed, the advantages of 
assuming the absence of people were so great that legal doctrine simply continued to 
depict the colony as one acquired by occupation of terra nullius. 56 As a result, 
Blackstone’s formulations, regarding the reception of laws into the colonies, were 
applied as if the territories were ‘desert and uninhabited’. In a triumph of fiction 
over fact, a distinction was drawn between what constituted discovery of uninhabited 
lands in law and the reality of Indigenous occupation.
The settlement thesis, which allowed the ‘discovery’ of inhabited territories, was 
extended to deny rights under the law of the land as well as under international law. 
The fiction of terra nullius asserted that discovery of uninhabited lands gave rise to 
rights of occupation in the sovereign, leading to a greater fiction of the state as first 
occupier of all the territories claimed. 57 The fiction of terra nullius fulfilled the 
imperial imperative for control over resources, allowing the state to govern the use of 
land and resources to serve its own purposes.58 Therefore, the ‘discovery’ obviated a 
fiction of absolute Crown ownership for the very reason, given by Reynolds, that is,
‘ [t]he fundamental problem with discovery as a basis for possession is that one can 
only discover that which is ownerless’ .59 It is not surprising then that the reality of
1,4 Reynolds, Sovereignty, op. cit., pp. ix-x, 17-19. See Sir Joseph Banks, The Endeavour Journal 
[1768-1771], vol. 2, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1962, pp. 122-3.
55 Reynolds, Sovereignty, op. cit., pp. x , 19-21. See, for example, the observations of Watkin Tench, 
Sydney’s First Four Years, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1961, pp. 51-2, that the area around Sydney 
Harbour was ‘more populous than it was generally believed to be in Europe’.
56 Reynolds, Sovereignty, op. cit., p. x.
57 See David Ritter, The ‘Rejection of terra nullius’ in Mabo : A critical analysis, Honours Thesis, 
University of Western Australia, October 1994, p. 63, who traced the emergence of the term terra 
nullius in Australian jurisprudence.
58 Smith, op. cit., p. 541.
59 Reynolds, Law of the Land, op. cit., p. 9.
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violent dispossession in Australia occurred despite the Imperial instructions to James 
Cook.60 The interests of the emerging colonial state were served best by the 
complete denial of the rights of the Indigenous inhabitants of the ‘acquired territory’.
Such wholesale dispossession was not unique to Australian colonies. The 
recognition of rights as conquered peoples under law, as had occurred in North 
America in the Marshall decisions, however, were not adopted in Australia. 
Nineteenth century Australian courts were aware of the Marshall decisions.61 Justice 
Wi llis of the Supreme Court of New South Wales followed similar reasoning to that 
of Johnson v M ’Intosh in describing the Aboriginal peoples of Australia as domestic 
dependent nations. In R v Bon Jon, in 1841, Justice Willis conceived Indigenous 
peoples as ‘dependent allies’ who were entitled to be left undisturbed in their 
possession save for the right of the Crown to preemption.62 Willis J refused to 
continue the trial of an Aboriginal person for a breach of British criminal law. 
Instead, evidence was accepted that the Indigenous people had a complete system of 
punishment among themselves which is appropriate for every sort of offence and that 
the British law was not applicable to the Indigenous peoples particularly in disputes 
among themselves.63 Therefore, Willis J considered that Indigenous peoples were 
not ‘unqualified subjects’ of the Crown and the introduction of the common law to 
the colony was thought insufficient to extinguish Indigenous laws and jurisdiction.
However, an earlier case had drawn a distinction between the Indigenous peoples of 
Australia and those of North America. In R v Jack Congo Murrell Justice Burton, of
60 For further illustration of the colonial policies toward the aboriginal people of the new colonies, 
see Reynolds, Sovereignty, op. cit., pp. 95-109; Hookey, op. cit., pp. 8-10; and Julie Cassidy, 
‘Observations on Mabo and Ors v Queensland’, Deakin Law Review, vol. 1(1), 1994, p. 66.
61 See for example, R v Jemmy (Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria, Stawell CJ, Barry and 
Pohleman JJ, The Argus, 7 September 1860), referring to the ‘laws o f the Conqueror’ but determined 
that ‘ [t]he jurisdiction of the Court is supreme, in fact, throughout the colony, and with regard to all 
persons in it.’
62 That is, the right as against other European nations (and against individuals) to purchase lands 
from the Indigenous peoples. R v Bon Jon (SCNSW, Willis J, Port Phillip Gazette, 18 September 
1841). This decision was a likely contributing factor to the dismissal o f Willis in 1843. See John 
Hookey, ‘Settlement and sovereignty’, in Peter Hanks and Brian Keon-Cohen (eds), Aborigines and 
the Law, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1984, p. 2.
63 (unreported decision of the SCNSW, Willis J, Port Phillip Gazette, 18 September 1841) reviewed 
by Hookey, op. cit., pp. 2-5. See also a South Australian Grand Jury decision in 1847 discussed in 
Reynolds, Sovereignty, op. cit., pp. 63-4; and pp. 69-71.
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the New South Wales Supreme Court, argued:
although it be granted that the Aboriginal Natives of New Holland are 
entitled to be regarded by Civilised nations as a free and independent 
people, and are entitled to the possession of those rights which are as 
such valuable to them, yet the various tribes had not attained at the first 
settlement of the English people among them to such a position in point 
of numbers and civilisation and to such a form of government and laws, 
as to be entitled to be recognised as sovereign states governed by laws of 
their own.64
Even a hierarchy of sovereignty between the colonial state and Indigenous peoples, 
such as had characterised the Marshall cases was rejected.
Burton J denied any sovereignty in the Indigenous peoples of the continent, rejecting 
their authority to determine their relations with the colonisers or to determine their 
internal relations, laws and political systems. While the case concerned a crime that 
occurred within the settlement community, it was implicit in the decision that the 
courts would not recognise the Indigenous peoples as distinct self-governing 
communities with their own traditional sanctions. 65 The assumption that British law 
was superior and universal justified its imposition over Indigenous peoples and, 
indeed, continues to obstruct the recognition of Aboriginal law today.66
The courts’ approach failed to acknowledge that law is derivative of the culture from 
which it emerged and cannot be assumed to be universally applicable. For practical 
purposes it is arguable that the introduction of the common law was necessary for the 
control of the British colonists. However, this does not justify the imposition of the 
law onto Indigenous peoples and the denial of any sphere of operation for Aboriginal 
law.
Understandably, it was not thought that the Aboriginal law could appropriately apply 
to the colonists. The colonial administration accepted the difficulties of applying the
64 R v Jack Congo Murrell (1836) 1 Legge Rep 72, affirmed in R v Wedge [1976] 1 NSWLR 581. 
Hookey, op. cit., p. 4, refers to a longer unreported decision. Reynolds, Sovereignty, op. cit., pp. 71- 
3, noted reliance on key passages from Vattel’s Law of Nations. See also, R v Peter (The Argus, 29 
June 1860), and R v Jemmy (The Argus, 7 September 1860) in which the United States precedents 
were rejected. See Reynolds, pp. 73-4.
65 Hookey, ibid., p. 5. Compare R v Bon Jon (SCNSW, Willis J, Port Phillip Gazette, 18 September 
1841) where Willis J accepted evidence of exactly that.
66 The Australian Law Reform Commission, Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, ALRC
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laws of one culture to the members of another who could not comprehend the law or 
its cultural context. However, This pluralism was not extended for the benefit of the 
Indigenous peoples. The inherent problems and inconsistencies of such an approach 
were obvious from the outset. In 1885, Justice Holroyd, of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria, observed that:
From the first the English have occupied Australia as if it were an 
uninhabited desert country. The native population were not conquered, 
but the English Government and afterward the colonial authorities, 
assumed jurisdiction over them as if they were strangers who had 
immigrated into British territory, and punished them for disobeying laws 
which they could hardly understand, and which were palpably 
inapplicable to their condition.6'
In contrast Justice Willis had recognised that the imposition of an alien legal system
on peoples who had no comprehension of it, was simply discriminatory:
As a British subject he is entitled to be tried by his peers. Who are the 
peers of a black man? Are those of whose laws, customs, language, and 
religion he is totally ignorant his peers? He is tried in his native land by 
a new race to him, and by laws of which he knows nothing.68
Daunton-Fear and Frieberg argued that this approach effectively translated the 
British law into a system of strict liability for Indigenous peoples.69 In applying 
British law to Indigenous people the notion of mens rea or moral guilt was dispensed 
with. They concluded that:
[it] would not be unreasonable to expect the law and its agencies to be 
meaningful to the people who are subjected to it and it would seem that 
unless this is done and if the law becomes increasingly removed from 
what is viewed as justice, it will rely more on force for its validity than 
on consent.70
Report No. 31, AGPS Canberra, 1986, accepted the simple settlement rule. See for example, p. 4.
67 M ’Hugh v Robertson (1885) 1 1 VLR410, at p. 431.
68 Quoted in Daunton-Fear and Frieberg, op. cit., p. 49. Also note observations by R. L. Misner, 
‘Administration of criminal justice on Aboriginal settlements’, Sydney Law Review, vol. 7(2), 1974, 
p. 260, o f the position of Indigenous peoples in the Australian criminal justice system, that ‘there are 
no aboriginal judges, no aboriginal lawyers, no aboriginal jailers. The aborigine has only one role, 
that o f prisoner’. The difficulties were admitted by the High Court o f Australia in 1934 in Tuckier v 
The King (1934) 52 CLR 335, at 349, per Starke J:
He lived under the protection of the law in force in Australia, but had no conception o f  
its standards. Yet by the law he must be tried. He understood little or nothing of the 
proceedings or of their consequences to him.
The indirect effect o f the failure to recognise Indigenous laws justified this comment from one judge:
We may recognise a marriage in a civilised country, but we can hardly do the same in 
the case of these aborigines who have no laws of which we can take cognisance.
R v Cobby (1883) 4 LR NSW 355 at p. 356, following R v Neddy Monkey (1861) 1 W&W(L) 40.
69 Daunton-Fear and Frieberg, op. cit., p. 50.
70 ibid., pp. 47-8, also noted that the greatest injustice arises where the offence being prosecuted is not 
a crime under Aboriginal law.
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In R v Murrell, counsel for the defendant had argued that Aboriginal people were not
bound by laws that gave them no protection. 71 In the same year similar reasoning
prompted Cooper CJ of the South Australian Supreme Court to suggest that the
killing of one Aboriginal person by another was not a concern of the colonial
government because as they claimed no protection from the law, they owed it no
allegiance.72 In Murrell’s case, however, Justice Burton rejected this argument:
the greatest possible inconvenience and scandal to this community would 
be consequent if it were to be holden by this court that it had no 
jurisdiction in such a case as the present.73
R v Murrell confirmed the imposition of the common law upon Indigenous peoples, 
in particular, the criminal law.74 However, John Hookey has noted that the reasoning 
of Burton J was not based on an acceptance of the settlement thesis. Rather, Burton 
J was concerned by the particular facts of the case, in which a murder had taken 
place within the limits of the township of Parramatta.
Even in Murrell, the court showed some understanding of the natural law traditions, 
in which the private rights of Indigenous peoples were recognised and considered to 
have the protection of the common law, in theory, if not in practice. 75 Justice Burton 
rejected the argument that the Indigenous people were independent peoples. 
However they were thought to be entitled, by law, to those rights ‘which as such are 
valuable to them’ .76 This recognition distinguishes between the assertion of sole 
sovereignty and the denial of rights. That is, an assertion of sovereignty does not of 
necessity result in loss of title to lands and resources.
71 The reciprocity argument was premised upon a conception of the social contract, that a person 
cannot legitimately be bound by a legal system that offers no protection.
72 In Daunton-Fear and Frieberg, op. cit., p.47.
73 Quoted in Hookey, op. cit., p. 3, referring to an unreported version of the judge’s reasons for 
decision.
74 R v Jack Congo Murrell (1836) 1 Legge Rep 72.
75 Compare the decision of the US Supreme Court in Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US (5 Pet) 1 
(1831), after which the Cherokee were removed from their traditional lands and forced to trek what 
became known as the trail o f tears. See generally, Anthony Wallace, The Long, Bitter Trail: Andrew 
Jackson and the Indians, Hill & Wang, New York, 1993.
76 (1836) 1 Legge Rep 72. Compare Burton J in MacDonald v Levy (1833) 1 Legge 39, at p. 45, 
where it was argued that, with regard to laws, the colony was not conquered.
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The paramount concern in Murrell was for order within the colony, and, in fact, the
courts did not generally concern themselves with matters amongst Indigenous people
outside the limits of the colony, or with matters concerning the commission of a
crime against an Indigenous person by a colonist.77 In hindsight however, the actions
of the colonists and the colonial administration were vindicated by the perpetuation
of a 'terra nullius mentality’.78 Henry Reynolds observed that:
Despite coming under the protection of the common law, over 20,000 
Aborigines were killed in the course of Australian settlement . . . and 
neither lawyers nor judges appear to have done much to bring the killing 
to an end.79
The courts gave Indigenous peoples no protection against the acts of the colonists. 
The reciprocity of responsibility and protection under the law was corrupted.
Regardless of any natural law rights to retain even private rights or possession, in 
Australia prescriptions for peaceful settlement would not be observed in practice as 
the battles for land were already being fought and lost at the hands of the colonists.80 
The settlers and squatters were aware of the claims of Indigenous peoples to 
particular tracts of lands but they had the intellectual affirmation of superiority and 
the sanction of the state, later reinforced by the law. What should not surprise, given 
the arguments put thus far about the willingness of the law to legitimate exercise of 
power by the state, is the judicial characterisation of the Indigenous peoples, as 
without land tenure system or ownership, divested of all pre-existing rights upon the 
assertion of sovereignty by the Crown.
77 See for example, public debate over the trial o f Wi War in Western Australia in January 1842, 
discussed in Reynolds, Sovereignty, op. cit., pp. 64-8.
78 Frank Brennan, ‘The Indigenous people’, in Paul Finn (ed.), Essays on Law and Government, vol. 
1: Principles and Values, Law Book Co, North Ryde, 1995, p. 32.
79 Henry Reynolds, The Law o f The Land, 2nd edn, Penguin, Ringwood, 1992, pp. 1-2.
80 Hookey, op. cit., p. 6. See generally, Henry Reynolds, Frontier, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987; 
The Other Side o f the Frontier, Penguin, Ringwood, 1982; and Reynolds, The Law o f the Land, ibid. 
In natural law, Vattel, op. cit., p. 141, affirmed the rights of the Indigenous peoples to retain so much 
of their land as was necessary for their survival under cultivation. Any more than this and Vattel 
cautioned:
Whoever agrees that robbery is a crime, and that it is not lawful to take away the 
property of another, will admit without further proof that no Nation has a right to drive 
another from the territory which it inhabits in order itself to there.
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The development of the settlement thesis
The protection of the private rights of Indigenous people that had been alluded to in
the early decisions was not pursued by the judiciary.81 Indeed, the denial of any
continuing rights has been a distinguishing feature of Australian law until recently.
The Australian legal system can be credited with an ignominious originality:
the distinctive and unenviable contribution of Australian jurisprudence to 
the history of relations between Europeans and the Indigenous people of 
the non-European world . . . was not to provide justification for conquest 
or cession of land or assumption of sovereignty - others had done that 
before Australia was settled - but to deny the right, even the fact, of 
possession to people who had lived on their land for 40 000 years.82
The colonial courts sought to draw a distinction between the Indigenous peoples in 
the Americas and those of New South Wales. The basis of the distinction was a test 
of social organisation as the threshold for the recognition of Indigenous peoples’ 
sovereignty and rights as well as laws.
There are a number of ‘justifications’ for non-recognition that have been used by the 
courts to deny Indigenous law. For example, in MacDonald v Levy, Burton J denied 
that Indigenous peoples had laws at all. Instead the inhabitants of the colony were 
described as ‘the wandering tribes of its natives, living without certain habitation and 
without laws . . .’83 The ‘scale of organisation’ test, as we have seen, had become a 
useful tool for denying Indigenous peoples’ sovereignty in international law. This 
particular interpretation of the test allowed the courts to ignore the fact of a self- 
governing and sovereign people with their own laws. In effect, the absence of an 
Indigenous legal system became an irrebuttable presumption.
Alternatively, it was thought that whether or not a system of laws had operated in the 
newly acquired lands prior to the introduction of the common law, any such system 
‘gave way’ upon the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown. The justification for this
81 See discussion of R v Bon Jon (SCNSW, Willis J, Port Phillip Gazette, 18 September 1841) above.
82 Reynolds, The Law o f  the Land, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
83 (1833) 1 Legge 39, at p. 45. The same reasoning led the Privy Council to conclude that ‘there was 
no land law’ existing in the colony at the time of colonisation: Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cas 
286, at p. 292.
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view was that the Crown had acquired sovereignty over the territory making the 
Sovereign the sole source of laws. The introduction of the common law therefore 
extinguished the laws of the Indigenous people. Surprisingly, this view has 
persisted. In 1976 Rath J, of the New South Wales Supreme Court, stated that 
‘[ujpon Settlement there was, in the colony, only one sovereign, the King of 
England, and only one law, namely the English law’.84 On this view, the denial of 
Indigenous peoples’ rights under their own law and the imposition of the law of the 
coloniser were a corollary of the assumption of sovereignty. As a result, Indigenous 
peoples possessed only those rights recognised by the Crown.
The most pervasive justification has been based upon assumptions of superiority of 
the English law over any other system of law. While the courts recognised that a 
system of laws operated, it was held to be inferior to, and not cognisable to, the 
common law. This approach differs slightly from that taken by Burton J in 
MacDonald v Levy,83 In that case there was a presumption that the Indigenous 
inhabitants had no law at all. Here, while the Courts accepted that some system of 
laws operated, Indigenous society was assumed to be so inferior that the British law 
became the universal standard.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council gave credence to this view in Cooper v 
Stuart an appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.86 The Court 
distinguished New South Wales as ‘a colony which consisted of a tract of territory 
practically unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or settled law’.87 Without 
representation from the Indigenous peoples of New South Wales and without the 
benefit of any evidence, the Privy Council concluded that ‘[tjhere was no land law or
84 R v Wedge (1976) 1 NSWLR 581. Rath J followed the decision in R v Jack Congo Murrell (1836) 
1 Legge Rep 72, where Burton J used similar reasoning:
the Aboriginal natives of this colony are amenable the laws of the colony for offences 
committed within it against the person of each other and against the peace o f our Lord - 
the King.
Hookey, op. cit., referring to a longer unreported judgement, p. 3.
85 (1833) 1 Legge 39, at p. 45.
86 (1889) 14 App Cas 286.
87 Cooper v Stuart { 1889) 14 App Cas 286, p. 291, reaffinned at p. 292.
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tenure existing in the colony at the time of its annexation to the Crown’ . 88 The 
notion that Indigenous peoples possessed any rights after the assertion of sovereignty 
was flatly rejected in Cooper.
In In re Southern Rhodesia, the Privy Council reaffirmed this view:
The estimation of the rights of aboriginal tribes is always inherently 
difficult. Some tribes are so low on the scale of social organisation that 
their usages and conceptions of rights and duties are not to be reconciled 
with the institutions or the legal ideas of civilised society. Such a gulf 
cannot be bridged. It would be idle to impute to such people some 
shadow of the rights known to our law and then to transmute it into the 
substance of a transferable rights of property as we know them. 89
For the Privy Council, the Indigenous people possessed neither sovereignty nor 
rights and were relegated, in effect, to merely a practical obstacle to the 
appropriation of territories. Their rights, customs, laws and autonomy would be only 
those recognised or granted by the Crown. Indigenous peoples’ rights, then, were 
contingent upon the pleasure of the Crown.90 Under this ‘contingent rights’ 
approach, Indigenous self-government and sovereignty could only exist through 
constitutional amendment or to the extent it is given force by legislative or executive 
action. The essence of this approach is that all rights arise from legislative grant, at 
the pleasure of the Crown, and not from the prior sovereignty of the peoples.91
The assumption of the supremacy of the coloniser, perpetuated through the 
settlement thesis, was of itself a denial of the independence of Indigenous peoples 
and hence an assertion of the state as sole possessor of sovereignty. The frontier 
expansion was supported by the law in the adoption of a test of the level of social 
organisation, in accordance with European assumptions of cultural superiority. The 
ranking of peoples had an established history in European political theory.92 The 
decision in Cooper ignored the reality that Indigenous peoples in New South Wales
88 ibid., p. 292. This case gave rise to the notion that issues of sovereignty and the recognition of 
self-determination claims were matters of law regardless of the facts.
89 In re Southern Rhodesia [1919] AC 211 (Privy Council), per Lord Sumner, at pp. 233-4.
90 This is the basis o f the dissenting opinion of Dawson J in Mabo v Queensland (1992) 175 CLR 1, 
see for example p. 159.
91 See Asch and Macklem, op. cit., p. 502.
92 See discussion at pp. 49-51 above.
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were organised in societies with laws regulating the use of resources, distribution of 
property and social interactions.93 The fundamental contradiction between law and 
fact created a dilemma for future courts in which evidence was actually adduced. In 
1971 a single judge of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory struggled with 
the incongruent fact and legal fiction. Milirrpum v Nabalco was the first case in 
which Indigenous peoples brought evidence of their continuing ownership of 
traditional lands, seeking a declaration of their title.94
In that case, the Yolgnu peoples brought an action against the Nabalco Company and
the Commonwealth for recognition of their right to control access to lands on the
Gove Peninsula over which mining leases had been granted. Justice Blackburn
respectfully noted the claimants, the land they spoke for and the people they came to
represent. The first plaintiff, Milirrpum was a representative of the Rirratjingu
people. The Gumatj and Djapu peoples were also represented.95 Justice Blackburn
began his judgement thus: ‘the meaning of [the] phrase ‘Riratjingu land’ is one of the
deepest questions in the case’.96 For Blackburn J, the evidence revealed:
a subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to the country in which the 
people led their lives, which provided a stable order of society and was 
remarkably free from the vagaries of personal whim or influence. If ever 
a system could be called ‘a government of laws, and not of men’, it is 
shown in the evidence before me.97
Despite this admission, Blackburn J felt compelled by the decision in Cooper v 
Stuart, given the paucity of decisions on this issue in Australian jurisprudence to 
disregard the facts and arguments before the court.
Earlier courts had not heard evidence from Indigenous people and instead based their 
findings on injudicious characterisations of Indigenous societies. However, in the
93 On the political and social organisation of Indigenous societies in this regard see Reynolds, 
Sovereignty, op. cit., pp. 16-59.
94 Milirrpum v Nabalco (1971)17 FLR 141.
95 ibid., p. 146.
96 ibid.
97 ibid. Further, at p. 267, Blackburn J stated that, ‘the natives had established an elaborate system of 
social rules and customs which was highly adapted to the country in which they lived and provided a 
stable order of society remarkably free from the vagaries of whim or influence.’ See also pp. 223, 
250.
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Milirrpum case the evidence o f ‘an elaborate system’ of laws was uncontrovertible.98 
In order to legitimise the fiction upon which the assertions of the colonising state 
were based, Blackburn J held that:
the question is one not of fact but of law. Whether or not the Australian 
aboriginals living in any part of New South Wales had in 1788 a system 
of law which was beyond the powers of the settlers to perceive or 
comprehend, it is beyond the power of this court to decide otherwise than 
that New South Wales came into the category of a settled or occupied 
colony.99
Blackburn J perpetuated the fictional claim to title by relegating the facts into 
irrelevance, reasoning that the characterisation of the colony was a matter of law, not 
of fact.100 Blackburn J followed the Privy Council decision and concluded that a 
common law doctrine of communal title did not form and ‘had never formed part of 
the law of any part of Australia’.101
This is an example of the responsibility that the courts bear for the current status of 
Aboriginal law in Australian society. The choice was there for the courts to 
acknowledge Aboriginal law to some degree. In the United States the Marshall 
Court had established the ‘domestic dependent nation’ doctrine under which the 
Indigenous peoples of North America were regarded as sovereign, within a 
hierarchy. Thus their laws continue, subject to the imposition of a level of 
jurisdiction in the federal government.102 While this approach should not be 
considered a model, it places the Australian courts’ approach in a contemporary 
context. The Australian courts were aware of the Marshall decisions, as is evidenced 
by comments of Willis and Burton JJ in the 1830’s.103 However, the courts chose to 
distinguish the case in Australia with reference to the ‘level of social organisation
98 ibid., per Blackburn J, p. 266. See also p. 268: ‘I hold that I must recognise the system revealed by 
the evidence as a system of law’.
99 ibid., p. 244.
100 ibid., p. 267.
101 ibid., p. 245.
102 This was the case for example in India and even closer to home with regard to Papua New 
Guinea: see Administration of Papua v Daera Guba (1973) 130 CLR 353, at p. 397, per Barwick CJ. 
The decision in Daera Guba is particularly interesting given Barwick’s criticisms o f the High Court’s 
Mabo decision.
103 See R v Bon Jon (SCNSW, Willis J, Port Phillip Gazette, 18 September, 1841), and R v Jack 
Congo Murrell (1836) 1 Legge Rep 72, discussed above.
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test’ . 104 The approach of the United States Supreme Court was also distinguished on 
the basis of the settlement and conquest doctrines. In Milirrpum, the classification of 
the colony as settled was considered sufficient to deny a sphere of operation for 
Aboriginal law. 105
Important implications of the settlement fiction reverberate through current 
doctrines. Just as the principle of equality of peoples was disregarded in favour of a 
universal and superior British law, the ideals of responsibility and protection and the 
notion of moral culpability were also disregarded. Assimilation became the 
justification for the punishment of morally innocent people, in line with government 
policy. Justice Kriewaldt thought it would be a ‘serious reflection on our capacity to 
assimilate the aboriginal part of our community’ if they were not punished for 
breaches of British law. 106 For Justice Chamberlain in R v Skinny Jack, as 
assimilation was the goal, ‘their first lesson should be to obey our laws’ . 107
The fictions of terra nullius, settlement and absolute Crown ownership that denied 
Indigenous peoples continuing rights to land were a direct result of the Court’s 
deference to the power of the state and the assertion of sole sovereignty. While the 
law maintained the appearance of consistency through this hall of mirrors, the gross 
abuse of rights perpetrated under its protection remain the ‘darkest aspect of the 
history of this nation’ . 108 Justice Blackburn’s decision in Milirrpum v Nabalco 
remains perhaps the best illustration of the fracture between law and fact that has 
characterised much of Australia’s legal history.
104 Willis J in R v Bon Jon (SCNSW, Willis J, Port Phillip Gazette, 18 September 1841) is a notable 
exception.
105 (1971) 17 FLR 141, at p.244.
106 M. C. Kriewaldt, ‘The application of the criminal law to the Aborigines of the Northern Territory 
of Australia’, Western Australian Law Review, vol. 5, 1962, pp. 20, 43.
107 (unreported decision, 13 July 1964), cited in Daunton-Fear and Frieberg , op. cit., p. 60.
108 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 109, per Deane and Gaudron JJ.
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III. Recognition of Indigenous peoples in Australian law
With the authority of the Privy Council,101' the law had seemed settled by the 1850s, 
and particularly in light of Milirrpum a century later. The decision in Cooper v 
Stuart clearly asserted the settled status of the Colony of New South Wales and the 
implication of settlement for the introduction of British law. There, it was stated 
that:
the law of England must (subject to well-established exceptions) become 
from the outset the law of the Colony, and be administered by its 
tribunals. In so far as it is reasonably applicable to the circumstances of 
the Colony, the Law of England must prevail. . .no
Lord Watson went on to cite Blackstone’s Commentaries, in which the accepted 
consequences o f ‘settlement’ were set out.* 111
However, in the years following Milirrpum, the High Court hinted at the possibility 
that it would be willing to hear an argument on the issue. In Coe v The 
Commonwealth, the High Court foreshadowed its willingness to hear argument on 
the implications of the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty.112 In addition, various 
judges questioned the correctness of the findings in Cooper.112 While the case was 
rejected on its pleadings, some members of the High Court intimated that they would 
be prepared to consider the implications of the colonisation of Australia. Jacobs and 
Murphy JJ both agreed that argument should be heard on the issue of whether 
Australia was a conquered territory. Murphy J felt there was sufficient material to 
support the argument and Jacobs J noted that no decision of an Australian court had 
confirmed the categorisation.114
109 Until the passage of the Australia Acts 1986 (Cth), the Privy Council had been the highest court of 
appeal for Australian cases.
110 (1889) 14 App. Cas. 186, at p. 291, per Lord Watson for the Privy Council.
111 Blackstone, Commentaries, op. cit., Book. 1, p. 107. See discussion at pp. 148-9 above.
112 (1979) 53 ALJR 403, at p. 408, per Gibbs J (with Aicken J), p. 411, per Jacobs J, and p. 412, per 
Murphy J.
113 ibid., per Murphy and Jacobs JJ. Contrast Gibbs J, at p. 408. In particular, note comments by 
Murphy J, p. 412, that ‘The statement by the Privy Council may be regarded as having been made in 
ignorance or as a convenient falsehood to justify the taking of Aborigines’ land.’
114 ibid., at p. 411, per Jacobs J, stated that ‘while the view has generally been taken that Australian
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While rejecting the statement of claim, most of the judges fell short of rejecting the
idea of prior sovereignty of the Aboriginal peoples.115 While Justice Murphy noted
that the decision in Cooper v Stuart was no longer binding on the High Court,116 in
contrast, Gibbs J reaffirmed the test of social organisation established in Cooper, and
again distinguished the recognition of sovereignty in the United States:
the history of the relationship between the white settlers and the 
aboriginal peoples has not been the same in Australia and the United 
States . . . They have no legislative, executive or judicial organs by 
which sovereignty might be exercised. If such organs existed, they 
would have no powers, except such as the laws of the Commonwealth or 
of a State or Territory, might confer upon them.117
The formulation of the contingent theory of Indigenous peoples’ rights by Gibbs J 
denied both the existence of prior and continuing sovereignty of Indigenous peoples 
and, in doing so, legitimated the claims of the state to sole sovereignty.
In Gerhardy v Brown, Justice Deane expressed grave reservations about the law as it 
stood:
The common law of this land has still not reached the stage of retreat 
from injustice which the law of Illinois and Virginia had reached in 1823 
when Marshall CJ, in Johnson v McIntosh, accepted that subject to the 
assertion of ultimate dominion . . .  by the State, the ‘original inhabitants ‘ 
should be recognised as having ‘a legal as well as just claim’ to retain the 
occupancy of their traditional lands. 8
By this time proceedings were under way in the most important case in relation to 
Aboriginal land rights in this country.
colonies were settled colonies . . . there is no actual decision of this Court or of the Privy Council to 
that effect’. Compare Gibbs J (with Aicken J), at p. 408 admitted that it was an arguable question if 
properly raised.
115 ibid., at p. 411, per Jacobs J. Murphy J at p. 412, went so far as to admit that the Indigenous 
peoples of Australia ‘had a complex social and political organisation; that their laws were settled and 
of great antiquity’.
116 ibid., at p. 412, per Murphy J. The Australia Acts 1986 (Cth) terminated the line of authority from 
the High Court of Australia to the Privy Council.
117 ibid., at p. 408.
118 (1985) 159 CLR 70 at p. 149. See also Northern land Council v Commonwealth of Australia [No. 
2] (1987)61 ALJR616.
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Reclaiming title in Mabo ’s case
In June 1992 in the case of Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] a majority o f six judges of 
the High Court agreed that traditional Indigenous titles to land continued after the 
colonisation of the continent, with the recognition and protection of the common 
law .119 The claim by Eddie Koiki Mabo and the Meriam peoples of the Torres Strait 
claimed title to their lands under a system of Meriam land law, including Malo ’s 
law.120 The settled status o f the colonies was not contested, but the Court was 
prepared to review the implications of ‘settlement’ for the recognition of Indigenous 
law and rights. The view taken by the majority was in accord with the arguments put 
by many academic commentators for a re-evaluation of the settlement doctrine.121 
All of the judges, with the exception of Dawson J, agreed that a concept of native 
title existed at common law. The source of that title while it lies outside the common 
law, in the traditional connection to the land, enjoys the protection of the common 
law. The content of native title is to be determined in each case by the nature of the 
traditional laws and customs of the native titleholders. The order of the Court 
declared that the Meriam people were ‘entitled as against the whole world to 
possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of the Murray Islands’.122 
However, native title can be extinguished by a valid exercise of governmental power, 
which demonstrates a clear and plain intention.121
The Court dismissed the earlier doctrine, which denied the rights of Indigenous 
peoples based on a supposed scale of social organisation, as unjust and 
discriminatory.124 The theory was acknowledged as ‘false in fact and unacceptable in
119 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
120 For background to the litigation see pp. 121-2 above
121 See, for example, Hookey, op. cit.; Garth Nettheim, ‘Judicial revolution or cautious correction?: 
Mabo v Queensland’, University of New South Wales Law Journal, vol. 16(1), 1993, Michael 
Detmold, ‘Law and difference: Reflections on Mabo’s case’, Sydney Law Review, vol. 15(2), 1993; 
and Mark Walters, ‘British imperial constitutional law and Aboriginal rights: A comment on 
Delgamuukw v British Columbia’, Queen’s Law Journal, vol. 17, 1992. In answer to criticism that 
the decision was a deviation from settled law, Frank Brennan, ‘The implications of the Mabo 
decision’, Reform, No. 65, 1993, p. 11, argued that the High Court ‘did not invent a legal fiction 
called native title, they destroyed one called terra nullius’.
122 ibid., p. 217, per Order of the Court.
123 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 64, per Brennan J.
124 ibid., at p. 42, per Brennan J.
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our society’.125 The High Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that all 
interests in land were abolished upon the acquisition of sovereignty, except those 
specifically recognised by the Crown.126 Brennan J affirmed the view of the Privy 
Council in Amodu Tijani [1921] ‘that a mere change in sovereignty does not 
extinguish native title to land’.127 In this regard, the Court sought to remove the 
distinction between Indigenous peoples of a settled colony and those of a conquered 
or ceded colony for the purposes of recognising their rights and interests in land.128
Also in Mabo the High Court gave legitimacy to Indigenous peoples’ claims to 
sovereignty. The decision was specifically concerned with title to land and while the 
Court relied on the Marshall cases and their derivatives in the United States, Canada 
and elsewhere, the decision did not explicitly recognise the continuing sovereignty of 
Indigenous peoples or any self-government or autonomy rights.129 However, the 
Court recognised the pre-existing rights and interests of the Indigenous peoples, 
Brennan J referring specifically to ‘a change in sovereignty’ occurring when the 
British annexed the colonial territories.130
The judgements rejected the approach of the Privy Council in Cooper and Gibbs J in 
Coe.131 Importantly, Mabo’s case affirmed the inherent nature of Indigenous rights, 
based in prior sovereignty, and disapproved of the assumptions of cultural 
superiority that underlie any test of social organisation. Specifically, the High Court 
expressed the opinion that social organisation and concepts, in this case of land 
ownership, need not be confined by reference to ‘European modes or legal
125 ibid., at p. 40, per Brennan J, and per Toohey J, at pp. 182, 187.
126 ibid., at p. 57, per Brennan J, at p. 81, per Deane and Gaudron JJ, and p. 184, per Toohey J.
127 ibid., at p. 57, per Brennan J, referring to Amodu Tijani v Sec'y, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 
399 at p. 407. See also, Adeyinka Oyekan v Musediku Adele [1957] 1 WLR 876, p. 880; [1957] 2 All 
ER 785, at p. 788, per Lord Denning for the Privy Council: ‘The courts will assume that the British 
Crown intends that the rights of property of the inhabitants are to be fully respected’.
128 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 57, per Brennan J, hence the reliance on 
Amodu Tijani, op. cit.
129 This reading of the decision is supported by other commentators, see for example Nettheim, 
Judicial revolution..., op. cit., p. 48. Others argued that the decision specifically denies continuing 
sovereignty. See, for example, Reynolds, Sovereignty, op. cit., p. 3. However, the issue was not 
argued.
130 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2j (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 57, per Brennan J.
131 ibid., at p. 36, per Brennan J.
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notions’ . 132 The source of authority for Indigenous land titles was identified as 
emerging from the rights of Indigenous peoples prior to colonisation. 133 Therefore, 
they are neither contingent upon nor sourced from the Crown.
Acceptance of the prior sovereignty of the Indigenous peoples and rejection of the 
need for legislative or executive recognition of rights implies an acceptance of the 
inherent nature of Indigenous peoples’ rights. Moreover, it is the pre-existing 
sovereignty, which continues as a source of rights and of laws, that is the foundation 
of the title. 134 As a result, the common law recognises that:
[native title] has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional
laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the
Indigenous inhabitants of a territory. 135
This recognised Indigenous society as a source of rights and of laws. In this way it is 
also an acknowledgement that the title, while recognised by the common law, has its 
source in the community, and exists apart from the common law protection. 136 This 
reasoning reflects an acceptance of the rights of Indigenous peoples to their lands, 
and the right to determine the laws and customs attributable to the territory, as 
inherent rights.
Therefore the Mabo decision moves Australian jurisprudence toward a theory of 
inherent Indigenous rights, that accepts that Indigenous peoples’ rights ‘inhere in the 
very meaning of aboriginality’ . 137 Asch and Macklem argued that the reproduction 
of Indigenous identity and social organisation requires a system of rights and 
obligations that reflect and protect what is essential to, or inheres in, the unique 
relations that Indigenous people have with nature, themselves and other 
communities. 138 In this sense, sovereignty describes the totality of powers and
132 ibid., at pp. 85-6, per Deane and Gaudron JJ, and p. 40, per Brennan J.
133 ibid., at p. 60, per Brennan J.
134 ibid.
135 ibid., at p. 58, per Brennan J. See also Deane and Gaudron JJ, at pp. 87-8.
136 Paul Patton, ‘Mabo, freedom and the politics of difference’, Australian Journal o f Political 
Science, vol. 30, 1995, pp. 111-14.
137 Asch and Macklem, op. cit., p. 502.
138 ibid, pp. 502, 506.
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responsibilities necessary or integral to such a process. 139 Indigenous peoples’ 
sovereignty, then, is the source from which Indigenous peoples’ rights are defined.
The approach taken toward rights over country has implications for all self- 
determination claims. For if rights to self-determination are also inherent then the 
failure to recognise these rights is merely temporal, existing only in the colonial 
law. 140 This approach is also consistent with arguments put forward in earlier 
chapters that the law and legal reasoning are culturally relative. While some values 
may be truly universal, the way those values are reinterpreted into rules and 
behavioural norms is highly specific to each society.
Discussion of inherent rights unavoidably raises the issue of a universalised group of 
rights. However, the acknowledgment of universal rights and principles of justice is 
not an acknowledgment of the universality of a particular legal regime. The often- 
cited criticism of Indigenous Law is the suggestion that the common law could never 
apply laws that are ‘morally repugnant’. This criticism can merely disguise an 
assertion of cultural superiority, and a denigration of Indigenous society. It denies 
that Indigenous peoples have the capacity to demonstrate the values of equality and 
justice as Western societies understand them. 141 Western democracies, and Australia 
in particular, can make no claim to an irreproachable system for the protection of 
rights. 142
139 ibid, p. 503. See Canadian jurisprudence based on this approach, for example, Calder v Attorney- 
General of British Columbia (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145, R v Sparrow (1990) 70 DLR (4th) 385 at p. 
402, R v Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507, and most recently, Delgamuukw v British Columbia 
(unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, No. 23799, 11 December 1997, Lamer CJ, La 
Forest, L’Heureux-Dube, Cory, McLachlin, and Major JJ).
140 Although such rights still require recognition by the courts in order to be enforceable against the 
state. This argument will be explored in greater detail in the following chapter.
141 Compare Frank Brennan, ‘Self-determination: The limits of allowing Aboriginal communities to 
be a law unto themselves’, University of New South Wales Law Review, vol. 16(1), 1993, pp. 247-8. 
Compare Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Rights, Clarendon, 
Oxford, 1995, pp. 152-72.
142 See Michael Dodson, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, First- 
Fifth Reports, AGPS, Canberra, 1991-1997; Indigenous Deaths in Custody 1989 to 1996, Office of 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, October 1996; and Chris 
Cunneen and David McDonald, Keeping Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People Out of 
Custody: An Evaluation of the Implementation of the Recommendations o f the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, ATSIC, Canberra, 1997. Compare Robert Williams and Robert 
Laurence debating the Indian Civil Rights Act: Williams, Algebra, op. cit., and Myopia, op. cit.; 
Robert Laurence, ‘Learning to live with the plenary power of congress over the Indian Nations: An 
essay in reaction to Professor Williams Algebra’, Arizona Law Review, vol. 30, 1988, and ‘On 
Eurocentric myopia, the designated hitter rule and “ the actual state o f things” ’, Arizona Law Review,
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However, Kenneth Maddock observed that what is considered law ultimately 
depends upon the lawyer. 143 For example, on one view, cognisable law requires 
distinctive features of legislative, judicial and coercive bodies. This view was 
reflected in Coe v Commonwealth where Chief Justice Gibbs suggested that 
Indigenous people must be subject to the laws of the Commonwealth and the States, 
because ‘they have no legislative or judicial organs by which sovereignty may be 
exercised’ . 144 Ample evidence exists and, in fact, existed at the time of colonisation 
to show that highly developed systems of law and government were operating in the 
territories. 145
A more inclusive view would characterise law as ‘any rule of human conduct which 
is regarded as obligatory’ . 146 On this interpretation it has been argued that any stable 
society, utilising scarce resources develops a system of law and government. 
Moreover, Frank Brennan argued that any society that organises itself on such a level 
is self-governing and is entitled to be respected in its sovereignty. 147 This approach 
recognises that sovereignty inheres in Indigenous peoples by virtue of their existence 
as distinct peoples and respects Indigenous peoples as a constitutional entity, rather 
than a mere minority. 148
The Indigenous system of laws did not simply ‘give way’ to the colonial system but 
survived. 149 This argument was successfully asserted in relation to property laws in 
Mabo v Queensland. The form of title recognised by the High Court in Mabo ’s case 
is not merely a recognition of private, or individual, rights to land. Rather, the Court
vol. 30, 1988.
143 Kenneth Maddock, ‘Aboriginal customary law’, in Hanks and Keon-Cohen, op. cit., p. 213.
144 (1979) 53 ALJR 403, at p. 408.
145 Reynolds, Sovereignty, op. cit., p. 19. Others have argued that irrespective o f such evidence, the 
existence of a recognisable legal system should be a self-evident presumption. Moreover, the social 
organisation and institutions of a people should be assumed rather than proved. See for example, 
Asch and Bell, op. cit., p. 526.
146 Maddock, op. cit., p. 213, quoting A. L. Goodhart. Of course there are other views, for example, 
Maddock, p. 214 contrasts an Austinian view of the law as merely the command of the King.
147 Frank Brennan, The Indigenous people, op. cit., p. 34. See also, Asch and Bell, op. cit., p. 524.
148 Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., p. 1325. See also, Menno Boldt and J. Anthony 
Long, Surviving as Indians, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1988, p. xv.
149 There is evidence to suggest that the Indigenous law has been far more accommodating of British 
legal concepts than has been reciprocated. See Daunton-Fear and Frieberg, op. cit., pp. 70-3, with 
regard to the evolution of payback remedies.
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affirmed a communal title that carried with it the power to determine the law and 
custom applicable to land. Therefore, native title is a collective right that carries 
with it the power to make laws. In this way, the decision of the High Court in Mabo 
is an acknowledgment of the continuation of Aboriginal law and of Indigenous 
society as a source of authority. It is a recognition of the people as law makers and 
law keepers.150
In this context, the importance of the Mabo decision for Indigenous self- 
determination movements has not been underestimated. Michael Dodson argued that 
despite the limitations of the Mabo decision it represents ‘a possible turning point in 
the recognition, by the imposed Western legal system, of Aboriginal law’.151 The 
Mabo decision changed the law but importantly demonstrated a change in the 
approach of the courts to the claims of Indigenous peoples. The High Court rejected 
the contingent approach to Indigenous peoples rights and embraced an inherent 
rights approach. The High Court recognised prior sovereignty and the continuing 
authority of Indigenous societies recognising Indigenous peoples as law makers. All 
of these are signs of respect for the authority of Indigenous peoples and demonstrate 
a commitment to a non-discriminatory legal response to self-determination claims 
including recognising the equality of Indigenous peoples as a basis for assessing the 
legal consequences of acts of the colonial state.
The emergence of ‘act of state’ in Australian law
Among those who embraced the High Court’s decision in Mabo v Queensland [No. 
2] there has been debate over whether the decision was a ‘judicial revolution or 
cautious correction’.152 It was an important precedent for the assertion of self-
150 Brennan, The Indigenous people, op. cit., p. 34.
151 Michael Dodson, ‘From Lore to Law: Indigenous rights and Australian legal systems’, Alternative 
Law Journal/ Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol 20(l)/3(72), 1995, p. 2. See also, Michael Dodson, 
‘Indigenous culture and native title’, Alternative Law Journal, vol. 21(1), 1996, p. 2.
152 Nettheim, Judicial revolution or cautious correction, op. cit., p. 2. The title o f this paper was a 
direct challenge to an early collection of papers by the University of Queensland Law Review, M. A.
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determination claims in Australian courts. However, reliance on a doctrine emerging 
from the Mabo decision requires a measure of caution. While rejecting the notion of 
superiority in relation to the use of land and, in the same context, the nature of 
political and social organisation, the courts have refused to hear argument on the 
inherent and continuing sovereignty of Indigenous peoples. Cases following Mabo 
illustrate the inconsistency in the Australian courts’ approach to self-determination 
claims that challenge the assertion of sovereignty.
Despite the apparent commitment to an inherent rights approach to self- 
determination claims in Mabo, the test of social organisation remains the foundation 
of Australian sovereignty. Paul Patton has argued that because of the failure to 
consider issues of sovereignty directly, the hierarchy of cultures and powers 
established at colonisation remains essentially intact. 153 The Court artificially 
separated issues relating to land title from other aspects of Indigenous society. 
Michael Dodson criticised this aspect of the decision, saying that ‘[t]he Australian 
legal system must take the further step of accepting that native title is inseparable 
from the culture which gives it meaning’ . 154
For self-determination claims, questions of land are intimately connected to 
questions of government and jurisdiction. 155 Rights, which flow from an 
identification with traditional lands, are also claims to cultural survival. The 
collective rights that determine titles to land also control access to lands and 
resources. All of these derive from prior sovereignty and the continuing collective 
rights of Indigenous peoples. They can be considered inherent in that they exist 
irrespective of recognition by the state. Therefore, a consistent accommodation of 
Indigenous rights would incorporate the notion of self-direction and control over the
Stephenson and Suri Ratnapala (eds), Mabo: a Judicial Revolution: The Aboriginal Land Rights 
Decision and its Impact on Australian Law, University o f Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1993.
153 Patton, op. cit., p. 111.
154 Dodson, From Lore to Law, op. cit., p. 2.
!5S On this, see Patrick Macklem, ‘Indigenous peoples and the Canadian constitution: Lessons for 
Australia?’, Public Law Review, 1994, p. 32. See also, Meyers, op. cit., pp. 79-82.
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future of the people. The basis for respecting Indigenous rights of self-government 
is the same as that which requires respect for title to land.
The Mabo judgment recognised public or collective rights of Indigenous peoples to 
determine the distribution of property rights and other associated rights. 156 Frank 
Brennan has argued that this recognition of the existence of Aboriginal law and land 
rights has provided a jurisprudential basis for self-determination on Aboriginal 
lands. 157 While this may be the case, it is important to distinguish between the 
jurisprudential basis for future claims of self-determination that involve self- 
government and sovereignty rights, and the limits of the reasoning in the Mabo 
decision and later cases that attempt to construct doctrinal walls to such recognition.
For example, the scope of the recognition of Indigenous society as a source of 
public, or collective, rights has been limited by the High Court’s unquestioning 
acceptance of the Crown as sole sovereign. While issues of sovereignty remain to be 
fully argued before the Court, a major limitation was foreshadowed in the notion that 
the sovereignty of the State is non-justiciable. 158 The High Court reiterated the view 
that any assertion of sovereignty was a challenge to the legitimacy of the state that 
could not be heard by a municipal court. 159
While the classification of the colony of New South Wales as settled was confirmed, 
the judges argued that the classification had no impact upon the rights of the
156 Importantly, native title laws need not be analogised to the English law or notions of private 
property: Mabo v Queensland [No. 2J (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 87, per Deane and Gaudron JJ.
157 Brennan, The Indigenous people, op. cit., p. 12. Similarly, Richard Bartlett, ‘Inherent Aboriginal 
sovereignty in Canada and Australia’, Australian-Canadian Studies, vol. 11, 1993, p. 14, argued that 
while the case rejects sovereignty in the international sense this does not preclude recognition o f more 
limited, though inherent, sovereign rights of self-government.
158 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 69, per Brennan J; and p. 78-9, per Deane 
and Gaudron JJ. Compare Isabel Coe (1993) 118 ALR 193, per Mason CJ.
159 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at pp. 31, 33, 69, per Brennan J; and pp. 78, 95, 
per Deane and Gaudron JJ. However, sovereignty was not explicitly challenged in that case. See also 
Coe v Commonwealth of Australia (1979) 53 ALJR 403, at p. 408, per Gibbs J. Compare Kent 
McNeil, ‘A question of title: Has the common law been misapplied to dispossess Aboriginals?’, 
Monash University Law Review, vol. 16(1), 1990, p. 99, who compiled an extensive survey of 
Australian and English decisions which support the view that acquisition of sovereignty by whatever 
means the Crown chooses is an act of state the validity of which cannot be questioned in the Courts: 
Cook v Sprigg [ 1899] AC 572, at p. 578; Vajesingji v Sec y  of State for India (1924) LR 51 IA 357, at 
p. 360; Coe v Commonwealth of Australia (1979) 53 ALJR 403, at p. 408, per Gibbs J. See also R v 
Kent Justices [1967] All ER 560, at p. 564; and Post Office v Estuary Radio Ltd [1968] 2 QB 740.
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Indigenous peoples to retain their lands. 160 Yet, settlement remains not only the 
justification for acquisition of sovereignty without consent but also for the denial of 
other rights. This creates an inconsistency in the treatment of rights. Michael 
Mansell has argued that:
The Court refused to follow precedent on the issue of terra nullius for to 
do so would be to maintain a legal fiction based on political convenience.
Yet the very same convenience was relied upon by the Judges to shut the 
door to any Aboriginal hopes for arguing Aboriginal sovereignty in the 
courts. This aspect of the judgement is pure hypocrisy. 161
While embracing an inherent rights approach in relation to land title, the Court has 
sought to avoid one of its implications, that is, a recognition of inherent Indigenous 
sovereignty, which gives the land title its content and meaning.
The courts have recognised that Indigenous peoples’ rights to land exist outside 
common law or legislative recognition, but the judges in Mabo specifically asserted 
that the state has power to divest those rights unilaterally, without consent or 
recompense. 162 The basis for this is the claim that the underlying title of the state 
may be perfected by the exercise of complete dominion. The doctrine creates a 
property interest unique to Indigenous people, but places them in a position of 
dependence in relation to the state. 163 Therefore, the judgement does not adequately 
reflect the fact that the Indigenous people are the original inhabitants of the 
territories of Australia whose prior sovereignty is reflected in continuing collective 
rights.
The structure of native title does not replicate the aboriginal rights doctrine of 
Canada nor the domestic dependent nation doctrine of the United States, yet all three 
share a common deference to the state’s power to unilaterally extinguish Indigenous 
rights. 164 The majority of judges in Mabo held that past ‘acts of state’ adverse to the
160 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at pp. 33, 58, per Brennan J.
161 Michael Mansell, ‘The court gives an inch but takes another mile’, Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 
2(57), 1992, p. 5.
162 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at pp. 68-74, per Brennan J; pp. 94, 100, per 
Deane and Gaudron JJ (although compare p. 92); and pp. 194-5, per Toohey J.
163 Macklem, ...Borders of the Canadian legal imagination, op. cit., p. 397.
164 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at pp. 68-74, per Brennan J; pp. 94, 100, per 
Deane and Gaudron JJ (but compare comments at p. 92); and pp. 194-5, Toohey J. See Johnson v
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rights of Indigenous peoples to their land were not wrongful. 165 In this way, the 
common law legitimates the divesting of rights without consent. Michael Dodson 
criticised these limitations:
The Mabo decision does not recognise equality of rights or equality of 
entitlement: it recognises the legal validity of Aboriginal title until the 
white man wants that land . . .  For the vast majority of Indigenous 
Australians the Mabo decision is a belated act of sterile symbolism. It 
will not return the country of our ancestors, nor will it result in 
compensation for its loss. 166
Thus the native title doctrine establishes a hierarchical relationship between 
Indigenous interests and the interests of others, reinforcing the dependency of 
Indigenous rights on the good will of the state.
The courts have been reluctant to accept self-determination claims that challenge the 
state’s assertions of sovereignty and jurisdiction over Indigenous peoples and their 
territories. Australian courts have assumed that jurisdiction over Indigenous peoples 
is situated wholly with the Crown. The imperial assertion of the Crown as sole 
source of law within the state is translated into a denial of any other source of 
authority. The rejection of Aboriginal law by the courts could only be founded upon 
the fiction that Australia was a political and legal vacuum. The implications for 
Indigenous people, at the time of colonisation, and into the present, has been the 
denigration of Indigenous society through the usurpation of authority and the 
imposition of alien legal norms and structures.
Blackstone’s formulation of the settlement thesis stated that British subjects settling 
an uninhabited land carried the English law with them as their birthright, but only so
M ’lntosh 21 US (Wheat.) 543 (1823) at p. 588, Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831), at 
pp. 557-62, US v Sandoval 231 US 28 (1913) , at pp. 46-7; in Canada, see St Catherine’s Milling and 
Lumber Co. v The Queen (1887) 13 SCR 577 but compare the fiduciary duty doctrine in Guerin v The 
Queen [1984] 2 SCR 335.
165 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, loc. cit. Compare Deane and Gaudron JJ, p. 92, 
who initially commented on wrongful extinguishment, but reverted to the power of the state at pp. 94 
and 100. Toohey J, at pp. 194-5, was the only judge to affirm the rights of Indigenous peoples 
against arbitrary exercise of power by the state. The brief judgement of Mason CJ and McHugh J 
confirmed the ratio of the case in this regard.
160 Michael Dodson, ‘Statement on behalf o f the Northern Land Council’, in ATSIC, The Australian 
Contribution: UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Tenth Session, Geneva, July 1992, p. 
35.
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much as was ‘applicable to the conditions of the infant colony’ . 167 Similarly, Deane
and Gaudron JJ argued in Mabo that even the Cooper v Stuart formulation could
allow for the recognition of Aboriginal law: 168
The common law so introduced was adjusted in accordance with the 
principle that, in settled colonies, only so much of it was introduced as 
was ‘reasonably applicable to the circumstances of the Colony’. This left 
room for the continued operation of some local laws and customs among 
the native people and even the incorporation of some of those laws and 
customs as part of the common law. 1
It was upon this basis that the Aboriginal law regarding land was recognised by the 
common law. It has been argued that the more complex approach to settlement 
would also recognise that Aboriginal law operates for Indigenous communities 
where appropriate. 170
The survival of Indigenous peoples and of their law is a reality that the colonial legal 
system has had to confront from the outset. Judges who deal specifically with the 
interaction of the two legal systems have made various accommodations. 171 In some 
circumstances judges have called for the strengthening of traditional authority. In 
other circumstances the courts have encouraged Indigenous communities to deal 
with their own members. 172 In some circumstances consultation with the community 
has occurred to determine appropriate sanction. 173 In mitigating the harshness and 
discrimination of the imported law, judges have paid regard to Aboriginal law, 
particularly in determining sentences. 174 Yet very few changes to substantive law
167 ibid
168 See also Nettheim, Judicial revolution..., op. cit., and generally, Walters, op. cit.
169 (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 79, per Deane and Gaudron.
i7° Nettheim, Judicial revolution..., op. cit., p 10. See also Walters, op. cit.
171 See generally, Daunton-Fear and Freiberg, op. cit.
172 See for example, R v Butler and Ors (unreported decision, Muirhead J, SCNT Nos 170-6 of 
1975).
173 See for example, R v Puruntatameri (unreported decision, Forster J, SCNT No 104 o f 1974); R v 
Goodwin (unreported decision, Forster J, No. 191 of 1975); R v Inginiwuni (unreported decision, 
Muirhead J, SCNT No. 6 of 1975); R v Lim (unreported decision, Muirhead j, SCNT Nos. 7-9 of 
1975); and R v Bullen and Ward (unreported decision, Muirhead J, SCNT Nos. 127-30 of 1975).
174 Of particular interest is the different approaches taken to the likelihood of traditional punishment. 
In one instance, the decision o f a Western Australian judge to impose a longer sentence to avert the 
payback system was overturned on appeal. The Chief Justice stated that the gesture was ‘kindly but 
inappropriate’: Jameson v R (unreported decision, Full Ct, 7 April 1965). In contrast, two decisions 
in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, R v Ferguson (unreported decision, Burt J, 8 April 1970) 
and R v Fazeldean (unreported decision, Wallace J, 21 Dec 1973), being aware o f the problem of  
double punishment, imposed minimal (or nominal) minimum terms. See also R v Skinny Jack and 
Ors. (unreported decision, 13 July 1964); Jacky Anzac Jadjurin v R (1982) 44 ALR 424; 7 A Crim R
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have been made.175 In 1986, the Report of the Australian Law Reform Commission 
on the Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law reviewed the current approach but 
failed to recommend any material changes to the status quo with respect to the 
common law.176
Increasingly, pressure has been brought to bear for greater reform in the law. 
Daunton-Fear and Frieberg commented on the changing notion of equality that lies at 
the heart of calls for change:
the answer to the problem of pluralist values has been a centralist legal 
system which, from a position of power, has assumed the right to 
subjugate those who are less articulate and less organised . . .  In the 
culture of the ‘melting pot’, equality meant homogeneity, but in recent 
times the concept of equality has come to denote more the right to be 
different, the right to retain and enjoy ones own values. This has entailed 
a penetrating reconsideration of the role of law in society.177
There are difficulties of course in accommodating two legal systems. The survey by 
Daunton-Fear and Frieberg, however, has shown concrete examples of interaction 
that have been mutually satisfactory.178 For these examples to exist suggests an 
implicit acceptance by the judiciary of the continuing authority of Indigenous 
peoples.
Recently, however, a claim for explicit recognition of a sphere of authority of 
Aboriginal law, in the operation of criminal laws was rejected by Chief Justice 
Mason in the High Court of Australia. The case concerned a well-known Aboriginal
182; and R v Peter Daniel Jagamara and Ors [1980] NTJ 372. In R v Lane and Ors. (unreported 
decision, SCNT Gallop J, SCC, Nos. 16-21 of 1980, 29/5/1980) incarceration was accepted as 
banishment.
175 The exception has been to incorporate a person’s culture as a factor in determining the 
reasonableness of actions. Rather than a recognition of Aboriginal law, this accommodation is 
merely a non-discriminatory application of a general rule. See R v Aboriginal Louie Barry 
Muddarubba [1956] NTJ 317; R v Skinny Jack (unreported decision, 13 July 1964); and R v Patipatu 
[1951] NTJ 18. Compare the decision in Police v James Galarrwuy Yunupingu (unreported decision, 
Mr Gillies SM, NT Court of Summary Jurisdiction, No. 9709243 of 1998, 20 February 1998), at pp. 
12-13, where the common law and Criminal Code defence of a claim o f right was recognised to 
protect the exercise of obligations imposed by Yolgnu law, that is, Galarrwuy had acted in the honest 
belief that he had a right to do so when he acted to prevent photos being taken of Yolgnu children on 
Yolgnu land without permission.
176 ALRC, op. cit., Summary of Recommendations, para. 173: ‘The scope for recognition of 
Aboriginal customary laws through the common law . . .  is very limited’. The ALRC made some 
recommendations in the area of marriage and family: para. 174.
177 Daunton-Fear and Frieberg, op. cit., p. 77.
178 ibid., pp. 62-77. Contrast Rob McLaughlin, ‘Some problems and issues in the recognition of  
Indigenous customary law’, Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 3(82), 1996, pp. 4-9.
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activist, Denis Walker, who was charged with assault while protecting a sacred site 
at the behest of the Bunjalung elders. 179 In Walker v The State o f New South Wales 
Counsel for Walker argued that the effect of Mabo v Queensland was that Aboriginal 
customary criminal law survived the acquisition of sovereignty by British settlement 
in the same way as the customary law relating to land tenure. 180 In response, Mason 
CJ made a number of assertions that affirmed historical barriers to recognition of 
Indigenous law.
In coming to terms with the injury in our past, the High Court in Mabo accepted 
responsibility for the denial of rights to land. In Walker Mason CJ had the 
opportunity to accept that same responsibility for the denial of law. Instead, in 
asserting the authority of the Crown to make laws that bind Indigenous people, 
Mason CJ criticised the claim for asserting that a ‘new source of sovereignty resides 
in the Aboriginal people’ . 181 Further, Mason CJ denied that there is an ancient and 
persisting sovereignty in the Indigenous peoples of this country who seek to assert 
that sovereignty to varying degrees. As we have seen, the Mabo decision affirmed 
Indigenous society as a source of laws. Yet in Walker, Mason CJ asserted that Mabo 
is entirely at odds with the notion of Indigenous sovereignty. Moreover, where in 
Mabo the principle of ‘equality before the law’ was used to justify the recognition of 
Aboriginal law, 182 Mason CJ used the same principle to deny any operation to 
Aboriginal law that conflicts with Australian criminal law. 183 Dodson commented on 
the contradiction, arguing that Walker creates an ‘[ajbsurd position if our title to land 
is recognised but the laws and customs which give meaning to that title are treated as 
if they don’t exist’ . 184
Like the Mabo decision, Walker reinforced the cultural hierarchy by affirming the
179 For further detail about the case, see Watson, Indigenous Peoples’ law-ways, op. cit.
iso ( 1 9 9 4 ) 126 ALR 321, at p. 322. The claim also challenged the application of NSW laws to
Indigenous peoples unless consented to.
181 ibid.
182 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 58, per Brennan J.
183 Walker v NSW (1994) 126 ALR 321, at p. 323.
184 Dodson, From Lore to Law, op. cit., p. 2.
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unrestrained authority of the state. Mason CJ refused to question the legislative 
competence of the state over Indigenous peoples, on the basis that the state is the 
sole source of sovereignty. The notion of consent for the imposition of laws by the 
legislature was rejected and the recognition of laws in Mabo was limited to those not 
inconsistent with the common law.
Rather than develop the recognition of Indigenous peoples as lawmakers, the 
judgement affirms historical barriers to recognition of Indigenous law. Mason CJ 
cited with approval the comments of Griffith CJ in Quart Yick v Hinds that ‘it has 
never been doubted’ that the imperial criminal law was introduced to the colonies. 185 
As we have seen there was considerable doubt about how far the law extended into 
relations with Indigenous peoples. 186 But, as Foster noted, ‘of course, in law the 
claim that there was “never any doubt” is often a sign of distant rumblings’ . 187 
Indeed, Asch and Macklem have argued that the phrase ‘never any doubt’ is a clear 
indicator of a legal fiction. 188 In this instance, the assertion of exclusive jurisdiction 
over peoples has been given new life through the Walker decision.
The decision in Walker is premised on the value of equality before the law. Rather 
than affirm equality, the Walker decision disregards the values of equality before the 
law, moral culpability and trial by ones peers. Instead the criminal law was treated 
as an end in itself, rather than a means to justice. The evidence is uncontrovertible 
that the uniform imposition of the criminal law in Australia has not resulted in 
equality before the law, and certainly not in justice. Rates of arrest, over­
representation of Aboriginal people in Australia’s jails, deaths in custody and 
juvenile recidivism are clear indicators that the Australian criminal justice system is 
not universal. 189 Moreover, it has not treated Indigenous peoples of Australia well, 
and certainly not equally.
185 (1905) 2 CLR 345, at p. 359, cited by Mason CJ in Walker v NSW ( 1994) 126 ALR 321, at p. 323.
186 See for example, Willis J of the South Australian Supreme Court discussed above.
187 Foster, op. cit., p. 346.
188 Asch and Macklem, op. cit., p. 509.
189 See the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Elliot Johnston QC, 
Commissioner), Final National Report, 5 vols., AGPS, Canberra, 1989. The failure of governments
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Since Mabo v Queensland the assertion that sole sovereignty resides in the state has
been challenged more directly before the High Court in Isabel Coe v the
Commonwealth. '90 Isabel Coe sought a declaration on issues that had not been raised
in the Mabo case, specifically putting forward alternative models for the recognition
of sovereignty. The statement of claim asserted the sovereignty of the Wiradjuri
nation or, in the alternative, domestic dependent nation status under the Marshall
model.191 A third alternative was a broad claim of autonomy:
the Wiradjuri are a free and independent people entitled to possession of 
those rights and interests (including rights and interests in land) which, as 
such are valuable to them.192
The claim did not set out the basis or purposes for the assertion of sovereignty in any 
detail and it was not a well prepared case in this respect. This case, like Walker, was 
rejected on its pleadings, that is, it was held not to show a valid claim. Interestingly, 
Mason CJ, who heard the case, also rejected the pleadings in the Paul Coe case. 
Mason CJ argued that a claim based on grounds that challenged the sovereignty of 
the state were ‘untenable’.193 However, Mason CJ did not rely on the non­
justiciability of a claim of sovereignty. Rather than suggest that the court was 
incapable of hearing such a claim, Mason CJ went further to reject the assertion of 
any form of sovereignty persisting in the Indigenous peoples of Australia:
Mabo [No. 2] is entirely at odds with the notion that sovereignty adverse 
to the Crown resides in the Aboriginal peoples of Australia. The 
decision is equally at odds with the notion that there resides in the 
Aboriginal people a limited kind of sovereignty embraced in the notion 
that they are ‘a domestic dependent nation’ entitled to self-government 
and full rights (save the right of alienation) or that as a free and 
independent people they are entitled to any rights and interests other than 
those created or recognised by the laws of the Commonwealth, State of 
New South Wales and the common law. Mabo [No. 2] denied that the
to adequately respond to the recommendations of the Royal Commission exemplify that this is a 
problem not merely of willingness but of capacity to accommodate the fundamental changes in 
institutions required by those recommendations. See also Michael Dodson, Deaths in Custody, op. 
cit.; Reports of the Social Justice Commissioner, op. cit.; and Cuneen and MacDonald, op. cit.
190 Paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim. The Wiradjuri nation covers a large area o f central New 
South Wales.
191 Paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim.
192 Paragraph 8 of the Statement of Claim. Other claims, in paragraphs 9-25 of the Statement of 
Claim, included assertions of genocide and crimes against humanity, wrongful and unlawful 
acquisition o f lands, fiduciary duty of the Crown, possessory rights and a ‘Mabo style’ claim which 
failed for insufficient particulars.
193 Walker v NSW (1994) 126 ALR321,p. 321; Isabel Coe (1993) 118 ALR 193, p. 200.
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Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty can be challenged in the municipal 
courts of this country. 194
This is significant because in coming to a conclusion about the absence or otherwise 
of adverse sovereignty, Mason CJ has opened the issue for debate. While the Isabel 
Coe decision is not a positive step in itself, the comments of Mason CJ provide a 
point of criticism and argument for future challenge. The decision does not restrict 
itself to the issue of justiciability but makes a positive argument against the 
sovereignty of Indigenous peoples. In this regard Mason CJ made his determination 
without access to comprehensive arguments on the matter. Future courts will have to 
assess the conclusions of Mason CJ on the existence of sovereignty and the extent to 
which it resides in the Indigenous peoples of this continent. In light of the cursory’ 
treatment of the issues in Isabel Coe, an opportunity could exist for full argument of 
continuing Indigenous sovereign authority.
The Australian courts may be asked to revise their approach to the assertion of sole 
sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction. While alternative approaches exist within the 
common law world, the inconsistencies and hierarchies that characterise them 
suggest a novel approach is needed. 195 Australian courts are faced with an interesting 
route for the future. In recognising the prior sovereignty of Indigenous peoples, they 
have undermined the discovery doctrine and the settlement thesis. Moreover, in 
recognising the continuing rights, laws and authority of Indigenous peoples the 
courts have recognised a sphere of authority that can legitimately be claimed to be 
sovereign. The foundations exist in the Mabo decision for an accommodation of the 
self-determination claims of Indigenous peoples in a way that respects their distinct 
identity and authority as peoples.
194 Isabel Coe, ibid. Mason CJ reiterated this view in Walker (1994) 126 ALR 321, at p. 322, citing 
Mabo v Queensland [No. 27(1992) 175 CLR l,a tp p . 15,31-2, 69,78-9, 122, and 179-80.
195 For example, though many commentators have proposed the domestic dependent nation model, 
Johnson v M ’Intosh (1823) 21 US 260, has been described by Flanagan, op. cit., p. 84, as an ‘uneasy 
compromise’ between the Indigenous peoples view of themselves as sovereign peoples and the 
colonial view o f them as ‘uncivilised populations subject to the imposed sovereignty o f colonising 
powers’.
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However, the inconsistent treatment of the theory of inherent Indigenous rights has 
meant that Indigenous sovereignty is excluded from the scope of rights that can be 
claimed before the courts. While the tenor of recent judgements appears respectful 
of Indigenous peoples, the law they set down still contains vestiges of the 
assumptions of superiority. The requirements of proof, of social organisation, and 
traditional connection since the assertion of sovereignty, as well as the emphasis on 
tenure history and extinguishment, are all examples of the way in which the law has 
subordinated Indigenous society. An approach that begins from the premise that all 
peoples are equal, and that their rights are worthy of protection against the excesses 
of the state, would produce a different picture. The focus would be on the 
relationship of the land, and other rights being claimed to the existing communities 
social and political life, resulting in a presumption of ownership and other social, 
political and cultural rights. 196
The fiction that the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown extinguished the 
sovereignty of Indigenous peoples is the sole reason for its exclusion from the scope 
of the rights that can be asserted under the common law. This fiction is in turn 
supported by the assertion that the Crown is the sole possessor of sovereignty. 
Neither of these fictions are sustainable in the light of either the reality of Australian 
politics or, indeed, existing decisions of the Australian courts.
Illustrating the commonality of the Indigenous experience in common law countries, 
Williams lamented that:
Legal doctrines . . . continue to be asserted today to deny respect to the 
Indian vision and to assert its truths in a world which has not yet learned 
that freedom is built on my respect for my brother’s vision and his 
respect for mine. 197
The assertion of state as sole sovereign relies on the settlement thesis and therefore a 
contingent approach to Indigenous peoples5 rights. In the Canadian context Asch 
and Macklem argued strongly that:
196 Asch and Bell, op. cit., p. 530.
197 Williams, Algebra, op. cit., p. 299.
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[this approach] does violence to fundamental principles of justice and 
human rights in the modern world, such as the assumed equality of 
peoples, especially in their ability to govern themselves, and the basic 
rights of a people to self-determination. We believe it abhorrent that 
Canada was constituted in part by a reliance on a belief in inequality of 
peoples and that such belief continues to inform political and legal 
practice. 198
The assumption of sole sovereignty was achieved through the exercise of power but 
not necessarily through the exercise of legitimate authority. Sovereignty was 
asserted without consent and without respect for the equality of peoples. Regardless 
of the assertion of sovereignty by the colonising state, and regardless of the failure of 
the state to acknowledge Indigenous sovereignty, the right persists as an inherent 
right to exercise the powers and responsibilities necessary to maintain an identity as 
Indigenous peoples.
Conclusion
The common law has been responsible for inculcating the policies of the state and
has perpetuated injustices against Indigenous peoples in Australia and throughout the
common law world. Michael Dodson observed that ‘the machinery of the Australian
legal system has acted as the legitimising arm of colonialism’ . 199 This criticism is
echoed in the United States by Robert Williams Jr.:
law regarded by the West as is most respected and cherished instrument 
of civilisation, was also the West’s most vital and effective instrument of 
Empire during its genocidal conquest and colonisation of the non- 
Western peoples of the New world. 0
198 Asch and Macklem, op. cit., p. 510.
199 Dodson, From Lore to Law, op. cit., p. 2.
200 Williams, ...Discourses o f Conquest, op. cit., p. 6.
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Through legal fictions, such as terra nullius and the doctrine of discovery, the courts 
have given unquestioning adherence to assertions of sole sovereignty and superiority 
by the more powerful colonising state. These assumptions are also reflected in the 
construction of specific doctrines of Indigenous peoples’ rights such as native title.
Both American and British courts created legal fictions to justify the acts of state in 
assuming sovereignty of Indigenous peoples and their lands. Chief Justice Marshall 
was frank in admitting that the compromise doctrine promulgated by his decisions in 
the Cherokee cases was based more on political expediency and the policy needs of 
the state than on the law of nations or indeed on the facts.201 These same 
compromises have been reached in the emerging common law of native title in 
Australia.
Notwithstanding the importance of the recognition of common law native title rights, 
the courts continue to assume the inferiority of Indigenous sovereignty and 
Aboriginal law.202 George Mye, Commissioner for the Torres Strait on the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Commission forewarned that the Mabo decision 
‘. . . has not quenched our thirst for unconditional justice.’203 An approach based on 
fiction cannot, of course, be reconciled with fact, and is as ignorant of Indigenous 
reality now as it was in 1788. Arguments for recognition of Aboriginal law are as 
salient now as they were in the 1800s and yet continue to be ignored.204
The piecemeal approach of the courts to recognising Aboriginal law is a reflection of 
the tension between the fictions that support assumptions of the state as sole 
sovereign and the fact of Indigenous authority, which continues to play a significant 
part in the lives of Indigenous peoples. It appears that the greater the threat to the 
established hierarchy the greater the reluctance of the courts to recognise Indigenous
201 See Fletcher v Peck 10 US (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Johnson v M ’lntosh 21 US (8 Wheat.) 543 
(1823); and Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831). See discussion pp. 150-4 above.
202 See Mason CJ in Walker (1994) 126 ALR 321, and Isabel Coe (1993) 118 ALR 193.
203 George Mye, Statement on behalf of ATSIC, Australian Contribution, op. cit., p. 31.
204 Compare the ALRC Report, op. cit., with similar arguments before the Courts o f New South 
Wales and South Australia in 1830s. See also Commonwealth Parliament, Report on the 
Implementation o f ALRC Report on the Recognition of Customary Laws (1986), AGPS, Canberra, 
1995.
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self-determination claims. This has led the courts to acknowledge rights to land, but 
only subject to the superior sovereignty and plenary power of the state.
The courts have acknowledged that, although vulnerable, these rights are inherent 
because their source is not the state but a pre-existing source of authority. The 
failure of the courts to accommodate greater degrees of self-determination in, for 
example, recognition of jurisdiction and government powers, cannot be reconciled 
with an inherent rights approach to Indigenous peoples’ claims. However, the 
recognition of the least threatening of self-determination claims gives reality to 
Indigenous sovereignty, carving out a sphere for the operation of Indigenous law. 
Macklem described these admissions as ‘moments of transformative possibility’ 
which represent opportunities for expanding and transforming the law.205 Macklem 
argued that:
even if the law is partially responsible for the current status of native 
people, this fact alone ought to be sufficient justification for re-imagining 
law’s relation to [Indigenous peoples] . . .  It is possible for the law to 
reform itself so as to become an instrument of native empowerment . . . 
the legal imagination contains moments of possibility that could facilitate 
the realisation of native self-government.206
The process of transformation had a languid evolution, which has allowed centuries 
of injustice. The Mabo decision was a beginning. In disposing of the fiction of terra 
nullius, some hope has appeared for Indigenous peoples to maintain control of their 
traditional lands. However, similar action has yet to be taken against other fictions 
that limit the recognition of Indigenous sovereignty. If the recognition of Indigenous 
peoples’ rights is based on respect and equality of peoples, then sovereignty and 
autonomy are among those rights protected. That is, the sphere of authority from 
which Indigenous collective rights emerge should be respected in the same way as 
rights to land.207
205 Macklem, ...Borders of Canadian legal imagination, op. cit., pp. 394-5.
206 ibid, pp. 453-5.
207 Land rights therefore belong to Aboriginal peoples as a collective, but are themselves not a source 
of rights. On this, see Douglas Sanders, ‘Aboriginal peoples and the Constitution’, Alberta Law 
Review, vol. 19, 1981, pp. 410-12.
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Future claims asserting greater self-determination goals cannot rely solely on the 
development of a doctrine of native title, the foundations of which reassert 
inequality. Future claims must question the legitimacy of the hierarchical 
relationship built into native title, questioning the entrenched position of authority of 
the Crown. Otherwise, the result, as we have seen with tensions in the domestic 
dependent nation doctrine, is simply to ‘reproduce the dependency in new form’ .208 
The following chapter explores in greater detail how future claims might be argued 
in a manner that could be accepted by the courts in order to overcome the barriers 
discussed here.
208 Macklem, ...Borders of the Canadian legal imagination, op. cit., pp. 410, 414. Macklem, p. 412, 
argued that decisions which build upon these foundations (for example, the fiduciary duty) frustrate 
rather than facilitate a greater degree of self-determination.
Chapter 5
Indigenous Self-determination and Equality of Peoples
The cultural and institutional limitations of the courts constrain their ability to 
understand the self-determination claims of Indigenous peoples. Existing legal 
doctrines too provide serious hurdles to utilising the courts and the common law. 
The discussion thus far has highlighted the way in which assumptions of superiority 
and universality of European institutions have become entrenched in the law. 
Indeed, Peter Kulchyski argued that the challenge posed by Indigenous peoples’ 
rights is precisely that they force a re-examination of the foundations of law. 1 
However, the strategic value of asserting claims through the courts have led many 
Indigenous peoples to utilise the courts in their self-determination strategies. To this 
end, many commentators have argued that despite the ‘ugly realities’ of the colonial 
law there are aspects of the legal system that can be advantageous to Indigenous 
peoples.2 Moreover, in the same way that the law has been manipulated to justify 
exclusion and legitimise prejudice, it can be appropriated by Indigenous people to
1 Peter Kulchyski, Unjust Relations: Aboriginal Rights in Canadian Courts, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1994, p. 17. Kulchyski, p. 19, suggested that the recognition o f ‘aboriginal rights’, in 
Canadian law, is ‘the mark, within the established order, o f what has not been established’. Mabo v 
Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, and Calder v Attorney General of British Columbia [1973] 
SCR 313; (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145 are cases in point.
2 For example, Colin Tatz, ‘Aborigines and the civil law’, in Peter Hanks and Brian Keon-Cohen 
(eds), Aborigines and the Law, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1984, p. I l l ,  argued that ‘the law and legal 
processes are perhaps a more effective means of asserting rights than conventional politics’. More 
forcefully, Tatz, p. 104, argued that the Australian political system has nothing to offer Indigenous 
peoples.
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their purpose, to support self-determination claims and to agitate for reform. 3 The 
usefulness of the courts to Indigenous peoples may not always be measured by the 
success of particular claims. Here, however, I wish to concentrate on strategies 
aimed at achieving significant recognition of self-determination through successful 
court action. The aim of this chapter is to identify aspects of the law that can be 
harnessed to facilitate the recognition of Indigenous peoples’ claims. The focus of 
this examination is the way in which self-determination cases have been successfully 
argued and presented before the courts.
In part one of this chapter, I argue that the courts require familiar concepts upon 
which to base their reasoning. The doctrine of stare decisis and the role of principle 
injudicial decision-making are key foundations for the development of the common 
law. Part two concentrates on an aspect of the common law tradition that is capable 
of accommodating the principle of self-determination. This is the principle of 
equality before the law, or as it is sometimes described, equality of respect.4 
Therefore, I suggest that judicial reasoning in self-determination cases that has as its 
guiding principles non-discrimination and the equality of peoples can accommodate 
the claims of Indigenous peoples. The approach in this chapter takes seriously the 
challenges to the courts’ legitimacy that are posed by Indigenous peoples’ claims. 
As a result, in part three I contrast the equality approach with one which uses the 
assertion of sovereignty as the centrepiece of the argument. In particular, I examine
3 See, for example, Guntram Werther, Self Determination In Western Democracies: Aboriginal 
Politics in a Comparative Perspective, Greenwood, Westport, 1992, pp. 50-1. See also Tatz, p. 111. 
Tatz did not gloss over the part that law has played in the oppression o f Indigenous peoples, at p. 110, 
arguing that ‘[l]aw it must be admitted, has been the creator of the Aboriginal condition and the 
impediment to their aspirations.’ Compare Kirby P, in Williams v Min, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 
1983 (1994) 35 NSWLR 497, at p. 515: ‘The law which has often been an instrument of injustice to 
Aboriginal Australians can also, in proper cases, be an instrument of justice in the vindication o f their 
legal rights.’
4 Michael Detmold, Leeth’s case: Constitutional equality of respect, paper presented to the Social and 
Political Theory Group Workshop on Legal Interpretation, Research School o f Social Sciences, 
Australian National University, 12 September 1996, argued that it is equality of respect with which 
the law is concerned, citing, for example, the fundamental precepts o f contract law that the courts’ 
role is not to determine the value of the contract but to ensure that the contract was made under 
conditions o f equal respect, that is, with no exploitation of relations of unequal power.
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the sovereignty claims of Isabel Coe and Denis Wa lker determined in the wake of 
Mabo v Queensland [No. 2].5
Equality may seem a curious concept upon which to rely, particularly when equality 
is so often used as the justification for rejecting or objecting to Indigenous peoples 
claims. However, the argument in part four seeks to explain how the principle of 
equality supports rather than undermines Indigenous self-determination claims. I do 
not deny the importance of the assertion of sovereignty at the heart of all self- 
determination claims, but I seek to draw a distinction in the way such claims are 
argued. Therefore, inherent sovereignty is explained in the context of equality of 
peoples to provide a focus more familiar to the courts.
I. Familiar concepts in judicial reasoning
To varying degrees, strategies for asserting self-determination claims in the courts 
demand a revision of current law. The differences in approach may be said to be 
pragmatic assessments of the possibilities for achieving change given the strictures 
of judicial decision-making. It is therefore useful to examine the role of doctrine in 
judicial reasoning, as the courts look for familiar concepts upon which to base their 
decisions. I discover the broad areas of agreement amongst the varying approaches 
by exploring the flexibility within the constraints of doctrine and precedent.
5 (1992) 175 CLR 1. See also Isabel Coe v Commonwealth (1994) 118 ALR 193, and Walker v New 
South Wales (1994) 126 ALR 321.
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Revising the content o f the law
The most common level of analysis in academic commentary is concerned with 
extending the recognition of Indigenous claims through current doctrines. Of 
particular interest to Australian commentators has been to compare the position here 
with doctrines in other jurisdictions and in some cases to seek to transplant doctrines 
such as the doctrine of continuity of Aboriginal rights from Canada or the ‘domestic 
dependent nation’ doctrine from the United States.6 This type of analysis 
extrapolates the elements of existing doctrines that can ‘advantage’ Indigenous 
peoples in Australia. The value of this approach is said to be in attaining specific 
self-determination goals within the existing regime.7 Reliance on existing doctrines 
may be criticised for failing to take sufficient account of the inherent racism of 
current doctrines.8 9 The danger is that gains made under current legal doctrine will be 
pyrrhic victories.
Often those who reject current doctrines as a basis for further development are 
dismissed as the radical fringe of legal analysis. 7 This criticism is misleading as
6 See, for example, Richard Bartlett, ‘Inherent Aboriginal sovereignty in Canada and Australia’, 
Australian-Canadian Studies, vol. 11, Nos. 1 & 2, 1993, pp. 1-16, or Camilla Hughes, ‘The fiduciary 
obligations of the Crown to Aborigines: Lessons for the United States and Canada’, University of 
New South Wales Law Journal, vol. 16(1), 1993, pp. 70-96. For an explanation of the doctrine of 
continuity, see Brian Slattery, Ancestral lands alien laws: Judicial perspectives on Aboriginal title, 
Studies on Aboriginal Rights No. 2, University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983, p. 10. 
Aboriginal rights based on prior occupation are presumed to continue, having survived the change of 
sovereignty, unless expressly abrogated. This is the model of native title in Mabo’s case. On the 
domestic dependent nation doctrine, see Philip Frickey, ‘Marshalling past and present: Colonialism, 
constitutionalism and interpretation in federal Indian law’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 107(2), 1993, 
pp. 381-440.
7 The recognition of land rights can be seen as both an end in itself - as a pragmatic measure to regain 
control of at least some traditional lands - and as a means to a greater end - ‘as part of an attempt to 
reshape and redefine the settler-indigenous relationship through peaceful means’: Brian Keon-Cohen 
and Bradford Morse, ‘Indigenous land rights in Australia and Canada’, in Hanks and Keon-Cohen, 
op. cit., p.75.
8 The notion of extinguishment, which underlies the native title doctrine, is an example. Robert A. 
Williams Jr., ‘Learning not to live with Eurocentric myopia: A reply to Professor Laurence’s 
Learning to live with the plenary power of Congress over Indian Nations’, Arizona Law Review, vol. 
30, 1988, p. 447, warned that Indigenous peoples can no longer suffer the inherent racism of current 
doctrines. Williams, p. 439, argued that ‘the central texts of federal Indian law, beginning with its 
grounding legal text, the Doctrine of Discovery, deny respect to American tribal peoples’ 
fundamental rights of autonomy and self-determination’. Werther, op. cit., p. 15, criticised historical 
legal analysis as a basis for explaining Indigenous peoples self-determination claims because of the 
pervasive legal bias in favour of the oppressor. See also Garth Nettheim, ‘International legal notes: 
Seminar on the rights of Indigenous peoples under law and practice, Canberra, May 1-2 1986’, 
Australian Law Journal, vol. 60, 1986, p. 418.
9 See, for example, Patrick Macklem, ‘First Nations self-government and the borders of the Canadian 
legal imagination’, McGill Law Journal, vol. 36, 1991, p. 393. See also Hamar Foster, ‘Forgotten 
arguments: Aboriginal title and sovereignty in the Canada Jurisdiction Act cases’, Manitoba Law
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many of those same commentators argue forcefully for the potential of the law to 
embrace an Indigenous vision of the appropriate structuring of political and legal 
relationships between two peoples. 10 This is not necessarily a romantic vision but a 
recognition of the central role played by the law in determining the current 
circumstances of Indigenous peoples. Robert Williams, for example, focused on the 
history of the law as a barrier to a more inclusive jurisprudence, yet recognised the 
potential for the law to embrace Indigenous values and Indigenous sovereignty.”
Increasingly, commentators have adopted a more selective approach to current
doctrines in a search for what was eloquently stated by Patrick Macklem as:
moments of transformative possibility which, if taken from the margins 
of legal discourse and placed at the centre of the law governing native 
people, could assist in the realisation of First Nations self-government. 12
This approach admits the problematic foundations of current doctrines that create 
inconsistencies and hierarchies of rights and acknowledges that without clear reform 
in the fundamental assumptions of the courts, the common law is a dangerous ally. 13 
However, it is argued that there are threads within the doctrines and precedents that 
are salvageable and can form the basis for the future development of the law. 14
Approaches that call for a revision of the law are not necessarily radical or
Journal, vol. 21, 1992, p. 388; and Kevin Worthem, ‘Sword or shield: The past and future impact of 
Western legal thought on American Indian sovereignty (Book Review: Robert A. Williams Jr., The 
American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 1990)’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 104, 1991, p. 1382, 
who criticised Robert Williams specifically, saying that ‘[t]his absolutist position ignores the 
compelling role that settled expectations play in any non-anarchic society’. In contrast, Williams, op. 
cit., pp. 441-2, criticised the myopic vision of ‘hardassed empire builders, or their descendants, who 
enjoy the material as well as intellectual legacy of their labours’. See also Michael Mansell, ‘Can 
White law accommodate Black demands?’ Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 1(23), December 1986, p. 
10.
10 Robert A. Williams Jr., ‘The algebra of federal Indian law: The hard trail of decolonizing and 
Americanizing the white man’s Indian jurisprudence’, Wisconsin Law Review, 1986, p. 291. See also 
Williams,... Myopia, op. cit., p. 439.
11 Williams, Algebra ..., op. cit., p. 291. See also p. 222.
12 Macklem, First Nations ..., op. cit., p. 387.
13 ibid. Although note a later article in which Macklem presented an argument that departed from 
current doctrine in order to justify the rights of self-government. This later article provides 
considerable support for many of the ideas in this thesis and in this chapter particularly. See Patrick 
Macklem, ‘Distributing sovereignty: Indian nations and equality of peoples’, Stanford Law Review, 
vol. 45, 1993, p. 1311.
14 An example of this is the discussion of inherency versus contingency in existing doctrine and 
recent cases. See, for example, Michael Asch and Patrick Macklem, ‘Aboriginal rights and Canadian 
sovereignty: An Essay on R v Sparrow’, Alberta Law Review, vol. 29(2), 1991, p. 499. See also, 
discussion at pp. 171-7 above.
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revolutionary. Rather, they demonstrate an understanding of the ability of the 
common law process to reform itself. It would be misleading to suggest that ‘the law 
has no clear mechanism for rewriting its wrongs’ . 15 On the contrary, the law has 
shown a capacity to adapt and reformulate its doctrines. For example, in Mabo’s 
case Justice Brennan expressed the High Court’s view of the ability of the common 
law to rejuvenate itself and disentangle itself from racist doctrines. In that case it 
was stated that ‘no case can command unquestioning adherence if the rule it 
expresses seriously offends the values of justice and human rights’ . 16 Moreover, 
without such revisionary change, artificial barriers to self-determination and 
inconsistencies in the treatment of claims will continue as the courts struggle to 
reconcile common law values with an historical deference to power and precedent.
The development of the common law
The question remains whether there is any reason to argue a doctrinal approach at all. 
We have seen how inconsistencies and assertions of superiority and sole sovereignty 
that are inherent in current doctrines stand in the way of Indigenous peoples’ self- 
determination claims. Perhaps we should disregard existing doctrines entirely and 
argue on principle alone. Here, however, we meet the limits of the flexibility of the 
law, or more correctly, of judicial decision-making.
Greg McIntyre, Counsel for the Meriam people in Mabo’s case, insisted on the 
necessity of a doctrinal basis for Indigenous peoples’ claims, arguing that doctrinal 
support was imperative to the success of the case. 17 The reason for McIntyre’s 
insistence lies in the nature of judicial decision-making and the methods used for 
developing the common law. The courts are not completely free to depart from
15 See Frederic William Maitland, ‘Why the history of the English law is not written’, in Hal Fischer 
(ed.), The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1911, p. 491. See also Foster, op. cit., p. 348.
16 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 30, per Brennan J.
17 Greg McIntyre, interview, 3 December 1996.
197
established principles of law. The doctrine of stare decisis, the foundation of 
common law decision-making, demands that consideration be given to the need for 
stability, consistency, coherence and, importantly, predictability in the law through 
adherence to precedent. 18
The reasons for judicial restraint were stated by Justice Mason in SGIC (SA) v 
Trigwell:
I do not doubt that there are some cases in which an ultimate court of 
appeal can and should vary or modify what has been thought to be a 
settled rule or principle of common law on the ground that it is ill- 
adapted to modem circumstances . . . But there are powerful reasons why 
the court should be reluctant to engage in such an exercise. The court is 
neither a legislature nor a law reform agency. Its responsibility is to 
decide cases by applying the law to the facts as found. The court’s 
facilities, techniques and procedures are adapted to that responsibility. 19
In Mabo ’s case the relationship between principle and doctrine in the development 
of the common law was considered. Brennan J explained that the legal system ‘can 
be modified to bring it into conformity with the contemporary notions of justice and 
human rights, but it cannot be destroyed’ .20 Brennan J expressed concern that if any 
doctrine of the common law were to be rejected the effect on the ‘skeleton of 
principle’ that forms the basis of Australian law would have to be considered.21 
However, as an illustration, in the Mabo decision itself the accepted doctrines of 
state property ownership, including the doctrine of terra nullius, that underpinned the 
property law of Australia were not considered so fundamental that they justified 
adherence to racist doctrine.22 This reasoning reflects the balancing of the principles
18 Mason, Future directions ..., op. cit., p. 150.
19 (1979) 142 CLR 617, at pp. 633-4. It is interesting to contrast this statement with the judicial 
creativity, or activism, that is seen as the ‘legacy’ of the Mason Court. See for example, P. H. Lane, 
‘The changing role of the High Court’, Australian Law Journal, vol. 70, 1996, pp. 246-51, and D. A. 
Smallbone, ‘Recent suggestions of an implied “ Bill o f Rights” in the Constitution, considered as part 
of a general trend in constitutional interpretation’, Federal Law Review, vol. 21, 1993, pp. 254-70. 
On whether the traditional view of the courts ‘facilities and procedures’ reflects what they actually 
do, see Abram Chayes, ‘The role o f the judge in public law litigation’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 
89(7), 1976, pp. 1281-1316, especially pp. 1282-3. See discussion at pp. 111-16 above.
20 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 30, per Brennan J.
21 ibid.
22 The doctrine of absolute beneficial ownership persisting in the Crown over the whole of the lands 
of Australia was rejected when adherence to such a doctrine required denial o f Indigenous rights to 
property which existed prior to the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty: Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] 
(1992) 175 CLR 1, for example, at pp. 25-31, per Brennan J, especially pp. 29-30. See also Deane 
and Gaudron JJ, at pp. 82-7.
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of judicial decision-making, that is the adherence to precedent and the need to adapt 
laws to the circumstances of contemporary society.
For some time, the Australian courts were strongly influenced by the concept of 
‘strict and complete legalism’ which saw a subordinate role for the courts in applying 
and interpreting already existing law.23 While this classical view is often raised in 
debates by politicians and by the general community, it is a view no longer held by 
lawyers and judges.24 Mason CJ argued that ‘[i]t is now accepted that, at the 
appellate level at least, judges do make law when they extend, qualify or reshape a 
principle of law’ .25 It is unrealistic to suggest that courts do not give consideration to 
policy issues when making the simplest of determinations.26 This movement away 
from ‘the traditional methodology of legal formalism’ has resulted in greater 
acknowledgment of the courts’ law-making role and greater openness in the 
consideration o f ‘underlying policy, moral and ethical’ questions.27
Therefore, the law is not necessarily ‘the prisoner of history’ through doctrine and 
precedent.28 The need to keep the law in good repair and to overturn unacceptable or 
outdated precedent is presented as the balance to the rigidity of stare decisis. 
However, justice remains the paramount concern in both achieving stability and
23 This phrase was used by Sir Owen Dixon, Swearing in of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice, 
Commonwealth Law Reports, vol. 85, 1952, p. xiv. This view was consistent with the Diceyan notion 
of parliamentary sovereignty, requiring absolute judicial restraint. The theory denied any role for the 
court in making law. See also Sir Owen Dixon, ‘The law and the Constitution’, Law Quarterly 
Review, vol. 51, 1935, p. 590.
24 For discussion, see Paul Finn, ‘Of power and the people: Ends and methods in Australian judge 
made law’, Judicial Review, vol. 1(4), 1994, pp. 255-281.
25 Mason, Future directions ..., p. 158.
26 Indeed, Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The role of the Court in a federation: A comparison of the Australian 
and United States experience’, Federal Law Review, vol. 16(1), 1981-2, p. 5, suggested that there is a 
danger that “‘strict and complete legalism” will be a cloak for undisclosed and unidentified policy 
values’.
27 Mason, Defining the framework ..., op. cit., p. 1. See also Mason, Future directions ..., op. cit., 
pp. 155-63.
28 Compare Brennan J in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 29:
Although our law is a prisoner of its history, it is not now bound by the decisions of 
courts in the hierarchy of an Empire then concerned with the development of its 
colonies . .. Here rests the ultimate responsibility of declaring the law of the nation.
On the development of a distinctly Australian law, see Mason, Future directions..., op. cit., pp. 149- 
55. See also Paul Finn, ‘A sovereign people, a public trust’, in P. D. Finn (ed.), Essays on Law and 
Government, Vol. 1: Principles and Values, Law Book Co., North Ryde, 1995, p. 6.
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predictability as well as in the development of the law to respond to changing
circumstances.29 To this end, Sir Anthony Mason argued that:
Fortunately, stare decisis is so flexible, for so much depends on what is 
‘settled principle’, that we can preserve a balance between the demands 
for law that is predictable and law that is adaptable and therefore 
responsive to social necessity.30
The common law by its nature is a developing system of laws. That development is 
not determined entirely by reference to historical precedent. Rather, judicial 
decision-making is guided by values and principles of justice that temper adherence 
to doctrine and precedent.31
Similarly, Justice Toohey argued that the role of an independent judiciary is to give 
effect to those principles, within the rule of law, as best it can.32 Moreover, Paul 
Finn argued that these fundamental principles are manifest in abstract ideals, rights 
and, finally, rules that form the substance of common law doctrines.33 At the same 
time, the common law relies upon the identification of fundamental principles to 
maintain the stability and coherence of the body of law as a whole.
However, as Alexander Bickel has suggested, ‘[principle, ethics, morality, these are 
evocative, not definitional, terms; they are attempts to locate meaning not enclose 
it. ’ 34 In this search for meaning, ‘fundamental values’ are increasingly being invoked 
to justify judicial decision-making, particularly where a reassessment of precedent 
has led the courts to change the direction, scope or form of individual rules and
29 Mason, Future directions ..., op. cit., p. 158, suggested:
[Judges] must have an eye to the justice of the rule, to the fairness and the practical 
efficacy o f its operation in the circumstances of contemporary society. A rule that is 
anchored in conditions which have changed radically with the passage of time may 
have no place in the law of today.
30 ibid., p. 150.
31 Sir Harry Gibbs, on the occasion of his swearing in as Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, 
12 February 1981, Commonwealth Law Reports, vol. 148, 1981, p. xi, reflected on the responsibility 
of the courts ‘to develop the law in a way that will lead to decisions that are humane, practical and 
just’.
32 John Toohey, ‘A government of laws, and not of men?’, Public Law Review, vol. 4, 1993, p. 174.
33 Finn, Of power and the people, op. cit., p. 281.
34 Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar o f Politics, 
[1962], 2nd edn, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1986, p. 199.
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doctrines.35 Members of the High Court have suggested that the fundamental 
principles upon which the common law should be developed can be determined with 
reference to values accepted by the community, rather than those personal to a 
judge.36
This community values approach to judicial decision-making has been strongly 
criticised.37 In essence, concern over the use of community values is that while 
speaking in terms of objective truths, judges are ‘likely to be discovering, whether 
they realise it or not, their own values’ .38 In this sense, community values are seen as 
merely a new veil behind which personal opinion is expressed. The danger is that 
such decision-making would follow a systematic bias in favour of the interests of the 
dominant culture, from which most lawyers and judges are drawn.39 The reasons for 
this need not appear sinister, for as Ely stated, ‘people understandably think what is 
important to them is important’ .40 The judge’s own assumption would therefore go 
unquestioned.
However, Krygier and Glass argued that criticisms of the courts’ use of values are 
too simplistic. They concluded that the courts embark upon a different inquiry -  into 
the nature of law itself. The courts, they argued, ‘are concerned with the law, with
35 Finn, A sovereign people, op. cit., p. 6. See, for example, Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 
292; Secretary>, Department o f Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion’s Case) 
(1992) 174 CLR 218; and, of course, Mabo v Queensland [No. 27(1992) 175 CLR 1.
36 Mason, Future directions ..., op. cit., p. 159. For example Brennan J, in Dietrich v The Queen 
(1992) 177 CLR 292, at p. 319, reiterated the ‘genius’ of the common law to adapt, but clarified this 
flexibility with reference to ‘relatively permanent values’.
3/ It is argued that judges are not in a position to know what the community values are, nor do they 
have the capacity to decipher them. There is also criticism that values are essentially contested, 
particularly as between different cultures and legal systems, or at least, consensus could only be 
found at such a level of abstraction as to have little meaning at all and ‘once the Court supplies this 
context it will lose the moral consensus’. See Martin Krygier and Arthur Glass, ‘Shaky premises: 
Values, attitudes and the law’, Sydney Law Review, vol. 17, p. 390. See generally, John Hart Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory o f Judicial Review, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 
1980.
38 Ely, ibid., p. 44.
39 Peter Kulchyski, op. cit., p. 13, took this further, warning that:
The values and traditions, most especially the material preconditions of the dominant 
society are totalizing. By this I mean that dominant Canadian society demands to 
understand everything in a form that suits the basic principles upon which the 
established order is premised.
40 Ely, op. cit., p. 59. This would explain the bias in favour of individual property rights.
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clarifying it, pursuing its intimations, rendering it predictable, and indeed 
deliberating over values which inhere in it and which might enhance it’ .41
On this view, the premise that judges are making new law has incorrectly led to the 
conclusion that the answers are somehow coming from outside the law.42 The 
alternative is that the values that the courts refer to are drawn from the law itself. In 
this sense, ‘legal traditions are densely textured and layered . . . they embody 
particular values, principles and commonplaces, whose implications have often been 
pondered and particularised over generations’ .43 Therefore, it can be argued that 
reference to community standards is not a departure from the traditional common 
law concerns but an accentuation of them in changing circumstances.44 These 
traditional concerns with human, democratic and societal values are centred on the 
relations of power within the state.45
The distinction drawn here between values intrinsic to the common law and 
community consensus becomes particularly important in the consideration of the 
rights and claims of minorities. Where rights of a minority are asserted against 
actions taken by the majoritarian government then the absurdity of appealing to the 
values of the majority for determination of the issue seems clear.46 This concern is 
reflected in Sec y, Dept o f Health and Community Services v JWB in which Brennan 
J argued that community standards may not be the appropriate standards where the 
‘tyranny [of the] majority opinion may impose on a weak and voiceless minority’ .47
41 Krygier and Glass, op. cit., p. 395.
42 ibid., p. 387. See also Ely, op. cit., p. 72: ‘no answer is what the wrong question begets’, quoting 
Bickel, op. cit., p. 103.
43 Krygier and Glass, op. cit., p. 392.
44 This approach is reflected in comments by Deane J in Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 
at p. 329:
circumstance [being] such that [a court] is entitled and obliged to reassess some rule or 
practice in the context of social conditions, standards and demands and to change or 
reverse the direction of the development of the law.
45 Finn, A Sovereign people ..., op. cit., p. 8. See also Krygier and Glass, op. cit., p. 393.
46 For Ely, op. cit., p. 69, ‘it makes no sense to employ the value judgements of the majority as a 
vehicle for protecting minorities from the value judgements of the majority’. Compare comments of  
McHugh and Kirby JJ during oral submissions by the Commonwealth in Kartinyeri v The 
Commonwealth (A29/1997 High Court of Australia, Transcript of Proceedings, 6 February 1998) at 
pp. 37-8.
47 (1992) 175 CLR 218 at p. 277. In response, proponents of the ‘community values’ approach have 
suggested that the values should be ‘screened’ for bias and prejudice. See, for example, Ely, op. cit.,
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The direction of change and the basis upon which change is to be justified have come 
under significant scrutiny. The questions of accountability and legitimacy have led 
to an inquiry, both in academic circles and in the judiciary itself, to identify where 
these changes come from and how they identify the values and rights that are 
considered so fundamental as to warrant judicial recognition and protection.
The courts have been criticised for an increased, judicial ‘activism’ or ‘creativity’ 
that has seen a series of watershed cases substantially change the course of the law in 
Australia.48 Justice Kirby has observed that the apparent increase in judicial 
creativity may be more noticeable because of the earlier ‘abstinence’, in favour of 
absolute judicial restraint.49 Kirby J had this response to criticism of the High 
Court’s decision in Mabo ’s case:
To those who say that the creative judiciary ought to have waited for the 
legislatures of Australia to correct this long standing affront to justice to 
an important section of Australian community -  the question comes 
back: why had they not acted before now? How long must the courts wait 
before discharging their own constitutional duty to ensure justice under 
the law? 50
The failure of the legislature to concern itself with updating the law is an issue 
touched on by many commentators and judges. The need to respond to injustice, 
particularly in light of developments in international human rights, has led the courts 
to revisit the nature and extent of common law rights. 51 To this end, Sir Anthony 
Mason argued that the exercise of judicial power in the development of the common 
law may well involve the ‘creation’ of new rights.52
pp. 67-8. See also Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, 1977, pp. 126, 
240-58. This would seem to be more an approach that requires the judges to have regard to the 
values the community ought to hold. See Finn, A sovereign people ..., op. cit., pp. 32-3.
48 See, for example, Lane, op. cit., pp. 250. See discussion at pp. 101-2 above.
49 Michael Kirby, ‘In defence of Mabo’, in Murray Goot and Tim Rowse (eds), Make a Better Offer, 
Pluto Press, Leichhardt, 1994, pp. 72-3.
50 ibid., p. 77.
51 Finn, Of power and the people, op. cit., pp. 271-2, and Mason, Future directions..., op. cit., p. 162. 
Mason, Defining the framework..., op. cit., p. 2, suggested that the lack of political will on the part of 
successive governments, by choosing not to take the electoral risk of bringing the law up to date, has 
‘elevated the curial process’.
52 Mason, Defining the framework ..., ibid., p. 11. ‘Recognition’ would be a better term here as 
many of these rights are considered inherent rights. The debate over whether the court should or 
should not have made law in M abo’s case is not relevant to this inquiry, with issues of competency 
and capacity addressed in some detail in chapter four. However, it is worth reiterating here that the 
courts remain mindful of the constraints placed upon them by the institutional structure of the state.
203
Mason argued that the underlying reasons for the evolution are directly linked, first,
to the emergence of human rights as a matter of national and international concern
and the need for judicial enforcement of such rights, and, second, by a ‘resurgence of
natural law philosophy’ . 53 Here Mason CJ referred to reaching back to first
principles of justice in determining the future direction of the common law .54 Finn
too, suggested that there is an acknowledgment that:
some values, some human, some democratic or societal, are to be 
regarded as intrinsic to the social and governmental order we have 
created in this country. It is this perhaps that is prompting the occasional 
suggestion that a species of natural law is re-emerging in Australian 
law / 5
Arguably, the return to natural law theory is more a re-conceptualisation of the 
values of the common law in terms of a broader understanding of human rights, in 
the context of state power.
In Australia, where rights are not enumerated in the Constitution, the common law 
plays a significant role in protecting the rights of citizens.56 There are well-founded 
concerns about the security of common law rights in the face of hostile governments. 
There is a tension for the courts in the need to protect human rights and the need to 
respect legislative judgement.57 The courts can only ensure that the legislature is
See Mason, Future directions ..., ibid., p. 160. See generally Bickel, op. cit., and Krygier and Glass, 
op. cit.
53 Mason, Defining the framework..., ibid., p. 1. Justice Toohey, op. cit., p. 167, also refers to a 
revival of natural law jurisprudence in the return to fundamental principles of justice.
54 Natural law theory in essence suggests that there is an intrinsic law that exists among us as human 
beings which draws upon our fundamental notions of what is just. Natural law theory was also a 
fundamental influence on early international law. See discussion pp. 47-9 above. For a critical view 
of natural law theory and the treatment of Indigenous peoples in Western legal thought, see Williams, 
Algebra ..., op. cit., especially pp. 247-52, 272; and Robert A Williams Jr., The American Indian in 
Western Legal Thought: The Discourses o f Conquest, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, 
especially pp. 270-300.
55 Finn, A sovereign people ..., op. cit., p. 8. Occasional references include Mason, Defining the 
framework ..., op. cit., p. 1., and Toohey, op. cit., p. 167.
56 In Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 146 CLR 126, at p. 141, Brennan CJ, for example, said 
that equality was neither explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. See generally, Sir 
Maurice Byers, ‘The Kruger case’, Public Law Review, vol. 8, December 1997, pp. 224-28. 
However, it is important to note that even in the United States and Canada, where constitutional Bills 
of Rights exist, the recognition of Indigenous collective rights has occurred predominantly within the 
common law. To this end, Ely, op. cit., p. 105, argued that:
rights, whether or not the are specifically mentioned [in a written constitution], must 
nonetheless be protected, strenuously so, because they are critical to the functioning of 
an open and effective democratic process.
57 Mason, Defining the framework ..., op. cit., p. 3. However, in the absence of a bill of rights, the 
judicial protection of rights is a ‘less dominating force’ than in other jurisdictions: at p. 2. John 
Williams, The protection of rights under the Australian Constitution: A republican analysis, PhD
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aware of the impact of its actions on people’s rights, by narrowly construing 
legislation where possible.58 The High Court has reinforced the presumptive rule of 
interpretation that, in the absence of unmistakable and unambiguous expression of 
intention, no statute will be read as authorising an abrogation or curtailment of a 
common law right and has extended the rule to cover a fundamental right, freedom 
or immunity.59
In Mabo’ case, the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) offered the quasi­
constitutional protection for common law recognition of Indigenous interests.60 
Frank Brennan has observed that only while Australia maintains a legislature 
committed to non-discrimination and the Racial Discrimination Act and international 
obligations, will the courts be free to exercise their duty to ensure equal protection 
for Indigenous peoples rights.61 However, Neil Löfgren has argued that the 
protection against non-discrimination is not vulnerable in this way because it has the 
force of international law.62
Fundamental, or inherent, human rights have increasingly become part of the 
common law framework. Historically, the emphasis has remained on how these 
values can be promoted through individual rights.63 However, at both the
Thesis, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1997, attributed this 
emphasis to the High Court’s preference for tracing protection to a textual basis within the 
Constitution. Evidence of this can be seen in the emergence of the ‘democratic principles’ argument 
to sustain judicial intervention. Specifically, see Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth 
(1992) 177 CLR 106, at p. 134, per Mason CJ.
58 Toohey, op. cit., p. 170, and Mason, Defining the framework ..., op. cit., p. 28. Areyh Neier, Only 
Judgement: The Limits o f Litigation in Social Change Legislation, Wesleyan University Press, 
Middleton, 1982, pp. 237-9, argued that the power of the legislature to nullify the courts findings is 
the ‘[o]ne aspect of any venture in judicial policy making [that] confirms their legitimacy’. 
Moreover, ‘the legitimacy of judicial policy-making power is validated by inherent judicial 
powerlessness’, where an institution like the court puts its own legitimacy on the line they heighten 
the degree to which they personify justice. Concomitantly, the necessity to persuade others of their 
authority is a powerful constraint on the courts.
59 Mason Defining the framework..., op. cit., p. 28, and Coco v the Queen (1994) 170 CLR 427, at p. 
437.
60 The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), arises from Australia’s international obligations under 
human rights instruments: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 26 and the 
Convention on the Elimination o f all forms o f Racial Discrimination.
61 Frank Brennan, ‘Mabo misconceptions’, Res Publica, vol. 2(2), 1993 p. 12; and ‘The implications 
of the Mabo decision’, Reform, No. 65, Autumn 1993, p. 11.
62 Neil Löfgren, ‘Keeping the colonisers honest: The implications of Recommendation 333’, in Greta 
Bird, Jennifer Nielsen and Gary Martin (eds), Majah: Indigenous Peoples and the Law, Federation 
Press, Sydney, 1996, p. 18.
6J Mason, Future directions ..., op. cit., p. 163. As we have seen, Mason has linked the protection of 
fundamental rights to responsible government:
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international and domestic level the inability of individual rights to protect 
collectives within the state has necessitated a reconceptualisation of the rights 
regime. It is the rights of peoples, and, importantly, of Indigenous peoples, to self- 
determination that have come to the fore most recently. As we have seen, the right 
to self-determination and other rights that derive from it, are not merely amalgams of 
individual rights.64 The recognition of these rights is unfamiliar to the courts, but 
growing respect for the rights of collectives in international jurisprudence has been 
reflected in developments in common law countries. In Australia the recognition of 
the right of Indigenous peoples is beginning to establish itself in the judiciary. In 
1985 Mason J stated that:
the concept of human rights, though generally associated in Western 
thought with the rights of individuals, extends also to the rights of 
peoples and the protection and preservation of their cultures.65
The influence of international norms in fostering this appreciation has been of 
paramount importance. International law has always been a source of domestic law, 
although in Australia it does not automatically form part of the domestic law.66
In keeping with the thesis that courts draw upon values that are intrinsic to the 
common law, Finn argued that, to some degree, the use of international and 
comparative materials by the courts has been strategic and selective.67 International
Our evolving concept of the democratic process is moving beyond an exclusive 
emphasis on parliamentary supremacy and majority will. It embraces a notion of 
responsible government which respects the fundamental rights and dignity of the 
individual and calls for the observance of procedural fairness in matters affecting the 
individual. The proper function of the courts is to protect and safeguard this vision of 
the democratic process.
The protection of due process and of individual liberty take prominence in Mason’s argument and 
have been the areas where the courts have been most comfortable in asserting their role as protector, 
particularly where related directly to the integrity of judicial process. On this, see Neier, op. cit., 
particularly chapters 2 and 15, ‘Thoughts on legitimacy’ and ‘Further thoughts on legitimacy’ 
respectively. Compare Eugene Hickock and Gary L. McDowell, Justice vs Law, Free Press, New 
York, 1993.
64 See discussion at pp. 61-6 above.
65 Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 149 CLR 70 at p. 104.
66 The doctrine of discovery is an obvious, though disreputable, example. See pp. 145-52 above. For 
the traditional formulation of the principle of incorporation, see Koowarta v Bjelke Petersen (1983) 
153 CLR 168, pp. 224-5, per Mason J. International law, even when not implemented, provides 
‘materials from which judges can formulate or reformulate common law rules’. See Mason, Defining 
the framework..., op. cit., p. 31. See also Michael Kirby, ‘Domestic application of international 
human rights standards’, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 59, 1988, p. 187.
67 Finn, Of power and the people, op. cit., p. 266.
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law, then, provides support for the values of the common law. To this end Michael 
Kirby argued:
It is usually where the issue for determination is uncertain that a judge 
will seek guidance of international legal material. Such uncertainty may 
arise where an established doctrine of the common law, by the passage of 
time, becomes inappropriate to the responsibilities and demands of 
modern society. Such was the case in Mabo.68
Kirby J argued that the decision Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] was the culmination of 
a 'new found legitimacy’ for international law as a source of law.69 Justice Brennan 
stated, in Mabo that:
The common law does not necessarily conform with international law, 
but international law is a legitimate and important influence on the 
development of the common law, especially when international law 
declares the existence of universal human rights.70
This approach has been followed in later decisions.71 These cases have demonstrated 
that the use of international law is not necessarily limited to those instances where 
universal human rights are declared, but may be influenced by ‘legal authority,
68 Kirby, In defence of Mabo, op. cit., p. 19. See also Michael Kirby, ‘The Australian use of 
international human rights norms: From Bangalore to Balliol -  a view from the Antipodes’, UNSW 
Law Journal, vol. 16(2), 1993, p. 274. See also Michael Kirby, ‘The impact of international human 
rights norms: A law undergoing evolution’, Western Australian Law Review, vol. 25(1), 1995, pp. 33- 
4.
69 Kirby, In defence of Mabo, op. cit., p. 19, noted that Justice Murphy recognised international law 
much earlier, noting, in particular Mclnnes v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 575. Murphy’s minority 
judgement there has been affirmed in Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292. See also Koowarta 
v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168. Compare Thorpe v The Commonwealth [No. 3] (1997) 71 
ALJR 767, at p. 779, where Kirby J stated that any ‘universal jurisdiction’ of international law could 
not be exercised by the courts in a manner inconsistent with delineation of powers under the 
Constitution.
70 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 42. The right of those within the Australian 
jurisdiction to appeal to international fora for protection against human rights violations has also 
influenced the view of the High Court, in Mabo. At p. 42, Brennan J stated:
The opening up of international remedies to individuals pursuant to Australia’s 
accession to the [First] Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights brings to bear on the common law the powerful influence of the 
Covenant and the international standards it imports.
On this, see Mason, Defining the framework ..., op. cit., p. 33. Although note that cases by 
Indigenous peoples for recognition of their rights under the first optional protocol have been largely 
unsuccessful. See generally Mary Ellen Turpel, ‘Indigenous peoples’ rights of political participation 
and self-determination: Recent international legal developments and the continuing struggle for 
recognition’, Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 25, 1992, p. 602, who argued that, ‘the United 
Nations and the Human Rights Committee have been of virtually no assistance to indigenous 
struggles’.
71 See Brennan J in Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, at p. 321. See also Chu Kheng Lim v 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, at p. 38, per Brennan, Deane and 
Dawson JJ. Also note EPA v Caltex Refining Co. P/L (1993) 68 ALJR 127, per Mason CJ and 
Toohey J. A similar trend has occurred in other common law countries. See Kirby, ... A view from 
the Antipodes, op. cit., pp. 35-9.
207
policy, principle and applicable rules of international law’ . 72 Therefore common law 
rights or developments may also be influenced by the broader context of 
international debate.
Within a similar context, attention has also been given to comparative materials that 
are thought to reveal a ‘universal common law’.7' Increasingly, reference is being 
made to Canadian and United States decisions, as well as decisions of the European 
Court and Commission on Human Rights.74 Where it appears that there is universal 
acceptance of a right in other common law countries, there is pressure on the courts 
to make Australian law conform to international trends. Again, this was clearly the 
case in the Mabo decision.
Justice Kirby tied the recognition of international and comparative law to the role of
the courts and the traditional concerns of the common law process:
insofar as courts give effect at least to fundamental rights, they are 
assisting in the discharge of their governmental functions to advance the 
complex notion of democracy as it is now understood.75
In the eyes of the international community, it is recognised that modem notions of 
democracy measure the legitimacy of the government of a state not merely by its 
reflection of the will of the majority, or even the protection of individual rights, but 
by the respect shown for the rights of minorities.76
72 Kirby, In defence of Mabo, op. cit., p. 20. The High Court has reaffirmed its practice of having 
recourse to the provisions of international convention (whether implemented or not) in developing the 
common law: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273. For 
discussion, see Mason, Defining the framework ..., op. cit., p. 9. See generally Sir Anthony Mason, 
The internationalisation of domestic law, Centre for International and Public Law, ANU, Law and 
Policy Paper No. 4, 1996, and Kirby, A law undergoing evolution, op. cit., pp. 30-48.
73 Finn, Of power and the people, op. cit., pp. 266-7, doubted the validity of a claim to universal 
common law but acknowledges the influence of trends in other common law countries.
74 Kirby, In defence of Mabo, op. cit., p. 20. See for example Australian Capital Television v 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, at pp. 142-3, per Mason CJ, and p. 155, per Brennan J. The 
judgements in Mabo relied heavily on comparative materials for the recognition of Indigenous rights 
to land. See Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 60, per Brennan J; pp. 87-88, 
Deane and Gaudron JJ; and pp. 186-89, per Toohey J, especially reliance on Hamlet o f Baker Lake v 
Minister o f Indian Affairs and Northern Development [1985] 1 FC 518; (1979) 107 DLR (3d) 513.
75 Kirby, In defence of Mabo, op. cit., p. 43
76 ibid. See also Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Protecting human rights’, Law Institute Journal (Vic), vol. 68, 
1994, pp. 462-3.
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The development of human rights has made reliance on discriminatory precedents 
even more contentious, further undermining adherence to traditional formalism. 77 
The common law recognition and protection of rights has fuelled public debate 
concerning the extent of the courts’ law-making role. However, as Finn argued, 
recent developments do not necessarily represent a departure from the roots of the 
common law but perhaps the present ‘ideology’ of the common law has been more 
clearly revealed. 78 As a result of the greater honesty in judicial decision-making the 
courts may be more open to the principled claims of Indigenous peoples for self- 
determination. Equally, where these claims present a challenge to existing doctrine, 
recognised common law principles can be used to justify a departure from precedent 
and serve as the foundation for future development of the common law.
Familiar foundations for reasoning
It can now be said that judges do make law, and in doing so, they have regard to 
certain principles and values to guide the development of the common law. 
Responding to injustices that persist in ‘the life and government of the community’ 
has required greater specification of these principles in recent times.79 Protecting 
people against the arbitrary exercise of power by the state has come to define the role 
of the judiciary in promoting democratic government. This ‘evolving concept of a 
modem democracy’ encompasses a new notion of responsible government that goes 
beyond mere majoritarian government to respect fundamental rights.80
77 Mason, Defining the framework ..., op. cit., p. 1, and Future directions ..., op. cit., p. 159.
78 Finn, A sovereign people, op. cit., p. 6, linked recent trends in reformulating the common law to 
the patriation of the common law since the demise of the line of appeal to the Privy Council. See also 
Finn, Of power and the people, op. cit., p. 272.
79 Mason, Defining the framework ..., op. cit., p. 1.
80 Mason, Future directions ..., op. cit., p. 163. See also Toohey, op. cit., pp. 172, 174, and Ely, op. 
cit., p. 87 (for a full discussion, see pp. 73-105). This emphasis can be seen in Australian Capital 
Television v Commonwealth [No. 2] (1992) 177 CLR 106. See also Nationwide News P/L v Wills 
(1992) 177 CLR 1 and Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994)182 CLR 104. The 
relationship between the citizen and the state was also at issue in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273. See Sir Anthony Mason, The role of the judge at the 
turn o f the century, Fifth Annual AIJA Oration in Judicial Administration, 5 November 1993. On 
relationships between citizens, particularly in relationships of unequal power, see Finn, A sovereign 
people ..., op. cit., pp. 7-8, and Finn, Of power and the people, op. cit., p. 257. Neier, op. cit., p. 24,
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An understanding of the array of principles from which the courts will take
reference, and their source, gives an indication of the types of argument that can be
utilised in self-determination claims. Justice Kirby, while reflecting on the impact of
international norms on the development of the common law, commented that:
As we enter a new millennium where there will be increasing 
international law of every kind, it is part of the genius of our legal system 
that our courts have found a way to take cognisance of international 
human rights jurisprudence in appropriate circumstances and by 
appropriate and familiar techniques of reasoning. 81
These comments highlight an important element in asserting self-determination cases 
through the courts. That is, providing the courts with a familiar basis of reasoning, 
grounded in the traditions of the common law is imperative to achieving significant 
reform. Understanding the scope within which the courts can operate may provide 
useful clues as to how claims should be argued. The identification of fundamental 
principles does not mean that the foundation of current doctrines should be ignored. 
Nor does it mean that change requires a slow progression of development within 
existing doctrines. While assumptions of superiority and inconsistencies are 
necessarily highlighted, the doctrines provide the point of departure for the 
identification of principles.
Principles will be derived from precedent, however selectively that process may 
evolve. For, as Finn argued, the courts enter into an historical survey to discern 
principles or values intrinsic to the common law, rooted in the community and 
confirmed by ‘deep seated beliefs’ and fundamental human rights.82 Support is also 
drawn from comparative law and the ‘expectations of the international community’ .83 
In this way, doctrines play a role in the process of association or analogous reasoning
argued that without a way to deal with the interests of minorities that are effectively excluded from 
the political process by prejudice, the government cannot claim the consent of the governed.
81 Kirby, A law undergoing evolution, op. cit., p. 44. (typographical error corrected)
82 Finn, Of power and the people, op. cit., p. 268.
83 ibid., p. 269, referring to a phrase used by Brennan J in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 
CLR 1, at p. 42. Finally, these foreign conclusions are screened by reference to perceived domestic 
considerations. This process was identified by Finn in numerous cases including Mabo v Queensland 
[No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1; Environmental Protection Agency v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 68 
ALJR 127; Sec ’y, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion’s Case) 
(1992) 174 CLR 218; and R vL  (1991) 103 ALR 577.
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upon which the courts rely in making decisions. In this type of reasoning argument 
must proceed from:
ethical principles or conclusions it is felt the reader is likely already to 
accept to other conclusions or principles he or she might not previously 
have perceived as related in the way the writer suggests . . . [T]he 
inference proceeds, as it must, from one “ought” to another.84
Weither suggested that ‘[t]he trick here involves getting the courts . . .  to interpret 
self-determination issues in a manner favourable to aboriginal people’ .85 In this 
context, the ‘moments’ of recognition and respect in existing cases, particularly in 
Mabo ’s case, illustrate that it is within the power of the courts to make the changes 
that are being sought. With argument based on principles considered fundamental to 
the Australian common law, doctrinal barriers can be overcome by concepts with 
which the courts are familiar.
II. Equality as a fundamental principle of the common law
I have used the term ‘self-determination claims’ to encompass a broad array of 
claims by Indigenous peoples against the state. These claims are made collectively 
and are founded in the identity of, and status of, Indigenous peoples. Indigenous 
peoples make claims against the state for the recognition, protection and promotion 
of rights that inhere in them as Indigenous peoples. Self-determination is not 
necessarily asserted as a specific right because self-determination is better 
understood as the process of asserting rights as peoples. In their most particular form 
they include claims to their traditional lands, waterways, claims to carry on 
customary practices, and claims to regulate those lands, waterways and practices. In
84 Ely, op. cit., p. 54.
85 Weither, op. cit., p. 51.
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addition claims are made for the right to retain the laws and institutions of their 
peoples and to control the nature and extent of interaction with others outside. 
Therefore, the principle of self-determination provides a foundation upon which 
more particular claims are asserted.
An acceptance of Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination would provide a 
principle upon which the courts could rely to determine specific claims. However, 
the principle of self-determination is not currently understood by the courts as a 
principle or value upon which they base their decisions. This is not to say that it will 
never be recognised as such. Self-determination, while controversial, is a recognised 
principle in international law and is a recognised right of all peoples .86 Increasingly, 
the language of self-determination and the acceptance of legitimate Indigenous 
authority over lands and cultural issues have become more commonplace in political 
and public debate, though it is still vehemently contested by some .87
In contrast to self-determination, the place of equality within the central tenets o f the
common law tradition is indisputable. Justice Gaudron observed that:
There is . . . one principle that is never questioned and never debated.
I’ve sometimes heard that the principle was not applied. I’ve heard it 
said that it was not understood. But I’ve never heard it suggested that it 
was not a firm principle of the law . . .  I speak, of course, of the principle 
that all are equal before and under the law, the principle of equality .88
In Leeth ’s case Justices Deane and Toohey argued that at the heart of the obligation
to act judicially (itself the essence of the judicial process) was the ‘duty to extend
equal justice’, to treat those before the court fairly and impartially and ‘to refrain
from discrimination on irrelevant or irrational grounds’ .89 In that decision Deane and
Toohey JJ emphasised the primacy of equality in the distribution of justice:
The essential or underlying theoretical equality of all persons under the 
law and before the courts is and has been a fundamental and generally
86 See pp. 57-8 above.
87 For discussion, see Dodson, Self-determination versus assimilation, op. cit., and Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commission, Fourth Report, AGPS, Canberra, 1996.
88 Justice Mary Gaudron, ‘Equality before the law with particular reference to Aborigines’, Judicial 
Review, vol. 1(2), 1993, p. 81.
89 Leeth v the Commonwealth [1991-2] 174 CLR 455, at p. 487. See also Kruger v The 
Commonwealth 146 CLR 126, per Gaudron J.
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beneficial doctrine of the common law and a basic prescript of the 
administration of justice under our system of government.90
The difficulty, Gaudron J suggested, is that despite the apparent simplicity of the 
notion, until relatively recently, ‘neither our law nor our legal theory seriously 
concerned itself with any analysis if what was meant by “equality”’.91 As a result, 
the law has at times talked of equality in a universal sense, where everyone is subject 
to the same law, regardless of ‘rank or condition’.92 But this interpretation was never 
firmly established in the law.93 Deane and Toohey JJ noted that the doctrine is a 
beneficial one, that is, it should not be construed so as to disadvantage a person or
94group.
Although the application of law may have focused on formal equality, as we
understand it now, this was more a result of failing to understand what constitutes a
relevant difference to be taken into account. Justice Gaudron examined the nature of
the inquiry into equality before the law:
Although, modem legal theory turns out to be very ancient doctrine, its 
modem application poses particular challenges . . .  It requires each of us 
to analyse what it is we are doing and for what reason. Only when that is 
done can we be sure whether we are or are not proceeding on the basis of 
a distinction. If we are, we must ask whether it is a relevant distinction 
and if so, what consequences properly attend it; if we are not, we must 
ask whether the failure to distinguish is not itself, the cause of injustice, 
either because it continues the effects of past discrimination or because it 
compounds underlying inequality.95
These themes were picked up in the 1994 Australian Law Reform Commission 
Report on Equality Before the Law.96 The report discusses the harm caused by 
blanket application of a formal equality approach because it assumes that equal
90 Leeth v the Commonwealth [1991-2] 174 CLR 455, at p. 486. The primacy of the concept is not 
always stated as it is often taken for granted. See Mason CJ in Leeth, at pp. 470-1.
91 Gaudron, op. cit., p. 83.
92 This was Dicey’s formulation of equality as an aspect of the rule of law. See A. V. Dicey, 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th edn, McMillan, London, 1920, pp. 198-9.
93 As the law of equity and even of contract show. See Detmold, Seminar, op. cit.
94 Leeth v the Commonwealth [1991-2] 174 CLR 455, at p. 486.
95 Gaudron, op. cit., p. 88.
96 Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality Before the Law: Justice for Women, ALRC Report 
No. 69, ALRC, Sydney, 1994. Chapter 3, titled ‘Understanding equality’ specifically concerns the 
different models of equality. The report outlines the ‘contemporary approaches’ to equality as (1) the 
formal equality approach; (2) the differences approach; and (3) the subordination/domination 
approach.
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treatment will achieve equality without regard to the standard against which 
treatment is measured. Moreover, formal equality cannot accommodate the many 
experiences for which there is no comparison in that dominant standard. Nor can 
formal equality identify institutionalised discrimination and disadvantage.97 Instead, 
the report advocates an approach that looks at how the law operates to maintain the 
relations of subordination and domination in society.98
The idea that where relevant differences exist, there should be different treatment has 
become entrenched in the common law in more recent times.99 The principle of 
equality rejects uniformity. Instead, ‘it proceeds on the basis that artificial and 
irrelevant distinctions must be put aside, but that genuine and relevant distinctions 
must be brought to account’ . 100 This conception of difference has led to a greater 
understanding of equality, clarifying what constitutes relevant distinctions. 101
A conception of equality that respects Indigenous difference through recognition of 
the equality of peoples provides a foundation for self-determination in fundamental 
notions of justice. 102 Different treatment can be understood as ‘a recognition of 
disadvantage, or culture, or language, or age, or gender, or other distinctive 
circumstance’ . 103 To treat people in relatively different positions equally is therefore 
as arbitrary as treating those in relatively equal positions differently. 104
97 ibid., para. 3.8-3.9.
98 ibid., para. 3.13.
99 See for example, Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 160; Leeth v the Commonwealth [1991-2] 174 
CLR 455 and Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1.
100 Gaudron, op. cit., p. 88. Gaudron suggested that this is really nothing new, it merely reflects the 
duty to act judicially which has always required that proper weight be given to relevant factors. 
Indeed, Gaudron, p. 88, argued, ‘it is the duty to act judicially which is the cornerstone of equality 
before and under the law’. This approach echoed comments by Deane and Toohey JJ in Dietrich v 
The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, at p. 486.
101 See Australian Law Reform Commission, The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law, ALRC 
Report No. 31, AGPS, Canberra, p. 117.
102 Equality as a fundamental principle of justice has much deeper roots than the common law. For 
Aristotle, ‘... if the people involved are not equal they will not justly receive equal shares; indeed 
whenever equals receive unequal shares or unequals equal shares in a distribution, that is the source 
of quarrels and accusations.’ Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, translated by H. G. Apostle, 
Synthese Historical Library, vol. 13, 1975. On the concept o f distributive justice in liberal 
philosophy, see Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence o f Pluralism and Equality, Basic 
Books, New York, 1983. For a critical perspective, see Martha Nussbaum, ‘Aristotle, Feminism and 
needs for functioning’, Texas Law Review, vol. 70, March 1992, pp. 1019-28.
103 Robert Jansen, Arguing from first principles for separate Aboriginal Legal Services, unpublished 
manuscript, February 1997, p. 1.
104 Geoffrey Walker, The Rule of Law, Melbourne University Press, Collingwood, 1988, p. 26.
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The principle of equality proscribes ‘illegitimate* differentiation and some will argue 
that differentiation on the basis of race is never a legitimate basis for the distribution 
o f rights. However, ‘race’ is not the basis upon which Indigenous peoples claim 
rights. Indeed ‘race’ is a negative term that seeks to draw distinctions between 
peoples on the basis of cultural or biological characteristics. For Indigenous peoples, 
it was ‘racism’ that led to the denial of the rights o f peoples to respect for their 
sovereignty and independence. 105 The claims of Indigenous peoples demand equality 
o f respect as peoples not different treatment based on biology, culture or ‘race’. In 
the broadest terms, all peoples should be shown equal respect and should therefore 
be treated equally unless there are valid reasons for differential treatment. 106
As with any Western legal concept, there is a danger of individualising the concept 
o f equality. Indeed moving away from the individual as sole possessor of rights may 
well require a convincing argument. However, self-determination claims are 
collective claims. Macklem argued that while equal treatment of individuals may be 
appropriate for the distribution of political rights within a particular collective, it is 
an inappropriate basis upon which to assess the justice of distributions among 
collectives particularly in the distribution of sovereignty and government. 107 It is the 
equal treatment of Indigenous peoples as a collective and as peoples that provides the 
justification of self-determination claims.
Indigenous peoples can appeal to the legal concept of equality in two ways, keeping 
in mind the inquiry set out by Gaudron J in Leeth’s case. First, formal equality 
requires that irrelevant distinctions cannot be relied upon to deny Indigenous
105 In particular, scientific racism. See generally, Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 175-80. See also Will 
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Rights, Clarendon, New York, 
1995, pp. 59-60.
106 See Warwick McKean, Equality and Discrimination Under International Law, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1993, p. 288. Michael Dodson, Discrimination, special measures and the right to 
negotiate, paper presented to the HRC/AIATSIS Racism Conference, 21 February 1997, pp. 5-6, and 
Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., pp. 1356-7. See also Western Australia v Commonwealth 
(1995) 183 CLR 373, at pp. 483-4. Contrast Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 59 ALJR 311.
107 Contrast Kymlicka, op. cit., p. 107, who justified self-government on the basis o f individual 
freedom (culture as freeing choice rather than restricting). Kymlicka, p. 113, viewed the ‘unequal’ 
distribution o f political rights within the polity as justified on the basis o f the importance o f cultural 
ties. Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., p. 1355, suggested that the problem with this 
approach is that it includes Indigenous peoples in the very political structure they wish to be separate 
from.
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peoples’ claims and that relevant distinctions should be taken into account. 
Secondly, substantive equality justifies weight being given to improving the 
circumstances of the disadvantaged. It has been argued that in the past Indigenous 
peoples’ difference has been taken into consideration in exactly the opposite manner 
to that required by the principle of equality. 108 Substantive equality would justify 
many self-determination claims, particularly given this historical treatment. 109 In 
this way, equality takes into account differences of power in relationships and 
recognises that aspects of Indigenous society may require protection from the 
dominant state. Similarly, Michael Dodson argued that ‘inherent, unique 
characteristics which impact on a groups enjoyment of human rights must be 
adequately accommodated in order for that group not to be discriminated against’ . 110
More simply though, Indigenous peoples should not be arbitrarily distinguished from 
other peoples, for example in the recognition of laws, institutions, culture, language, 
or religion. * 111 Upon closer examination the real objection to Indigenous peoples’ 
self-determination claims appears not to be that they require distinct systems of 
government and legal systems. We live in a society accepting myriad different 
governance structures, all of which, it is generally accepted, respect the rights and 
freedoms of the individual. 112 Rather, the objection is directed to the recognition of 
Indigenous authority. There is an unjustifiable skepticism in non-Indigenous people
108 Macklem, First Nations, op. cit., p. 392, suggested that Indigenous difference has been ‘denied 
where its embrace would render problematic the current ways o f knowing’ and embraced where its 
denial would achieve the same.
109 Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., pp. 1356, 1360-1.
110 Dodson, Discrimination, special measures ..., op. cit., p. 6 (original emphasis), see also p. 5. See 
also McKean, op. cit., p. 288; and Macklem, p. 1362. See also ALRC, Report 31, op. cit., p. 117. In 
contrast, Kymlicka, op. cit., p. 109, argued that substantive justice measures are warranted to ensure 
individuals and minorities are free from disadvantage. See also Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is equality? 
Part II: Equality o f resources’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 10(4), pp. 283-345; and John 
Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, Oxford University Press, New York, 1971, p. 96. Webber, op. cit., pp. 
151-2, argued that:
Our [non-Indigenous] standard of equality has to be sufficiently supple that it can take 
into account the fact that the justice system already treats Aboriginal people differently.
It treats them worse. In order to treat them equally we have to recognize their 
difference
111 Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., pp. 1356-7, formal equality also justifies an 
examination of past injustices, where the application o f standards, for the recognition of laws and 
government for example, have taken difference into account in some instances and ignored difference 
in others.
112 Webber, op. cit., pp. 141-2.
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that safeguards for the rights of individuals do not exist in Indigenous decision­
making structures.113 This may be due in part to the collective nature of the claims. 
There are important issues that need to be considered arising from genuine concerns 
of this kind.114 However, these concerns are rarely raised as a wholesale rejection of 
Indigenous institutions. Indigenous cultures and laws are not static and, as Lois 
O’Donoghue conceded:
Some traditional practices of two hundred years ago are no more 
appropriate to the Aboriginal communities today than would some of the 
practices of the criminal law of Britain two hundred years ago in that 
country today.115
The inclusion of cultural considerations in the design of institutions does not, of 
necessity, put individual rights at risk. Indeed, Webber has lamented that the cultural 
choices in our own law seem to have faded from our view and we have learnt to 
think that they are culturally neutral.116
Indigenous peoples have been recognised as peoples within the common law in 
Mabo’s case.ul Therefore, when equality is understood in a way that respects 
Indigenous difference, acknowledges historical disadvantage and recognises the 
equality of peoples, then equality is not in opposition to self-determination. This 
approach is supported by the decision in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2]. There, the 
High Court founded the recognition of native title, a collective right, and the 
recognition of Indigenous land law on the concepts of ‘justice and human rights 
(especially equality before the law)’.118 This was not an attempt to treat Indigenous
113 See, for example, Frank Brennan, ‘Self-determination: The limits of allowing Aboriginal 
communities to be a law unto themselves’, University of New South Wales Law Review, vol. 16(1), 
1993, p. 245; and Kymlicka, op. cit., pp. 152-72, on ‘illiberal minorities’.
114 Particular concerns have been expressed by some Indigenous women. See Deborah Bird Rose, 
‘Land rights and deep colonising: The erasure of women’, Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 3(85) 1996. 
For a North American perspective, see Thomas Isaac and Mary Sue Maloughney, ‘Dually 
disadvantaged and historically forgotten?: Aboriginal women and the inherent right o f Aboriginal 
self-government’, Manitoba Law Journal, vol. 21, 1992, pp. 453-75.
115 Lois O’Donoghue, ‘Customary law as a vehicle for community empowerment’, Proceedings of 
the Indigenous Customary Law Forum, Parliament House Canberra, 18 October 1995, AGPS, 
Canberra, 1996, p. 60. See also Williams, ...Myopia, op. cit., in relation to the imposition o f the 
Indian Civil Rights Act in the United States.
116 Webber, op. cit., p. 143. See also Kymlicka, op. cit., pp. 69, 107.
117 The determination in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, was directed to the Meriam 
people. More specifically, claims were accepted from the Wik peoples and the Thayorre people in 
the Wik case. See Wik Peoples and the Thayorre People v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 1.
118 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 30, per Brennan J, also p. 58.
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peoples the same but to show equal respect for their rights as peoples and equal 
respect for their way of life.
Mabo’s case also affirmed that where decisions are fundamentally flawed or no 
longer acceptable because of the assumptions and prejudices they encapsulate, then 
they should be rejected. The principle of equality was reiterated in the context of the 
common law commitment to non-discrimination. Justice Brennan stated this 
principle of common law development in relation to the rights and interests of 
Indigenous peoples:
it is imperative in today’s world that the common law should neither be 
nor be seen to be frozen in an age of racial discrimination.
The fiction by which the rights and interest of Indigenous inhabitants in 
land were treated as non-existent was justified by a policy which has no 
place in the contemporary law of this country . . . Whatever the 
justification advanced in earlier days for refusing to recognise the 
interests in land of the Indigenous inhabitants of settled countries, an 
unjust and discriminatory doctrine of that kind can no longer be 
accepted.119
Giving primacy to the principle of equality, Brennan J stated that ‘no case can 
command unquestioning adherence if the rule it expresses seriously offends the 
values of justice and human rights’.120 To this end, the values of non-discrimination 
and equality before the law, supported by international norms, formed the foundation 
of the decision in Mabo ’s case justifying the rejection of significant legal fictions.
This understanding of equality was reinforced in Western Australia v Commonwealth 
(The Native Title Act case).nx The High Court accepted that a law protecting 
Indigenous peoples’ unique rights over land was not merely a ‘special measure’ to 
overcome disadvantage but was not discriminatory because the distinct identity and 
status of Indigenous peoples were relevant distinguishing characteristics.122 Mabo v 
Queensland [No. 2] and other recent High Court decisions concerning rights, have
119 ibid., at pp. 41-2, per Brennan J.
120 ibid., at p. 30, per Brennan J.
121 (1995) 183 CLR373.
122 ibid., at pp. 483-4. Compare Brennan J in Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 59 ALJR 311, at p. 339, 
where it was argued that ‘special measures may be necessary to achieve equality between groups’. 
See generally, Dodson, Discrimination, special measures..., op. cit., p. 10.
218
shown a willingness to take direction of the law, to embrace non-discrimination.
Previous doctrines of terra nullius and parliamentary sovereignty had subverted the 
jurisprudential basis for Indigenous self-determination claims. However, recent 
decisions in Australia, as well as international and comparative developments, 
provide a stronger basis for self-determination founded on the principle of equality 
of peoples. The principle of equality could lead to a recognition of Indigenous 
peoples as distinct constitutional entities, embracing claims to sovereignty, self- 
determination and self-government. 123
Self-determination claims will still require a re-conceptualisation of the relations
between Indigenous peoples and the state by the courts. In part this is due to the
influence of past doctrines. 124 However, the decision in Mabo’s case showed that
these claims are not on completely unfamiliar ground. Justice Gaudron stated that:
The modem application of the doctrine of equality, particularly in 
relation to Aborigines, demands that we confront our preconceptions and 
our prejudices; it demands that we know ourselves. It is a formidable 
task, but one that inevitably attends judicial office in a society which 
tolerates social, economic or cultural inequality. 125
The fact that racist foundations of current doctrines can be challenged before a court, 
with a degree of success, indicates the usefulness of the courts and the common law 
within the self-determination strategy of Indigenous peoples. Mabo ’s case showed 
that if the unjust and discriminatory nature of the law is argued before the courts, 
change can be achieved and self-determination goals realised. The primary reason 
for this success is the familiar principle of equality upon which the courts can base 
their reasoning.
123 Frank Brennan, ‘The Indigenous people’, in Finn, Essays on Law and Government, op. cit., p. 33.
124 See Mason, Future directions ..., op. cit., p. 150: ‘Unfortunately precedent is sometimes 
transformed from legal doctrine into an attitude of mind’.
125 Gaudron, op. cit., pp. 88-9.
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III. The difficulty of arguing sovereignty in the courts
In order to put forward a convincing argument for equality as the foundation for 
arguing self-determination claims before the courts, I must explain why I have not 
pursued the alternative approach, which places sovereignty at the centre of the 
argument. Indeed, it may require particular explanation in the context of this thesis 
where so much attention has been given to the concept of sovereignty.
I have argued that Indigenous peoples’ self-determination claims, as I have used the 
term in this thesis, range from specific claims of authority over traditional lands or 
customary practices to broader claims of jurisdiction and government. I have also 
argued that an assertion of sovereign authority, in the sense of legitimate authority, 
by a people is implicit in the process of self-determination and lies at the heart of all 
the claims made by Indigenous peoples against the state. In this sense, sovereignty is 
the source of the rights asserted although it is not one of the rights themselves. This 
reflects a similar conception of self-determination as the process of asserting rights 
as peoples rather than identifying a specific right with a certain content.
The courts have, however, refused to entertain arguments that assert sovereignty. 
This judicial reticence is illustrated in current doctrinal barriers - some that can be 
traced back to the earliest decisions on Indigenous peoples’ rights and others that 
have emerged more recently. An examination of the problematic foundations of 
current doctrines, though not intended to allocate blame or guilt, may reveal the 
underlying assumptions that inhibit the ability of the courts to accept arguments for 
sovereignty. In a damning critique of the doctrine of discovery, Robert Williams 
observed that modern common law doctrines, such as native title, are built upon 
doctrines whose ‘premises, once revealed, would shame those who cite them’ . 126
126 Williams, Algebra, op. cit., p. 299.
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Similarly, Asch and Macklem identified the inconsistencies within current doctrines 
that emerge from the assumptions or premises upon which decisions are based. 
These assumptions are not essential to the common law. They are historical 
assertions whose bases are no longer acceptable. It is essential in arguing self- 
determination claims that the racist foundations of current doctrines are clearly 
contrasted to the facts of Indigenous sovereignty.
For example, while the Mabo decision contained a stated commitment to the 
principle of equality, there is a general acceptance in the native title decisions that 
Indigenous rights are more vulnerable under the law than those of the wider polity. 
The susceptibility to extinguishment and the subordination of native title to the rights 
of holders of other forms of title, places native titleholders in a position of 
powerlessness in the face of action by governments. 127 In the same way, while 
recognising Indigenous society as the source of rights and entitlements to land, under 
the native title doctrine these laws are seen as lesser laws than those of the state. 
Indeed in cases after Mabo Mason CJ asserted that there was no source of law other 
than the Crown and sought to reaffirm the Crown as sole sovereign. 128 The assertion 
of sole sovereignty and assumed superiority of the dominant legal system have 
resulted in the inconsistencies in doctrine that were outlined in chapter four. It was 
argued there that in seeking to present a coherent doctrine of the rights of Indigenous 
peoples, the courts have entrenched inconsistencies. Significantly, the recognition of 
the inherent nature of the rights of Indigenous peoples in relation to land is 
contrasted to the rejection of inherent rights in other contexts and in relation to 
jurisdictional issues.
Sovereign rights do not depend on recognition by the state or the legal system. They 
emerge from Indigenous peoples’ own authority. For those rights to be enforceable, 
however, Indigenous peoples depend upon at least judicial cognisance. This should
127 Comparative jurisprudence rests on the same assumptions of superiority and hierarchy. See 
chapter four, above.
128 See discussion of Isabel Coe v The Commonwealth (1993) 118 ALR 193 and Walker v NSW 
(1994) 126 ALR 321, p. 181 -5 above.
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not be confused with a contingent rights argument, which suggests that the only 
rights that exist are those recognised by the state. Instead, the extent of recognition 
is a measure of the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state. In this 
way it has been argued that doctrines such as native title provide a ‘recognition 
space’ between Indigenous sovereignty and the sovereignty of the state. 129 This 
understanding provides an interesting context in which to consider the meaning of 
extinguishment, and current debates concerning the ‘revival’ of native title. 130 The 
two sovereign spheres are seen as running parallel and the extent of mutual 
recognition and interaction will be changeable.
In the Mabo decision the High Court purported to embrace the inherent nature of 
Indigenous peoples’ title to their land. The judgements asserted the source of the 
title in the Indigenous community and acknowledged that the title predated 
colonisation. Moreover, it was accepted that the title was not contingent upon 
recognition by the colonial system of law or government. Indigenous peoples’ rights 
to country were recognised to inhere in the Indigenous peoples themselves. Yet, as 
many commentators have argued, the courts continue to deny one of the most 
fundamental implications of an inherent theory of rights and that is the recognition of
• i l lsovereignty.
To accept that titles to land inhere in the Indigenous community is to implicitly 
accept a number of important points. First, it is a recognition of an alternative source 
of law in the Indigenous community. It is also a recognition of the prior sovereign 
authority of the Indigenous community. Finally, it is a recognition of the Indigenous 
community as lawmakers and law keepers. Mabo’s case recognised Indigenous
129 See Noel Pearson, ‘Concept of native title’, Proceedings of the Northern and Central Land 
Councils, Land Rights -  Past, Present and Future Conference, Canberra, 16-17 August 1996, p. 120. 
See also, Paul Patton, Aboriginal or Indigenous sovereignty, unpublished manuscript, 1997, who 
argued that a concept of sovereignty could also be conceived in this way.
130 Kirby J tried to grapple with this idea in the Wik case, in response to argument by Counsel for the 
Thayorre people. See The Wik Peoples and the Thayorre People v Queensland and the 
Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 1, per Kirby J. See also oral submissions by Sir Maurice Byers.
131 See, for example, Dodson, From Lore to Law, op. cit., and Michael Mansell, ‘The High Court 
gives an inch but takes another mile: Perspectives on Mabo, The Aboriginal Provisional Government 
perspective’, Aboriginal Law Bulletin, vol. 2(57), 1992.
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peoples as a source of law, distinct from, and indeed prior to, the state. The 
recognition of native title is a recognition of a ‘discrete and underived’ sphere of 
authority in the Indigenous peoples.132 Taken together, the implicit 
acknowledgments that are made in accepting that the rights are inherent, embraces 
the Indigenous community as peoples. A pre-existing sovereignty that has survived 
and continues to exist is an inescapable conclusion from these acknowledgments. 
This sovereignty describes the sphere within which Indigenous peoples assert their 
right to be self-determining.
There is a long history, predating Mabo, of implicit recognition of the continued 
sovereignty of Indigenous peoples. Indigenous law and jurisdiction have been 
recognised by the courts in the recognition of customary law.133 The sovereignty of 
Indigenous peoples has also been recognised by governments through land rights 
legislation, the establishment of land councils and a statutory authority committed to 
self-management -  the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission. Patrick 
Macklem has argued that this sort of delegated authority is a recognition of the 
remnant authority that Indigenous peoples continue to exercise. The response of the 
courts to claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction is therefore inconsistent with 
political realities.
There have been two cases since Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] that have sought to 
extend the recognition of Indigenous sovereignty. The first, Isabel Coe v The 
Commonwealth was a claim for sovereignty on behalf of the Wiradjuri nation.134 
The second, Walker v NSW, was a claim against the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of 
the New South Wales Parliament.135 Both were spectacular failures, struck out on 
their pleadings. However, the Isabel Coe and Walker decisions have not closed the 
issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction. An examination of the claims and the
132 Frank Brennan, The Indigenous people, op. cit., p. 38.
133 See discussion at pp. 180-1 above.
134 Isabel Coe on behalf o f the Wiradjuri People v The Commonwealth (1994) 118 ALR 193.
135 Walker v the State o f New South Wales (1994) 126 ALR 321.
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judgements of Mason CJ (who decided both cases) revesil the balance involved in the 
successful assertion of self-determination claims.
The statement of claim in the Isabel Coe case sought a declaration of the sovereignty 
of the Wiradjuri nation.136 This posed two problems for the courts, in accordance 
with the methodology set out here. First, there is little precedent to support a claim 
of sovereignty, apart from the United States domestic dependent nation doctrine, and 
this status was distinguished in the statement of claim.137 Second, the claim did not 
provide the court with a familiar basis from which to reason. A successful claim 
must build upon recognition in current doctrines, leading the court from the familiar 
to accept claims that extend to self-government. The statement of claim in Isabel 
Coe asserted a series of absolutes: that the Wiradjuri people are a sovereign nation, 
and if not then they are a domestic dependent nation and if not they are self- 
governing and if not the are native title holders. The direct challenge to the 
sovereignty of the state was a significant hurdle for Chief Justice Mason.
Similarly, in Walker the statement of claim challenged the legitimacy of the state by 
questioning the legislative power of the state. While Mason CJ expressed explicit 
deference to the value of equality before the law in Walker, the Chief Justice fell into 
the danger identified by Justice Gaudron of not paying sufficient regard to the 
meaning of equality.138 What the judgement in Walker highlighted was not equality 
before the law but equal citizenship and the universality of the laws of the state. 
Moreover, Mason CJ gave no serious regard to the issues of self-determination that 
were raised by the claim.
The form of the claims allowed Chief Justice Mason to make a determination based, 
ironically, upon an error that the judge himself had identified in 1987, that is:
[transforming precedent] from a legal doctrine into an attitude of mind,
so that the search for an answer to a legal question begins and ends with
136 See Statement of Claim, para. 6.
137 See Statement of Claim, para. 7.
138 (1994) 126 ALR321 at p. 323.
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the quotation of a Delphic utterance by another judge on another 
occasion directed to another question. 139
This error is manifest in the decision of Mason CJ in llsabel Coe and reiterated in
Walker. In Isabel Coe Mason CJ referred to Gibbs J in the Paul Coe case that:
to suggest either that the legal foundation of the Commonwealth is 
insecure, or that the powers of the Parliament are: more limited than is 
provided for in the Constitution, or that there is an Aboriginal nation 
which has sovereignty over Australia, it cannot be supported. 0
Gibbs J went on to characterise Indigenous peoples as without recognisable 
institutions and as without any rights except those granted by the Crown. Chief 
Justice Mason’s reliance on this passage was a disappointing aspect of the Isabel Coe 
decision. The proposition that the Mabo decision was ‘entirely at odds with the 
notion that sovereignty . . . resides in the Indigenous peoples of Australia’ incorrectly 
draws a link from the non-justiciable issue of international statehood to determine 
that sovereignty, in the sense of the internal distributions of power and authority 
within the state, did not include Indigenous peoples. 141
The distinction between the Isabel Coe claim and the suggested basis for argument 
here may not be apparent from the outset. However, I have suggested claims may be 
more successful, if while based on Indigenous sovereign authority, they did not 
necessarily assert a claim for sovereignty itself. It would have been less 
confrontational to move from the claim that the Wiradjuri people are traditional 
owners of their lands and therefore native titleholders. 42 Native title is based on 
recognition of the equality of peoples. Indigenous forms of title and law are 
deserving of equal respect in relation to the colonial law. As such, they are self- 
governing at least to the extent of their traditional land laws. The same arguments 
that support the recognition of Indigenous land law support the recognition o f all 
Indigenous law and warrant a recognition of broader rights of self-government. This
139 Mason, Future directions ..., op. cit., p. 150.
140 (1993) 118 ALR 193 at p. 199, citing Coe v Commonwealth (1979) 53 ALJR 403, at p. 408; 24 
ALR 118, at p. 128.
141 Isabel Coe v Cth (1994) 118 ALR 193, at p. 200.
142 I acknowledge that it may well have been the plaintiffs intention to be confrontational.
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is a recognition of a sphere of inherent sovereignty. The distinction is subtle, but it 
may be an important distinction for the successful assertion of self-government 
claims.
A recent decision of Justice Kirby of the High Court was criticised as ‘another failed
sovereignty claim’.143 The claim, which sought a declaration of fiduciary duty and
the instigation of international proceedings was, like Walker and Isabel Coe, struck
out on its pleadings.144 Kirby J stated that to the extent that the plaintiff, Mr Thorpe,
raised similar questions of sovereignty adverse to the Crown, the case would
‘obviously encounter the same difficulties’.145 Rather than wholeheartedly endorse
Chief Justice Mason’s conclusions in the earlier cases, Kirby J reaffirmed the role of
the courts in providing a forum for Indigenous peoples claims against the state.
Kirby J acknowledged that the courts must give serious consideration to such claims
as they come before them and remain mindful that:
as the decisions of this Court in Mabo [No.2] and Wik Peoples v 
Queensland demonstrate, sometimes Australian law (including as it 
affects Aboriginal Australians) is not precisely what might have been 
expected or predicted. Australian law at this time is in the process of a 
measure of readjustment, arising out of the appreciation, both by the 
parliaments and the courts of this country, of injustices which statute and 
common law earlier occasioned to Australia’s indigenous peoples.146
Kirby J reaffirmed earlier statements that it was neither ‘just or reasonable’ to close 
the door in the face of claims, which may, in time, contribute to this readjustment. 
Instead, such claims, whether they succeed or fail, should be heard in full.147
Success through the common law still requires an argument that will overcome the
143 Thorpe v The Commonwealth [No. 3] (1997) 71 ALJR 767. See Martin Flynn and Sue Stanton, 
‘Another failed sovereignty claim: Thorpe v Commonwealth [No. 3] (1997) 71 ALJR 767 
(Casenote)’, Indigenous Law Bulletin, vol. 4(7), 1997, pp. 19-20.
144 Thorpe v The Commonwealth [No. 3] (1997) 71 ALJR 767, at p. 779. Kirby J found that the 
pleadings failed to raise a ‘matter’ on which the court could exercise its judicial powers. It was 
stressed that the mere involvement of a political or controversial issue did not necessarily mean the 
court lacked jurisdiction. See Gerhardy v Brown (1983) 159 CLR 70, at p. 139 or Melbourne 
Corporation v The Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31, at p. 82. However, in the issues raised by the 
pleadings, Kirby J felt that they sought an advisory opinion on a theoretical issue and were not 
sufficiently grounded in an ‘immediate right, duty or liability’ amenable to judicial determination.
145 ibid., p. 5.
146 ibid., p. 8.
147 ibid. Kirby J reaffirmed statements made in Williams v Minister for Aboriginal Land Rights Act 
1983 (1994) 35 NSWLR 497, at p. 515.
226
doctrinal barriers to the recognition of self-determination claims. To challenge the 
doctrines and their racist foundations is to challenge the very assertions upon which 
state power is based. That is, the assertion of sole sovereignty, the assertion of 
exclusive jurisdiction over lands and peoples and the assertion of the universality of 
uniform legal and political institutions. The unquestioning acceptance of the Crown 
or the state as the sole repository of sovereignty has led to the denial of rights and 
undermining of Indigenous self-determination. This assumption is inaccurate in a 
federal system such as Australia, where powers are divided amongst many sovereign 
authorities within different spheres of autonomy. Yet it remains the most significant 
barrier to the recognition of Indigenous sovereignty, and therefore to government 
and jurisdiction rights. The continuing impact of past perceptions, prejudices and 
assumptions has much to do with the nature of legal reasoning. In many respects, 
this legitimising exercise could only be achieved by the development of legal 
fictions, such as discovery and terra nullius, which ‘border on fantasy’ . 148 Or, as 
Foster argued, by repeatedly repressing alternative arguments, so that over time they 
become ‘unsayable in legal language’ . 149
Chief Justice Mason’s approach in Isabel Coe and Walker raised significant concern 
that native title would be the extent of the recognition of Indigenous rights. It 
seemed that the High Court, having ‘prodded’ the government into consideration of 
the issues, was going to retire to a less active role in the recognition and protection of 
Indigenous rights. This concern should be understood in the context that current 
doctrines concerning Indigenous rights, here and in other common law jurisdictions, 
have emerged from established relations of power. The common law methodology
148 Weither, op. cit., p. 49. See also Williams, ...Discourses of Conquest, op. cit., and Algebra, op. 
cit., on the doctrine of discovery.
149 Foster, op. cit., pp. 383-4. Foster, p. 383, explained:
Law achieves its clarity partly by constructing an orthodoxy determined more by 
political theory than historical accuracy, an orthodoxy that masks competing views. . .
As the colonial machine grinds forward through time and space, the law tends to 
repress alternatives rejected by power, sometimes even to deny they existed. If this 
‘legitimising’ enterprise is so effective that it makes what was once a coherent and 
competing view unthinkable, then it has succeeded most admirably. And by 
succeeding, distortion ceases to distort: bad history becomes good law.’
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of stare decisis suggests that once decisions have been made they form part of the 
doctrinal history of the law. This does not, however, make them irreproachable.
IV. The relationship between sovereignty and equality
Recognition of inherent sovereignty would allow Indigenous peoples to assert 
control over the form, content and direction of their distinct collective identity, to 
have their independence respected and to be treated equally . 150 Moreover, 
understanding sovereignty as the heart of the claim to self-determination highlights 
the right to be treated on an equal basis. This does not mean that Indigenous peoples 
will be treated exactly the same as other sovereign entities - but to be treated justly, 
that is with equal respect as peoples.
While it is necessary to ground the claims of Indigenous peoples with a foundation in 
the common law, it is important to retain sight of the source of Indigenous peoples’ 
claims. Any strategy or analysis must ensure that the integrity of these claims is not 
compromised by an approach that focuses on the traditions of the courts. In the end 
the equality approach must be compatible with the principle o f self-determination. 
The principle of equality of peoples, while familiar to the courts, is also a concept in 
which Indigenous peoples’ vision of themselves is reflected.
Any society with collective rights to land is self-governing and sovereign at least to 
the extent that it formulates and enforces rules for individual relations to land and 
others . 151 Moreover, as has already been discussed, the recognition of laws and
Similarly, the courts are able to justify a particular outcome by the language they employ. See Asch 
and Bell, op. cit., p. 511.
150 Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., p. 1347.
151 Frank Brennan, The Indigenous people, op. cit., p. 35.
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institutions relating to land cannot be severed from other societal rights. Dodson 
argued that ‘the Australian legal system must take the further step of recognising that 
native title is inseparable from the culture which gives it meaning’ . 152 Indeed many 
commentators support the argument that self-government is a necessary implication 
of native title. 153
There is a growing acceptance in legal discourse of the distinct status of Indigenous 
peoples within the state, not least by the High Court. 1' 4 For this reason, Paul Finn 
suggested that the decision in Isabel Coe’s case has not stilled the issue of 
Indigenous sovereignty under the common law. 155 Recognition of self-determination 
claims can be justified on two conceptions of sovereignty; first, in determining the 
distribution of authority within the state and second, based on the prior and 
continuing sovereignty of Indigenous peoples. 156 On this latter view, Indigenous 
sovereignty is not just an incidence of the popular sovereignty of the state 
generally. 157 Rather, Indigenous peoples constitute what Canadians have referred to 
as another inherent order of government. 158 In the United States, too, it is suggested 
that popular sovereignty, or consent of the people, partly explains the recognition of 
the distinct sovereign authority of Indian Nations. 159
Recognition of both prior and continuing sovereignty can be found in the recognition 
of native title. Importantly, native title was not merely recognising rights of usage
152 Dodson, From Lore to Law, op. cit., p. 2.
153 ibid., p. 2. See also Frank Brennan, The Indigenous people, op. cit.
154 Recognition of the Meriam peoples’ rights was a beginning. While the Isabel Coe claim was 
accepted on behalf of the Wiradjuri nation, the Wik peoples’ claim was accepted without a named 
plaintiff. See also Finn, A sovereign people, op. cit.
155 Finn, Of power and the people, op. cit., p. 256. But compare Finn in the more recent paper, A 
sovereign people, op. cit., p. 5, where it is suggested that popular sovereignty confirms a sovereignty 
lost by Indigenous peoples: ‘Absent a new Constitutional settlement the indigenous peoples can only 
be regarded as participants in the collective [Australian] sovereignty’. Michael Dodson, in comments 
on an earlier draft o f this chapter, criticised this approach saying that it is ‘a myth and a nonsense to 
suggest that we are (willing) participants in a collective Australian Sovereignty.’
156 See Frank Brennan, The Indigenous people, op. cit., pp. 34-7. See generally, Macklem, 
Distributing Sovereignty, op. cit., p. 1316.
157 Compare Finn, A sovereign people, op. cit., p. 5.
158 Canada, Report o f the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996, vol. 1, p. 680, discussed 
in detail at vol. 2, pp. 163-245.
159 Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., p. 1316.
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based on prior occupation. 160 Native title recognises tlhe laws of the peoples that 
existed prior to and survived colonisation. 161 Patrick Macklem has identified the 
strength of the sovereignty claim, in that, ‘it intimates that something more than the 
use and enjoyment of land was lost and ought to be restored . 162 In this way, the prior 
relations with each other, rather than merely presence on the land, becomes the 
focus. Moreover, this focus provides a closer link between the prior position and the 
current demands. 163
While I have argued that sovereignty is inclusive of Indigenous peoples claims, the 
concept of sovereignty has to a large degree become institutionalised in the 
international law governing relations between states. Sovereignty is therefore often 
considered in the sense of the bundle of international powers that attach to 
statehood . 164 I agree with Patrick Macklem that the concept of sovereignty should 
not be equated with statehood, or with hierarchical power structures. 165 Instead, the 
terms must be re-conceptualised to accommodate new ways o f understanding 
relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. 166 For the courts it is 
important to change the focus, from sovereignty in the statehood sense, that has 
resulted in denying the authority of Indigenous peoples within the state.
The notion of a sphere of authority and autonomy is the clearest explanation of the 
nature of sovereignty . 167 However, as Macklem argued, the meaning of sovereignty
160 Compare references in Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, e.g. pp. 182-8, per Toohey 
J, at pp. 42, 52, per Brennan J. For a more comprehensive discussion of why prior occupancy is not a 
sound basis for development of the law, see Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., pp. 1328-34. 
Similarly, Jeremy Webber, op. cit., p. 134, suggested that self-government claims will not be treated 
like property claims. See also Kymlicka, op. cit., p. 123.
161 Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., p. 1333.
162 ibid., p. 1334. See also David C. Williams Jr., ‘The borders of the equal protection clause: 
Indians as peoples’, UCLA Law Review, vol. 38, 1991, p. 817.
163 Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., p. 1334.
164 For this reason, some commentators are skeptical of the use of the term at all. See Menno Boldt 
and J Anthony Long, ‘Tribal traditions and European-Western political ideologies: The dilemma of 
Canada’s Native Indians’, in Menno Boldt and J Anthony Long (eds), The Quest for Justice: 
Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights, University Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985, pp. 335-7.
165 Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., p. 1349.
166 See Webber, op. cit., p. 136. While Indigenous peoples are understandably concerned about 
recognition of their status in the form of an international personality in international fora, the courts 
are unlikely to find such issues justiciable.
167 Sovereignty is infinitely divisible, at its most particular, liberal theory accords individual rights 
that demarcate a personal sphere of authority and autonomy. Federalist structures, too, illustrate the 
distribution of sovereign power within a state.
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‘is not entirely shared across particular groups, societies, or cultures, nor does 
sovereignty’s meaning somehow inhere in the word” . 168 While there may be 
disagreement over the uses to which sovereignty should be put, there is a shared 
value or meaning in sovereignty which can be universal ly understood. That shared 
value is ‘a legal space in which a community can negotiate, construct and protect a 
collective identity’ . 169 The value that a community attaches to that space is deserving 
of respect and deserving of the same protection and facilitation as that o f the 
dominant community . 170
I argue that at the most fundamental level it was the failure of respect for the equality 
of peoples that lead to a failure to recognise Indigenous sovereignty. At the time of 
colonisation, Indigenous peoples were not treated as equal to the colonising 
peoples. 171 In Australia, a further distinction was made between the Indigenous 
peoples of this continent and those of the United States who had their sovereignty 
partly recognised, though not fully respected. 1 2 An inquiry based on equality 
demands investigation of the distinctions made between Indigenous peoples in 
Australia and both European and other peoples to determine if they were justifiable 
distinctions to make. The justification for ignoring the rights and sovereignty of 
Indigenous peoples was based on differences of culture, religion and the assumed 
superiority of the colonisers. Echoing statements by Brennan J in Mabo’s case, 
Macklem noted that while this may have ‘afforded an apology’ at the time, it cannot 
now be used as a reason for continuing to exclude Indigenous peoples from the 
distribution of sovereignty within the colonial state. 172
168 Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., p. 1346.
169 ibid., p. 1348. See also Patton, op. cit.
170 See Kymlicka, op. cit., pp. 108-113. Kymlicka argued that the separation between state and 
ethnicity is a lie. Every decision about language, boundaries, public holidays, even state uniforms 
and emblems recognise accommodate and support a particular cultural identity.
171 Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App Cas 286. See pp. 163-5 above.
172 Coe v Commonwealth (1979) 53 ALJR 403; 24 ALR 118; and R v Jack Congo Murrell (1836) 1 
Legge Rep 72.
173 Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., p. 1358, referring to Marshall CJ, in Johnson v 
M ’Intosh 21 US 260 (1823) at p. 573, see also p. 589. Compare Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 
175 CLR 1, per Brennan J., pp. 41-2.
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Recognition of sovereignty is justified by both formal and substantive equality. 174 
Despite the divergence over the content and meaning of sovereignty, its value to a 
people should be respected. 175 Formal equality requires that Indigenous peoples be 
given equal respect in the recognition of their sovereigm authority. In essence, it is 
argued that no relevant distinctions exist that justify their exclusion. 176 As 
Indigenous peoples constitute identifiable communities that have been and continue 
to be oppressed by a variety of social and economic forces, a commitment to equality 
justifies recognition of differential rights, in particular the right of self- 
government. 177 The underlying justification for all of these arguments remains the 
equality of peoples. Therefore, a commitment to equality as the basis for 
determining the relations between Indigenous peoples and the state must be firmly 
established within the common law approach to self-determination claims before 
sovereignty can be successfully asserted.
Robert Laurence criticised an approach based on equality of peoples as a ‘charming’
though perhaps unrealisitic vision. 178 Instead Laurence propounded an argument for
accepting ‘the actual state of things’. Laurence argued that it is possible to support a
doctrine the roots of which you don’t respect, for Laurence does not feel personally
‘responsible for the history’ . 179 A comment by Milner Ball highlights the
problematic nature of such an assertion, in that:
[it reveals] an incapacity for talking openly and honestly about the injury 
in our origin. Unless it is acknowledged and transcended, this original 
wrong can only be extended into the present and augmented. 180
174 Macklem, Distributing sovereignty, op. cit., p. 1345.
175 On this view, distributive justice demands that sovereignty be distributed in accordance with 
equality of peoples. See Macklem, ibid., p. 1350.
176 ibid., p. 1357.
177 ibid., p. 1361. Compare, Kymlicka, op. cit., pp. 109-113, 129, and Webber, op. cit., p. 137.
178 Robert Laurence, ‘Learning to live with the plenary power of Congress over Indian Nations: An 
essay in reaction to Professor Williams Algebra’, Arizona Law Review, vol. 30, 1988, pp. 421-2. 
Laurence’s critique gave rise to an exchange between the two commentators in which Williams cut 
down Laurence’s ‘Promethean feats’:
here, the historical materialist in me naturally bridles at the liberal progressivism of a 
viewpoint which recognises the ‘smelly and unattractive’ nature of the legal structure 
but assumes that men and women of goodwill can come out smelling like roses if they 
apply, ‘with both brains and heart’, the few cleansed principles deemed worthy of 
saving from the deracinated structure.
179 ibid., p. 437, quoting Marshall CJ in Worcester v Georgia 31 US (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
180 Milner Ball, ‘Constitution, court, Indian tribes’, American Bar Association Journal, 1987, 1 at p. 
43. Curiously, this comment was reproduced by Laurence, op. cit., p. 422.
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Robert Williams argued that, without uncontroverted acceptance of Indigenous 
peoples as equal sovereign peoples, the common law becomes, at best, a ‘sometimes 
fair weather friend’ . 181 Respect for the equality of Indigenous peoples, must provide 
the basis for common law determinations otherwise decisions will perpetuate 
assumptions of superiority and universality. 182
The importance of recognition of the full array of self-determination claims cannot
be overstated. Webber suggested that self-government and jurisdiction is about
‘restoring continuity with Aboriginal ways of talking about society’, within the
structures with which Indigenous peoples must relate. 183 The continued denial of
Indigenous peoples’ claims has devastating implications. Lois O’Donoghue
expressed concern that the continued denial of Indigenous law:
has had a detrimental effect on all facets of Aboriginal community 
development and that it has substantially contributed to many of the 
social problems and varying degrees of lawlessness present today. 184
Recognition of Indigenous rights to self-government and jurisdiction has a primary 
role in overcoming the disadvantage suffered by Indigenous peoples at the hands of 
the colonial state. Acknowledging the impact of the colonial system on Indigenous 
peoples, together with the respect for Indigenous peoples’ identity and status as 
peoples, provide the foundation for all self-determination claims.
A fundamental re-conception of relations between Indigenous peoples and the state, 
as it is construed through the law, is required. Respect for the equality of Indigenous 
peoples provides an appropriate foundation of this reformulation. 185 The principle of
181 W illiams,... Myopia, op. cit., p. 449.
182 ibid., p. 440.
183 Webber, op. cit., pp. 138, 139.
184 O’Donoghue, op. cit., p. 58, identified the importance of the Indigenous law to the social fabric of 
Indigenous societies:
The law is undoubtedly the most important means of social control which exists in any 
society. Any segment of that society which has no access to the regulation of social 
control will inevitably suffer far reaching consequences.. .
Aboriginal communities have been no exception. The loss of control experienced by 
many communities has had many far reaching non-legal consequences, including a 
high level o f social deprivation.
This social deprivation itself resulted in further breakdowns of law and order which the 
general system of law could not, and cannot, adequately deal with.
185 Frank Brennan, The Indigenous people, op. cit., p. 33.
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equality and non-discrimination direct the court from familiar concepts to the 
equality of peoples, a principle more inclusive of collective assertions premised on 
prior and continuing sovereignty.
Equality of respect for the rights of Indigenous peoples, first requires the courts to 
affirm their recognition of Indigenous authority, but explicit recognition of 
continuing sovereignty of Indigenous peoples may need to come through the 
development of the common law. The arguments presented here are aimed at 
challenging the courts to recognise Indigenous sovereignty and sovereign rights over 
time through notions of justice and equality that are familiar. These notions are both 
a sound basis from which the common law can develop and to which Indigenous 
claims can be anchored.
Conclusion
The internal distributions of power and authority within the state, including 
Indigenous self-government and jurisdiction are justiciable issues. Moreover, they 
are matters with which the common law has traditionally concerned itself. In Mabo, 
the High Court recognised Indigenous peoples’ authority by recognising the 
community as the source of law underlying native title. Further advances toward 
significant self-determination goals will require affirmation of prior and continuing 
sovereign authority based on respect for the equality of peoples.
Returning to the concept of self-determination outlined in previous chapters, I 
recalled that the prior and continuing sovereignty and rights to self-determination as 
peoples lies at the heart of Indigenous claims against the state. And yet, as was 
illustrated in chapter four, current doctrines have generally refused to entertain
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claims that assert sovereignty. The success in the Mabo case is in stark contrast to 
the decisions in Isabel Coe and Walker. However, I have argued that the principle of 
equality, and particularly the equality of peoples, provides a basis from which courts 
can come to recognise sovereignty despite the historical barriers created by current 
doctrines.
I have argued that recognition of equality of peoples is an appropriate methodology 
in judicial decision-making and in fact avoids the inconsistencies that emerge from 
reliance on doctrines whose assumptions remain unchallenged. At the same time, 
sovereignty, understood as a sphere of authority and autonomy, and the process of 
self-determination can find roots in the fundamental notion of equality of peoples, 
thus giving structure to self-determination claims.
The reasoning in the Mabo decision was based upon an approach that centred on the 
values of non-discrimination and equality before the law, rather than the unalterable 
compliance with historical precedent. 186 It reflects some acceptance by the judiciary 
of responsibility for the impact of past doctrines and is also an illustration of the 
scope within which the Court can operate, independently of the legislature.
The nature of the courts as a protector of rights against the exercise of power of the 
state, together with the flexibility of the common law and the role that the principle 
of equality plays in its development, ensure that the courts are a useful tool in the 
assertion of Indigenous self-determination. I have advocated a strategic use of 
doctrine and principle to overcome both the doctrinal barriers and the courts’ 
unwillingness to accept the inherent sovereignty of Indigenous peoples in Australia.
I argued that the use of doctrines cannot be rejected entirely because the courts rely 
on them in the development of the common law to identify traditions of the common 
law. In order to maintain the integrity of Indigenous peoples claims, I have
186 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2J (1992) 175 CLR 1, at p. 30, per Brennan J. Specifically, reaffirming 
the values of non-discrimination and equality before the law as ‘aspirations’ of the Australian legal 
system, to be upheld in the common law. Compare Hamilton, op. cit., p. 441, regarding the 
protection of the rights of particular classes of citizens.
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suggested a predominantly principled argument based on the equality of peoples. 
The doctrines, or more specifically, their shortcomings - their inconsistencies, their 
racist foundations and their historical barriers - challenge the legitimacy of a court 
that tries to rely upon them. Yet, the moments of possibility displayed in these 
doctrines illuminate the courts’ capacity to make the changes to the law that are 
sought by Indigenous peoples.
For this reason, while the principled argument builds upon assertions of inherent 
sovereignty to express more specific self-determination claims such as fishing rights 
or self-government rights, the doctrinal argument shows how these things emerge 
from what has already been recognised by the courts. The recognition of native title, 
for example, necessitates the recognition of rights to fish but also necessitates rights 
to govern the territory and jurisdiction over the rights exercised upon it.
Indigenous peoples’ inherent sovereignty and sovereign rights of government and 
jurisdiction exist regardless of recognition by the state. The spheres of autonomy 
and authority that determine the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the 
state will require negotiation as well as acts of mutual recognition. 187 However, there 
is a role for the courts in first recognition of jurisdiction and government rights, and 
in the recognition of the inherent equality of peoples as the basis for Indigenous 
rights. Success in the courts may result in recognition of Indigenous authority and 
autonomy and the recognition of Indigenous law creating an impetus for greater 
engagement.
187 See Tully, A fair and honourable relationship, op. cit., and the Canadian Royal Commission, op. 
cit., vol.l, pp. 677-91.
Conclusion
The self-determination of Indigenous peoples in Australia may seem a more distant 
and unattainable goal now, even in comparison with when I first began this project. 
Any willingness on the part of governments to recognise Indigenous peoples seems 
to have been lost. Despite this, Indigenous peoples continue to struggle for self- 
determination and recognition.
Arguing for an approach that utilises the most costly and time consuming institutions 
of government is a controversial strategy. Change through the courts can only be a 
slow and piecemeal process. The institutionalised biases seem to work against 
Indigenous claimants at every stage. However, the courts remain an integral part of 
the self-determination strategy of Indigenous peoples. Therefore, this thesis has 
examined the limitations and the advantages of the courts. Moreover, a greater 
understanding of the limits and possibilities of the courts can help to ameliorate the 
frustration of the clash of cultures in the courts. In short, the aim of this thesis has 
been to provide analysis of the utility of the courts for Indigenous peoples’ self- 
determination claims. Understanding the limitations of the courts is crucial for a 
realistic examination of the potential that lies in the courts.
In order to exploit the potential of the courts for principled and respectful 
consideration of self-determination claims, it is necessary to look to the area where 
the courts have the most freedom. This kind of consideration is most fully expressed 
in the common law. It is the common law response to self-determination claims, 
therefore, that has been the focus of this thesis. As important as exploring the
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potential of the common law is to identify why this potential has not been realised. 
There is more to the historical denial of Indigenous claims than incapacity or 
unwillingness, and more than just the way the claims have been presented. 
Indigenous peoples’ self-determination claims question the fundamental assumptions 
upon which the colonial state is structured. As such, they challenge the assumptions 
that non-Indigenous people hold about their place in the world.
Throughout the history of Australian colonisation Indigenous peoples have been 
patient with the non-Indigenous worldview but are, understandably, often bewildered 
by it. As a non-Indigenous person, part of the value of this project for me has been to 
identify the constraints on our ability to accept the injustice of our occupation. The 
more difficult challenge was to propose a way to reach beyond those barriers to a 
core of shared understanding based on equality and respect.
Self-determination is about Indigenous peoples having the ability to freely choose 
how they wish to structure their lives and control over decisions that affect them. 
Listening to Indigenous people expressing the injustices of the colonising system 
explains the concept of self-determination and the need for its recognition to secure 
Indigenous peoples’ very survival. Chapter one showed that Indigenous people place 
the daily experience of every Indigenous person - of unemployment, ill health, poor 
education and housing - in the context of Indigenous identity.
Just as Indigenous people experience the relationship of colonial oppression as an 
individual, so must each non-indigenous Australian accept their position of relative 
power and advantage in the relationship. Equality and respect between people 
through mutual recognition and accommodation are the paths away from colonialism. 
As many of the Indigenous voices in chapter one revealed, until the relationship 
between Indigenous peoples and the state is structured around equality and mutual 
respect, Indigenous peoples will challenge the legitimacy of the state.
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At a recent conference on Indigenous rights and political theory Michael Dodson 
drew an analogy between the High Court of Australia’s recognition of native title and 
Copernicus’ theory that the sun was in fact at the centre of the solar system, not the 
earth. Dodson observed that both were ridiculed for their ‘discovery’ or invention, 
but neither of them were changing reality. Rather, they had merely recognised the 
truth of what was already there. The analogy is apt and can be extended to 
assumptions of universalism that dominate political relations. Perhaps Western 
society is yet to realise that it is not at the centre of the universe. Chapter two 
showed that the theories of sovereignty and state building upon which our society 
and our institutions are based have, in their origin, an assumption of superiority and 
universality. International law reinforces the universalism of liberal democratic 
government and individual human rights in a way that gives primacy to the status 
quo. Sovereignty is linked to statehood in a way that obscures the injury in the past 
of many modern states. However, Indigenous peoples’ movements across the globe 
have brought to prominence the failure of modern states to secure the rights of 
Indigenous peoples and has given legitimacy to their claims. The international 
system is being forced to re-conceptualise their idea of the state as sole sovereign and 
the individual as the sole possessor of rights. Instead, they are moving to recognise 
the authority and autonomy and distinct identity of Indigenous peoples.
Where does this tie into the courts and the common law as a tool for the assertion of 
self-determination? Chapter three illustrated that the same political theory and 
assumptions of universalism influence the courts’ institutional structure. A cursory 
look at the perceived advantages of the courts shows an accessible forum, open to 
principled argument, where Indigenous peoples can have the opportunity to explain 
their truth and to assert their claims. Yet, success has been limited. One constraint is 
the institutional relationship between the courts and other institutions of the state that 
limit their capacity to depart from the will of the majority. The limitations are not 
insurmountable because the courts are not subordinate to other arms of government. 
They are capable of independent adjudication and have the capacity to recognise
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rights under the common law. The more difficult obstacle is in the culture of the 
courts’ reticence to acknowledge that they are, indeed, a cultural institution. Aspects 
of the court process and judicial reasoning that appear on the surface to be 
accommodating and receptive are heavily laden with cultural bias. Just one example 
is the giving of testimony which many intuitively perceive as being suited to oral 
tradition but can, in fact, be quite exclusive of Indigenous peoples truth and law- 
ways.
Assumptions of universalism permeate through to the common law decisions 
themselves. Chapter four traced the history of exclusion, which began with the 
theories of superiority from political and international law theory. These theories 
were ‘domesticated’ in the common law of Australia as tests of social organisation. 
Recognition of non-European systems of law and governance was precluded. Theory 
became doctrine, and as such became a matter of law. By the time the Yirrkala 
people brought their claim before the Northern Territory Supreme Court in 1971 the 
facts of Indigenous law, land rights or authority were considered irrelevant to the 
inquiry. The idea that Australia was acquired by peaceful settlement of terra nullius 
meant that Indigenous people in this country were not recognised as law makers nor 
as owners and custodians of their lands.
Mabo ’s case changed the way the courts approach Indigenous peoples’ claims. The 
High Court recognised that Indigenous peoples law relating to land continued with 
the protection of the common law unless abrogated by the legislature or executive. 
The theory of settlement was adjusted to acknowledge Indigenous peoples’ prior and 
continuing ownership subject to the power of the colonial state. This decision 
brought the Australian common law more into line with the law in other jurisdictions 
such as Canada, the United States and New Zealand although many of the limiting 
assumptions remain. The assumption of the superiority and universality of the 
colonial law was reinforced in Walker v Queensland and the conflation of 
sovereignty with statehood was reasserted in Isabel Coe and in Walker. As a result
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the recognition of Indigenous peoples self-determination has been limited to rights 
over land.
The limiting assumptions identified in the emerging doctrine of native title are not 
fully theorised by the courts. Nor have Indigenous peoples had the opportunity to 
fully argue against the inconsistencies and false assumptions of hierarchy and 
homogeneity implicit in existing doctrine. However, if these doctrinal barriers are to 
be overcome, the argument must take into consideration the nature of judicial 
reasoning. I argued in chapter five that the court must be lead from familiar concepts 
and, by analogy and logical reasoning arrive at the evident and just recognition of 
Indigenous peoples autonomy and authority. It may seem to some that the courts 
should respond more easily to the claims of Indigenous peoples. However, I have 
argued that the assumptions that judges are being asked to question go to the heart of 
their worldview.
When I first began this project and I explained that my thesis was going to examine 
Indigenous sovereignty, the eminent Australian constitutional scholar, Leslie Zines, 
immediately warned that talk of sovereignty raises fears of separate statehood, and 
that to argue sovereignty in the courts would ‘scare the horses’ so to speak. This 
concern was proved true in the Isabel Coe and Walker cases. Self-determination 
claims that seek recognition of the authority and jurisdiction of Indigenous peoples 
cannot be confrontational if they are to succeed. Rather, arguments must be 
developed which draw upon the recognition of equality and respect for Indigenous 
peoples in Mabo’s case and which have resonance in other recent cases. The 
equality of peoples has similar implications for a full recognition of Indigenous self- 
determination claims and unpacks the baggage surrounding the concept of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty is instead built up from its foundations in a way that is 
inclusive of Indigenous claims but mindful that the legitimacy of the state cannot be 
expressly undermined by the courts.
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Throughout the thesis I have tried to show that the courts are an imperfect ally in the 
struggle of Indigenous peoples for self-determination. Yet there is potential to 
further the goals of self-determination through common law recognition of 
Indigenous rights. Regardless of the limitations of Mabo’s case, it has probably 
cemented the role of the courts in Indigenous peoples’ self-determination strategies. 
The recognition of the rights of Indigenous peoples to own and make laws for their 
land was a pivotal moment in Indigenous-non-Indigenous relations in Australia 
because it was an expression of equality and respect. Mabo ’s case also shows the 
potential of the common law to transform itself, to reject discriminatory doctrines 
and renew the law. It is possible for this renewal to continue and for Indigenous 
peoples to enjoy equal respect for all of their laws, for their legitimate spheres of 
autonomy and authority and to be recognised as equal and first peoples of this land.
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